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Abstract 
This thesis explores the role the Federal Republic of Germany played in the 
transformation of the Western international economic system between 1972 and 
1976. It has two main aims: first, it examines Bonn's activities in the shaping of 
the Western response to the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, 
the first oil crisis 1973174 and the 1975 world recession; and second, it studies 
the effect of these actions on West Germany's political position in the Western 
alliance. As will be shown, Bonn was able to have a significant impact via four 
means: an ability to manage its economic and political goals; clever use of its 
economic strength; the adoption of a mediating role among its Western allies, 
above all the United States and France; and the strong political leadership of 
Helmut Schmidt (as finance minister, then chancellor). As a final consequence, 
the Federal Republic through a combination of its actions, the waning of 
American, French and British economic and political power, the transformation 
of the institutional setting and the advancement of economic issues to the fore 
of political debates achieved the permanent enhancement of its political status 
within the Western alliance. 
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Introduction 
In the early 1970s, the Western alliance was in the midst of a transition. 1 
The two pillars of the alliance, the military security dimension on the one hand 
and the economic dimension on the other, were fundamentally changing. With 
the introduction of detente, the tensions between East and West eased and 
security related issues became less acute. In the improved relations, West 
Germany's Ostpolitik was essential. At the same time, however, the economic 
pillar came under tremendous strain when the West was struck with three 
economic crises between 1972 and 1976. Troubles in the international monetary 
system had been progressively mounting through the 1960s as a result of the 
gold problem, the growth of the Euromarkets and increasingly large balance of 
payments disequilibria. Western leaders attempted to mend these problems first 
through the creation of the Standard Drawing Rights (SDRs) and the first 
amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 1968. A second try came a few years later with the completion of the 
Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971 and the start of an overhaul of the 
international monetary system through the Committee of Twenty (C-20) in 
September 1972. Their efforts though did not suffice. 
Instead, only fifteen months after the signing of the Smithsonian 
Agreement, the Bretton Woods international monetary system collapsed in 
March 1973. Before the C-20 could reach an agreement on reform of the 
international monetary order, a second crisis struck the West in autumn 1973. 
Angered by the pricing policies of the multinational oil companies and even 
more so by Western actions during the October War, Arab oil producers 
embargoed oil supplies to the United States and the Netherlands and the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled the price of 
oil within a three month period, unleashing the oil crisis. By 1975, the 
economic fallout of the oil crisis coupled with the inflationary policies of 
several Western states in the early 1970s and the continued uncertainty 
1 The Western alliance in this thesis is understood to mean the United States, Western Europe-
both those states in the European Community (EC) and those outside the EC but aligned with 
the West - Japan, Canada and Australia. 
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surrounding the monetary system as well as oil and raw material pnces 
combined to create the worst global recession since the Great Depression with 
macroeconomic conditions never before experienced. Economic conditions 
deteriorated to such a degree that many Western leaders began to fear social and 
political unrest. Yet, in the midst of this economic chaos, the West slowly came 
together. In the final months of 1975, Western leaders took steps to reverse the 
downward spiral of the world economy, established new international economic 
fora, adopted new approaches to influencing oil prices and to relations with the 
oil producers and completed international monetary reform. By spring 1976, 
through their efforts not only had the industrialized states overcome the 
economic crises, but also the international economic system of the West had 
been re-shaped. 
As the economic crises began to unfold, West Germany was in a unique 
position to play a crucial role in altering the international economic system. 
Bonn possessed the greatest economic strength in Europe. It rested on large 
balance of payments and trade surpluses, low inflation and unemployment rates, 
steady growth and the Federal Republic's leading trading nation status 
alongside America. Although the United States remained the Western economic 
hegemon, in the early 1970s the American economy was in decline, as balance 
of payments and trade deficits, rising inflation and slowing growth began to 
undermine its economic power. Increasingly America's economic and political 
authority was under question as a result of President Richard Nixon's economic 
policies. Moreover, given the scale and nature of the crises coupled with the 
interdependence of the Western economies by the 1970s, Bonn perhaps more so 
than any other Western state had motivation to act: highly dependent on the 
international economy for its abovementioned export-driven economic strength 
and the Western alliance for its political and security shield, the Federal 
Republic had much to lose from the economic turmoil and potential political 
upheaval. Yet West Germany also had much to gain from a changed economic 
dimension, not least greater political power within the Western alliance. For 
such a power shift to occur, however, Bonn had to be politically, and not just 
economically, savvy. Looking at this period of transformation, this thesis aims 
to answer two questions: first, what role did the Federal Republic of Germany 
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play in shaping a Western response to these three crises and hence the re-
shaping of the international economic system of the West; and second, to what 
extent did West Germany's actions affect its political position in the Western 
alliance? 
Many works have been written on these economic crises, but few have 
done so from a historical political economic point of view as well as with the 
use of government documents and none have aimed to answer the two 
abovementioned questions. Providing insight into the West German perspective 
on and actions during these three crises are memoirs by Otmar Emminger and 
Helmut Schmidt.2 Emminger's main focus is monetary events, both of a 
domestic and international nature, but he also comments on the oil crisis and the 
1975 recession, albeit with greater focus on the effects these crises had on the 
West German economy. Overall though, Emminger's viewpoint is primarily 
economic with his limited commentary on political events tending to focus on 
inter-governmental disputes rather than the international political dimension. In 
comparison, Schmidt's work offers fewer specifics about the unfolding of 
events and very little economic analysis; however, it does give insight into the 
role political relationships and international politics played in the outcome of 
the Western response to these crises. Also helping to reveal West Germany's 
influence during these crises are Henry Kissinger's memoirs. 3 In each, 
Kissinger gives an American view of the economic events and reveals his 
feelings toward Western officials and the actions undertaken with them. Yet, 
most memoirs when compared with documents and accounts of other officials 
present at the time tend to distort the details of the proceedings either through 
national bias or inaccurate recounting. Emminger, Schmidt and especially 
Kissinger are no exception to this. 
In key works by political scientists, the economic crises of the early 
1970s are generally analyzed separately from one another with an emphasis on 
2 Otmar Emminger, D-Mark, Dollar, Wiihrungskrisen: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen 
Bundesbankpriisidenten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986); Helmut Schmidt, Men and 
Powers: a Political Retrospective, trans. Ruth Heim (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987). 
3 Henry Kissinger, Years 0/ Upheaval (London: Phoenix Press, 2000); Henry Kissinger, Years 
o/Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). 
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the systemic change caused by them or In an effort to prove a theory of 
international relations. Falling into the former category are the publications by 
Kenneth W. Dam, John Williamson, Robert Solomon and Tom de Vries.4 Each 
of these writings deals exclusively with the collapse of Bretton Woods and the 
attempts at international monetary reform first in the C-20 and then the Interim 
Committee, by and large passing over the two other crises taking place 
simultaneously. In addition, these writings concentrate predominately on the 
role of the United States, the C-20 Bureau or the IMF with West Germany 
being grouped together with its EC partners. Moreover, of all the authors, only 
de Vries closely looks at the politics behind many of the decisions made during 
the reform efforts, highlighting the Group of Five's (G-5) influence on 
monetary negotiations. That said, de Vries like Dam, Williamson and Solomon 
is above all interested in systemic change, seeking to understand the reasons for 
the collapse of Bretton Woods, the failure of the C-20 and the prospects of 
success for the "non-system" of monetary relations created in 1976. 
Included in the latter group are works by Johannes von Karczewski as 
well as Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne.s Both look at the establishment of 
the world economic summits in the 1970s, with the former highlighting 
Schmidt's role in them. Their overall goals, however, are theoretical, not 
historical: von Karczewski aims to understand the significance of the world 
economic summits in international politics and to determine if they can be 
viewed as a new form of collective leadership; Putnam and Bayne are interested 
in the management of a politically and economically interdependent world. 
Other key works by political scientists tend to look at the economic crises of the 
4 Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the International 
Monetary System (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982); John Williamson, The 
Failure of World Monetary Reform, 1971-1974 (New York: New York University Press, 1977); 
Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1954-1976 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1977); Tom de Vries, "Jamaica, or the non-Reform of the International Monetary System," 
Foreign Affairs 54, no. 3, (1976): 577-605. 
S Johannes von Karczewski, "Weltwirtschaft ist unser Schicksal:" Helmut Schmidt und die 
SchafJung der Weltwirtschaft (Bonn: Dietz, 2008); Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, 
Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (London: Heinemann, 1984). Also interested in 
theories of interdependence is Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and 
Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). 
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1970s in order to prove theories of economic hegemony. 6 In such works, the 
Federal Republic's position throughout these economic events is included in the 
discussion, but it is not closely analyzed. While these theoretical studies can 
provide relevant detail on the events under consideration, neither they nor the 
works on systemic change, adequately address the questions of this thesis. 
Still, political scientists are clearly aware of West Germany's increasing 
economic strength and the opportunities available for a larger political role 
within the Western alliance during the 1970s. An example of this is Wilfrid 
Kohl and Giorgio Basevi's edited work, West Germany: a European and 
Global Power. 7 Looking at individual aspects of West German economy, such 
as trade performance and stability policy, or its political relationships with its 
Western allies in each article, the book aims to better understand the dynamic 
between West German economic and political power. Yet, while many of the 
articles discuss the Federal Republic's outstanding economic performance and 
highlight signs of increasing political strength through the 1970s, the focus is 
on the latter half of that decade and the main aim overall is to theorize how the 
Federal Republic could continue to maintain or even grow its economic and 
political power. 
Many of these flaws recur in contemporary histories of the events of the 
era. Harold James's monumental book International Monetary Cooperation 
since Bretton Woods is an example ofthis.8 In it, James covers the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods monetary system, international monetary reform efforts in 
the C-20 and Interim Committee, the oil crisis, the 1975 recession and the 
Rambouillet Summit, considering both the economic and political factors 
contributing to each. In his analysis of monetary events though, James takes a 
similar approach to Dam, Williamson, Solomon and de Vries: although James 
does discuss West German involvement in them, his focus is primarily on 
6 Examples are David CaIleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982); Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money: the Role of Hegemony and 
International Monetary Order (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
7 Wilfrid L. Kohl and Giorgio Basevi eds., West Germany: a European and Global Power 
(Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980). 
8 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1996). 
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America's role. In addition, lames's depiction of the C-20 discussions makes it 
seem as though the EC were a united block against the United States. 
Moreover, while James discusses the creation of the G-5, he fails to show the 
crucial role the G-5 discussions had in influencing the results of the monetary 
reform talks. 
With regard to the oil crisis, lames's analysis of the struggle between 
international institutions and the markets in recycling oil surpluses and 
financing oil deficits is substantial. But he offers relatively few words on other 
key factors in the West's attempt to overcome the oil crisis like consumer-
producer relations. On the 1975 recession and the Rambouillet Summit, James 
only gives a short summary. He slightly makes up for this in the German 
translation of this book.9 In a special introduction to it, James provides greater 
detail and analysis on the creation, purposes and outcomes of the first world 
economic summit. Yet because it is a translation, the overall objective of this 
book remains very much the same as that of International Monetary 
Cooperation since Bretton Woods: namely, to look at the change in the 
character of monetary relations since the Second World War. Thus in both 
books, like many works of political science, James is primarily interested in 
systemic change, albeit from a historical viewpoint. 
In broader historical works on the Federal Republic, the three economic 
crises are often mentioned, but are frequently analyzed with the intention of 
understanding their impact on domestic developments - political, societal or 
cultural - within West Germany. Moreover, because of the breadth of the 
period covered, the questions of this thesis are only addressed in a cursory 
manner, if at all. 10 Economic histories of the Federal Republic and those on 
West German foreign policy covering the period 1972-1976 do little more to 
answer the questions posed in this thesis. A major shortcoming of most works 
belonging to the former category is their overwhelming focus on economic 
9 Harold James, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975: Die Globa/isierung der WirtschaJt, trans. 
Hermann Graml (Munchen: DIV, 1997). 
10 Examples are Manfred Gortemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: von 
Griindung bis zur Gegenwart (Milnchen: Beck, 1999); Dietrich Thriinhardt, Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996); Andreas ROdder, Die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1969-1990 (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004). 
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trends and technical analysis. I I Thus, rarely do their analyses include an 
examination of the international politics behind the economic and monetary 
policies so heavily influencing inflation, unemployment and growth 
developments. In the latter category, a large portion of the literature is devoted 
to security issues. In those works which address the economic crises, they are 
generally covered in two ways: either monetary events are emphasized or the 
analyses of these crises are brief and conducted as part of one long continuum 
of economic upheaval throughout the 1970s or beyond. 12 The problem with the 
first approach is evident: a full picture of West German foreign policy on 
economic issues cannot be given without including the other crucial economic 
crises outside the monetary realm. The second approach poses a problem to 
understanding the intricacies of West German participation in the economic 
events of the early 1970s and makes the outcomes of the later 1970s, such as 
the European Monetary System (EMS) and the division between the United 
States and West Germany (which more often than not receive the greatest 
attention), appear self-evident. 
More recent historical works based on historical documents and 
focusing on West German foreign policy during the 1970s tend to center on 
military-security issues and Ostpolitik. Over the last several years, numerous 
publications have appeared on these issues.13 In literature on West German 
foreign policy where economic issues are considered, the focus is frequently on 
llExamples are Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
1945-1980 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983); Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paque, 
and Holger Schmieding, The Fading Miracle: Four Decades of Market Economy in Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Jeremy Leaman, The Political Economy of 
West Germany, 1945-1985 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987). 
12 Hanrieder is an example of the former approach and Haftendorn and Hacke are examples of 
the latter approach. Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German 
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Helga Haftendorn, Coming of Age: 
West German Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2006); Christian Hacke, Die AuJ3enpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: von Konrad 
Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroder (Miinchen: Ullstein Verlag, 2003). 
13 Examples are Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer, eds., Ostpolitik, 1969-1974: European and 
Global Responses (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Gottfried Niedhart, 
"Revisionistische Elemente und die Initiierung friedlichen Wandels in der neuen Ostpolitik 
1967-1974," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28, no. 2 (2002): 233-66; Wilfried Loth, Overcoming 
the Cold War: A History of Detente, 1950-1991 (New York: Palgrave, 2001); as well as several 
articles in Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwarz, eds., The Strained Alliance: U.s.-
European Relations from Nixon to Carter, (Washington DC: Publications of the German 
Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2010) (hereafter The Strained Alliance). 
13 
the Federal Republic's involvement in European integration process and 
monetary issues. 14 Looking specifically at West Germany's role in the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods monetary system are William Glenn Gray and Hubert 
Zimmermann. IS In his article, Gray rightly takes issue with much of the 
published literature for its overwhelming focus on the United States in this 
economic crisis. 16 Pointing to West German domestic conflicts as well as 
Brandt's shift in policies and diplomacy, Gray contends that alongside the 
weakness of the US dollar, the Federal Republic's decisions to float the D-Mark 
in 1969, 1971 and 1973 had an important impact on the manner in which 
Bretton Woods broke down. Yet, Gray does not consider the political 
implications of the Federal Republic's actions for the Western alliance and 
specific conclusions reached by Gray about Bonn's role in the final fifteen 
months of the Bretton Woods system are shown in thIs thesis to be inaccurate. 
Zimmermann improves upon Gray slightly, addressing the political impact in 
his article, but Zimmermann's analysis is less focused on West Germany's part 
in the collapse of Bretton Woods and more on the emergence of a European 
monetary cooperation. Moreover, it is almost entirely based on the 1965-1971 
timeframe, only briefly highlighting events thereafter. 
Hartmut Soell's recent political biography of Helmut Schmidt breaks 
the usual patterns. 17 Using Schmidt's personal papers as well as other West 
German governmental documents, Soell writes the story of Schmidt's years in 
14 Examples are Andreas Wilkens, ed., Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg: Willy Brandt und die 
europiiische Einigung (Bonn: Dietz, 2010); William G. Gray, "Towards a 'Community of 
Stability'? The Deutsche Mark between European and Atlantic Priorities, 1968-1973," in The 
Strained Alliance, 145-168; Hans Tietmeyer, Herausforderung Euro: Wie es zum Euro kam und 
was er for Deutschlands ZukunJt bedeutet (Munchen: Hanser, 2005). 
IS William Glenn Gray, "Floating the System: Germany, the United States and the Breakdown 
of Bretton Woods, 1969-1973," Diplomatic History 31 no. 2, (2007): 295-323; Hubert 
Zimmermann, "Unraveling the Ties That Really Bind: The Dissolution of the Transatlantic 
Monetary Order and European Monetary Cooperation, 1965-1973," in The Strained Alliance, 
125-144. 
16 Examples are Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy 
(New York: The Free Press, 1997); Allen 1. Matusow, Nixon's Economy: Booms, Busts, 
Dollars and Votes (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Paul Volcker and 
Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World's Money and the Threat to American 
Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992); Daniel Sargent, "From Internationalism to 
Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of International Politics in the 1970s," 
(PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2009). 
17 Hartmut Soell, Helmut Schmidt 1969 bis heute: Macht und Verantwortung (Munchen: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008). 
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federal office, beginning with his position as minister of defense through his 
chancellorship. Soell addresses the three economic crises in his work, but does 
so selectively, highlighting those aspects of the crises in which Schmidt's role 
was more pronounced and discussing the crises at their peaks, but skipping over 
Schmidt's efforts in between. Moreover, because it is a political biography, 
Soell hardly discusses factors beyond Schmidt himself which contributed to the 
Federal Republic's influence on the Western response to these crises and only 
inconsistently analyzes the effect Schmidt's actions had in the international 
context. As a result, the conclusions Soell reaches about the economic events 
are limited by the nature of the work. 
Like those on West Germany, the histories of the Western alliance 
generally cover the economic crises of the early 1970s, but the emphasis in 
most lies much more on the political debates around the Year of Europe and 
after the outbreak of the oil crisis. While the political debates are important to 
understanding the difficulties the West encountered in reaching a common 
response, it alone hardly suffices as a full explanation for the reactions of 
various Western states to these crises. 18 Because of European integration efforts 
throughout the 1970s, a second pattern in publications on the Western alliance 
is to look at developments during this period as struggles between the United 
States and the European Community.19 There is merit to this method when 
taking a longer term view, but when investigating the economic events of this 
time period, it has severe shortcomings. First, it tends to result in an 
overemphasis on the aspects in which a clear line can be drawn between the 
United States and the EC, such as on the Year of Europe and the initial response 
to the outbreak of the oil crisis. Second and more importantly, attempts at closer 
European integration by no means equated to a unified European position in 
response to any of these crises. Indeed, by 1974 at the latest, negotiations 
18 Examples are William C. Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar: the Strained 
Alliance (London: Macmillan, 1992); Derek W. Urwin, Western Europe since 1945: a Political 
History, 4th ed. (London: Longman, 1989); Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-
American Relations since 1945 trans. Michael Shaw (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1980). 
19 Prime examples are Geir Lundestad, Empire by Integration (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Klaus Larres, "The United States and European Integration, 1945-1990," in A 
Companion to Europe since 1945, ed., Klaus Larres, (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-
Blackwell,2009),151-181. 
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surrounding these crises were conducted bilaterally or among the G-5 countries. 
Thus, by employing such an approach to this critical stage of economic 
restructuring, the story of the development of the Western alliance becomes 
skewed. A final trend in literature on the Western alliance is a strong focus on 
Henry Kissinger. While this is understandable given America's superpower 
status and the key role that Kissinger played in American diplomacy during the 
period under study, surprisingly few of these works look at Kissinger's impact 
on these three economic crises. The one receiving the most attention is the oil 
crisis and there the focus tends to be on Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, his 
dismay with the position adopted by several of America's European partners 
and his actions at the Washington Energy Conference.2o 
Authors of more recent historical works on the Western alliance alter 
the established patterns only slightly.21 Challenging them the most is Fiona 
Venn. 22 Focusing overwhelmingly on the West's actions after the first price 
hike and the onset of the oil embargo, Venn gives an overview of how national 
economic self-interest and allegiance to political initiatives associated with the 
transatlantic relationship and the European integration undermined Western 
cooperation in an interdependent economy which required such cooperation. 
Her analysis, however, focuses less on the Federal Republic and more on 
America, Britain and France. Bucking the trends less, but still contributing to 
the debate is Daniel Mockli.23 In his book, Mockli thoroughly examines the 
West's reaction to the oil crisis from the outbreak of the crisis in October 1973 
20 Examples are Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American 
Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the 
American Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Robert 
Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (London: Allen Lane, 2007). 
21 Examples are Claudia Hiepel, "Kissinger's Year of Europe - A Challenge for the EC and the 
Franco-German Relationship," in Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's 
Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975, ed., Jan van der Harst, (Brussels: 
Bruylant, 2007), 277-296; Alistair Horne, Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year (New York, Simon 
& Schuster, 2009); Niklas Rossbach, Heath. Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: 
Britain, the US and the EC, 1969-1974 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Mario Del 
Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); and several articles in The Strained Alliance. 
22 Fiona Venn, "International Co-operation versus National Self-Interest: the United States and 
Europe during the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis," in The United States and the European Alliance since 
1945, eds. Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 71-100. 
23Daniel Mockli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and 
the Dream of Political Unity (London: I.E. Taurus & Co Ltd, 2009). 
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through March 1974. Yet, the chief aim of his study is to show how Europe's 
attempts at a common foreign policy in response to the oil crisis either 
advanced or hindered its goals of European Political Cooperation (EPC). With 
this intention, Mockli focuses on the political aspects of the negotiations and 
underplays such key economic factors as bilateral deals and views the actions of 
the Washington Energy Conference less as a step towards a Western response 
and more as the beginning of the end of EPC. Moreover, because of his aim, 
Mockli stops his analysis of the response to the oil crisis when EPC begins to 
fade rather than following it through to the Martinique Agreement. 
By taking a different perspective and approach to research and 
organization, this thesis aims to contribute significantly to the existing literature 
of both West German history as well as that of the Western alliance. It aims 
also to bridge the gap between economic and political histories of the period, by 
writing history from an international political economic viewpoint; thus, 
economic as well as political factors are analyzed alongside one another. This 
thesis focuses on the Federal Republic's interaction with the United States, 
France and Great Britain as the West attempted to craft a response to each crisis 
and reshape the international economic system of the West. European 
Community initiatives are only discussed when necessary, for as this thesis will 
illustrate much of the work done to overcome these crises was undertaken 
outside the EC framework. Broader conclusions about the political position of 
the Federal Republic in the Western alliance are then drawn from close analysis 
of the Federal Republic's actions during these crises. Future developments such 
as EMS and the fissures between West Germany and the United States in the 
late 1970s are briefly considered. The main focus, however, remains on the 
economic events of the early 1970s, as only through understanding them, can it 
become clear how the latter events came to be. 
Second, unlike many works on West German foreign policy or the 
Western alliance, this thesis uses archival resources, interviews and other 
primary documents to support its claims. Research conducted at the following 
archives and documents from them support the claims made in the thesis: das 
Historische Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank, Bundesarchiv der 
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Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Koblenz, Germany, the Helmut Schmidt 
Archive in Bonn, Germany, the Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amts, the 
National Archives of the United Kingdom, the United States National Archives 
and Record of Administration, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and the 
International Monetary Fund. Using international, multi-archival resources 
allowed for a fuller picture of the sentiments of the Federal Republic, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France towards each crisis as well as 
each of the other players' perspectives on West German actions. Although 
French archival resources are not featured, the French position in many of these 
debates could be garnered by comparing various archival findings as well as by 
using secondary literature. This approach also allowed access to the minutes 
and discussions of various meetings of the G-5, C-20 and other international 
organizations inaccessible through the German archival system. 
In addition to archival sources, interviews with the former Bundesbank 
presidents Karl Otto Pohl and Hans Tietmeyer also contributed to the findings 
of the thesis. Both held key positions in the federal government during the early 
1970s and were able to provide insight into the Federal Republic's thinking 
during the economic crises. Lastly, primary documents published in the Akten 
zur Auswiirtigen PoUtik der BundesrepubUk Deutschland, volumes covering 
1972 through 1976, as well as those appearing in Foreign Relations of the 
United States, volumes covering 1972 through 1976, also added to the positions 
taken in this thesis. 
Finally, the organization of this thesis also separates it from the 
secondary literature available. Rather than look at each economic crisis 
individually, the three economic crises are arranged here chronologically. This 
structure serves to better illustrate how one crisis affected the other and hence 
the possibilities for action open to Western leaders in regard to each crisis. The 
first chapter looks at the fifteen months between the creation of the Smithsonian 
Agreement in December 1971 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary 
system in March 1973. It begins by examining the first six months of 1972, 
concentrating initially on the Federal Republic's participation in the EC's move 
to the European Currency Snake in April 1972. It then investigates the events of 
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summer 1972, starting with West Germany's response to the floating of the 
British pound in July 1972 and ending with the calming of currency markets 
through the American intervention actions of late July 1972. This section also 
highlights the controversy surrounding Schiller's resignation from his post as 
dual economics and finance minister and Helmut Schmidt's assumption of this 
role as well as explaining why the Federal Republic decided against floating. 
Next the chapter focuses on the currency crisis in February 1973. It shows that 
Bonn was not against floating at this juncture and only reluctantly accepted the 
Volcker plan. The last section in the chapter covers the currency crisis of March 
1973 and the final collapse of Bretton Woods. It offers new insight into West 
Germany's role in the international process that led to the creation of a 
European group float, a move which allowed the Federal Republic to emerge 
from this crisis in a position of economic and political strength. 
The second chapter deals with efforts to reform the international 
monetary system through the C-20 between spring 1972 and January 1974. The 
chapter starts by giving a brief history of the events leading to the decision for 
monetary reform and the creation of the C-20 as the forum for the negotiations. 
Next, it looks at the European and American processes to define their respective 
positions for the talks. This section shows how the Federal Republic's aims 
were not entirely in line with those of several of its EC partners. The chapter 
then covers the period between when the reform talks began in September 1972 
and when the first outline of reform was put forward in September 1973. This 
part investigates the troubles encountered during the reform process, in 
particular the disagreements between the United States and the EC and the 
discord among the European states, highlighting West Germany's role in these 
debates. Finally, this chapter focuses on the collapse of the C-20 efforts 
between September 1973 and June 1974. It shows how the oil crisis combined 
with the creation of the G-5 and growing weariness with the C-20, particularly 
on the part ofthe Federal Republic, undermined the work of the C-20. 
The third chapter examines the oil crisis and the process undertaken to 
find a common Western response to it between October 1973 and December 
1974. It first looks at the causes of the oil crisis and investigates the dual path 
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taken by the Federal Republic within the EC to achieve a common European 
political and economic response to the oil crisis. In this section, the divide 
within the West Gennan government on how best to handle this crisis as well as 
the increasingly strained relationship between Europe and the United States are 
addressed. Next, the chapter focuses on the period between January 1974 and 
April 1974. It shows how the West took the fIrst steps toward a common 
response to the crisis at the Washington Energy Conference, highlighting how a 
shift in West Gennan policy and strong leadership from Bonn contributed 
greatly to the outcome of this conference. Lastly, the chapter looks at how the 
West built on the progress made at the Washington Energy Conference through 
the remainder of 1974, culminating in the Martinique Agreement in December 
1974. 
In the fourth chapter, the intertwining relationship between the 
economic crises begins to be examined, as this chapter looks at the ongoing 
process to shape a response to the fIrst two crises during the fIrst half of 1975. It 
concentrates fIrst on the West's implementation of the Martinique Agreement, 
the failed preparatory meeting for the consumer-producer conference in April 
1974 and the fallout from it, highlighting the Federal Republic's actions in 
each. Second, this chapter investigates Bonn's role in the renewed efforts to 
reform the monetary system through the IMP Interim Committee, looking 
specifIcally at the debates around IMF quotas, gold and the exchange rate 
regime. 
The fIfth chapter begins by introducing the third crisis, the 1975 
recession, considering its causes and the problems of using conventional 
methods and theories to combat it. It then focuses on three essential 
components of the Federal Republic's approach to the recession, namely the 
hannonization of economic policies among EC member states, the creation and 
development of the Rambouillet Summit and fInally economic cooperation with 
the United States. Next, this chapter considers the efforts within the Western 
alliance to reach an accord on the outstanding issues of monetary reform, in 
particular questions of gold and the exchange rate regime, looking specifically 
at West German contributions to this process. Finally, it examines how through 
20 
a combination of American, West German and French appeals, the West 
avoided another oil price hike and cartelization of raw materials and revived the 
consumer-producer dialogue by establishing the Conference for International 
Economic Cooperation (CIEC). 
The sixth and final chapter looks at the three economic summits which 
represent and in many ways bring a close to the three economic crises. It first 
focuses on the negotiations at the Rambouillet Summit, showing that the G-5 
heads of state and government gathering not only served to revive confidence, 
but also helped the West to reach a consensus on monetary and trade issues as 
well as a strategy on energy, raw materials and relations with the oil producers 
and non-oil LDCs. This chapter then turns to the CIEC and Bonn's efforts to 
ensure complete consumer solidarity at it. Finally, this chapter considers the 
outcome of the IMF Interim Committee meeting in Jamaica 1976. Overall this 
chapter demonstrates how through these conferences, the West, with significant 
contributions from the Federal Republic, took the steps necessary not only to 
overcome the three economic crises, but also to re-shape the international 
economic system. 
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Chapter 1 
The Breakdown of Bretton Woods 
January 1972-March 1973 
"Hell, we're out o/the Woods, but we're in the damn slum . ... It's a swamp, now. ,,} 
Richard Nixon 
3 March 1973 
-Introduction-
There was hope among Western leaders that with the adoption of the 
Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971 the monetary difficulties that had 
plagued the West during the previous years were finally beginning to be 
resolved. Indeed, U.S. President Richard Nixon called the agreement "the most 
significant monetary agreement in the history of the world.,,2 Although the 
dollar still remained inconvertible and thus one of the two main pillars of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system defective, Western leaders clearly expected 
that the realignment of parities under the Smithsonian Agreement would 
quieten the markets thereby allowing Western governments the time to 
undertake more thorough reform of the international monetary system. Through 
the first half of 1972, some progress on these aims was made, as the European 
Community (EC) re-Iaunched its plan for European economic and monetary 
union (EMU) by establishing the European currency snake. But speculative 
flows undermined these efforts in June 1972, forcing the pound out of the snake 
and into a float and threatening to do the same to the D-mark. Calm only 
returned to the markets once the United States began to intervene in July 1972. 
The quiet persisted through the remainder of the summer and autumn 1972, 
allowing EC member states to advance on their integration efforts and the West 
to begin international monetary reform through the Committee of Twenty (C-
20). Yet by January 1973, a new round of speculation began. Through hasty 
arrangements, Western leaders managed to curb speculation and maintain the 
fixed parities system in February 1973. By early March 1973 though, massive 
speculative flows started agai~. At this point, European governments undertook 
t Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976 XXXI: Foreign Economic Policy. 1973-
1976 (hereafter FRUS XXXI), 59. http://historv.state.gov.gate2.library.lse.ac.uk! (accessed 
January 2011). 
2 Harold James. International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1996), 238. 
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a group float against the dollar. With this act, the other central component to the 
Bretton Woods monetary system - the fixed exchange rate regime - crumbled 
and with it Bretton Woods collapsed, ushering in a floating regime. 
Given the United States' unique position atop the Bretton Woods 
system, American behavior was most certainly central to the unfolding of 
events. Yet, because of the systemic nature of monetary relations, American 
actions alone could not have brought about the downfall of Bretton Woods. 
Rather, in the collapse of the monetary system, the conduct of Europe as a 
whole was important. And still, as the largest target of massive speculative 
waves, the strongest European economy and the linchpin in European efforts 
toward monetary and economic integration, the Federal Republic's response to 
the deteriorating economic circumstances heavily influenced the outcome of the 
crisis. Focusing on the final fifteen months of Bretton Woods, as the 
international monetary system went from "the Woods" through "the swamp" 
and into a float, and concentrating above all on the role of West Germany, this 
chapter explores the connections between the collapse of Bretton Woods and 
changes in political relationships in the Western alliance. It looks specifically to 
answer the questions: What drove West German authorities to adopt the 
policies they did? What impact did these policies and the actions of West 
German leaders have on the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system? 
And, to what extent did the Federal Republic's position in the Western alliance 
change as a result of its actions during this crisis? 
-January 1972-July 1972: Early Signs of Trouble-
Despite Nixon's declaration, it did not appear as though the United 
States was overly committed to the Smithsonian realignment's success. Only in 
February 1972 did his administration send Congress the required legislation for 
a change in the price of gold. 3 The process of setting up the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to intervene in the exchange rate markets to maintain the 
newly established parities was equally difficult. In addition, Washington 
3 Hans-Peter Schwarz et al., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen PoUtik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1972, vol. 1, (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003) (hereafter AAPD 197211), 
127-8. 
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refused calls by its European allies to reintroduce the convertibility of dollars to 
gold.4 Rather than shifting its policies to help ensure the Smithsonian 
Agreement's success, America continued its policy of "benign neglect" - that is 
Washington would more or less ignore the problems of the dollar and its 
balance of payments position and instead focus on domestic economic 
problems. 5 Through early 1972, the Nixon administration maintained its 
expansionary course and refused to intervene on behalf of the dollar. 6 
Although American support for the new parities was for the most part 
absent, speculation remained at bay through the first half of the year. For the 
Federal Republic and European integration efforts, this calm was opportune. 
Since becoming chancellor in 1969, Willy Brandt had attempted to pursue 
closer European integration as a counterbalance to Bonn's new approach to the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc - a Westpolitik to the Ostpolitik.' Yet, 
almost from the beginning the economic aspects of this plan encountered 
problems, as Paris adopted opposing views to Bonn's. 8 Finally, on 22 March 
1971, the European Council of Ministers adopted a step-by-step plan for 
EMU;9 but soon thereafter, troubles within the world monetary system derailed 
these efforts. First, facing destabilizing capital inflows, West Germany floated 
the D-mark in May 1971 with Holland taking the same action a few days later. 
Thereafter, smaller currency crises followed until on 15 August 1971, 
unbeknownst to its European allies, the Nixon administration announced its 
New Economic Program. In it, the United States closed the gold window, 
placed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, put a 90-day freeze on wages and 
4 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B13617351, Verteidigung der Dollarparitiit durch die 
Amerikaner? (Vorschliige von Dr. Hankel). 
S Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World's Money and the Threat to 
American Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992),61; Otmar Emminger, D-Mark, Dollar, 
Wiihrungskrisen: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Bundesbankpriisidenten (Stuttgart: OVA, 
1986) (hereafter, Emminger, Wiihrungskrisen), 214; David Marsh, The Euro: The Politics of the 
New Global Currency (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009) 60-1. 
6 AAPD 1972/1,127; VoIcker, 104. 
7 Loukas Tsoukalis, The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration (London: 
George AIIen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 85; See also several articles in Andreas Wilkens, ed., Wir 
sind auf dem richtigen Weg: Willy Brandt und die europiiische Einigung (Bonn: Dietz, 20 10). 
8 For information on these opposing views, see ibid (Tsoukalis). and Matthias Kaelberer, Money 
and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2001). 
9 Kaelberer, 104-105. 
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prices and introduced tax cuts to boost employment. 10 By early 1972, with the 
Smithsonian realignment in place, the European Commission revived the stalled 
initiative, calling for EC member states to narrow the margins of fluctuation 
between their currencies to 2 percent. 11 
Bonn realized that although the D-mark float of May 1971 had helped 
its economic position, it had undermined EMU and damaged its political 
relationships with other European countries, in particular France. Thus, almost 
immediately Bonn did its part to maintain the Smithsonian alignment and 
reignite the EMU process. Within a few days of the conclusion of the 
Smithsonian Agreement, West Germany began work to change the 
Bardepotgesetz, a law established in 1961 to help control speCUlative capital 
flows from abroad. 12 This eventually led to the introduction on 1 March 1972 
of the Bardepot requirement: under it, banks had to make a 40 percent cash 
deposit on any funds borrowed from abroad. 13 Second, the Bundesbank pursued 
an externally-oriented interest rate policy, reducing the West German discount 
rate in December 1971 and February 1972 to 3 percent. In this way, West 
Germany hoped to eliminate large discrepancies in interest rates between its 
own and America's, thereby removing one incentive for speculative flOWS. 14 
Despite the tensions of the previous year, West Germany in 1972 found 
a very willing partner in France to restart EMU. Prompting Paris's desire in this 
direction was its dismay over American actions since the Smithsonian 
Agreement. IS At the West German-French consultations on 10 February 1972, 
the French President, Georges Pompidou, maintained that it had become clear 
that Europe had its own economic and monetary personality and the time had 
10 The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, Vol. 1971, Address 
to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy; "The Challenge of Peace" - August 15. 1971, 
889. (http://guod.lib.umich.edufcgi/titextitext-
idx?c=opotpus:cc=opotpus:view=toc:idno=4731800.1971.00 I accessed January 2011). 
11 AAPD 197211. 129. 
12 Ibid., 129. 
13 Otmar Emminger, The D-mark in the Conflict between Internal and External Equilibrium, 
1948-1975 Princeton Essays in International Finance no. 122 (1977) (hereafter Emminger, 
Conflict), 34; James, 240. 
14 Ibid., 34; Ibid., 240. 
IS Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976 III: Foreign Economic Policy: International 
Monetary Policy, 1969-1972 (hereafter FRUS III), 604-607. 
http://history.state.gov.gate2.library.lse.ac.ukl (accessed January 2011). 
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come to restart EMU. 16 Brandt did not disagree with Pompidou, indeed re-
launching EMU was one of Bonn's main aims for the consultations, but the 
chancellor wanted to be sure that it was undertaken in the proper manner. 17 As 
had been Bonn's position for years, Brandt pushed for the parallel tracks of 
closer economic and exchange rate policy coordination. 18 The chancellor 
suggested to proceed in stages from the basis of the March 1971 EMU decision. 
Pompidou agreed, stressing that the narrowing of fluctuation bands was a 
necessary first step, not least because of the problems which the wider 
Smithsonian fluctuation bands caused for the EC's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Brandt did not dispute this point; indeed the CAP had also been a 
factor in West Germany's desire for EMU. Bonn and Paris concluded that 
officially the first stage should begin at a summit of the heads of state later in 
1972, but in the meantime, preparations for it should begin through the council 
of finance ministers and steps towards reducing the exchange rate bands should 
be undertaken. 19 
Over the coming weeks, as agreed, French and West Gennan 
representatives worked to reignite EMU. At a meeting of the EC finance and 
economics ministers as well as central bank governors on 6-7 March 1972, the 
EC member states agreed to a resolution expressing their "political will" to 
begin work towards the first stage of EMU with a narrowing of the fluctuation 
bands between the EC currencies to +/- 1.25 percent taking place no later than 1 
July 1972.20 This resolution was passed by the Council of Ministers on 21 
March 1972. Shortly thereafter on 10 April 1972, the governors of EC central 
banks met in Basel, Switzerland and established the European Currency Snake 
under the Basel Agreement. Given the narrower band inside the larger one set 
up under the Smithsonian Agreement, the system came to be known as the 
snake in the tunne1.21 The Basel Agreement came into force on 24 April 1972 
with West Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy 
16 AAPD 197211, 128-130. 
17 Ibid., 149-150. 
18 Ibid .• 131-132,136-137. 
19 Ibid." 134-138. 148-149. 
20 Ibid., 146. 
21 The 'bands' were the margins of fluctuation which a currency could move either against the 
dollar or in the case of the snake the European currencies against one another. 
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as members. A week later, on 1 May 1972, the future EC member states of 
Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom also joined the snake.22 Thus, in 
only four months since the Smithsonian Agreement, the Ee with West 
Germany very much in vanguard took a major step towards EMU. But it was 
not long until the calm in the markets ceased and the snake arrangement 
encountered problems. 
Trouble began in June 1972. The deterioration of the British trade 
balance, rising inflation, dock strikes and comments by the British Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, suggesting that the United Kingdom would 
not defend the pound's rate led to speculation against sterling. 23 Between 16 
and 22 June 1972, approximately $2.6 billion flowed out of Great Britain with 
nearly two-thirds going into the D-mark. 24 Finally on 23 June 1972, the British 
government withdrew from the snake and began a free float of the pound.25 But 
the damage had already been done: under the enormous speculative pressure, 
the Federal Republic along with several other European countries was forced to 
close the exchange markets for the following few days.26 
Bonn understood that closing the exchange market would not end the 
rush of foreign currencies into the Federal Republic, but Brandt's government 
was divided as to what would. The par value of the D-mark appeared accurate 
to West German officials. This latest speculation was not caused by a dollar 
crisis, but rather by the pound and uneasiness in the markets. Given the 
circumstances, a revaluation seemed inappropriate.27 Karl Schiller, the dual 
Finance and Economics Minister, strongly advocated a European group float. 
Schiller took a neo-liberal approach to economics, preferring to let the markets 
rather than government regulation work out the problems of the economy. As 
such, he generally opposed capital controls because they ran counter to market 
22 Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom were due to join the Ee on 1 January 1973. 
23 FRUS III, 628; Volcker, 104; Emminger, Conflict, 33. 
24 FRUS III, 628; Emminger, Wiihrungskrisen, 217. 
25 David Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank that Rules Europe (London: Heinemann, 1992), 
190. 
26 Emminger, W iihrungskrisen, 217. 
27 Ibid., 219. 
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economic principles.28 Thus, in the face of past disruptive speculative flows, 
Schiller had turned to floating; indeed he had been the main driving force 
behind the float of the D-mark in May 1971. 
The other option for the Federal Republic was to defend the parity, 
erecting further capital controls to stifle the flows. All members of Brandt's 
cabinet but Schiller, preferred this option. Helmut Schmidt's (then the minister 
of defense) preference was partly shaped by his close friendship with the 
President of the Bundesbank, Karl Klasen, who was a strong advocate of the 
use of capital controls. Already in late May 1972, Klasen sent Schmidt a note 
outlining how destabilizing inflows could be countered with the use of further 
capital controls.29 As troubles mounted a month later, on 26 June 1972 and 
without the knowledge of Schiller, Klasen wrote to Brandt, advocating such 
action. 3o Klasen's letter set up a battle in Brandt's cabinet which would be 
extremely decisive for the debate over Bonn's handling of this crisis. 
When the West German cabinet came together on 28 and 29 June 1972 
to discuss the appropriate course of action in response to the crisis, the meeting 
was both tense and long. In the end, Brandt was swayed by three main political 
considerations. First, a European group float seemed highly unlikely and an 
independent float of the D-mark would have destroyed the burgeoning EMU 
efforts as well as greatly soured relations between West Germany and France.31 
Capital controls, however, would do neither. Second, Klasen promised that the 
capital controls he proposed would keep the markets calm until the November 
1972 Bundestag elections. Thus, this method would improve the Social 
Democratic Party's (SPD) and Brandt's re-election prospects. Finally, Klasen 
threatened to resign should his proposal not be adopted. 32 Wanting to keep 
Klasen on and with a promise for economic stability without damaging 
28 Arnulf Baring and Manfred Gortemaker, Machtwechsel: Die .. fra Brandt-Scheel (Berlin: 
Ullstein, 1998), 795-810; Marsh, Bundesbank, 190. 
29 Hartmut Soell, Helmut Schmidt 1969 bis heute: Macht und Verantwortung (Munchen: DVA, 
2008), 161. 
30 Ibid., 161-2. 
31 This indeed was confirmed by Paris in late July 1972, see Emminger, Wiihrungskrisen, 220. 
32 Soell, 162. 
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Germany's international relationships or his re-election chances, Brandt's 
cabinet voted unanimously, save Schiller, to adopt capital controls.33 
Angry about this decision as well as the budget for the following year, 
Schiller. resigned on 2 July 1972. Brandt accepted his resignation without 
question. Although Schiller had been one of his most trusted advisors, tensions 
between Schiller and other cabinet members, in particular Schmidt, as well as 
between Schiller and the SPD's coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party 
(FDP), had been growing for some time. Moreover, Schiller was particularly 
unpopular among the growing left-wing element of the SPD. After a series of 
defections from the SPD over his Ostpolitik, Brandt was more dependent on 
this faction's support in his upcoming re-election campaign. 34 It was an abrupt 
end to a partnership which was so important to the course West Germany had 
trod in the past years in the face of the currency crises and economic reform in 
the Federal Republic. But with it came a definite shift in West German policy. 
Schiller's replacement was one of his strongest opponents - Schmidt. 
Schmidt was a stark contrast to his predecessor. Unlike Schiller, Schmidt was 
not a neo-liberal: he had not been in favor of the two previous D-mark floats 
and had complained that West Germany was carrying out "super, super liberal 
policies.,,35 Rather, Schmidt believed that the Federal Republic's economic and 
monetary policy needed to be viewed less from the economic perspective and 
more from a political perspective.36 For Schmidt, the West had become both 
economically and politically interdependent and West German economic and 
political strength and stability could only be assured by cooperating with its 
allies, both French and American. In 1972, this meant working with its 
European allies towards closer integration and its American partner on 
monetary issues.37 On the former though, Schmidt also understood that Paris 
preferred an "inward-looking" European Community, while Bonn sought an 
"outward-looking" one, as the Federal Republic did not want "the European 
33 FRUS III, 635. 
34 Baring and Gortemaker, 795-810. 
35 Soell, 161. 
36 Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank (hereafter Bbk), B330/6703/1, Protokoll der 
382. Sitzung des Zentralbankrats. 15. Februar 1973. 
37 FRUS III, 638. 
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Community to become a currency bloc against the dollar.,,38 And on the latter 
issue, cooperation meant not giving into American demands. In order to achieve 
this balanced approach, Schmidt aimed to work closely with his Western 
counterparts, something he later noted to the American National Security 
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, his predecessor was unable to do. 39 
The adoption of further capital controls and the change in minister, 
however, initially only slightly stifled speculative flows. Instead, through the 
first half of July 1972, destabilizing flows continued as the United States 
refused to intervene to support the dollar or make any changes in its economic 
policies. Speculation peaked again a few days before a special session of EC 
economics and finance ministers on 17-18 July 1972. The meeting had little to 
do with the currency crisis; instead its purpose was to create a set of general 
principles for the EC to use at the first meeting of the C_20.40 Yet, in the days 
preceding it, rumors started to circulate in the press that the meeting was to 
discuss a possible European group float. 41 As a result, on 13-14 July 1972, the 
Bundesbank was forced to take up another $1.2 billion.42 Once it became clear 
that no such group float was going to occur, speculation began to recede.43 Yet, 
quiet only returned to the exchange markets in late July 1972 when the United 
States intervened in the markets to support the dollar against the D-mark. After 
a long debate in the cabinet, Nixon gave his permission on 18 July 1972 for the 
Federal Reserve to intervene in the markets.44 The first intervention occurred 
on the afternoon of 19 July 1972 with the Federal Reserve buying around $2 
million and more followed on 20 and 21 July 1972 in the amount of 
approximately $10 million per day.45 Although in relative terms the 
interventions were not large, their psychological effect on the markets sufficed 
38 Ibid., 637-8. 
39 Ibid., 637-8. 
40 BAK, B13617351, Ergebnisvermerk iiber das Sondertreffen der EWG-Finanzminister am 
17.118.7.1972 in London; BAK, B13617351, TO-Punkt 1: Reform des Wiihrungssystems: zum 
Treffen der EWG-Wirtschafts- und Finanzmin ister am 17.118.7.1972. 
41 FRUS III, 636; BAK B13617351, Vermerk: Betr.: Amerikanische 1nterventionen am 
Devisenmarkt (Unterredungen mit Prof Burns. Finanzminister Shultz. Mr. Volcker) (hereafter 
B 13617351,1nterventionen). 
42 BAK, B 13617351, Betr.: Problematik amerikanischer Dollarinterventionen; B 13617351, 
Interventionen. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
4S Ibid. 
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to convince speculators that the United States was prepared to defend the dollar 
parity.46 
The main driving force behind this intervention was Arthur Bums, the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, a long-time supporter of fixed exchange 
rates. 47 Through 1972 Bums had become increasingly dismayed by the White 
House's refusal to support the dollar parity and the Smithsonian Agreement. 48 
His opinion, however, found few allies in Washington. Although the 
antagonistic John Connally had resigned as secretary of the treasury in May 
1972, his replacement, George Shultz, the former dean of the University of 
Chicago business school, advocated floating exchange rates as he was a 
follower of Milton Friedman's monetarist views.49 The Undersecretary of the 
Treasury, Paul Volcker, was also generally negative about intervening in the 
markets. 50 With the summer currency crisis threatening to undermine the 
Smithsonian realignment, Bums pushed more strongly for intervention to 
support the dollar. 51 His cause was helped by upcoming efforts to begin an 
overhaul of the international monetary system through the C-20. The United 
States was particularly anxious to reform the monetary system, as the Nixon 
administration felt that the present system restricted America's monetary 
freedom and was weighted in favor of countries holding balance of payments 
surpluses. 52 Thus, Bums argued, the United States would lose a great deal of 
credibility at the reform talks, should Washington be perceived as not acting in 
good faith regarding the Smithsonian Agreement. Moreover, reform efforts 
would be greatly complicated should parities again be realigned. S3 
46 Ibid. 
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Despite this act of intervention, European leaders were still worried 
about America's commitment to the Smithsonian realignment and were 
growing increasingly concerned about American economic leadership. Schmidt, 
since Schiller's resignation occupying a new double role as finance and 
economics minister, as well as Bundesbank Vice-President Otmar Emminger, 
both happened to be in Washington at the time of the intervention and held 
meetings with Shultz, Volcker and Bums about it. In their meetings with their 
West German counterparts, the American officials maintained that the move 
should be taken as a "demonstrative act" of America's willingness to contribute 
to maintenance of orderly markets, which at that time were perceived by 
American officials as being "disorderly.,,54 Independent of Shultz and Volcker, 
Bums also noted that it was to show that America was actively participating in 
"supporting the Smithsonian Agreement. ,,55 Shultz, Volcker and Bums all 
stressed, however, that the interventions did not represent a change in American 
policy and that intervention would continue to occur on a case-by-case basis. 56 
Bums went further in his meeting with Emminger, expressly stating that in the 
instance of great pressure again on the dollar, the main burden for supporting 
the dollar parity would continue to fall to European central banks. 57 Overall 
American officials maintained that the recent intervention and any future acts 
should be seen as practical steps to uphold the system until a more thorough 
reform of the international monetary system could be completed. 58 
In his explanation and response to the American intervention, Schmidt 
differed from his predecessor in both substance and style. Over the previous 
years, Schiller would defer to American leadership, taking actions - be it 
floating or devaluing - which served to maintain the dollar parity without the 
United States having to act. 59 Schmidt, however, came to Washington in July 
1972 with a new message: namely, "dass die Epoche, in der [der 
Bundesrepublik] allein die Verteidigung des Dollar zugemutet wurde, ihr Ende 
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findet und man von [Bonn] nicht erwarten kann, der Verteidigung des Dollars 
eigene wesentliche Interessen unter Belastung unseres gesamten politischen 
Systems zu opfem.,,6o Schmidt made it clear that neither a floating of the D-
mark nor a European group float were open for debate. 61 Schmidt also let it be 
known that the Bundesbank had reached its limit for the accumulation of dollars 
and that the imported inflation associated with every dollar crisis had become 
politically unacceptable. 62 Indeed over the previous months, the West German 
inflation rate had risen above 5 percent, particularly high for a country used to 
2-3 percent inflation and with price stability as one of its primary goals.63 
In a further meeting with Kissinger, Schmidt firmly reiterated these 
sentiments. While he maintained that his "main objective [was] to have US-
German cooperation survive," he also informed Kissinger, that the dollar 
problem and high inflation remained and that he needed to do something to 
counter these problems.64 Schmidt highlighted, "The German price level is 
rising far too fast. . . . This will be the number one campaign issue. If I am to 
survive politically, I will have to do something about this.,,65 Schmidt warned 
Kissinger that West Germany may have to cut off the purchase of dollars 
immediately by means of controls on capital and trade. 66 Attempting to avoid 
appearing too aggressive, Schmidt also noted that no measures had yet been 
taken in Bonn to stop the buying of dollars. Moreover, he hoped that through 
continued intervention in the markets along the lines taken by the United States 
over the previous days would sustain the Smithsonian Agreement. Schmidt 
stressed, "The Agreement must be defended until the [German] elections.,,67 
Yet, despite Bonn's pleas, American intervention in the currency 
markets only lasted a few days. Growing increasingly frustrated with 
Washington, Schmidt called the American ambassador in for talks on I August 
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1972. During the discussion, Schmidt expressed exasperation over the 
American actions in the international monetary field in recent months. Schmidt 
repeated many of the points he had made a week previously in Washington, 
refusing to float the D-mark and threatening controls should a dollar crisis 
break OUt.68 Luckily for all Western countries, in particular the Federal 
Republic and the United States which both held elections in autumn 1972 and 
in which the incumbent administrations would emerge victorious, Schmidt's 
threats went untested, as the exchange markets remained calm throughout the 
remainder of 1972. Still, in Schmidt's dealings with the Americans, there were 
signs of an overall shift in West German international economic policy: Bonn 
was becoming more assertive in expressing its interests and those interests were 
much more evenly split between politics - both international and domestic -
and economics. These trends only became more pronounced as the next wave 
of speCUlation hit the Western economies in February 1973. 
-The February Crisis: A Last Attempt at Saving Bretton Woods-
After the July 1972 currency crisis, speculation remained at bay for 
another six months. Just as they had earlier in the year, the calm in the markets 
coupled with American economic and monetary policy decisions resulted in a 
greater push among EC member states towards European integration. This drive 
was again led by the Federal Republic and France. Yet while the two states had 
common cause, they did not have the same perspectives on how to achieve it. 
Rather, Bonn and Paris differed in their approaches to controlling dollar inflows 
as well as technical and institutional issues surrounding the first stage of 
EMU. 69 Over the coming months, the two states worked to bridge the gaps 
between their positions on these points and to lead other EC member states to 
agreement on the components of EMU.7o Their cooperation, in tum, allowed 
for the later success of the European Summit in October 1972 at which the first 
68 Ibid., 649-50. 
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stage of EMU was launched. 71 Also during this time, West Germany 
collaborated with its European allies to reach common general principles on 
international monetary reform. C-20 negotiations proceeded steadily through 
autumn 1972, after kicking off at the IMF annual meeting in Washington in 
September 1972.72 Thus, in January 1973, both EMU and the C-20 talks 
seemed on course, if not moving particularly swiftly. But work on both reform 
efforts was soon overshadowed by yet another currency crisis. 
Trouble started in mid-January 1973 in Italy. Investors fled the Italian 
lira under growing concerns about the Italian inflation rate and internal 
domestic problems. 73 On 21 January 1973, in a bid to stop the outflows, Rome 
split the currency market into a market with fixed rates for commercial 
transactions and a market with floating rates for capital transactions.74 The 
currency streaming out of Italy went predominately into Switzerland, as the 
Swiss central bank authorities had recently raised interest rates. Within days 
speculation grew around the Swiss franc and increasingly the dollar as well. 
Destabilizing capital flows reached into the hundreds of millions of dollars in 
Switzerland until eventually Swiss authorities decided to float the Swiss franc 
on 23 January 1973.75 This move eased capital flows into Switzerland, but 
speculation continued, particularly against the dollar. Investor confidence in the 
dollar dropped after the Nixon administration ended its loan and wage controls, 
reports emerged of deteriorating American balance of payments and trade 
positions as well as increasing inflation and finally the Watergate scandal 
intensified. 76 
At nearly the same time that American data on its poor balance of 
payments appeared, West German figures for 1972 were released showing a 
sizeable balance of payments surplUS. The contrast between the two countries 
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resulted in the markets dumping dollars for D-marks. Problems grew in the last 
week of January 1973 and into the beginning of February 1973. Although the 
Bundesbank would have preferred to close the exchange market on 2 February 
1973, the Brandt government was opposed on political grounds.77 Instead, the 
federal government tried to stop the speculative inflows on 2 February 1973 by 
extending capital controls, including raising the Bardepot to 100 percent. 78 
These new measures, however, did little to stem the speculative tide; rather, the 
inflows increased, with the Bundesbank being forced to take up a billion and a 
half dollars in one day on 6 February 1973.79 
That evening Brandt called an emergency meeting to discuss the 
currency crisis. Representing the Bundesbank at that meeting was Emminger 
who was acting president of the Bundesbank for much of early 1973 because 
Klasen was hospitalized. At the meeting, Emminger pushed strongly for 
floating the D-mark. His argumentation was based predominately on inflation: 
the Bundesbank's main charge was to maintain domestic price stability, but in 
the last year, the Bundesbank had been forced to subjugate this priority to 
maintaining the external exchange rate. 80 In the process, however, the 
Bundesbank was forced to take in billions of dollars which in turn had led to 
domestic inflation. By early 1973, the inflation rate in West Germany had 
reached nearly 6 percent. 81 
Although the West German government was particularly focused on 
European integration efforts which would make a float difficult, Emminger had 
reason to believe that his pleas might have resonance: alongside EMU efforts, 
there had also been a drive in recent months to counter inflation. In the EC, the 
Federal Republic had been the main force behind the passage of a common 
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price stability resolution in autumn 1972.82 Moreover, in his government 
address on 18 January 1973, Brandt had stated, "die dringendste Aufgabe, die 
wir mit den europaischen Partnerstaaten meistern miissen, ist es, wieder mehr 
Preisstabilitat zu gewinnen.,,83 Yet, Emminger's reasoning proved inaccurate. 
Despite his contributions to European efforts on inflation in recent months, 
Schmidt was firmly against floating. 84 In the end, the effects that floating would 
have on European integration and in particular Bonn's political relations with 
France were the overriding factors. The Brandt government thus determined 
that the Bundesbank must continue to defend the D-mark-dollar parity and 
should abandon any thoughts of floating. 85 
Still, the destabilizing capital flows did not cease. On 8 February 1973, 
the Bundesbank had to take up another $1.7 billion. 86 With the crisis 
worsening, Brandt called another meeting. Under the growing pressure, tempers 
flared, as Emminger and Schmidt again advocated opposing positions.87 
Despite also having Hans Friderichs (who had become minister of economics 
after Schmidt's dual role as economics and finance minister was split after the 
1972 federal elections with Schmidt retaining control of only the finance 
ministry) support his position, Emminger once again lost the argument. Brandt 
in line with Schmidt decided against floating and kept the currency markets 
open. At market closing time on 9 February 1973, the Bundesbank had taken in 
$5.9 billion since 1 February 1973.88 
Yet, while Brandt decided against floating during the 8 February 
meeting, his government did realize that West German capital controls alone 
were not enough to regain control over the destabilizing capital flows. By the 
next day, the Federal Republic was actively enlisting the help of its allies in the 
United States, France and Great Britain to overcome the latest currency crisis. 
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Brandt began by sending a letter to Nixon, entreating the president to take 
action to support the dollar parity.89 Brandt asked Nixon to send an authorized 
official to consult with Schmidt about how the two countries could work 
together on the very serious matter at hand. The chancellor also noted that he 
would be sending Schmidt to Paris that evening to discuss the crisis with the 
French Finance Minister, Valery Giscard d'Estaing.9o 
The United States, however, had already recognized that the latest 
currency crisis could not be ignored. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Nixon's 
economic advisers had been following the developments closely and they had 
come to the conclusion that the combination of the American trade and balance 
of payments deficits warranted action. 91 On 6 February 1973 Shultz and Bums 
met with Nixon to explain the developments in the currency markets and to 
gain his approval for their plan of action. Their strategy involved devaluing the 
dollar by at least 6.5 percent and a revaluation of the yen against the dollar by at 
least 15 percent. European countries, for their part, were to keep their rates 
steady. Getting agreement from all parties involved, however, would be 
particularly difficult to achieve without the markets catching wind of the 
American action. So, Shultz and Bums proposed that an American 
representative be sent on a special, secret mission first to Japan and then to 
Europe to secure agreement from the various countries. 92 
Nixon was initially reluctant to revalue, as he believed it would only 
lead to another revaluation in the future. But with a little persuasion from 
Shultz, who surprisingly was advocating intervention, Nixon soon realized that 
American inaction would be ''just too much of a 'To hell with the rest of the 
world' as a policy" and would be perceived by the United States' allies as 
"economic belligerency.,,93 Understanding that inaction would not only sour 
political relations but would also undermine Washington's other goals in trade 
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and international monetary refonn negotiations, the president consented to the 
plan. 94 
As the American representative, Nixon sent Volcker on a windowless 
military plane first to Japan on 7 February 1973 before moving on to Europe to 
two days later. Upon arrival in Japan on 8 February 1973, Volcker went 
immediately into secret meetings with the Japanese Finance Minister, Kichi 
Aichi. For several hours Volcker tried to persuade Aichi to accept a slightly 
altered plan for a 10 percent dollar devaluation and a 10 percent revaluation of 
the Japanese yen. 95 Aichi, however, was hesitant to agree for several reasons: 
first, given that the Japanese government was only infonned the previous day of 
Volcker's arrival, Aichi did not have pennission to agree any formal action 
with the Volcker. 96 Furthermore, he was concerned about the implications for 
Japanese trade.97 Finally, the Japanese minister of finance faced internal 
domestic political and budgetary hurdles. 98 While the two officials agreed that a 
floating of the yen could overcome some of the difficulties raised, it could not 
solve al1. 99 Rather, Aichi, concerned about a competitive loss for Japanese 
exports vis-a-vis West Gennan exports, pushed for a float of the D-mark as well 
as the yen. IOO Volcker, however, knew that the Federal Republic would not 
accept floating because of the political consequences in regard to European 
integration and explained as much. In an attempt to gain Japanese concessions, 
Volcker tried reasoning and eventually threats, but Aichi did not give in. 
Instead, Vo1cker left Japan uncertain if Tokyo would eventually agree to the 
plan once Aichi had spoken to the Japanese prime minister. lOl Volcker was to 
continue his mission in West Germany, arriving in Bonn on the evening of 9 
February 1973 for talks with Schmidt. Yet, his plane was delayed and by the 
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time Volcker landed in the Federal Republic, Schmidt had already left for 
Paris. 102 
On the morning of 9 February 1973, Brandt had not only been in touch 
with Nixon, but also his counterparts in Paris and London. 103 Pompidou and the 
British Prime Minister, Ted Heath, agreed with Brandt on the need for talks 
among Schmidt, Giscard and Barber, the same evening.104 Although Giscard 
was hosting, Schmidt quickly took the lead at the gathering, informing his 
counterparts that there were "three alternatives for the Germans: a two-tier 
system, a common European float, and a float by Germany alone.,,105 Schmidt 
ruled out the first one on administrative grounds. 106 Schmidt informed his 
counterparts that he and Brandt were in favor of the European solution, but he 
warned, "If no other solutions [were] available, the DM would have to float 
when markets reopened on Monday, unwelcome though that would be.,,107 
Thus, within less than twenty-four hours it seemed Bonn had completely 
changed its position, for only the previous night the West German federal 
government with Schmidt leading the pack had staunchly refused the 
Bundesbank any option to float. Now both of their options for action involved 
floating. Quite clearly, despite Schmidt's affinity for fixed exchange rates and 
desire to achieve EMU, neither he nor his colleagues could justify continuing 
taking in billions of dollars. 
Even more astounding than the seeming West German reversal on 
floating was the French reaction to the Federal Republic's suggested plans. 
Initially, Giscard reacted coolly to the idea of a common European float. After 
some discussion, however, Giscard left the room to consult with Pompidou. 
Upon re-entering the room, he announced that France would be prepared to join 
102 Volcker, 109-10. 
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a European float. 108 After months of vigorously opposing any form of floating 
and pushing for capital controls, Paris too now seemed to have drastically 
changed its position - indeed, within less than ten minutes! 109 Thus, the only 
major remaining roadblock to a common European float was the United 
Kingdom. Floating since June 1972, London had repeatedly stated that it would 
rejoin the European snake when conditions allowed. Barber, however, did not 
feel that the time had come in the midst of the February 1973 currency crisis; 
rather, he expressed concern at the meeting about the British balance of 
payments position and sterling balances. Schmidt tried to tempt Barber with 
promises of "unlimited West German support," but the latter would not commit. 
Instead, it seemed to Barber that Schmidt and Giscard had "concerted in 
advance to put pressure on [London]."IIO This was indeed quite plausible, given 
France's quick change of position on floating. Moreover, since summer 1972, 
France had strongly desired that sterling return to the EC currency snake, 
pushing strongly for it in EC negotiations. III For West Germany, a European 
group float would be by far the best option, allowing it to maintain its European 
political relations unscathed and affording it greater economic freedom to 
achieve its domestic stability policy. I 12 No decision was made on a European 
group float that evening; instead, the three ministers agreed to discuss the 
matter two days later on 11 February 1973 in the morning.113 Meanwhile, 
however, many telephone calls and meetings transpired which altered the 
course of this plan. 
Schmidt met with Volcker on the morning of 10 February 1973. Volcker 
presented the American scheme in which the United States would devalue the 
dollar by 10 percent, the Japanese would float the yen until it revalued by 
approximately 8 to 10 percent, the European countries would hold their 
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currencies steady and then America would begin selling minimal amounts of 
gold in the market. 114 Considering Bonn's great desire to defend the 
Smithsonian Agreement, as expressed both in the cabinet meetings on 6 and 8 
February 1973 and in Brandt's letter to Nixon, Volcker's plan should have 
come as a great relief to the Brandt administration. While the D-mark would 
automatically be slightly revalued against the dollar because of the one-sided 
dollar devaluation, the change would be minimal. In essence, the Volcker plan 
defended the fixed parities as the West German cabinet, and in particular 
Schmidt, had advocated. Yet, Bonn's reaction to Volcker's plan was hesitancy, 
rather than relief. Calling Volcker's proposal "interesting," Schmidt only 
confirmed that he would speak with Brandt about it and then give a response. I IS 
By the morning of 10 February 1973, it seemed that West Germany, and 
Schmidt in particular, much preferred to move to a European group float than 
take up Volcker's offer. 
After his talks with Volcker and despite Volcker having asked him not 
to do so, Schmidt informed his counterparts in Paris and London about the 
nature of the American plan. Speaking to Barber, Schmidt maintained that 
Brandt "preferred the European solution, both politically and economically, to 
the Vo1cker package.,,116 Schmidt then arranged with Barber for Emminger to 
discuss with Sir Leslie O'Brien, the Governor of the Bank of England, 
technicalities of a possible group float that evening at a meeting of the central 
bank governors in Basel. 117 Schmidt also informed Barber that Brandt would be 
available for talks with Heath this evening after O'Brien had reported to the 
prime minister. liS He assured Barber that he would provide the United States 
with no answer until the three ministers had spoken as previously arranged the 
following morning. Schmidt concluded noting once more, "although they 
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preferred the European solution, if this turned out not to be feasible they might 
have to fall back on the Volcker package." 1 19 
Through the remainder of the day, Schmidt took steps to achieve a 
European group float. After speaking with Barber, he talked with Giscard, 
expressing similar sentiments. 120 He then met with the British ambassador in 
Bonn, relaying the same message. 121 Later in the day, Schmidt instructed 
Emminger to discuss options for credit help from the Federal Republic for the 
United Kingdom with O'Brien.122 Finally, as Schmidt had arranged with 
Barber, Brandt called Heath that evening. In a last attempt to win over London 
to a European group float, Brandt expressed doubt that France would accept the 
Volcker package and warned that should no common solution be found, West 
Germany would have to float the D-mark alone and that would endanger 
EMU. 123 
Yet despite Schmidt's extensive efforts and Brandt's threats, a European 
group float failed to come about at this juncture. Although Emminger was a 
proponent of floating, - in contrast to Schmidt - he was reluctant to force 
through a European group float at any cost. 124 Instead of offering unlimited 
funds to the British as Schmidt had done, Emminger, only discussed the credit 
options open to the United Kingdom through the EC, as he believed he did not 
have the required permission from the Central Bank Council of the Bundesbank 
to extend a unilateral West German offer. 125 Without the necessary credit 
assurances, London was unwilling to join a European group float and resolved 
in a late night meeting on 10 February 1973 to push for the Volcker plan the 
following morning among its European allies. 126 
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On the morning of 11 February 1973, Barber outlined to Giscard the 
two options available to Europe and advocated adoption of the American 
scheme. Barber also expressed his concerns about a European group float, 
informing Giscard that Great Britain would be unable to participate in any such 
action at this time. 127 France was already beginning to rethink the option of a 
European group float only a few hours after having expressed its readiness to 
join one on the evening of 9 February 1973. The following day in a meeting 
with the West German ambassador Pompidou maintained that he was unsure if 
the timing was right to undertake "this experiment.,,128 Without the British 
pound, the French franc would have been the weakest currency in a European 
group float lead by the strong D-mark. Such an economically and politically 
unpalatable prospect was enough to persuade France to accept the Volcker plan. 
Giscard informed Schmidt of this even before Giscard had the opportunity to 
meet personally with Volcker. 129 With this, Bonn realized that the European 
group float option was clearly dead and agreed to the Volcker plan. 130 Schmidt 
concluded, "this would be a good solution for the world monetary system 
though less good from a European point ofview.,,131 
That evening in Paris Giscard, Schmidt, Barber, Volcker and the Italian 
finance minister, Giovanni Malagodi, met to finalize the details. The five men 
reached an agreement whereby the United States would devalue the dollar by 
10 percent, the Japanese would float their currency, the parities of the 
currencies participating in the Ee currency snake would remain steady, the 
British pound would continue to float freely, Italy would begin a free float, 
West Germany would maintain its capital controls and the United States would 
refrain from selling gold on the market. 132 All that remained was convincing the 
Japanese to float the yen. This happened the following day when the Japanese 
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ambassador to the United States informed the Nixon administration that Japan 
would float the yen until it reached parity with the dollar at 264: 1. This would 
be equivalent to a 16 to 17 percent revaluation against the dollar. 133 According 
to British sources, key in convincing Japan to accept the Volcker plan was 
Schmidt who called on the Japanese ambassador in Bonn and informed him that 
if Japan refused to go along with the Volcker plan, there would be economic 
war between the United States and Japan.134 This was somewhat odd given that 
Schmidt had only grudgingly accepted the Volcker plan himself. That said, had 
the Volcker plan fallen through, in all likelihood, West Germany would have 
had to have floated independently, a fate, which despite its threats, the Brandt 
government wished to avoid. 
When the exchange markets re-opened on 14 February 1973, calm 
returned. Yet, this outcome was far from "Schmidt's triumph," as Gray has 
argued. 135 Rather, it is quite evident that despite having refused the 
Bundesbank's requests for an independent float of the D-mark, it was the 
preference of the Brandt government, and above all Schmidt, to undertake a 
European group float rather than continue to maintain a fixed parity with the 
dollar. In this way Bonn could achieve its political goals associated with EMU. 
Yet, because of internal West German disagreement, the dire economic position 
of the British, French worries about West German economic power and the 
willingness of the United States to revalue the dollar, Bonn failed to generate 
the support needed for its European plan. That said, the Federal Republic did 
not fail in the wake of the February currency crisis; instead, West Germany 
played a key role in ensuring a multilateral solution to it, saving the Federal 
Republic from an independent float of the D-mark which would have surely 
ruined its political goals. Moreover, Bonn's efforts towards a European group 
float no doubt contributed to Paris's acceptance of such an arrangement only a 
few weeks later. Indeed, shortly, Bonn would achieve its political and economic 
goals and Schmidt his real triumph. 
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-The March Crisis: The Final Collapse-
The February 1973 realignment held less than two weeks. As rumors 
began to swirl about a possible European group float, speculators began 
attacking the D-mark. 136 On 1 March 1973, the Bundesbank was forced to take 
in $2.7 billion - 16 percent of the currency in circulation and the amount the 
Bundesbank normally would have taken in throughout an entire year.137 As 
Emminger later recounted, this "was the death knell for the Bretton Woods 
parity system.,,138 At the close of the day, Emminger contacted Brandt and an 
emergency meeting was organized. Only Brandt, Emminger and Friderichs 
were present at the small gathering, as Schmidt was in the hospital and the 
acting Finance Minister, Karl Otto Pohl, on a skiing holiday in Switzerland. 
Unlike during the February 1973 currency crisis though, Emminger did not 
advocate a national float; instead, along with Friderichs, he pushed for a 
European group float and encouraged closing the currency markets until such a 
float could be arranged. As is evident from Bonn's position during the 
international negotiations during the February currency crisis, Brandt (and 
Schmidt) already veered towards such a solution. Brandt concurred with 
Emminger's assessment and solution. 139 Once West Germany closed its market 
on 2 March 1973, nearly all other Western countries followed suit. The 
currency markets throughout the West did not re-open until 19 March 1973. 140 
Yet, as Bonn knew all too well from recent experience, it would be 
difficult to convince its European partners to undertake a European group float. 
A major stumbling block to progress a few weeks earlier had been Great 
Britain. With Heath and Barber already in Bonn for scheduled talks, West 
Germany used the opportunity to measure the willingness of the United 
Kingdom to move into a group float and to press for cooperation in an 
afternoon meeting on 2 March 1973. Despite mention again of the Federal 
Republic extending extensive credit to Great Britain, the British remained cool 
to the idea of a European group float, doubting whether the other EC partners, 
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in particular Italy, would agree to the United Kingdom receiving such a large 
sum. Moreover, London questioned whether the necessary EC machinery could 
be established to ensure the functioning of such concerted action at such short 
notice. 141 
Alongside its talks with London, Bonn also got in touch with the 
European Commission, pushing its ideas for a European group float and 
requesting a special meeting of the EC economics and finance ministers be 
called to discuss the latest currency crisiS. 142 The Commission responded to the 
West German pleas by setting a meeting for 4 March 1973. At it, the 
Commission presented a plan for a European group float supported by three 
technical elements: draconian capital controls; an extension of the existing 
credit facilities; and, the establishment of fixed, but adjustable rates with greater 
elasticity in the bands. 143 The Commission's proposal, however, offered no 
easy solution; each technical element had dissenters. 144 The Commission's plan 
was not the only stumbling block to agreement. The United Kingdom and Italy 
were also demanding special conditions for their return to the EC snake. 145 
Great Britain's petitions included such extravagances as "support without limits 
of amount, without conditions and without obligation to repay or to 
guarantee.,,146 In addition, London insisted upon the full pooling of reserves, in 
essence, spreading the British problem of sterling balances to the rest of Europe 
without any conditions on the British government. Italy supported the United 
Kingdom's call for the creation of an unlimited credit facility by pooling all 
reserves and also pushed for a three stage approach which would begin with a 
"concerted" float, followed by a "joint float" with rates subject to revision and 
finally a "full community float" with fixed rates. 147 The remaining seven EC 
members were unwilling to go along with either Great Britain's or Italy's 
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demands. 148 With no agreement in sight, still unconvinced about floating and 
inclined towards fixed parities, France suggested that the Ee member states 
meet with the United States and other members of the Group ofTen (G-lO) in 
an effort to see to what extent Washington was prepared to defend the rates set 
only two weeks earlier. 149 This, all Ee ministers agreed, was the best approach 
to the currency crisis at this point. 150 In the following days, France organized a 
conference of the enlarged G-l 0 to take place on 9 March 1973 in Paris. 151 
For Bonn, the results of the 4 March Ee economics and finance 
ministers meeting were very disconcerting. It now appeared to the Brandt 
government that the odds for achieving a group float were less than 50 
percent. 152 Thus, in the five days before the G-I0 meeting, the Federal Republic 
began exploring multiple avenues in an effort to bring about a multilateral 
response. West Germany warned its Ee partners in private meetings and public 
statements that if no agreement on a group float could be attained, then the D-
mark would float independently.153 Bonn also started to develop plans for a 
group float without Great Britain, Italy or France; hence with only the Benelux 
countries. 154 Finally, the Federal Republic pursued talks with the United States. 
Of all the paths pursued, it was the last one which proved paramount in the 
creation of a European group float. 
West Germany's correspondence with America about the crisis actually 
began before the 4 March meeting of the Ee finance and economics ministers, 
when Brandt wrote to Nixon on 2 March 1973 informing the president, 
148 Ibid. 
The talks for which Prime Minister Heath was in Bonn yesterday and today, 
centered on the alarming new currency crisis .... We agreed that we must 
make every conceivable effort to find a way out which strengthens European 
integration. After his return to London, the Prime Minister will thoroughly 
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examine what contribution his Government can make to a common solution. I 
am convinced that a joint action represents at the same time an element of 
stabilization in the world political situation. This is to the benefit of all 
members of the Western world. A weakening of the Community by separate 
action would be harmful to all. Much will depend now on the results of the 
forthcoming meeting of the Ministerial Council of the European Community. 
The Federal Government is prepared to do everything in its power in order to 
achieve a positive result. 155 
The economics advisors to Nixon had been following the developments in the 
currency markets quite closely and it seemed to them that the devaluation of the 
dollar twice in two years had led to a confidence crisis. 156 It was not a foregone 
conclusion that the United States would tum to floating; rather, as Vo1cker 
informed Nixon in a meeting on 2 March 1973 which also included Shultz, 
Bums, and other member of the economic team, there were two possible 
courses for action: move to floating or intervene on a massive scale. IS7 
Throughout their 2 March 1973 meeting, Nixon and his economic 
advisors explored both the short-term and long-term advantages and 
disadvantages of the two choices while also contemplating how to respond to 
Brandt's message. In the short-term, floating appeared particularly risky, as no 
one could be sure how the markets would react: if the float was smooth and 
stable, it would stop the speculative flows; but if the markets perceived this 
action as a weakness on the part of governments, they could attack currencies 
individually and undermine the entire international monetary order. ISS Over the 
long-term, however, floating seemed to be much more in America's interests: 
since August 1971 the United States had been taking steps to make the 
international monetary system more flexible and as recently as September 1972 
at the first meeting of the C-20, Shultz had presented an American plan for 
reform ofthe international monetary system based around this principle. Letting 
the Europeans float would allow for the flexibility in the system that the United 
States was after. 159 
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Intervention seemed to offer the best immediate solution: American 
officials were relatively confident that a massive intervention in the range of 
billions of dollars would suffice to calm the markets. 160 Yet, there were many 
short and long range disadvantages to intervention. First, the Nixon 
administration could not be sure that even with a massive intervention another 
crisis would not occur within a few months or a year. 161 In addition, there were 
problems with financing: the United States did not hold enough D-marks to 
intervene on a massive scale to support the dollar; thus, Washington would 
have to borrow D-marks from West Germany. There was no way for America 
to tell whether the Federal Republic would be willing to engage in such a 
scheme or the terms which Bonn would attach to it. 162 Moreover, if the United 
States chose to intervene, it would go against its efforts to create a more flexible 
international monetary system. Indeed, it would affirm the fixed parity system. 
This, in turn, would create for America the same problems it had been trying to 
solve over the last years, above all subordinating its domestic economic goals to 
international monetary considerations. 163 
Proponents of floating, including Shultz, all pushed the president to take 
a "wait-and-see" approach. It seemed to them that in his letter, Brandt was 
implying that Europe was planning a group float. If this was the case, then the 
United States should let them do it, for with it they would achieve the flexible 
system America desired. Moreover, it would serve as a shock to Europe to work 
towards a new international monetary system. 164 Arguing strongly for fixed 
rates was Burns. He maintained that floating would be perceived as a lack of 
leadership on the part of Washington. While Burns did not argue with the 
perception that Brandt's letter implied that Europe was moving towards a group 
float, he believed Europe's actions were motivated by the belief that the United 
States would not be willing to defend the fixed parities. Thus, it seemed to 
Burns that Nixon should write with an offer of intervention and show American 
leadership. Were this to be done, Burns argued, Europe would be more likely to 
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move more quickly on refonn of the international monetary system and give the 
United States what they wanted. 165 
Nixon could see the pros and cons of both positions, but it was this 
question of American leadership and it was the political much more than the 
economic repercussions of floating that worried him. It seemed to Nixon that 
the United States was "in a watershed period with regard to [their] relations 
with Europe" and he had to view the situation in tenns of foreign policy.166 
Nixon feared that the "leave-it-alone deal" might actually drive Europe together 
and, as the French hoped, lead to a European monetary system at the expense of 
America. 167 Unsure of the political ramifications, Nixon requested that Shultz 
and Bums meet with Kissinger immediately and get his input on which strategy 
to choose and how to respond to Brandt's message. 168 Kissinger's involvement, 
however, turned out not only to be crucial in America's forthcoming action in 
the economic and monetary fields. 
Upon reading Brandt's letter, Kissinger became highly suspicious and 
accused Europe of wanting to take a common position which would be 
"unpalatable" to Washington. 169 From a political viewpoint, Kissinger 
maintained, the United States looked weak if currency crises continued, but 
bothering him most was that Europe had not included the United States in 
consultations on matters so vital to its interests. Ignoring the fact that the Nixon 
administration had failed to consult its European allies before the Nixon shocks 
of 15 August 1971, Kissinger argued, regardless of whether America intervened 
or not, "we must in any event make clear to Brandt that this procedure is 
unacceptable to US.,,170 In addition, it seemed to Kissinger that Brandt was 
treating the Americans like "idiots," and was telling the United States that 
whatever was good for European integration was good for America. 171 
Kissinger concluded, "You know, I'm no longer so sure that European 
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integration is all that much in our interest." 172 Since coming to office in 1969, 
many in the Nixon administration, in particular Connally, had doubted that 
European integration was in America's interests, but Kissinger had not 
necessarily been one of them. 173 The handling of this issue by Brandt and other 
European leaders was clearly changing Kissinger'S mind. 
Nixon was already convinced that US-EC relations were at a defining 
moment and Kissinger's impressions that actions taken by Europe could further 
European integration to America's detriment prompted the president to seek a 
solution which would divide Europe. 174 With Bums not taking part in the 
meeting, Shultz was able to push the floating perspective. After much back and 
forth about how to write the letter and whether or not to suggest intervention, 
Shultz convinced them to leave out any mention of intervention, remarking that 
it could possibly damage Washington's attempts to handle monetary, trade and 
military negotiations collectively.175 Having pushed for these matters to be 
dealt with together for several years, Nixon was unwilling to risk this aspect of 
his foreign policy. In the end, Nixon, Kissinger and Shultz decided on sending a 
response to Brandt as well as a similar letter to Heath which made clear that the 
United States should be consulted on these matters vital to its interests; that 
America was open to many alternatives in the face of this crisis; and that 
European integration should not come at the cost of Atlantic cooperation. In 
addition, they decided to contact the Japanese and make them aware of the 
developments in an attempt to win them over. 176 The letters went out to Bonn, 
London and Tokyo on 3 March 1973. 177 Japan expressed a keen willingness to 
work with the United States in its response a day later. 178 Heath replied 
assuring Nixon that it was not the intention of the EC to impair Atlantic 
relations with their efforts towards a common float. 179 Brandt though did not 
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answer Nixon until 8 March 1973. 180 Instead, the next words between West 
Germany and America came on 5 March 1973 between Schmidt and Shultz, 
beginning a series of bilateral back-channel discussions. 
Schmidt was very pessimistic about the possibility of achieving a 
European group float after the discussions on 4 March 1973 of the Ee 
economics and finance ministers. To Brandt's chagrin, Schmidt voiced 
public ally his concerns that West Germany may have to pursue a national float 
of the D-mark. But behind the scenes, despite being in and out of the hospital, 
Schmidt was working to create a more multilateral approach, if not necessarily 
a full European group float. On 5 March 1973 he spoke first with Shultz about 
the possibilities for American action. Shultz did not mention intervention, but 
did suggest that Bonn and Washington may be able to work out some terms 
should West Germany pursue an individual float or should a group float occur 
the United States was willing to think about ways of making it more 
manageable for Bonn. 181 Schmidt then used his personal contacts, calling 
Kissinger to try to get greater American action. Schmidt told Kissinger, "I 
remember a conversation back in October last year when we said I should call 
upon you when monetary problems tend to become political problems. . . . 
Henry, I've been with this now, it is the danger.,,182 Schmidt then requested that 
Washington intervene on behalf of the dollar; if the European float did not 
occur it would be most necessary, but even if the European countries did 
manage a float, it would serve to help calm the markets. 183 While Kissinger 
could not say for certain what American policy would be, he did promise 
Schmidt that he would speak with Nixon and Shultz about the matter and get 
back to him in due course. 
Meeting with Shultz and Nixon soon thereafter, Kissinger conveyed 
Schmidt's warnings of the political seriousness of the West German domestic 
position in the face of this crisis. Yet, after some discussion Washington 
decided that a massive intervention was no longer a possibility and it would to 
180 Ibid., 117-8. 
181 Ibid., 100-1, 106. 
182 Ibid., 102. 
183Ibid., 102-3. 
53 
wait to see what action Europe proposed at the upcoming G-IO meeting before 
giving any firm commitments to intervene to support any form of a float. 184 As 
promised, Kissinger telephoned Schmidt on 7 March 1973 with news of his 
discussions. Given, however, the American stance, Kissinger was quite vague. 
He would only say that Washington was "not wedded to one plan" and were 
prepared to help "put some limits on a float.,,18S But when Schmidt directly 
asked Kissinger whether Washington would be opposed to a European group 
float as this was the preference of Brandt, Kissinger acknowledged that the 
United States would accept a European group float, so long as there were not 
too many conditions attached to it, in particular trade conditions. 186 Schmidt 
assured Kissinger that trade conditions had not been considered. 187 In 
concluding his conversation with Kissinger, it now seemed to the Federal 
Republic that America would not intervene heavily in order to prop up the fixed 
rated system and indeed would prefer a group float. With this message taken, 
Bonn renewed its efforts in Europe to achieve the European group float. 
Although Schmidt did not share this with Kissinger, it was precisely the 
conditions attached to any float, particularly those called for by the British but 
also Italy and France, which were preventing the EC from entering into a group 
float. Even letters from Brandt to both Heath and Pompidou on 8 March in 
which the chancellor implored his counterparts to reconsider their respective 
positions or risk the EC remaining only a customs union failed to have any 
sway.1S8 Thus, when the meeting of the enlarged G-IO opened on 9 March 
1973, it was still very much unclear how the EC or indeed the West would 
respond to the latest currency crisis. 
By meeting's end very little had been resolved. While the EC had 
proposed three issues for debate - intervention in the international monetary 
market, controlling intemationalliquidity and controls on capital movements -
the United States would only discuss the matter of intervention, for Washington 
184 Ibid., 106-12. 
185 Ibid., 113-4. 
186 Ibid., 114. 
187 Ibid., 114. 
188 AAPD 197311, 356; 
54 
had not prepared for the other two. 189 Shultz maintained that the United States 
wished to do its part to defend parities and would be willing to cooperate with 
the other G-1O countries on "practical means" to establish "orderly markets.,,190 
But, Shultz contended, the set of parities must first be known; thus, the Ee must 
first decide whether it was going to undertake a group float or not. France 
responded to the American position, by noting that a decision on the European 
group float was not necessary to the proceedings and would depend heavily on 
the outcome of the present G-I0 meeting. After several hours, the meeting was 
adjourned with no concrete decisions made on intervention, as the United States 
refused to act without knowing what type of float European countries would 
undertake. The G-10 member states, however, did agree to continue to discuss 
the matter in the coming days first at a meeting of the deputies of the enlarged 
G-1O on 12 March 1973 and then another meeting of ministers of the enlarged 
G-1O on 16 March 1973. 191 
While the American attitude at the enlarged G-IO meeting frustrated 
several European countries, it was actually quite beneficial to the West German 
push for a common float. It was now evident to all Ee member states, in 
particular France, that the United States would not intervene on a massive scale 
as Paris had hoped. Moreover, because Washington refused to act until a 
decision was made by the Ee on what type of float it would undertake, it put 
pressure on European countries to make a decision. When the Ee economics 
and finance ministers met on 11-12 March 1973, these factors weighed heavily 
in the debate. 192 The major roadblock to the formation of a European group 
float was Britain. Over the previous week, the Federal Republic had 
campaigned hard for the United Kingdom to alter its demands, but despite 
Bonn's pleas London continued to refuse. 193 West Germany though could not 
accept Britain's extraordinary conditions because of the risk that the problems 
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associated with the sterling balances would shift to the EC at large. 194 Schmidt 
made a last attempt at the EC ministers' meeting to sway Barber by offering to 
quadruple the credit facility already in place, but the latter would not budge. 195 
With London out, Bonn turned its attention to Rome, but the Italians followed 
Britain's lead and maintained that the proper conditions did not exist for a 
common float. 196 
This left only France. Paris though was still leery of being the weak 
currency in the group float. Yet, the Pompidou government had few options, as 
a massive intervention by the United States was clearly no longer an option. 
Moreover, not joining would clearly endanger efforts toward EMU. Given West 
Germany's continued dedication to this European goal over the previous year 
and its efforts to put together a group float which would preserve the progress 
made towards EMU over the previous year, France would be liable for 
obstructing European integration rather than the Federal Republic. Finally after 
several hours of negotiations, Bonn managed to convince Paris to join the float 
by agreeing to a revaluation of the D-mark by 3 percent. When the EC 
economics and finance ministers finally emerged in the early morning hours of 
12 March 1973, they had agreed on a partial group float including the Federal 
Republic, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. The 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Italy would continue to float individually, but 
pledged to join the group float as soon as conditions permitted. In essence those 
countries in the European snake began to float against the dollar, but remained 
pegged to one another. The bands of the EC snake would remain +1- 2.25 
percent and central banks of the snake countries were obliged to intervene in 
Community currencies to defend the group float. 197 Within days of its 
announcement, Norway and Austria also informally joined the European group 
float. 198 
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Despite the conditions around the group float, Bonn was rather pleased 
with the outcome. First, it would have a much more limited effect on the West 
German export economy than an individual float and a 3 percent revaluation of 
the D-mark would help lower West German inflation. 199 In addition, the group 
float solved some of the trade problems around the common agriculture market 
and the participation of non-EC countries in the group float would lead to a 
greater stabilization of trade and monetary relations.2oo It also allowed the 
European integration process to move forward and it preserved relations 
between Paris and Bonn.201 The exclusion of the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Italy from the group float actually made it economically easier for the Federal 
Republic: the Bundesbank would not have to intervene heavily in support of the 
weak pound and lira; and West Germany would be spared large contributions to 
a credit facility and the problems associated with sterling balances.202 
Moreover, this transition to floating finally freed the Bundesbank from having 
to support the dollar and thus sacrificing its domestic goal of stability policy to 
maintaining the external exchange rate. This move would allow the 
Bundesbank and Bonn the opportunity to reduce inflation in the Federal 
Republic and also lead to a drop in international liquidity.203 Finally, West 
Germany perceived the group float as a considerable concession to the United 
States which would probably help them at the upcoming G-I 0 meetings as they 
attempted to persuade America to intervene to control speculative flows; though 
this remained to be seen.204 
At the meeting of deputies of the enlarged G-l 0 on 12 March 1973, little 
progress was made. Despite the United States now knowing what type of parity 
regime the EC would undertake when the markets re-opened, America would 
only agree to take action to ensure "orderly markets," but would not commit to 
any specific steps.205 With this outcome, Bonn became more concerned about 
the European group float. No one knew how the markets would react to the 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Emminger, Wiihrungskrise, 252-3. 
204 BAK, B136/7357, Entwicklung. 
20S BAK, BI26/33544, Sitzung der Stellvertreter der erweiterten Zehnergruppe am 12.3.1973. 
57 
float and West Germany feared that the weakest member in the snake, the 
French franc, might come under pressure.206 The Federal Republic believed it 
was paramount that America be willing to intervene in the markets to ensure 
stability ensued.207 
In the course of this crisis, however, American attitudes had shifted and 
intervention, a serious consideration in the White House only two weeks earlier, 
had quickly lost ground due to Shultz's desire to float and Kissinger's political 
interpretation of Brandt's letter and growing suspicions of European integration 
efforts. Feeling that European unity was not in America's interests, either from 
an economic or political view, Kissinger gave Shultz, at the latter's request, his 
political interpretation of how to handle the upcoming G-I 0 meeting, stating he 
had "only one view right now which is to do as much as we can to prevent a 
united European position without showing our hand." He advised doing as little 
as possible to make the European group float work which meant only 
intervening to benefit individual countries or not intervening at all.208 
Shultz generally followed this advice during his talks with Brandt and 
Schmidt on 15 March 1973. Yet Shultz was not as convinced as Kissinger was 
about the intentions of Europe to use the group float as a means to further 
integration at the expense of Atlantic cooperation. Rather, Shultz pointed out to 
Kissinger in his response that Schmidt was a committed Atlanticist and Schmidt 
had even suggested that the Atlantic finance ministers meet periodically to 
discuss commercial, financial and energy matters relevant to them all. Shultz 
also noted that while Brandt was more ambivalent about European and Atlantic 
priorities, he had also thought to propose a forum for Atlantic cooperation. 209 
Shultz's message, however, did not change Kissinger's mind; instead, Kissinger 
responded, "We should create conditions in which the common float is as hard 
as possible to work.,,210 
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At the meeting of the 0-10 ministers on 16 March 1973, Shultz issued a 
statement which would allow the United States to do just as Kissinger 
prescribed. He assured the other G-I 0 members that America would do its part 
to maintain "an orderly exchange system with flexibility" and would intervene 
"from time to time, at the appropriate time." But Shultz did not indicate when 
or how such intervention would occur.211 Despite offering no specifics, 
America's stated commitment to maintain "orderly markets" surprisingly 
sufficed for its European allies. Indeed, the 16 March 1973 meeting of the 
ministers of the enlarged G-lO was viewed by all as a general success.212 
With the agreements reached at the 0-10 and at the meeting of the EC 
economics and finance ministers on 11-12 March 1973, the Bretton Woods 
system of international monetary relations had collapsed. On 19 March 1973, 
the exchange markets across Europe re-opened. With it a new era of floating 
rates had begun, though it would take Western leaders another three years to 
realize it. For now, they turned their attention to reform efforts in the C-20 with 
the aim of shaping a new international monetary system. With the move to 
floating and the monetary system in limbo, the completion of the reform work 
seemed ever more urgent. Hopes were high that the C-20 reform efforts would 
yield positive results by summer 1974 at the latest. This deadline, however, 
proved impossible to meet as the second economic crisis, the oil crisis, hit the 
West. 
-Conclusions-
Within fifteen months of the signature of what was called the most 
important monetary agreement in history, the Bretton Woods monetary system 
had collapsed under pressure from speculative flows. Having the strongest and 
largest economy in Europe with trade and balance of payments surpluses, West 
Germany was seen as an economic safe haven, as the United States, Great 
Britain and other Western countries struggled to settle their trade and payments 
deficits. Thus, the D-mark was often in the middle of the speculative storms. 
Yet, unlike in previous years, Bonn did not respond to the speculative pressure 
211 TNA, T354/37, Note for the Record - Meeting of Enlarged G.1O on 16 March. 
212 Ibid. 
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by floating the D-mark or revaluing its currency. Instead, for over a year West 
Germany did its part to uphold the parities established under the Smithsonian 
Agreement, erecting complex capital controls, taking in billions of currency 
reserves and promoting external exchange rate stability over its internal price 
stability policy goals. Only when speculation threatened to completely 
undermine West German domestic stability policy in early 1973, did Bonn 
move towards the floating option. 
Behind this shift in West German policy were three main factors. The 
first was political developments - both international and domestic. Having 
damaged efforts toward EMU and severely strained its relations with France by 
floating the D-mark in May 1971, the Brandt government made EMU and its 
relations with France a top priority after the Smithsonian Agreement. Over the 
following year, the Federal Republic revised its system of capital controls, so as 
to limit the possible currency inflows which had forced it to float in the past. In 
addition, Bonn worked closely with Paris to establish first the Ee snake in April 
1972 and then the first phase of EMU at the Paris summit. During the February 
1973 currency crisis, the Brandt government went against the advice and wishes 
of the Bundesbank, refusing to float the D-mark. Instead, Bonn undertook a 
multilateral approach, strongly collaborating with their counterparts in Paris. 
The Federal Republic would have preferred a group float. But when France 
refused, West Germany agreed to the American Volcker Plan in order to 
maintain EMU efforts and the positive relationship between Bonn and Paris. 
Even in the midst of the March crisis Bonn was still adamant about taking a 
European approach, agreeing to a 3 percent revaluation of the D-mark in order 
to make it possible for France to join the group float, thereby allowing the 
centerpiece of EMU to remain intact. Domestic politics too factored heavily in 
Bonn's decision-making process. Having lost constituents as a result of its 
Ostpolitik, the SPD's re-election prospects in 1972 were not strong. The Brandt 
government feared that another dollar crisis or the collapse of EMU efforts 
would weaken their chances further. Thus, Bonn resolved to take the course of 
action most compatible with re-election victory. With Klasen's promise that 
capital controls would prevent a dollar crisis until after the election, Brandt's 
cabinet voted to adopt capital controls in June 1972. 
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Also critical to the change in West German policy was the political 
leadership. Throughout the final year of the Bretton Woods regime, Brandt 
showed firm leadership, as he battled both the Bundesbank, Schiller and of 
course the markets to keep Bonn committed to the European political track. 
During both the February and March crises, Brandt took steps to coordinate 
with his Western counterparts and initiated multilateral responses, rather than 
simply jumping to the national floating solution as he had in the past. Finally, 
Brandt accurately judged when the West German economy could no longer 
uphold the fixed system established under the Smithsonian Agreement and 
pursued a European group float. Alongside Brandt, Schmidt was crucial to the 
strong leadership exhibited by the Federal Republic during this period. 
Schmidt's politically-focused perspective complemented Brandt's 
aforementioned international and domestic priorities. Schmidt's style, both his 
firm delivery of West German interests as well as his ability to build good 
working relationships with his counterparts in the West, contributed greatly to 
Bonn creating a common stability policy in the Ee, reaching agreements for 
EMU and establishing a group float. 
The final factor central to Bonn's actions was its economic strength. On 
the one hand, the strength of the West German economy made the D-mark a 
magnet for speculative flows. This made its policy central in any currency 
crisis. Yet, on the other hand, economic strength allowed the Brandt 
government the flexibility to pursue its political priorities. Had the economy not 
been as strong and those who managed it not as adept, it would have been 
difficult for the Federal Republic to refrain from floating sooner. 
These factors combined to shape West German policy in such a way that 
it had a tremendous impact on the manner in which Bretton Woods collapsed. 
Had West Germany been less concerned with its political European goals and 
positive relations with France and elected to float the D-mark in June 1972, the 
Federal Republic would have most likely avoided bearing the brunt of the 
currency crises of early 1973. Instead, the Federal Republic's use of capital 
controls considerably helped prolong the fixed exchange rate regime. The life 
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of Bretton Woods was also extended by the Brandt government's refusal to 
float independently in the wake of the February currency crisis, Bonn's 
acceptance of the Volcker plan as well as Schmidt's pressure on the Japanese to 
accept the American scheme. 
As the system began to unravel in early March 1973, the Federal 
Republic's actions played an even greater role. West Germany's decision to 
close its exchange markets induced other Western countries to follow suit. 
Bonn then took the lead in organizing a European group float, appealing to the 
EC Commission for such action and pushing for meetings to discuss the 
currency crisis. After the unsuccessful meeting of EC economics and finance 
ministers on 4 March 1973, the Brandt government continued to lobby heavily 
among its European allies for a common float. Although among the bigger EC 
members Bonn failed to convince the United Kingdom and Italy to join, the 
Federal Republic did eventually win over France and the smaller EC states. 
Bonn's success in this regard came not simply because of an agreement to a 3 
percent revaluation of the D-mark; rather, it was also a result of a long 
campaign started by West Germany during the February currency crisis. Had 
the Federal Republic not warmed French officials to the idea of a European 
group float at that time, it is doubtful that Paris would have been so 
forthcoming a few weeks later. 
West Germany, however, not only affected Europe's response to the 
March 1973 currency crisis, but America's as well. As the crisis broke out, the 
Nixon administration was still divided between the options of massive 
intervention and floating. It was Brandt's letter to Nixon which greatly altered 
Washington's path. Brandt's words enraged Kissinger, as it appeared to him as 
though West Germany with its European group float idea was taking action 
based on its suitability to European integration goals, while excluding the 
United States from discussions on an issue so vital to America's interests. In 
response, Kissinger grew more leery of European integration efforts and the 
entire debate in the Nixon administration became much more politicized; 
indeed American policy in the monetary realm became attached to broader 
political efforts to control European integration's effects on the Western 
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alliance, for example via its Year of Europe and New Atlantic Charter 
initiatives. This shift in perspective combined with Shultz's predisposition to 
floating exchange rates contributed greatly to the United States' refusal to 
intervene on a massive scale or agree to concrete terms to do so on a smaller 
scale in support of the European group float. Schmidt's personal appeals to 
Shultz and Kissinger came too late to change the course of events. If anything, 
Schmidt's suggestions to American officials that a European group float was 
Brandt's preferred option only reinforced America's decision to float. That 
being said, the subsequent back-channel discussions between Schmidt and 
Kissinger, allowed Bonn to gain an insight into Washington's position on 
intervention which in turn permitted the former to reassess and attach greater 
effort to its goal of a European group float. 
Brandt's and Schmidt's actions throughout the cnSlS had little 
immediate impact on West Germany's position in the Western alliance. Still, 
the changes that came about during this period as a result of the Federal 
Republic's policies proved to be essential to the transformation of West 
Germany's role in later years. Because of its structure, the European group float 
afforded Bonn many trade and monetary benefits which would enhance its 
economic strength and hence weight in dealing with the numerous economic 
crises that were to occur in the coming years. Moreover, it also gave West 
Germany a larger role in how EMU developed and consequently a greater 
leadership role within Europe. Significantly, Schmidt's move to the finance 
ministry proved important: his approach to economic problems and tactics had 
already altered Washington's and Paris's attitudes on policy issues and their 
perceptions of Bonn's commitment to international cooperation. As will be 
shown in the following chapter, as the West grappled with reform of the 
international monetary system, Schmidt continued to build on the relationships 
he formed during the collapse of Bretton Woods, much to West Germany's 
benefit. 
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-Introduction-
Chapter 2 
International Monetary Reform in the C-20 
July 1972-June 1974 
Monetary policy is foreign policy. 
Helmut Schmidt l 
Problems within the international monetary system had begun long 
before the currency crises of February and March 1973 and the resulting 
collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Already in 1971, serious 
consideration started to be given within the West to reforming the monetary 
system, with the establishment of the Committee of Twenty (C-20) in 
September 1972. But from the beginning the C-20 negotiations were difficult 
and progress slow, as the United States, the European Community (EC) and the 
less developed countries (LDCs) disagreed on the main issues of reform, 
including balance of payments adjustment process, asset settlement, reserve 
currencies, control of disequilibrating capital flows and the special issues of the 
LDCs. Even after the collapse of Bretton Woods, when agreement would seem 
to have become more urgent consensus did not come much easier. Instead, all 
sides remained reluctant to abandon their respective positions and by summer 
1973 reform talks were in near deadlock. Yet despite this, through September 
1973, Western leaders retained hope that the C-20 could agree upon the basic 
principles of reform within a year, especially after the creation of a new forum, 
the Group of Five (G-5) in 1973. This hope, however, was dashed with the 
onset of the oil crisis in autumn 1973, which led to the international balance of 
payments structure being challenged and hence national positions becoming 
more disparate and exchange rate movements more extreme. In the changed 
monetary landscape of early 1974, the C-20 members abandoned their efforts 
towards long-term reform of the international monetary system. 
As was shown in the previous chapter, in the final months of the Bretton 
Woods monetary system, the Federal Republic successfully managed its policy 
I Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective, trans. Ruth Hein (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1990), 158. 
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priorities, balancing the maintenance of its economic strength with its broader 
goals within Europe, in particular European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), achieving both in the process. In this outcome, West German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt and West German Finance Minister, Helmut Schmidt, 
played a key role. The Brandt government's combination of solid policy 
management and strategic leadership had a significant influence on the manner 
in which Bretton Woods collapsed. As a result, West Germany's economic and 
political position in Europe and by default also within the wider Western 
alliance was advanced. Yet, did Bonn's policy priorities remain the same and 
execution of them as swift during the long-term monetary reform efforts 
undertaken in the C-20? In the less personal environment of the C-20 where 
negotiations were conducted by ministers and technical monetary instruments 
the subject of debate, would Brandt and Schmidt continue to be as effective and 
the Federal Republic's influence on the outcome of the reform efforts as great? 
Finally, would Bonn's actions have a similar impact on its political position in 
the West as they did during the collapse of Bretton Woods? 
-The Origins of the C-20 Reform Efforts and Position Building-
Already in the mid-1960s, the problems of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system, including those with gold, the adjustment 
process and the growth of the Euromarkets, were apparent. The First 
Amendment to the Articles of Agreement (the Articles) which governed the 
Bretton Woods system in 1969 did little to quell the difficulties. Instead, 
currency crises and demands on dollar-gold conversion increased. Finally, as 
part of the "Nixon shocks" of 15 August 1971, the American President, Richard 
Nixon, without consulting with or informing America's Western allies in 
advance, closed the gold window and called for urgent reform of the 
international monetary system, among other measures. 2 After the economic 
turmoil brought on by the numerous currency crises of the previous years and 
the unilateral American acts, Europe agreed that fundamental reform of the 
international monetary system was needed. Over the following year, within the 
2 The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, Vol. 1971, Address 
to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: "The Challenge of Peace" -August 15. 1971, 
889. (http://guod.lib.umich.edulcgiltltextitext-
idx?c=opotpus;cc=opotpus;view=toc;idno=4 731800.1971.00 I accessed January 20 II) 
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Group ofTen (G-IO) forum, the West debated how such reform should occur.3 
The process was particularly long because the United States -due to political 
difficulties between the Nixon administration and the managing director of the 
IMF - was opposed to using the existing bodies within the International 
Monetary Fund (lMF), but desired inclusion of the LDCs in the reform 
discussions. In April 1972, the G-IO finally reached a decision to establish a 
new forum within the IMF to handle the reform negotiations - the C-20.4 
As its name suggests, the C-20 was made up of representatives from the 
twenty IMF member constituencies which already existed for the purpose of 
appointing the Executive Board of the IMF. Three officials - a finance minister, 
a central bank governor and a senior civil servant - represented each 
constituency. In addition, because ministers would be unable to meet regularly 
and carry out the detailed work of the negotiations, a C-20 deputies group was 
established to undertake these responsibilities. Finally, a C-20 Bureau carried 
out the secretariat function of the reform talks and was led by the chairman of 
the C-20 deputies. S The C-20 was officially created tllrough a postal ballot of 
the IMF Board of Governors in July 1972 with the first meeting taking place at 
the IMF Annual Meeting in September 1972 under the official name of "the ad 
hoc Committee of the Board of Governors on Reform of the International 
Monetary System and Related Issues.,,6 The ambitious goal of the C-20 was "to 
consolidate all that earlier work and to build, as at Bretton Woods, a complete 
design for an international monetary system that would last for 25 years.,,7 
In anticipation of the first C-20 gathering, through the summer of 1972 
Western states worked to shape their respective positions. In Bonn, the 
preparations were handled predominately by the Finance Ministry because of 
3 Please see Chapter I, footnote 151 for 0-10 membership. 
4 Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976 III: Foreign Economic Policy: International 
Monetary Policy, 1969-1972 (hereafter FRUS III), 619-20. 
http://history.state.gov.gate2.library.lse.ac.ukl (accessed January 2011). 
5 Ibid., 619-620; Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B13617351, Betr.: Stand der 
Oberlegungen zur Reform des internationalen Wiihrungssystems. 
6 John Williamson, The Failure of World Monetary Reform, 1971-1974 (New York: New York 
University Press, 1977), 61. 
7 Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1996), 246. 
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the technical nature of the talks as well as because the meetings were at 
ministerial level. Throughout the negotiations, Schmidt, Karl Otto Pohl, State 
Secretary in the Finance Ministry, and Otmar Emminger, Vice President of the 
Bundesbank, represented the Federal Republic at C-20 ministers' meeting; Pohl 
and Emminger were also the West German representatives at C-20 deputies' 
gatherings. 8 As chancellor, Brandt naturally had a say in the overall direction of 
the West German position, but monetary reform talks seemed not to be among 
his primary concerns. Instead, as was highlighted in the previous chapter, 
throughout 1972 Brandt was focused on European integration efforts, the 
currency crises, the federal elections and Ostpolitik. 9 Even after the move to 
floating in March 1973, Brandt's attention remained on European integration, 
but now also included other issues such as EC-American tensions over 
Kissinger's "Year of Europe" initiative. to Initially, Brandt's lack of 
involvement had few repercussions, as Bonn had similar policy goals to those 
undertaken during the collapse of Bretton Woods: namely, furthering European 
integration while also maintaining West German economic strength. 
At a special meeting of EC economics and finance ministers on 17-18 
July 1972, the Federal Republic along with its EC partners agreed that they 
would present a common position throughout the C-20 negotiations. The EC 
members believed that this would be productive on two fronts. First, a common 
EC position would be a logistical advantage - getting agreement among 20 
different constituencies would be nigh impossible if a few did not reach 
8 BAK, B13617351, TO-Punkt 1: Reform des Wiihrungssystems: Zum Treffen der EWG 
Wirtschafts- und Finanzminister am 17.118/711972 (hereafter B 13617351, EWG); BAK, 
B 126/33476, Kurzbericht iiber die Sitzung der Stellvertreter des Zwanziger-Ausschusses vom 
27. bis zum 29.11.1972 (hereafter B 126/33476, November Stellvertreter). 
9 ArnulfBaring and Manfred Gortemaker, Machtwechsel: Die A'ra Brandt-Scheel (Berlin: 
Ullstein, 1998),473-597; Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen mit den Notizen zum Fall G. (Munich: 
Ullstein, 2003), 295-314; Also see Chapter I. 
10 Daniel Mockli, "Asserting Europe's Distinct Identity: the EC Nine and Kissinger's Year of 
Europe," in The Strained Alliance: U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to Carter, eds. 
Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. Schwarz (Washington DC: Publications of the German 
Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2010),195-220; Fabian Hilfrich, "West 
Germany's Long Year of Europe: Bonn between Europe and the United States," in The Strained 
Alliance: U.S.-European Relationsfrom Nixon to Carter, eds. Matthias Schulz and Thomas A. 
Schwarz (Washington DC: Publications of the German Historical Institute and Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 237-256. 
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agreement beforehand. II Second, since the Ee was working towards EMU and 
closer European political cooperation as well, it naturally followed that Europe 
should speak with one voice at international negotiations. 12 At the same 
meeting, the Ee ministers attempted to agree to objectives for reform with the 
aim of coordinating their respective positions before the IMF annual meeting in 
September 1972. 13 To this end, the Ee ministers focused on four aspects of 
reform: exchange rate policy and the adjustment process; controlling 
international liquidity; dollar-gold convertibility; and short-term capital 
movements. 14 
West Germany's approach to the four topics of discussion was greatly 
influenced by recent economic events as well as Stablitatspolitik, a chief aim of 
West German monetary as well as economic policies. Being the main target of 
short-term capital flows, the Federal Republic was well aware of the difficulties 
in maintaining fixed parities and the benefits of floating. Yet Bonn also 
understood the trade benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime and was loath to 
lose them. Thus, West Germany argued for a more flexible fixed parity system 
in which the bands of fluctuation would be wide and the adjustments to rates 
more timely. IS The Brandt government was also of the opinion that floating 
exchange rates under the permission and supervision of the IMF should be 
allowed until a final agreement on reform of the international monetary system 
was completed. 16 
For Bonn, the final three issues intertwined with one another under the 
broader heading of control of international liquidity. With its inflation rate 
steadily rising and its Stabilitatspolitik ever more difficult to maintain, the 
Federal Republic was particularly keen to ensure a mechanism for controlling 
II Hans-Peter Schwarz et aI., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1972, vol. 2, (MUnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003) (hereafter AAPD 197212), 
940-1. 
12 BAK, Bl36/7352, TO-Punkt 2: Meinungsaustausch iiber die Arbeiten des Zwanziger-
Ausschusses (hereafter B 136/7352, Meinungsaustausch). 
13 IMF, S 1817, European Communities Commission 1972, Meeting of EEC Finance Ministers 
17118 July 1972 -Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
14 BI36/7351, EWG. 
IS Ibid.; B 136/7351, Erkliirung Staatssektretiir Dr. Emde. 
16 Ibid. 
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global liquidity in the reformed system. 17 West Germany saw two main sources 
of liquidity creation. First and foremost was the United States and its 
exploitation of the special privileges afforded the primary reserve currency 
country. Over the previous few years America had not settled its imbalances in 
primary assets; but rather through the creation of liabilities. In this way, 
Washington had financed its domestic programs as well as the Vietnam War. 
This form of financing led not only to an explosion in international liquidity 
through the early 1970s, but also contributed to chronic balance of payments 
deficits for the United States, the combination of which triggered currency 
crises. The closing of the gold window signalled that the United States intended 
henceforth only to settle in its own liabilities. 18 
A second major source of liquidity creation was the Euromarkets. Since 
the 1960s, the capital markets in Europe had grown massively, as central banks 
began placing their currency reserves through them and private entities used 
them for investment and financing purposes. Like America's exploitation of its 
privileged position, the Euromarkets played a key role in the currency crises. 
Not only did they inject liquidity into the system but due their enormous size, a 
given currency could be speculatively forced into having its par value altered or 
heavy intervention measures to support designated rates, regardless of whether 
the underlying economic data indicated that its relative value was correct. The 
floats of the D-mark in 1969 and 1971 were brought on primarily by such 
speculation. 19 
In order to regam control over international liquidity, the Federal 
Republic advocated a series of measures. First, to overcome the asymmetry that 
existed between the United States and the rest of the countries under the Bretton 
Woods System, Bonn proposed not simply the return of convertibility, but a 
symmetrical settlement: all countries - regardless of their previous status -
17 British National Archives (hereafter TNA), T354/139, German Paper on International 
Monetary Reform (hereafter T354/139, German); B13617352, Meinungsaustausch. 
18 Williamson, 78. 
19 BAK, B126/33476, A Note on Measures to affect Euro-Currency Markets; BAK, 
B126/33476, Observations on the Problem of Disequilibrating Capital Flows; B13617352, 
Meinungsaustausch. 
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should be required to settle their imbalances promptly in primary assets.20 This 
meant that America would be forced to convert all dollar balances into primary 
assets, thus putting the dollar on an equal footing with all other currencies and 
forcing the United States to address its balance of payments deficit. In addition, 
the Federal Republic called for SDRs to replace dollars and gold as the primary 
reserve asset and for the introduction of "working balances" with regard to 
currency reserves. 21 "Working balances" implied that central banks would only 
hold reserve currencies in an amount necessary to maintain an orderly system. 
Countries would then be required to place any excess reserves in other 
international reserve instruments, in particular SDRs.22 Furthermore, the Brandt 
government pushed for the creation of a system of controls through the DECO 
or IMF which would limit capital movements and the actions of the 
Euromarkets in general. Finally, Bonn was keen to deal with the enormous 
dollar overhang in existence as part of its efforts to control liquidity in the 
future and thus suggested that a system for consolidating it be developed. 23 
West Germany found only partial support among the two other major 
economies in the EC: France and Great Britain. Shaped by its strict preference 
of fixed exchange rates and relatively rarely subject to massive speculative 
flows, Paris agreed with Bonn on a fixed, but adjustable exchange rate regime. 
The Pompidou government however did not believe there were any 
circumstances under which floating exchange rates should be legalized.24 The 
French also shared the Germans' desire to introduce symmetrical settlement in 
primary assets between all countries.25 This was not necessarily because of any 
overwhelming worry about the inflationary effects of an overabundance of 
systemic liquidity as it was for Bonn; rather, France saw the issue in terms of 
power politics: in the future the United States should have the same rights and 
20 B 13617351, EWG; T354/139, German; B 13617352, Meinungsaustausch. 
21 BI3617351,EWG. 
22 Ibid.; B13617351, Erkliirung Staatssektretiir Dr. Emde; T354/139, German. 
23 Ibid.; B136/7352, Meinungsaustausch. 
24 Williamson, 88; BAK, B13617352, Europiiisch-amerikanische Beziehungen Reform des 
Weltwiihrungssystems (hereafter B13617352, Beziehungen). 
25 Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank (hereafter Bbk), N21K75, Note on the 
Symmetry in the Reserve Asset Settlement System. 
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duties as all other countries.26 In addition, because more than half of French 
reserves were in gold, they wanted it to retain a strong place alongside SORs in 
the future monetary order and hoped to increase the official price of it. 27 
Having been at the center of the speculative storms in recent years and forced to 
leave the EC snake and float independently in recent weeks, the United 
Kingdom agreed with the West German approach to the exchange rate regime. 
Although less concerned about the inflationary effects of liquidity, London 
shared Bonn's positions on the removal of the current asymmetry between the 
dollar and other currencies as well as SORs, gold and consolidation.28 
By the end of the meeting EC ministers had managed to agree to eight 
broad points which reflected their common perspectives on the goals of 
monetary reform. At the heart of their emerging common position was the 
agreement on the issue of convertibility or, as it was later referred to, "asset 
settlement": although Europe was still undecided over which reserve 
instruments should become the primary reserve asset, all agreed that 
convertibility of dollar reserves was essential and that all countries should be 
required to settle in primary assets. In addition, the EC concurred that the future 
system should be based on fixed, but adjustable exchange rates. Given 
European differences on the concept, floating went unmentioned. Finally 
Europe also agreed the following: there should be greater regulation of 
international liquidity; attempts should be made to diminish disruptive short-
term capital movements; all participants should maintain balance of payments 
equilibrium and abide by the same rules and duties; the interests of the LOCs 
should play a larger role; and reform of the international monetary system 
should in no way be incompatible with the further development ofEMU.29 Yet, 
strong differences on key aspects of reform still remained among the European 
states, above all floating, the role of gold and SORs, the means to control short-
term capital movements and how to specifically address the special issues of 
LOCs. Although these issues continued to be discussed over the following 
26 BAK, B13617351, Ergebnisvermerk iiber das Sondertreffen der EWG-Finanzminister am 
17.118. Juli 1972 in London (hereafter B13617351, Ergebnisvermerk). 
v . -ibid.; Bbk, N21K89, BetrefJ-ZusammenJassung erster Jranzosischer Uberlegungen zum 
Problem des Numeraire, B13617352, Meinungsaustausch. 
28 B 13617351, Ergebnisvermerk. 
29 Ibid. 
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months, EC finance ministers failed to agree common positions by the first C-
20 gathering in September 1972 as they had initially hoped. 3o Consequently, 
Europe went into the first C-20 meeting with general goals, but no clear plan as 
to how these objectives were to be attained technically. 
The United States took a different approach to the C-20 talks. Viewing 
them as the first real opportunity to devise a plan for an overhaul of the 
monetary system, Washington worked throughout the summer of 1972 to create 
a comprehensive reform strategy. 31 America's position on key aspects of 
reform contrasted noticeably with Europe's. While Washington agreed with its 
European allies that the balance of payments differentials between the major 
Western states were disrupting the international monetary system, America did 
not view itself as primarily responsible for this. The United States believed that 
the problem lay above all with the surplus countries, in particular the Federal 
Republic and Japan. It seemed to Washington that the lack of substantial 
incentives for surplus countries to decrease or eliminate their surpluses had 
driven America into deficit. Over the years, the United States had acted as the 
systemic balance or residual country, allowing other countries to live with 
undervalued currencies, thereby maintaining their competitiveness and 
increasing their balance of payments surpluses. Surplus countries were able to 
hold and even increase their stockpile of reserves without any recourse under 
the Bretton Woods rules, while deficit countries felt great pressure to reduce 
their deficits. Thus, from the Nixon administration's perspective, the main 
problem was the asymmetry in the adjustment process that existed between 
deficit and surplus countries. In order to correct this problem the balance of 
payments adjustment process would have to be reformed to impose greater 
obligations on the countries in surplus to correct their positions. 32 Based on this 
view, the United States developed its proposal for reform. 
30 B13617351, Zur Klasurtagung vom 1.12.9.1972. 
31 Paul Volcker and Toyoo Gyohten, Changing Fortunes: The World's Money and the Threat to 
American Leadership (New York: Times Books, 1992), 117-8. 
32 Bbk, N21K75 , Vermerk: Betreff-Objektive Indikatoren (hereafter N21K75, Indikatoren); 
BAK, B126/33478, I. Anpassungsprozess; BAK, B126/33476, Stellvertreter November. 
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Objective reserve indicators formed the core of America's proposal. The 
Nixon administration understood that the other members of the newly 
established C-20 were going to require that the reformed system be based on a 
fixed exchange rate regime and include convertibility. Yet if such a system 
were to be created and not place America in the same position as it had been 
under the Bretton Woods system, Washington concluded that demand for could 
not outweigh the supply of reserves. To this end, the United States devised the 
'reserve indicator system.' In it, countries would be forced to adjust when 
reserves passed their respective reserve 'norm' - an internationally agreed 
initial reserve base level. If a country refused to adjust, it would be susceptible 
to sanctions or 'pressures' from the IMF.33 
Although the American proposal focused primarily on the adjustment 
process, it also dealt with points related to convertibility and the exchange rate 
regime. Washington accepted a return of dollar convertibility into primary 
reserve assets under two conditions: flf~t, an improvement in the US liquidity 
position; and second, the introduction of a reserve indicator. In addition, the 
United States advocated the introduction of a 'convertibility point' or later 
referred to as 'primary asset holding limits.' If a country's reserves exceeded 
this point, the country would be prohibited from converting additional foreign 
exchange accruals into primary reserve assets. Contrary to the view of most EC 
states and in particular West Germany, America did not wish to ban holdings of 
foreign exchange. 34 As to the fixed exchange rate regime, the United States 
proposed the introduction of multi currency intervention (MCl) under which 
national currencies would be pegged to a basket of currencies rather than the 
dollar. This idea was meant to deal with what the United States saw as a further 
asymmetry in the Bretton Woods system: namely, that because of its status as 
the principal intervention currency, America had only half the flexibility for 
market exchange rate variation as all other countries and thus, greater 
limitations on its economic and monetary policy options. 3s 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
3S Ibid.; Bbk, N21K75, BetrejJ - Reform des Weltwiihrungssystem, "A Note on Possible 
Intervention Arrangements". 
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-Slow Reform: C-20 Negotiations September J972-September J973-
The first meeting of the C-20 ministers took place on 25-29 September 
1972. Most of speakers' remarks, including all European representatives, 
focused on an August IMF report. 36 Although presenting options for possible 
solutions to monetary problems, it gave no concrete suggestions for action. In 
six "chapters" it set forth areas for discussion: the necessity of reform; the 
exchange rate mechanism; convertibility and the financing of balance of 
payments positions; the role of various reserve instruments; the problem of 
disruptive capital movements; and finally monetary reform and the LDCs. 37 
Most C-20 members commented on the individual areas outlined; the United 
States, however, did not follow this pattern, as the American Secretary of the 
Treasury, George Shultz, revealed via the American proposal. Immediate 
responses to it were limited; instead, the C-20 ministers concentrated on more 
procedural matters. Using the IMF report as a starting point, the C-20 ministers 
agreed to four themes for discussion: the adjustment process and the exchange 
rate mechanism; reserve assets and convertibility; capital controls; and the 
special issues of the LDCs. Over the coming six months, the C-20 deputies 
were to meet and negotiate each issue. The chairman of the C-20 deputies was 
then to give a progress report to the C-20 ministers at their second meeting in 
March 1973.38 It was hoped that a considerable amount of headway would be 
made on each item. 
The convergence of ideas on the first theme - the adjustment process 
and the exchange rate mechanism - was limited. At the November 1972 
deputies gathering, the American Undersecretary of the Treasury, Paul Volcker, 
took the opportunity to explain in more detail the American proposal, but many 
of the deputies were skeptical, in particular West Germany's. Bonn argued 
against the usefulness of technical indicators, citing the risk of speculation if 
warning points were made public as well as the economic inaccuracy of using 
only reserves to determine when a country should adjust. Instead, it was 
36 BI36/7351, Zur Klasurtagung vom 1.12.9.1972. 
37 BAK, BI36/7351, Vermerk: Belr.: 1nhaltsangabe des Berichts der Direktoren des 1WF zur 
Reform des internationalen Wiihrungssystems; BAK, B136/7351, Report from Dr. Lore 
Fuenfgelt. 
38 B 136/7352, Meinungsaustausch; B 136/7352, Beziehungen. 
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maintained that the IMF should play a bigger role in determining when a 
country might need to adjust. Ultimately, however, the Federal Republic 
believed, that the individual country had to decide when and how it adjusted. 
Luckily for Bonn, its European partners as well as nearly all LDCs shared this 
view. 39 
Changing the American position would prove difficult: Washington 
believed in its plan and was not keen to have the IMF more involved in the 
international monetary system than necessary. The United States' argued that 
the objective reserve indicator system would be efficient and equitable, as 
national governments tended to avoid or delay politically uncomfortable 
adjustment decisions and international organizations, such as the IMF, were 
reluctant to deal with the politically sensitive issue of adjustment. 40 After two 
meetings, the C-20 deputies had only managed to slightly bridge the gap 
between the two positions. There was agreement that objective indicators could 
play a role in the adjustment process, in particular through opening a 
consultation process in the IMF. Yet, disagreement abounded as to which 
technical indicators should be used, whether the indicators should automatically 
trigger measures for adjustment, to what degree the IMF, rather that an 
individual country, should determine the necessary steps for adjusting, and what 
pressures should be applied if a country failed to adjust. Moreover, although the 
C-20 deputies concurred that the IMF consultation procedure should be 
improved upon, they failed to specify how this was to occur.41 
The C-20 deputies had less trouble reaching an agreement on the 
exchange rate mechanism, as all held the position that the reformed system 
should be based on fixed, but adjustable exchange rates.42 Moreover, all C-20 
39 BAK, B13617352, Vermerk: Stand der vorbereitenden Uber/egungen for die Sitzung der 
SteUvertreter des Zwanzigerausschusses am 27.129.11.1972 (BI3617352, Stand); BAK, 
BI26/55902, Betr.: Ergebnis des 44. TrefJen der EG-Finanzminister am 15.116. Januar 1973 in 
Luxemburg (hereafter B 126/55902, EG) 
40 N21K75, Indikatoren; Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the 
International Monetary System (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 224. 
41 BAK, B 13617352, Betr.: Sitzung der SteUvertreter des Zwanziger-Ausschusses am 
23,/25.1.1973 (hereafter B13617352, SteUvertreter Januar); B13617352, Meinungsaustausch; 
B 13617352, Beziehungen. 
42 B 13617352, SteUvertreter Januar. 
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deputies also believed that a country should first attempt to employ economic 
policy instruments when adjustment was required and only resort to an 
adjustment in the exchange rate when absolutely necessary.43 There were, 
however, varying views about the legalization of floating exchange rates, but 
here the split was not between the United States and the EC, but rather within 
Europe. 44 After having been forced to float several times over the previous 
years, the Federal Republic advocated legalizing floating rates, so long as they 
were limited in nature and IMF approved. 45 Bonn's European partners 
generally supported this position with France being the exception. Vehemently 
opposed to floating exchange rates, Paris rejected their legalization.46 Despite 
numerous discussions in both the C-20 and EC forums throughout this period, 
the French refused to alter their stance; this was only one of several issues on 
which the EC, despite its aim of presenting a joint position, failed to do so. 
The C-20 deputies struggled even more to reach agreements on the 
second theme - convertibility and reserve assets. 47 As pointed out earlier, these 
issues were of great importance to the Federal Republic because of their 
relationship to systemic liquidity and Bonn's position in the talks reflected this 
concern. As it had done at the special meeting of EC finance ministers in July 
1972, West Germany argued for mandatory asset settlement and the 
introduction of "working balances" for all newly accrued currency reserves 
with any amount exceeding the balance going into primary reserves, above all 
SDRs.48 In addition, Bonn also supported the Italian idea of a substitution 
account for the existing dollar overhang. The idea of asset settlement was one 
of the items which the EC countries had quickly agreed upon at the special 
43 Ibid. 
44 Despite the presence of floating over the past several years, technically floating was still 
considered illegal under the Articles. Thus, certain states wished to legalize floating with the 
permission of the IMF. 
45 B13617352, Stand. 
46 B13617352, Beziehungen; BAK, B13617352, Betref! Dritte Sitzung 
desStellvertreterausschusses der Zwanzig for die Reform des internationalen W iihrungssystems 
am 23. his 25.1.1973 (hereafter B13617352, Dritte). 
47 Ibid.; Bbk, N21K89, EBDI731106-Subject-Approaches to Consolidation, Convertibility and 
Asset Settlement. 
48 Ibid. 
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meeting of EC finance ministers in July 1972 and thus Bonn received firm 
support for this notion from its European allies.49 
While America accepted that convertibility should be part of the 
reformed system, Washington made the adoption of an adjustment process 
based on technical indicators a prerequisite to it. The United States would not 
be able to agree to settle in reserve assets so long as surplus countries could go 
on accumulating dollars and hence claims on American assets. Moreover, 
Washington argued that it should remain a right, not a duty, for creditor 
countries to present dollars to the United States for conversion at a time and 
magnitude of their choosing. This would allow for greater elasticity in the 
system, as countries would be able to determine the composition of their 
reserves according to their economic needs. 50 With regard to the consolidation 
of the dollar overhang, however, the United States agreed with the European 
position that the suggestion for a substitution account should be investigated. 51 
Many of the LDCs and the remaining industrialized countries, such as Canada, 
tended to take a largely American perspective. While they firmly desired a 
return of convertibility and would have preferred that the United States also 
settle in primary reserves rather than liabilities, it was more important to these 
countries to have the "freedom" to determine the composition of their 
reserves 52 - in particular the oil producing states, preferred holding dollars as 
they could gain a good return by placing them through the Euromarkets. 53 
During talks on reserve assets, Bonn had to be more careful in arguing 
its position. The EC had agreed going into the C-20 discussions to present a 
united position, but during the first meetings of the C-20 ministers and deputies, 
the European countries had struggled to do so. Consequently, the EC finance 
ministers had resolved at their meeting in January 1973 to improve upon this. 54 
Unfortunately, however, the EC was still divided about the role that gold should 
play in any future system. West Germany, as indeed most countries in the EC, 
49 Ibid. 
so B 13617352, Stellvertreter Januar. 
SI B 13617352, Dritte. 
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had a mild preference for a diminishing role of gold over time. In this context 
Bonn did not wish to see an increase in the official price of gold, as this would 
increase global liquidity and hence disrupt efforts towards Stabilitiitspolitik. 
Nor was the Brandt government prepared to see gold bought or sold on the 
market. 55 France, however, firmly stuck with its advocacy for a strong role for 
gold in the reformed system. Paris believed that if gold could not exist equally 
alongside the SDR, then the official price of gold should be increased and 
governments should be free to buy and sell gold on the market. 56 
Thus, given the EC finance ministers' agreement to appear united, in 
their comments, West German officials focused on SDRs rather than gold. The 
Federal Republic argued that SDRs should become the principal reserve asset. 
Surprisingly, not just Bonn's EC partners, but all of the C-20 deputies agreed 
with this position. 57 Disagreement, however, quickly followed over how to 
increase the attractiveness so that governments would choose to hold SDRs 
instead of currencies and the size of future SDR allocations. 58 Moreover, 
despite West Germany and the EC members' limited comments, it did not make 
the issue of gold any easier to resolve. Instead, France argued forcefully for 
increasing the price of gold and the sale of it on the open market. While Paris 
gained support from some speakers for the market sale of gold, the French ran 
up against a staunch refusal from the United States and a limited number of 
LDCs on its demands for gold. 59 
The C-20 deputies were to debate the topics of disequilibrating capital 
movements and the special issues of the LDCs at their March 1973 meeting, but 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system only days before altered 
these plans. As a consequence C-20 deputies spent the majority of the gathering 
discussing the recent developments with only capital movements being touched 
upon. This latter issue was important to Bonn, as Germany had been the main 
target for destabilizing capital flows, forcing the Federal Republic to float on 
SS B 136/7352, Meinungsaustausch; B 136/7352, Beziehungen. 
S6 Ibid. 
S7 B136/7352, SteUvertreter Januar, B13617352, Dritte. 
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numerous occasions. Bonn had suggested the use of coordinated capital 
controls at the July 1972 special meeting ofEC finance ministers, but due to the 
new circumstances, the Federal Republic changed its position, maintaining that 
it was futile to attempt to erect capital controls to try to prevent speculative 
movements. West German officials now argued for coordination of interest rate 
policies, greater flexibility in the exchange rate system, restricted investment of 
reserves on the Euromarkets and the imposition of reserve requirements. 60 
While several countries including the United States agreed with the Federal 
Republic's position on capital controls, some industrialized countries including 
France and Belgium as well as LDCs did not. Given the recent currency crisis, 
nearly all C-20 members concurred that a more flexible system was needed, but 
several countries, including the majority of the LDCs, were still leery of 
restricting reserve investment on the Euromarkets and Washington's position 
on convertibility remained unchanged. 61 Thus, much like the first two themes, 
little headway was made on dealing with disequilibrating capital movements. 
In the run up to the second meeting of the C-20 ministers on 26-27 
March 1973 it hence became clear that the C-20 negotiations were not 
proceeding particularly well. On nearly all the themes discussed, the United 
States took the opposing view to the majority of European countries. Yet, 
contrary to key works on the C-20 discussions, difficulties were not just the 
result of a transatlantic divide.62 After all the Europeans themselves proved 
incapable of reaching a common perspective on key aspects of reform. In some 
instances the EC had managed to conceal these divisions at the C-20 deputies 
meetings; but in others they had shone through. Just prior to the March C-20 
ministers meeting, European finance ministers met in a final attempt to 
establish harmony - to no avail. 63 Recognizing that their positions on reserve 
currencies, capital movements and issues of the LDCs were still disparate, the 
EC finance ministers resolved that in the joint EC statement to be read at the 
forthcoming C-20 meeting, they would focus primarily on the issue which they 
60 B13617352, Belr.: Sitzungen der Minister und der SteUvertreter des Zwanziger-Ausschusses 
vom 22. his zum 27.3.1973. 
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agreed upon - adjustment. In addition, they would also call for further priority 
consideration to be given to asset settlement and convertibility. 64 
Washington, similarly dismayed by the C-20's progress, believed that 
the blame for it lay with the EC.65 As was shown in the previous chapter, much 
of the Nixon administration's actions during the March currency crisis and 
subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods system were influenced by the 
potential repercussions on C-20 reform talks. Heading into the C-20 ministers 
meeting, America hoped that its adopted course would both provide it greater 
leverage in the C-20 to push through its vision of reform as well as increase the 
speed with which the talks were concluded. 66 
As planned, the chairman of the deputies opcncd the second meeting of 
the C-20 ministers on 26-27 March 1973 by providing a report on the deputies' 
progress. As each constituency responded to the report and offered its views on 
reform talks thus far, however, C-20 members mostly recapitulated the same 
positions they had taken over the previous six months. As talks moved onto the 
fourth theme - the special issues of the LDCs - further division appeared. The 
main point of discusssion concerned the creation of a link between additional 
SDR allocations and increased aid to the LDCs. "The link," as it would come to 
be known, was strongly opposed by the Federal Republic because its potential 
inflationary effects. 67 Bonn was joined by Washington in its opposition, with 
the American officials arguing that Congress would never agree to a reform 
package which included it. The rest of the EC, in particular the United 
Kingdom and Italy, however, were in favor of it as were the LDCs. 68 
It is important to note that C-20 ministers did manage to reach at least 
some agreement, helping to move the reform talks ever so slightly forward. 
64 BAK, B13617352, Ergebnisvermerk iiber das Sondertreffen der EG-Finanzminister am 23. 
Marz 1973 (hereafter B13617352, Sondertreffen Marz); BAK, B13617352, Statement by Mr. 
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Much like their deputy counterparts, the C-20 ministers spent a significant 
amount of time discussing recent monetary events, and it became clear that the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system had an effect on the perspectives of the 
C-20 members on two main issues. First, every C-20 constituency concurred 
that the main reason for the recent currency crises and collapse of Bretton 
Woods was the American balance of payments deficit and thus an improvement 
in it was a prerequisite for effective reform. 69 Second, with a large number of 
countries now floating their currencies, it was only logical that the issue of the 
exchange rate mechanism would become more controversial. Somewhat 
surprisingly, all agreed: all C-20 ministers affirmed that the reformed system 
should be based on "fixed, but adjustable par values;" and, France accepted, 
that floating on a "temporary" basis should be permitted.7o This French change 
of position was probably to do with the fact that Paris was now part of the 
European group float against the dollar. Whatever the case may be, all C-20 
members now recognized the necessity and practicality of floating in certain 
situations and thus resolved that it should be allowed under the Articles. 
Despite this agreement though, C-20 members were still divided as to whether 
or not there should be a timeframe imposed on floating - as the French desired, 
and if a country should need the IMF's permission to float (which both the 
United States and the United Kingdom opposed).71 On the back of these meager 
convergences, the chairman of the deputies was instructed to prepare an outline 
of reform for the September 1973 ministers meeting, including solutions agreed 
on by the deputies and identifying the key questions the ministers needed to 
decide upon. 72 
Over the coming months though, as the capitalist world adjusted to 
floating exchange rates, Bonn's policy priorities and hence its perspectives on 
international monetary reform began to change. With efforts toward European 
economic and monetary union (EMU) moving ahead after the creation of the 
European group float in March 1973 and the Federal Republic no longer having 
69 Ibid; B13617352, Erklarung von Bundesminister Helmut Schmidt Man 1973 (hereafter 
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to subjugate its domestic economic policy goals, in particular Stabilitatspolitik, 
to external exchange rate stability, West Germany's focus turned to fighting 
inflation. 73 By April 1973, the West Gennan inflation rate had climbed to 7 
percent, a figure considered to be very high by West German officials.74 Within 
weeks of the start of the group float, the Bundesbank took steps to lower 
inflation, increasing interest rates to between 7 and 9 percent. 7S Additionally the 
Brandt government introduced the most extensive stability program in the post-
war period in May 1973. In it, wide-ranging restrictive measures, such as 
raising taxes and the creation of a stability bond, were instituted in an attempt to 
regain price stability.76 In addition, West Germany pushed for and succeeded in 
getting common measures on inflation fighting in the EC in June 1973.77 When 
Bonn's restrictive course began to affect its partners in the EC, in particular the 
United Kingdom, Brandt was personally asked by the British Prime Minister, 
Ted Heath, to lower West Gennan interest rates. Yet Bonn refused to waver 
from its inflation-fighting path. 78 
The emphasis on regaining price stability had an impact on the C-20 
talks. Since the start of discussions on international monetary reform, the 
Federal Republic had been above all worried about controlling international 
liquidity because of its inflationary repercussions, but it had also made efforts 
to reach a common European position for the sake of European integration 
efforts. 79 By spring 1973, West Germany began to place a greater emphasis on 
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the former. so During the May and July 1973 C-20 deputies meetings, Bonn 
refused to budge on any point which could potentially result in the expansion of 
international liquidity, such as "the link."SI More importantly, the Federal 
Republic's anti-inflation drive also affected its perspectives on floating: the 
Brandt government was reluctant to cease floating until global liquidity could 
be brought under control, for West Germany wished to avoid importing 
inflation as it had during the currency crises over the previous year. S2 
Yet, for Bonn better control of international liquidity was only part of 
the prerequisite for a return to a fixed exchange rate regime. Having 
experienced the full wrath of the February and March 1973 currency crises, the 
Brandt government was unwilling to take part in a reformed system based on 
fixed, but adjustable exchange rates so long as the dollar did not strengthen and 
America's balance of payments improve. 83 Indeed, at their March 1973 
meeting, the C-20 ministers had agreed that the latter was a prerequisite for 
reform. Yet, between April and June 1973, the dollar depreciated substantially, 
as confidence in the American currency rapidly declined and the U.S. balance 
of payments position was not a priority of the Nixon administration, given the 
outbreak of Watergate and the recent surge of tensions between America and 
the EC over the new Atlantic Declaration.84 By June 1973 Schmidt maintained 
in an intergovernmental meeting, "Ich sehe nicht - das sage ich ganz im 
Klartext - wie im Laufe dieses Jahres der Dollar wieder allseitig als stabil 
eingeschatzt werden wird. Infolgedessen sehe ich auch flir den Augenblick 
kaum irgendeine Chance flir eine Reform des Weltwahrungssystems im Sinne 
der bisherigen Reformdiskussion, es sei denn, man ist der Auffassung - die ich 
mir nieht zu eigen machen -, das allseitige Floaten der wichtigsten Wahrungen 
der Welt sei schon das neue Weltwahrungssystems."s5 While Schmidt refrained 
from immediately voicing this perspective at the C-20 meetings, it was clear 
that he was beginning to doubt the usefulness of the C-20 negotiations. 
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This feeling was only reinforced by the work of the C-20 deputies 
during their May and July 1973 meetings. As pointed out above, West Germany 
was committed to its positions on controlling international liquidity; however, 
the United States and France were equally attached to their perspectives. 
America was particularly inflexible about its approach on the adjustment 
process, seeing it as a prerequisite for the return to convertibility. France was 
also adamant in its views on gold and asset settlement. Consequently, despite 
the establishment of working groups on the adjustment process and technical 
indicators, capital movements and "the link," the C-20 deputies had little 
success in bridging the significant gaps between members on any of the key 
issues of reform. Instead, deadlock occurred. 86 
In an attempt to find some common ground at least among themselves 
and devise a method for reaching at least some agreement with the United 
States, the EC monetary committee met shortly before the C-20 ministers 
meeting on 19-20 July 1973. Pessimism overshadowed much of the 
conversation; and the European partners reached few compromises on the 
outstanding contrasting positions. 87 In these circumstances, the Brandt 
government began to take the initiative by making a strong plea for focusing on 
the two issues where there was at least already a "semi-agreement": adjustment 
and asset settlement. This left the other matters for a later time. Crucially, Bonn 
was prepared to compromise and move closer to the American position on the 
adjustment process, even taking up the French suggestion of a negative interest 
on surplus countries with excess reserves in order to facilitate consensus and 
progress. The Federal Republic based its argument on the effect that C-20 
progress or the lack thereof would have on the exchange rate markets which in 
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recent weeks had been particularly erratic and were making the European 
currency snake harder to maintain. 88 France, however, was more apprehensive 
about both limiting the focus of the talks and accepting even small portions of 
the American plan for adjustment. Paris warned that compromise with the 
Americans was equivalent to allowing a "Trojan horse" into the discussions. 89 
Most EC members though agreed with the West German perspective and 
followed Bonn's lead, as focusing solely on adjustment and asset settlement 
was the best way to avoid a split amongst the Europeans and to advance overall 
C-20 negotiations. 90 
When the C-20 ministers met at the end of July 1973 the entire reform 
project seemed to be in limbo, unless one side was willing to compromise. As 
agreed at the EC monetary committee, Europe broke the stalemate first. Despite 
his feelings of frustration towards the entire C-20 process, Schmidt suggested a 
compromise on the adjustment process in which Washington's desire for 
graduated pressures on countries unwilling to adjust would be accepted so long 
as it followed a previous IMF decision to do so, rather than through an 
automatic trigger based on a technical indicator. 91 In addition, Schmidt made a 
concession on the issue of asset settlement, suggesting a multi-currency 
intervention system. 92 In this way, the United States would still be required to 
settle like all other major trading states, while the smaller LDCs would retain 
the right to compose their reserve assets as they saw fit. France also presented a 
possible compromise, proposing a system of graduated pressures in which those 
surplus countries with excess reserves would have to pay into a special account 
with a negative interest rate. Eventually even the United States showed a 
willingness to compromise, noting on technical indicators that they were not 
meant to be automatic triggers for pressure to be applied, but rather 
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presumptive. Moreover, America was also open to West Germany's suggestion 
for MCI. After all, such a system was part of its overall reform proposal. 93 
Although no firm agreements were reached at the July 1973 C-20 
ministers meeting, the number of compromise proposals and the cooperative 
attitude exhibited by the ministers seemed to give the C-20 reform process a 
much needed push forward. Schultz remarked that the meeting had been "the 
most useful one the Committee had had so far.,,94 By the end of the meeting 
there was hope that at the forthcoming C-20 deputies meeting in September 
1973, compromises could be attained based on the proposals presented. In a 
little over a month, however, this notion was dashed when despite "intense 
discussions" the C-20 deputies failed to reach a consensus on the major issues 
of reform during the September 1973 gathering.9s 
When the C-20 ministers met at the IMF annual conference in Nairobi, 
Kenya, in late 1973, they were disappointed with what the chairman of the 
deputies presented to them in the "Outline of Reform". Despite attempts to 
paper over the strongly contrasting positions, the Outline clearly revealed that 
perspectives on each theme of reform were still very divergent. 96 Frustration 
was evident and "an atmosphere of disappointment appeared to prevail": it had 
been two years since the call for reform of the international monetary system in 
1971 and one year since negotiations had begun in the C-20 and efforts toward 
the reform of the international monetary system had hardly progressed.97 
Despite their disappointment, the participants did not give up on their aim of 
completing the reform project. Instead, the C-20 ministers resolved to reach an 
agreement on the principles of a new monetary system by 1 July 1974. To this 
end they agreed that through the autumn 1973 the C-20 deputies should meet in 
working groups on each issue, rather than in a larger deputies' gathering. In this 
93 B 13617352, Sitzung Juli. 
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way it was hoped that they could achieve greater compromise and thus reform 
efforts would move forward. Within a few weeks, however, this hope vanished. 
As the first year of reform efforts drew to a close, Bonn's influence on 
the talks had been minimal compared to its impact on the collapse of Bretton 
Woods. Neither of its policy goals was achieved: the EC struggled to achieve a 
common approach to the key aspects of reform and at was thus forced to focus 
on those topics in C-20 talks on which the most agreement could be found, 
namely the adjustment process and asset settlement. While this gave the 
appearance of a transatlantic divide (which was subsequently reinforced in 
literature on the C-20), European finance ministers were aware that the EC was 
not blameless in the slow progress of the C-20 negotiations. 98 Second, Bonn's 
concern for price stability was neither fully shared by its EC partners in the 
reform efforts, nor, as reflected by their economic and policy decisions, in their 
response to the macroeconomic conditions prevailing in 1973. In addition, West 
German leadership affected the C-20 negotiations little. As highlighted 
previously, Brandt's influence was limited by structural factors, but also by 
other political debates and initiatives. Schmidt was able to contribute to the 
semi-compromises reached at the July 1973 C-20 ministers meetings, but in 
general Schmidt's persuasive powers were lost in the large and bureaucratic 
gatherings where representatives were generally restricted to giving an opening 
statement and a few comments during open discussion.99 In addition, as has 
been shown earlier in this chapter, most of the debate was being had among the 
C-20 deputies and there contrasting perspectives on technical issues were 
causing delay. 
Indeed by September 1973, Schmidt had grown quite frustrated with 
what he described as "the panoply of the C-20:" it just did not seem possible to 
him that agreement among all 20 constituencies was possible, even proposing in 
Nairobi that the size of the C-20 meetings be reduced. loo Less than a week 
98 See Williamson and James; B 126/55902, EG; B 13617352, Sondertreffen Marz; B 13617352, 
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after the conclusion of the September 1973 C-20 ministers gathering, Schmidt 
described the Nairobi meeting as a "Jagdausflug, urn die Trophae eines neuen 
Weltwahrungssystems zu erringen ... [der] kein fertiges, praxisreifes Modell 
fur die Reform des Weltwahrungssystems beschert [hatte]".l01 As his 
aggravation grew, Schmidt turned to a newly emerging forum in which his style 
ofleadership was sure to be influential and hence Bonn's impact greater: the G-
5. 
-The G-5, oil and unfinished reform: C-20 Negotiations, September 1973-June 
1974-
The G-5 was made up of the Western countries with the five largest 
economies: namely, the United States, West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and Japan. It had grown out of "the Library Group," so-called 
because its first meeting took place in the ground floor library of the White 
House on 25 March 1973. Shultz had called the initial meeting, but the original 
impetus for it came, at least in part, from Schmidt who during talks with Shultz 
in early March 1973 had suggested that regular meetings of the Western finance 
ministers should be held. 102 Shultz had thus seized on Schmidt's idea, inviting 
the finance ministers of the Federal Republic, France and Great Britain 
(Schmidt, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Anthony Barber respectively),as well 
as their undersecretaries or deputy ministers to take part. Given its timing -
directly after the collapse of Bretton Woods and the day before the March C-20 
ministers meeting, the group had exchanged views on recent monetary 
developments, whilst not making any concrete plans for future action. 103 
The first official gathering of the G-5 took place during the September 
1973 IMF annual conference prior to the C-20 gathering in Nairobi, Kenya and 
included Japan. 104 But whereas the Library Group's March meeting had little 
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discernable impact on the outcome of the C-20 ministers meeting following it, 
the G-5's gathering in Nairobi did. Indeed, it was there that the decision was 
made for the deadline of I July 1974 for agreement on the Principles of 
Reform. los As was the case with all successive G-5 decisions on matters of 
international monetary reform, the G-5 members had to present their idea to the 
other C-20 members at the September 1973 meeting. This, however, did not 
prove difficult - on the matter of the deadline, nor in any point to come. Rather, 
given that the five most powerful constituencies had already concurred, it was 
generally quite easy to convince the other C-20 members to agree to their 
proposals. Significantly the initial "Library Group" gathering and the first two 
G-5 meetings in September and November 1973 were secret; thus, at least for a 
while, the other constituencies, including other EC states, had little idea that the 
G-5 had colluded beforehand. This afforded the G-5 states even greater power 
in their efforts to sway the actions of non-G-5 countries. 
By the conclusion of the Nairobi meeting, Schmidt had grown quite 
fond of the emerging G-5 forum. In contrast to the C-20, the meetings were 
small and informal. 106 In addition, Schmidt grew to personally like and respect 
his counterparts in the G-5. As highlighted in the previous chapter, it was one of 
Schmidt's goals to have better working relationships with both Giscard and 
Shultz than his predecessor, Karl Schiller, had had. 107 At the Nairobi meeting, it 
seems that Schmidt achieved this goal. He later wrote of the G-5 gathering and 
the subsequent evenings spent socializing throughout the IMF annual 
conference, "in the end we had all learned that we could rely on our colleagues' 
word, transcending all differences of opinion. This knowledge also led to 
personal friendships: Giscard and myself, Giscard and Shultz, Shultz and 
myself ... and Anthony Barber.,,108 It was during this time that Schmidt 
recalled Shultz becoming "my closest friend in the United States.,,109 
lOS Ibid. 
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Schmidt was not alone in his feelings toward the G-5 forum; rather, all 
members seemed keen to continue with the gatherings. The next G-5 session 
was scheduled for November 1973, around the time of the C-20 deputies 
meeting, and was to be hosted by Giscard. Indeed, the G-5 meetings began to 
run parallel to C-20 meetings, increasingly affecting the shape of direction of 
the C-20 with each gathering. Yet, the creation of the G-5 was not the only 
factor to catalyse the progress of the C-20 towards international monetary 
reform; rather, before either the G-5 or C-20 meetings could carry on with their 
separate reform efforts, an even greater factor appeared: the oil crisis. 
The oil crisis broke out on 16 October 1973 partly as a repercussion of 
the October War and partly due to tensions between Western-controlled 
multinational oil companies and the Organization for Oil Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).1I0 On this day, OPEC increased the price of a barrel of Persian Gulf 
crude (Arabian Light) by 70 percent from $3.01 to $5.12. 111 Then only days 
later Arab states began an embargo of oil supplies to the United States and the 
Netherlands. 112 Because of the West's great dependence on oil, the increase of 
the price of crude affected individual balance of payments positions as well as 
the overall global payments structure: overnight, the balance of payments 
positions of nearly all oil-importing states declined sharply, while the balance 
of payments positions of the oil producing states went up. This made the C-20's 
work on adjustment even more difficult. The increased disparity in the world's 
balance of payments structure coupled with the continued threats from the oil 
producing states about a further increase in oil prices and a prolonged embargo 
created great uncertainty in the world economy. In such conditions, a return to 
fixed exchange rates was impossible, thus ending what was meant to be the 
centerpiece of the reformed system. 113 
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Consequently, when the G-5 met in Chateau d'Artigny, Montbazon, 
France on 24-26 November 1973 to discuss their options for monetary reform, 
their talks where much altered. First, in many respects it was surprising that this 
meeting took place at all: during the October War, nearly all the European 
states had refused to follow America's lead in supporting Israel. Since then and 
in dealing with the oil crisis, the United States and the EC had generally 
adopted two contrasting positions. Their opposing views caused tensions on 
both sides of the Atlantic, tensions which were already quite acute due to the 
battle over the Atlantic Declaration. 114 When Shultz arrived, he informed his 
counterparts that "there was counsel in Washington that the US should not 
attend this meeting.,,115 Yet, not only did Shultz, Volcker, and the Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, Arthur Bums attend, but they were also quite constructive 
in their comments. This was a testament to the G-5's staying power and its clear 
importance in the minds of its participants. 
Second, the G-5 talks did not focus on the four themes of reform. For 
Schmidt, the combination of the changed economic landscape and his disdain 
for the C-20 was enough for him to support a motion to suspend the July 1974 
deadline for the completion of the reform principles. While the other G-5 
members were not as frustrated as Schmidt with said forum, they easily 
concurred with his position on the reform deadline. 116 Yet, Schmidt, like his G-
5 counterparts, recognized that there were, as Giscard pointed out, certain 
aspects which "could not simply be blamed on the Arabs.,,117 SDR valuation, 
gold and the role and structure of the Fund were "unaffected by oil" and had to 
be addressed. But agreement on these issues would not be easy. G-5 ministers 
could not agree on a method for SDR valuation, as talks kept returning to the 
matter of 'the link' which Bonn, backed by Washington, refused to accept.1\8 
Schmidt refrained again from interfering on the matter of gold, but as usual, the 
United States and France argued over the same issues and were again unable to 
114 See Chapter 3. 
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reach a compromise. 119 As talks moved to the issue of the IMF's structure and 
role, Schmidt was the most outspoken of the group, expressing freely his 
disdain for the large meetings and giving a "recurrent diatribe against large 
meetings, especially FundlBank Annual meetings and all Brussels meetings." 
120 The other G-5 ministers were less critical of the structure of the C-20 and 
the IMF, but all agreed to some fundamental alterations of the IMF, including 
the creation of a new committee of 20 governors to replace the C-20 which 
would hold bi-annual meetings. In addition, the G-5 agreed to investigate the 
possibility of limiting IMF Annual Meetings in size and frequency. 121 Finally, 
given the realities imposed on the West as a result of the oil crisis, Giscard 
could no longer insist upon a return to a fixed, but adjustable exchange rate 
regime in the short tenn. Instead, the French foreign minister resigned himself 
to the fact that the exchange rate mechanism would "be what it is going to be"; 
for the rest, that meant a floating one. 122 
Coming out of the G-5 meeting, Schmidt and his counterparts were 
pleased with the overall outcome. They resolved that over the coming months 
the G-5 deputies should work to on those items on which no agreement could 
be found as well as the structure of the IMF. The G-5 ministers also agreed to 
gather again in January 1974 before the C-20 ministers meeting. 123 Yet not all 
were happy with the G-5's work. When shortly after the November meeting, the 
secret G-5 meetings became public knowledge, this caused anger among those 
EC states not included. In some instances, such as Italy, it was a case of 
wounded pride: Rome wanted to be invited. 124 In general, however, the G-5 
gatherings were seen as contradictory action. 125 Since the start of the C-20 
talks, the EC was supposed to be presenting a common position, both for 
logistical purposes but also as a symbol of closer European economic and 
monetary union. As highlighted previously though, despite numerous meetings 
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in various EC forums, Europe had struggled to do so.126 Now the three largest 
economies in the EC were negotiating separately with the United States. 
The G-S meetings were thus not only clearly detrimental to the symbolic 
gesture the EC was attempting to make, but indirectly further weakened an 
increasingly fragile effort towards EMU. Indeed by late November, EMU was 
in a grave position: the heart of the effort - the currency snake - had come 
under great strain in recent months with Bonn having had to revalue the DM in 
June 1973 and then intervene on behalf of the franc to the amount of DM S 
billion in September. 127 Aside from the problems of the snake, the EC also had 
difficulties meeting the requirements for moving to the second stage of EMU. 
According to the October 1972 Paris Summit resolution, the second stage of 
EMU was to begin on 1 January 1974, but the EC members could agree on 
neither the basic institutional aspects necessary for it nor the prerequisites for it, 
in particular the EC regional policy. 128 While the G-S talks did not affect EMU 
efforts directly, it was not encouraging to the talks that as economic conditions 
worsened, there was a shift from the EC back to the West. Consequently, some 
EC states not part of the G-S called into question the utility of further work on 
EMU should the G-S continue129 
Perhaps if Brandt had been more involved in the C-20 talks, the Federal 
Republic would have heeded more closely the concerns of those states not part 
of the G-S. But by November 1973, Brandt was focused on dealing with the oil 
crisis as well as party infighting and his health was beginning to fail. 130 Indeed, 
by autumn 1973, the Atlanticist Schmidt was firmly leading the West German 
approach to monetary reform. Despite the protests of European states outside 
the G-S, Schmidt was unwilling to give up on the forum or to widen it. Indeed 
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the opposite occurred. In the wake of the oil crisis, Schmidt wrote to Kissinger, 
proposing the use of a similar arrangement to the G-5 for a summit on oil. 131 
While at the time the American secretary of state refrained from taking up the 
West German finance minister's suggestion, Schmidt's proposal in and of itself 
illustrates his belief in the G-5 forum as well as his shifting concern from 
monetary reform to the economic repercussions of the oil crisis. Over the next 
couple of months Schmidt's focus moved almost entirely to the latter issue after 
OPEC announced on 23 December 1975 a 130 percent increase on the price of 
Arab Light crude from $5.01 to $11.65. 132 As to reform, the Finance Ministry 
con1cuded, "Wir brauchen dieses lang same Vorankommen nicht zu bedauern. 
Wir konnen mit dem gegenwartigen Regime gut leben .... Andere Lander wie 
Frankreich (Riickkehr zu festen Wechselkursen) und die Entwicklungslander 
(Link: Wiederaufnahme der SZR-Zuteilungen) miissten ein groi3eres Interesse 
am Abschluss der Reform haben als wir. Wir sollten daher an den Beratungen 
konstruktiv mitarbeiten, ohne aber auf Beschleunigung zu drangen.,,133 
With the second price hike, the world balance of payments structure 
became even more distorted and the exchange rate markets even more erratic. 
This ruined the prospects for lasting reform of the international monetary 
system. 134 In addition, it created new problems for the G-5 and C-20 members 
to deliberate, above all how to finance the oil importers' deficits, in particular 
those of the non-oil LDCs, and recycle the massive surpluses of the oil 
importers. Consequently, when both groups met, each spent a great deal of time 
discussing how to respond to the new economic difficulties and far less time on 
issues of international monetary reform. At the G-5 gathering on the eve of the 
C-20 ministers meeting on 15 January 1974, the discussions on oil were both 
animated and heated with Schmidt at the center of many of them. As to matters 
of international monetary reform, the ministers did not further discuss their 
previous decisions and agreed common C-20 positions from the November 
1973 meeting on the suspension of the July 1974 deadline for reform and a 
narrowed focus on issues of immediate nature, including SDR valuation and the 
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structure of the IMF. Rather, the ministers only touched briefly on the issue of 
gold and the exchange rate regime. The talks on gold played out betwecn 
France and the United States much as they had during the past year and with the 
usual result. 135 
Although the C-20 had been established for the sole purpose of 
reforming the international monetary system, at the C-20 ministers meeting on 
16-18 January 1974, the economic repercussions of the oil price hikes were 
given precedence over monetary reform efforts. 136 Thus, it was clear just by the 
order of the ministers' priorities that the reform efforts were doomed. Much as 
he had been during the G-5 meeting, Schmidt was very outspoken on issues 
regarding oil. 137 When talks moved to monetary reform, however, he towed the 
agreed line. Schmidt advocated that in light of the oil crisis, the 1 July 1974 
deadline was no longer feasible and that the C-20 should focus on issues of an 
immediate nature, including the SDR valuation and the structure of the IMF. 
Also, given the erratic movements in the floating exchange rate system and 
Bonn's general acceptance of the necessity of floating exchange rates in the 
interim period, Schmidt called for guidelines for floating. The Federal 
Republic's position was echoed in the comments of other G-5 and EC 
ministers, the latter of which had also agreed to these steps in the weeks and 
days before in the EC monetary committee meetings. 138 
Only on the matter of SDR valuation was there still some disagreement 
among the industrialized countries. In a bid to get West Germany to sell some 
of its large dollar holdings and thus reduce the dollar exchange rate which had 
skyrocketed after the oil price hikes, the United States threatened to block the 
basket-of-currencies solution agreed by all other C-20 members unless the 
Federal Republic and other countries in similar positions intervened. 139 Despite 
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the American attempts at intimidation, however, Schmidt refused to intervene 
on behalf of the dollar, noting that many countries had bought their dollars for 
far more only a few months previous. 140 Washington's hesitation on the SDR 
valuation in tum seems to have been little more than a ploy to gain West 
German compliance on dollar intervention, for the United States did not protest 
at a communique which presented the issue of SDR valuation as settled. 141 
The LDCs voiced little opposition to the Western perspectives on long-
term monetary reform. Rather, with relative ease, the C-20 ministers agreed to 
abandon the complete overhaul of the international monetary system originally 
envisioned and accept that reform would be more "evolutionary." In addition, 
the C-20 resolved that in the coming months the C-20 deputies would work on 
the issues ofSDR valuation, the structure of the IMF and guidelines for floating 
which the C-20 ministers would decide upon at their final meeting in June 
1974. 142 If this outcome was not enough to signal the end of the long-term 
reform effort of the international monetary system, then the actions of the 
French only days after the conclusion of the C-20 ministers meeting were. 
Relatively quiet at the C-20 gathering, Giscard announced on 19 January 1974 
that the French franc was leaving the European currency snake. Given France's 
outlook on fixed exchange rates, Paris's move to floating was a shock. Giscard 
had given no indication that it was coming - neither to the C-20 nor to his West 
German counterpart who only days earlier had offered France a DM 5 billion 
loan to keep it inside the snake. With the most ardent supporter of the fixed, but 
adjustable exchange rate regime moving to floating, it was even further proof 
that the reform efforts were truly dead. 143 
Still in the coming months the C-20 concluded its work. Since the 
deputies had put so much work into it and had actually reached some 
agreement, as had been agreed at the September 1973 C-20 gathering in 
Nairobi, the Bureau presented the Outline of Reform at the June 1974 ministers 
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meeting. The Bureau decided to produce it as a sort of guide to long term 
international monetary reform for whenever such efforts were revived. At the 
same meeting, the C-20 ministers agreed that the SDR should be based on a 
basket of currencies and to guidelines for floating prepared by the C-20 
deputies. As to the structure of the IMF, the ministers decided that in the future 
a permanent council should be established within the IMF, sitting between the 
Executive Board and the Board of Governors. Yet, until such council could be 
established under an amendment to the IMF Article of Agreement, the C-20 
resolved to create an Interim Council based on the structure of the C-20. In the 
coming months, the IMF Executive Board was to continue to debate aspects of 
long term monetary reform and give recommendations for amendments to the 
Articles of Agreement to the Interim Council to consider. 144 But before West 
Germany and its Western allies could again focus on international monetary 
reform, they first needed to deal with the oil crisis and its economic 
repercussions. 
-Conclusions-
Much like it had done during the collapse of Bretton Woods, Bonn tried 
to balance its European integration goals with the maintenance of West German 
economic strength. Yet, by March 1973, it was becoming clear that they were 
falling short on both accounts, as the EC failed to agree or even necessarily 
present a united front at the C-20 gatherings and West German views on 
controlling international liquidity were not shared by its European or American 
partners. After the move to the European group float, the Federal Republic's 
focus shifted towards achieving its domestic economic goals, above all 
Stabilitiitspolitik. In turn, within the C-20 talks, Bonn became even more 
determined on the need for strict control of international liquidity and reluctant 
to return to a fixed exchange rate regime. The Brandt government's economic 
approach did not ease the process of compromise necessary for reform. That 
said, in an effort to bring about progress, Bonn did persuade the other EC 
members to concentrate on the matters on which they agreed and to be open to 
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compromise with the United States. Finally, as the C-20 efforts encountered 
difficulties in autumn 1973, the Federal Republic - in addition to its economic 
priorities - began to see greater value in Atlantic cooperation, rather than in the 
European approach which Bonn had pursued earlier. Despite the ongoing EC 
meetings to align reform perspectives and the damage it would do to European 
integration efforts, West Germany not only fully participated in but started to 
push for more extensive use of the G-5. 
Compared to their impact during the collapse of Bretton Woods, the 
influence of West German policies on the outcome of C-20 talks was more 
limited. Even if Bonn had been less concerned with economic factors and more 
so with achieving a common European response, the C-20 negotiations would 
have still broken down due to the oil crisis and the starkly contrasting positions 
on key aspects of reform not only between the United States and Europe, but 
also within the EC. Yet, the Federal Republic's policies did influence the 
minimal reform decisions that were made throughout the process. Had Bonn's 
perspective not become more Atlanticist and interested in pursuing negotiations 
within the G-5, it is likely that the consensus achieved within the C-20 on the 
guidelines for floating, SDR valuation and the structure of the Fund would not 
have occurred. 
Alongside its policies, West German leadership was also important in 
shaping the outcome of the C-20 talks. Because of the structure of monetary 
reform negotiations, Brandt's interest in larger political issues and debates and 
later his focus on the oil crisis and party infighting, Brandt's influence on the C-
20 talks was limited. Instead, Schmidt was the primary driving force behind 
Bonn's policies and the presentation of them at the C-20. Skeptical of the 
ability of such a large body with disparate positions to reach an agreement, 
strongly disliking bureaucracy and formal conferences, Schmidt's impact on the 
broad C-20 discussions was initially constrained. Rather than remain stifled, 
Schmidt thus turned to the G-5, his brainchild and a forum which suited his 
preference for personal politics and Atlanticist outlook. He then pushed for its 
use through the latter half of the 1973, as it became increasingly obvious that 
the C-20 talks were headed for deadlock. Even faced with the disapproval of 
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other EC member states, Schmidt did not abandon the G-5; instead, he 
advocated it all the more. During the G-5 talks, Schmidt led the call for the 
scope of reform to be lessened in the face of the oil crisis and the deadline of 
July 1974 to be abandoned. Moreover, he initiated the reform of the IMF, in 
particular the reduction of meetings. Both of these initiatives were accepted by 
the other G-5 members and became key elements of the C-20 work after the 
outbreak of the oil crisis. Finally, Schmidt stood up to American pressure to sell 
dollars or face Washington resistance over the issue of SDR valuation. Calling 
America's bluff, Schmidt managed to achieve a dual victory: first, he 
maintained West German economic strength by avoiding the sale of dollars at 
far cheaper prices than what they had originally been purchased for; and 
second, he did so without sacrificing progress on the reform aspect, for 
agreement on the SDR valuation was approved in the C-20 communique. 
As a result of its policies and the efforts of Schmidt during the C-20 
negotiations, West Germany's position within the Western alliance was not 
immediately altered. Rather, similar to the effect which its actions had during 
the collapse of Bretton Woods on its role within the West, the importance of the 
steps taken by the Federal Republic during the C-20 talks would only become 
clearer in the future, as economic problems continued to mount. Because the 
Federal Republic had concentrated on regaining price stability in the run-up to 
the oil crisis, its inflation rate was 7 percent while those of nearly all other 
Western states were in the double-digits. As will be shown in the following 
chapters, this low inflation rate was an important factor in Bonn's ability to use 
its economic might to shape the Western response to both the oil crisis and the 
1975 recession. Alongside securing its economic strength and hence political 
influence, due greatly in part to Schmidt, during the C-20 talks a new forum for 
cooperation on international economic matters among the West began to 
emerge through the G-5. Within it, West Germany was well positioned to make 
a strong impact on Western efforts to respond to the on-going monetary 
difficulties as well as the oil crisis and 1975 recession. Finally, the growing 
influence of Schmidt within the Brandt government and his decidedly more 
Atlanticist approach to economic issues would come to be decisive as Bonn and 
the West began to deal with the oil crisis. 
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Chapter 3 
The Shaping of the Western Response to the Oil Crisis 
October 1973-December 1974 
A generation ago the western worldfaced a historic crisis-the breakdown of 
international order in the wake of world war. Threatened by economic chaos and 
political upheaval, the nations of the West built a system of security relations and 
cooperative institutions that have nourished our safety, our prosperity and our freedom 
ever since. A moment of grave crisis was transformed into an act of lasting creativity. 
Weface another such moment today. The stakes are as high as they were twenty-five 
years ago. The challenge to our courage, our wisdom, and our will is profound. 
-Introduction-
And our opportunity is great. 
What will be our response? 
I speak, of course, of the energy crisis. 
Henry Kissinger, 
14 November 1974 1 
The West was unprepared when, on the back of the October War, the oil 
producing states unilaterally raised the price of oil, imposed a complete 
embargo on the United States and the Netherlands and cut supplies to nearly all 
other industrialized states. 2 In the immediate aftermath, Western leaders 
struggled to find a solution to their oil supply predicament and the changed 
dynamics between the oil producers. Before either a European or Western 
approach could be fully realized, in late December 1973, the Organization for 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) more than doubled the price of oil. 
Faced with massive economic challenges brought on by the price surge, a first 
significant step was taken towards a joint Western response at the Washington 
Energy Conference (WEC) in February 1974. Yet, because of French refusal to 
participate in the advances made there, Western solidarity was weakened. 
Neither the change of political leadership in the United Kingdom, France, West 
Germany and the United States, nor the fading of competing European efforts, 
served to strengthen Western cooperation through spring and summer 1974. 
Instead, in the context of worsening economic conditions in autumn 1974, the 
United States and France announced opposing strategies. Given this discord, 
1 Helmut Schmidt Archives (hereafter HSA), Mappe 6579, Kissinger Address in Chicago on Energy 
Crisis (hereafter Mappe 6579, Kissinger). 
2 The October War broke out on 6 October 1973 when Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed over 
ceasefire lines in the Golan Heights and Sinai Peninsula and attacked Israel. Fighting ceased on 
25 October 1973. The October War is sometimes referred to as the Yom Kippur War because 
fighting began on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. 
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Kissinger's concern about the fate of the West in November 1974 was not 
misplaced. Yet within a few short weeks of Kissinger's pronouncement, and 
more than a year after the outbreak of the oil crisis, a remarkable tum of events 
occurred: Western leaders agreed upon ajoin response. 
Highly dependent on imported Arab oil as well as international trade for 
its domestic growth, the oil crisis placed the Federal Republic in a vulnerable 
economic position. At the same time, Bonn fell into a political quandary: while 
it was recognized that the oil crisis necessitated a multilateral response, the 
government was tom between choosing a European course, which would keep 
its European integration goals on track, or a more broadly conceived Western 
path, which was economically more advantageous and essential to preserving 
the transatlantic link. Although West Germany had taken the economic line 
more forcefully during the C-20 talks, Bonn's European integration goals 
remained an important aspect in West German policymaking after the collapse 
of Bretton Woods. 
In this chapter, the following questions are explored: as economic 
pressure of the oil crisis began to take hold, to what degree was the Federal 
Republic able to balance its economic and political goals? Were Willy Brandt, 
the West German Chancellor, and his Minister of Finance (and later chancellor) 
Helmut Schmidt, instrumental in shaping the Western response to the oil crisis 
or did Bonn rely on other means to influence it? Lastly, as it did during the C-
20 talks, was the Federal Republic able to capitalize on the Group of Five (G-5) 
forum to advance its position in the West? Did Bonn's actions during the oil 
crisis allow West Germany to enhance its role in other ways? 
-The Outbreak a/the Oil Crisis-
The oil crisis began on 16 October 1973 when OPEC, angered by the 
West's support for Israel in the days-old October War and frustrated by the 
ongoing attempts of the multinational oil companies to keep oil prices 
suppressed, made the unilateral decision to increase the price of oil by 70 
percent, raising the price of a barrel of Persian Gulf crude (Arabian Light) from 
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$3.01 to $5.12.3 It intensified the following day, when the Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) declared a production cut of 5 percent 
on oil supplies. Then on 18 October 1973, Abu Dhabi began a total embargo of 
oil exports to the United States and the Netherlands because of their continued 
backing ofIsrael in the October War and threatened to use the 'oil weapon' in 
the same way on any country adopting a pro-Israeli stance. By 30 October 1973 
nearly all Arab countries had adopted this position.4 Less than a week later, 
OAPEC decided again to reduce production, now by 25 percent of its 
September output, with a threat to reduce oil production by a further 5 percent 
in December.s These conditions applied to all countries deemed 'neutral' in the 
October War, while those regarded as friendly towards the Arabs would receive 
oil supplies as usual.6 By early December 1973, however, OAPEC reversed this 
decision and threatened to cut supplies for all countries in January 1974. The 
combination of these acts by OPEC and OAPEC meant that throughout the last 
months of 1973, many Western countries, in particular those in Europe and 
Japan, faced a supply crisis in its energy sector, due to their heavy dependency 
on imported Arab oil. 
Already before the crisis, West Germany had been increasingly 
concerned about this dependency. By 1973, 55.4 percent of the West German 
energy supply was in the form of oil and 71 percent of its oil supplies were 
imported from the Middle East via Rotterdam in the Netherlands.' Federal 
reports projected that within a decade West Germany's dependence on oil 
would be even greater, as it would require significantly more supplies.8 Thus, it 
was initially deemed that access to supplies, much more than price, would be 
one of the fundamental problems relating to oil. During 1973, Bonn had started 
3 Hans-Peter Schwarz et aI., eds, Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1974, vol. 1, (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005) (hereafter AAPD 197411), 
139; Ian Skeet, OPEC: Twenty:five Years of Prices and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988),87-91. 
4 AAPD 197411, 3. 
S Hans-Peter Schwarz et aI., eds, Akten zur Auswiirtigen Po/itik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1973, vol. 3, (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004) (hereafter AAPD 197313), 
1757. 
6 AAPD 197411, 3. 
7 AAPD 197313, 1610; Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank (hereafter Bbk), 
N21K155, Vermerk-Betre.ff: Auswirkungen der Erdolverknappung auf die deutsche WirtschaJt. 
8 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), BI02/123568, Brief an Brandt vom BM for 
WirtschaJt, 27. April 1973 (hereafter, BI02/123568, Brie/). 
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its first energy program. 9 Alongside a domestic program aimed at securing oil 
imports, the Federal Republic also advocated greater cooperation in areas such 
as research and development, advancement of alternative energy sources, 
energy conservation and consumer-producer relations. 10 Fortunately, many of 
its EC partners shared similar concerns. On 22 May 1973, the EC Council met 
to discuss a European Commission report on energy problems and proposals for 
a common policy. After a long debate, however, no agreement could be 
reached. Instead, while West Germany, Britain and the Netherlands wanted less 
market interference and cooperation with partners outside the EC, above all the 
United States, France refused to support any advance on the issue of external 
relations without first gaining agreement on an internal EC oil market which in 
the French view should include controls on imports, investment and price. 11 
Across the Atlantic, Washington also understood that the energy 
paradigm of the first half of the Cold War was in flux. In April 1973, the 
Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy in the US State Department, James 
Akins, published an article in Foreign Affairs warning that oil demand would 
soon outstrip supply. He argued that this would lead to higher prices, damaging 
the world's balance of payments structure severely. Oil producing states would 
be unable to absorb their new wealth, oil consumers would be forced to work 
out a common response as well as a new mode of cooperation with oil 
producers, Arabs were likely to use oil as a political weapon, and much 
depended on Arab-Israeli politics and the West's reactions to them. 12 Knowing 
the risks, the Nixon administration like their German colleagues introduced a 
9 BAK, B102/108467, Aufzeichnung: Betr.: Ergebnis des Gespriichs zwischen den 
Bundesministern Schmidt und Dr. Friderichs aber den Stand des energiepolitischen Programms 
und dessen jinanzielle Konsquenzen; BAK, BI02/123568, Aufzeichnung aber das Gespriich 
zwischen Minister Friderichs und Minister Charbonnel am 21.122.6.1973 (hereafter 
B102/123568, Friderichs. CharbonneT); BAK, B136/8030, Vermerk: Betr.: EG-Energiepolitik; 
hier: Mitteilung der Kommission yom 29.5.1974. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Hans-Peter Schwarz et aI., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1973, vol. 2, (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2004) (hereafter AAPD 197312), 
780-791; B102/123568, Friderichs. Charbonnel. 
12 James Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here," in Foreign Affairs vol. 51 issue 
3: 462-80. 
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new energy program (in April 1973) which included the elimination of import 
quotas on oil and the implementation of import fees on it. J3 
Despite these earlier efforts toward energy programs as well as concerns 
about rising Arab-Israeli tensions and the possible use of the oil weapon, West 
Germany and the West in general were nonetheless unprepared for the oil crisis. 
The sudden rise in prices and reduction in production shocked the Federal 
Republic. It was among the European countries most reliant upon imported 
Arab oil, and because its supplies were shipped through Rotterdam, West 
Germany, even if not officially included in the oil embargo, was still strongly 
affected and its economy suffered. 14 This was all the more the case as the 
Federal Republic had an export-led economy, and as such was very much 
dependent on the smooth functioning of international trade for growth and 
employment. World trade was, however, anything but smooth after the onset of 
the oil crisis, as the oil embargo disrupted established trade patterns and the 
unstable oil prices caused great fluctuations in exchange rates. 15 
Domestically, the Brandt government immediately took steps to reduce 
energy consumption, implementing conservation measures such as Sunday 
driving bans and passing an emergency energy law which would provide the 
outline for action should rationing or price measures become necessary.16 
Hoping to further their domestic efforts through international cooperation, Bonn 
looked to its European partners, rather than seeking a transatlantic approach, for 
several reasons. First, the interests of West Germany and its European partners, 
both in regard to oil supplies and dependency, were closely aligned. Like the 
Federal Republic, almost all other EC member states met more than 40 percent 
of their energy requirements through imported oil, with roughly half coming 
13 Skeet, 86; BI02/123568, Brief. 
14 United States National Archives and Records Administration II (hereafter NARA II), NSC 
Subject Files, Box 321, Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger; Subject: Assistance for the 
Dutch (hereafter Box 321, Dutch Assistance). 
IS BAK, B 136/17041, Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik; Wolfgang Hager, "Germany as an 
Extraordinary Trader," in West Germany: a European and Global Power, eds. Wilfrid L. Kohl 
and Giorgio Basevi (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980), 3-4. 
16 BAK, B 102/200539, Stichworte for das Einfohrungsstatement von Minister Dr. Friderichs 
zur Beratung des Energieprogramms im Wirtschaftsausschuss des Deutschen Bundestages; 
AAPD 197313,1759,1813,1892. 
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from Arab producers. The United States relied on oil imports for approximately 
15 percent of its energy needs, with only six percent coming from Arab 
sources. 17 
In addition, since the Paris Summit in October 1972, the Federal 
Republic, and Brandt in particular, had been heavily involved in European 
efforts toward establishing economic and monetary as well as political unity by 
1980. 18 Beyond its commitment to the monetary and energy aspects of closer 
integration (which was examined in chapter 1), Bonn was also a key participant 
in European political cooperation (EPC), with the West German Foreign 
Minister, Walter Scheel, among its strongest supporters. 19 And for nearly a year 
now, the Federal Republic had been working with its Community partners on a 
common Middle East policy.20 The outbreak of the war and the oil crisis was an 
opportunity for the Nine to demonstrate their cohesion in the foreign policy 
realm. For the Brandt government it also offered the chance to pursue a more 
Arab-friendly policy - an approach which would have been political suicide in 
West Germany given its recent past. Moreover, it would presumably be 
beneficial to its economic position, given Arab threats to again use the oil 
weapon against those countries supporting Israel. 21 
Finally, it seemed to West Germany that a common Atlantic Western 
approach was unlikely. Not only was Washington clearly pro-Israeli, but the 
Community's increasing drive towards closer integration and the United States' 
desire to redefine the Western alliance under a new Atlantic Charter as part of 
its Year of Europe initiative, meant that political relations between the EC and 
America had deteriorated significantly through the second half of 1973.22 With 
17 AAPD /973/3, 1610; AAPD 1974/1. 124; Box 321, Dutch Assistance. 
18 Daniel Mockli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath. Brandt. Pompidou 
and the Dream of Political Unity, (London: 1.B. Taurus, 2009), 17-55; Several articles in 
Andreas Wilkens, ed., Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg: Willy Brandt und die europiiische 
Einigung, (Bonn: Dietz, 2010). 
19 Ibid; Walter Scheel, Erinnerungen und Einsichten: Walter Scheel in Gespriich mit Jurgen 
Engert (Stuttgart: Hohenheim, 2004). 
20 Mockli, 205-6. 
21 AAPD 1973/3,1609. 
22 NARA II, NSC Country Files, Box 688, Letter from Kissinger to Schmidt. November 26. 
1973 (hereafter Box 688, Kissinger November); Pascaline Winand, "Kissingers 'Jahr Europas' 
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tensions running high, a Western consensus looked increasingly less likely, not 
least because of Kissinger's handling of the October War. Barely 
communicating his actions with his European counterparts and excluding the 
EC from the cease-fire negotiations and peace settlement talks, Europe, and in 
particular France, began to feel as though Kissinger was treating the 
Community as a "non-person" and grew suspicious of a Soviet-American 
condominium. 23 By the end of October 1973, Bonn and its European allies 
were extremely agitated with Washington's actions.24 
Initially, the Federal Republic desired a dual approach: a common 
European energy policy to address the oil supply problems arising from the oil 
crisis and a common European foreign policy to handle consumer-producer 
relations. On the former, Bonn pushed for coordination on alternative energy 
development and strongly supported a Dutch initiative in the EC for supply 
sharing and coordinated conservation. 25 But France, fearing Arab retribution, 
and the United Kingdom, worried about both the Arabs and the future 
possibility of having to share North Sea oil supplies, blocked the Dutch-led 
effort.26 Instead, these two countries advocated that EC member states handle 
supply issues through bilateral negotiations with oil producing states and 
consumer-producer relations through concerted political cooperation within the 
EPC framework. 27 While Bonn would have preferred cooperation in both 
energy and foreign policies, for the time being West Germany was willing to 
follow the French lead and concentrate on political cooperation. 
und die Europaer," in Wir sind auf dem richtigen Weg: Willy Brandt und die europiiische 
Einigung, Andreas Wilkens, ed., (Bonn: Dietz, 2010), 363-386; Mockli, 140-183. 
23 BAK, B 136/631 0, Fernschreiben, 14.11. 73, Betr.: /ranzosische Aussenpolitik; AAPD 197313, 
1560-1, 1634-5, 1671; British National Archives (hereafter, TNA) T354/52, Group of Five 
Meeting, Chateau d'Artigny, Montbazon 24-26 November 1973 (hereafter T354/52, G-5 
November); Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign 
Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 309. 
24 AAPD 197313,1668-70. 
25 Ibid., 1758, 1771-2. 
26 Ibid., 1758-9. 
27 Ibid., 1757-1760; Fiona Venn, "International Co-operation versus National Self-Interest: the 
Untied States and Europe during the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis," in The United States and the 
European Alliance since 1945, eds. Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 
83. 
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On the same day that Paris and London obstructed a common European 
energy policy, 6 November 1973, Bonn joined them and the other EC member 
states in issuing a "Declaration on the Middle East", which called for all parties 
to return to the positions occupied on 22 October 1973. In addition, it advocated 
that as part of any peace settlement Israel should leave the areas occupied since 
1967, grant Palestinians greater rights, and agree to the principal of Palestinian 
sovereignty.28 In many respects, the European declaration was pro-Arab: a 
return to the positions occupied on 22 October 1973 supported the Egyptian 
stance that all territories captured in violation of the cease-fire agreement 
should be relinquished. Palestinian rights were an Arab rallying point as was 
even more the evacuation by Israel of territories occupied in 1967. 
As Mockli has pointed out, aspects of the EC's declaration can be traced 
back to earlier talks within the EPC on their collective position vis-a-vis the 
Middle East. Yet, the oil crisis and the need to secure energy supplies certainly 
seems to have played a much larger role in the timing and overall direction of 
the Declaration.29 Up until this point, because of its relationship to Israel and 
declared neutral position in Middle Eastern affairs, the Federal Republic had 
kept quiet aspects of the EC's Middle Eastern policy which were more pro-
Arab. 3o Bonn's outlook changed, however, after it received an ultimatum from 
the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Ghadafi, only days before the 6 November 
declaration. Ghadafi threatened to include West Germany in the Arab oil 
embargo should its position towards the Arabs not become more favorable. 31 
Moreover, even if such a policy was underway before the outbreak of the crisis, 
European ministers were surely aware of the conclusions that would be drawn 
from such a biased policy announcement only days after OPEC decided to 
reduce its energy supplies. Naturally, the Arab governments warmly welcomed 
the European declaration, while Israel reacted with anger as did the United 
States.32 In the European press, the declaration was taken as sign of giving into 
Arab blackmail for oil and within the Federal Republic, Brandt was forced to 
28 AAPD 197313, 1777-8; William C. Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar: the 
Strained Alliance (London: Macmillan, 1992), 88. 
29 Mockli, 205-6. 
30 Ibid., 206. 
31 AAPD 197313,1812-3. 
32 Ibid., 1804-6, 1944. 
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defend the act to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, arguing that it was necessary 
for all countries to make compromises in order to further the interests and 
influence of Europe in the Middle East, and that the special relationship 
between West Germany and Israel would not be harmed. 33 
The criticism, however, did not sway West Germany or its European 
allies from their political path. Instead, attempting to capitalize on the Arab 
favor achieved through their declaration, the Ee foreign ministers latched onto 
a British suggestion for a demarche to the Arab capitals. After some 
negotiations, the demarche was sent to Arab capitals on 22 November 1973. 34 
In it, the Nine made clear that improving European-Arab relations was a 
priority and Europe was prepared to contribute to the peace process as well as 
cooperate with the Arabs, but that such cooperation could only occur should the 
oil weapon not be used against the Ee member states again.35 
Yet not all in the Brandt government were satisfied with the European 
political course Bonn had adopted; Schmidt strongly disagreed. He was 
particularly worried about the economic repercussions of the oil crisis and their 
potential to lead to greater macroeconomic problems, such as a recession, high 
inflation or even stagflation, and his proposed response varied greatly from that 
of official West German policy.36 Unlike Brandt, Schmidt was not swayed by a 
great attachment to European integration efforts; he was more concerned with 
maintaining West German economic strength: despite the threats his 
unwillingness posed to advancing EMU efforts, Schmidt was reluctant to 
contribute the sums requested of the Federal Republic for EMU, as well as the 
Ee budget, arguing that they would upset the West German national budget. 37 
In addition, as was evident in the previous chapter with his promotion of the G-
5, Schmidt's viewpoint was much more Atlanticist than that of Brandt and, as 
33 Ibid., 1806; TNA, FCO 93/226, UK Embassy to Bonn, 13 November 1973. 
34 BAI(, B136/6310, Betr.: Heutiges Gespriich mit PM Messmer; TNA, FCO 8/1967, Proposed 
Demarche to Arab Governments. 
35 AAPD 197313,1843; Mockli, 206. 
36 T354/52, G-5 November. 
37 BAK, B 13616306, Helmut Schmidt, Bundesminister der Finanzen, Rede vor dem lnstitut for 
das Studium der internationalen Politiik in Mailand (hereafter B136/6306, Mailand); BNA, 
T354/69, European Regional Development Fund: Herr Schmidt. 
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the previous chapters have shown, he had good working relationships with 
Kissinger and Shultz. 38 Given his perspective and economic concerns, Schmidt 
looked to the Western alliance to tackle the oil crisis. Regardless of the political 
tensions of the previous months and even Washington's handling of the 
October War, Schmidt believed that Europe was not in the position either 
economically or politically to overcome the oil crisis without the United 
States. 39 Moreover, Schmidt worried that the bilateral deals Paris and London 
were pursuing with the oil producers equated to little more than beggar-thy-
neighbor policies which would only exacerbate the global economic problems 
and hence harm the West Germany economy.40 
Schmidt first voiced his economic concerns in a speech in the West 
German state of Rhineland Palatinate in October 1973. Fearful that Schmidt's 
comments may affect the performance of the West German economy, Brandt 
reacted negatively to the finance minister's remarks. 41 Yet while Schmidt 
refrained from making more public pronouncements of a similar nature, his 
qualms did not subside. Despite the official perspective of his government, on 5 
November 1973, Schmidt contacted Kissinger with a "personal initiative." In 
his letter, Schmidt recognized that he was not "directly responsible according to 
the delimitation of Federal German Government functions" for this matter, but 
nonetheless was concerned about the lack of cooperation between oil 
consuming countries, even among those within the EC. Schmidt suggested that 
the United States hold a "private symposium (without any publicity) where a 
not so great number of energy, particularly petroleum, experts from government 
and company service in the some major industrial nations would meet to 
exchange views on certain subjects previously determined and perhaps to 
evolve suggestions for submission to their governments." In addition, Schmidt 
38 See also Martin Rupps, Helmut Schmidt: eine politische Biographie (Stuttgart: Hohenheim, 
2003), 175-80. 
39 T354/52, G-5 November; TNA, PREM 1512178, Record o/Conversation between Heath and 
Schmidt. 
40 TNA, T354/52, Group of Five - Meeting of EEC Finance Ministers. 16 January (hereafter 
T354/52, G-5 January). 
41 Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: a Political Retrospective, trans. Ruth Hein (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1990), 163. 
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voiced his displeasure at the recent discord in the Western alliance and 
promised to do his best to smooth West German-American relations.42 
While acknowledging the usefulness of such a conference, Kissinger felt 
that given the on-going friction in the Western alliance the timing was 
inappropriate for another American-led, alliance-based program of action. He 
responded, "Events associated with the Middle East Crisis and the discouraging 
experience we have had in connection with the 'Year of Europe' initiative 
indicate that much needs to be done in this direction." Kissinger decided against 
immediately acting on Schmidt's suggestion, but he did leave the door open for 
further backdoor communication of the sort undertaken with Schmidt during the 
March 1973 currency crisis on transatlantic relations, and on questions of future 
Atlantic cooperation on energy. 43 Despite Kissinger's negative response, 
Schmidt continued to push for united Western cooperation on energy issues. 
When the G-5 met in France on 24-26 November 1973 to discuss international 
monetary reform efforts in the C-20, Schmidt took the opportunity to raise the 
issue of oil, expressing dismay at both American unwillingness to cooperate 
and the divide among the European states on energy policy and supply sharing. 
He reminded his counterparts of the grave economic effects of the oil crisis and 
advocated a common response to this crisis.44 
Eventually, Schmidt's concerns were recognized in official West 
German policy. Having focused on European political cooperation for nearly a 
month, in late November 1973 the Brandt government returned to its earlier 
goal of a common energy policy. While Schmidt's perspective contributed to 
Bonn's shift, so too did the clear failure of the Declaration and the demarche to 
sway Arab behavior; instead West Germany along with the entire EC faced 
further supply cuts.4S Since the failure of the Dutch initiative in early November 
42 NARA II, NSC Country Files, Box 688, Letter from Schmidt to Kissinger, November 5,1973. 
43 Box 688, Kissinger November. 
44 T354/52, G-5 November. 
4S Although as a gesture of goodwill after the 6 November declaration, the Arab oil ministers 
agreed on 18 November 1973 that the planned 5 percent reduction in oil supplies would not 
apply to the EC member states, they refused to lift the embargo against the Netherlands. In 
addition, only days after the European demarche, at their meeting on 26 November 1973, the 
Arab oil ministers called on Europe to go beyond their first declaration. Nearly a week later, 
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1973, no progress had been made on a joint approach to energy issues. For 
Bonn, the refusal of the leading proponents of the political approach to 
cooperate on the creation of a common energy policy seemed to contradict the 
broader goals of European unity that the Nine were meant to be working 
towards. At the West German-French Summit in Paris on 26 November 1973, 
Brandt told the French president, Georges Pompidou, "Wenn die Europaische 
Gemeinschaft Bestand haben solle, so konne man diese [Energie]fragen nicht 
ausklammem; man konne in solchen Situationen nicht getrennt voneinander 
weiterleben, denn dann komme man nie wieder zusammen.,,46 Pompidou, 
however, disagreed, arguing instead that Community solidarity was better 
expressed in political terms alone.47 
The Federal RepublIc did not give in. Only a week later at the meeting 
of EC economics and finance ministers on 3-4 December 1973, Bonn raised the 
issue again in a special session on the oil crisis. There Schmidt maintained that 
"Wenn ein gemeinsamer Wille nicht bestehe, wenn Rat oder Gipfel sich nicht 
zum gemeinsamen Handeln fanden, sei ein Verfall von Ansehen und Vertrauen 
der Gemeinschaft in der Offentlichen Meinung, ein schnelles Auseinanderfallen 
der AuBenpolitiken groBer Partner in der Welt (USA, Japan, Europa), aber auch 
der europaischen Staaten entsprechend ihren unterschiedlichen national en 
Interessen zu befiirchten.,,48 Schmidt also highlighted the short-term effects on 
production, inflation and employment levels, while the West German 
Economics Minister, Hans Friderichs spoke of long-term goals regarding 
alternative energies. Lacking any sort of official paper or report, the West 
German representatives, backed by the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy, called 
for the pooling of energy reserves within the Community, pushing for a 
decision to be made at the upcoming EC summit in Copenhagen. Paris and 
London, however, opposed such action, maintaining that they were unprepared 
for discussions on such matters and lacked the permission of their governments 
to agree to such terms. In addition, the French Finance Minister, Valery Giscard 
OAPEC resolved that the suspended December supply cuts would be reinstated in January 
1974, should the EC fail to do more to support the Arab cause. 
46 AAPD 197313,1893-4. 
47 Ibid., 1893-4. 
48 Ibid., 1964. 
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d'Estaing, argued that the focus of a common policy should be on the long-term 
effects which the Community would have to face as raw materials became more 
expensive.49 
'Schmidt though was loath to allow France and Britain once again to 
obstruct efforts towards a common European energy policy. Aware of London's 
dependence on the establishment of the Regional Development Fund (RDF), a 
funding facility about to be established as part of Europe's efforts toward 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) before the start of its second 
stage on 1 January 1974, and Paris's strong desire that this second stage begin 
as scheduled, Schmidt maintained that the Federal Republic would not 
negotiate on greater monetary support for the RDF unless agreement could be 
achieved on a common energy policy at the Copenhagen Summit. 50 With this 
use of West German economic power, the debate around the oil crisis within the 
EC started to move away from the French-led political perspective and towards 
a West German-led economic one. The debate was moving in the direction that 
Schmidt had advocated. 
A week later, only days before the Copenhagen Summit was to start, it 
seemed that Schmidt's approach was poised to receive yet another boost when 
Kissinger proposed a Western response to the oil crisis. At a meeting of the 
Pilgrims Society in London on 12 December 1973, Kissinger gave an address in 
which he called for consumer solidarity and advocated the establishment of an 
Energy Action Group (EAG). Through the EAG, Washington hoped to tackle 
all aspects of the oil crisis including supply - both cutbacks and future output-
along with prices and possibly the problem of balance of payments surpluses. 51 
Kissinger's initiative was greeted warmly by West Germany.52 In the the 
Ministry of Economics it was commented "Sie entspricht unseren eigenen 
Grundvorstellungen, wie wir sie im Energieprogramm niedergelegt haben, und 
im Hinblick auf die Gemeinschaft unseren immer wieder vorgebrachten 
49 Ibid" 1965. 
50 Ibid., 2074. 
51 BAK, BI02/201338, Betr.: Gipfelkonferenz am 14./15. Dezember 1973; TNA, T354/152, 
Draft Briefing for the Chancellor of the Exchequer: Rome Meetings 15 January to 18 January. 
52 Ibid.; TNA, PREM 1512041, Copenhagen Summit: Kissinger's Proposal on Energy (hereafter 
PREM 15/2041, Proposal). 
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Forderungen nach einer Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EG und den groBen 
Verbraucherregionen sowie mit den Forderlandern .... Die Gemeinschaft kann 
es sich politisch nicht leisten und sollte es sich auch angesichts des 
Energiepotentials der USA nicht leisten, dies ausgestreckte Hand 
auszuschlagen.,,53 
Trying to rally support for the Kissinger initiative before the 
Copenhagen Summit, Brandt telephoned the British Prime Minister, Ted Heath. 
Given Britain's preference for bilateral deals and reluctance to undertake a 
common energy policy in the EC, Brandt was surprised when Heath not only 
supported the American proposal but was also prepared to work with Bonn to 
achieve a "positive response" from the other Community members, even 
France.54 The main motivation for British support of the EAG plan was 
London's concern about the price of oil. Over the preceding weeks, speculation 
in the oil market had pushed a barrel of oil to $17, a development which the 
United Kingdom doubted OPEC would ignore. Britain worried that if another 
oil price surge occurred, it could "bring down all or most of the developed 
countries.,,55 Such had long been the worry of Schmidt as well as those of the 
West German Ministry of Economics. Indeed, the Finance and Economics 
Ministries had become so concerned about this prospect that they advocated 
cooperation with Americans on the EAG initiative even if the other EC 
members were unwilling to do so. 56 Yet, while this may have been the position 
of the West German Economics and Finance Ministries, Brandt and the Foreign 
Ministry were not yet willing to go so far. 
At the Copenhagen Summit Brandt and Heath raised the issue of the 
American proposals for an EAG. After a "lively discussion," however, the two 
leaders failed to win support even for the inclusion of "a welcome" to it in the 
Summit communique. 57 Although a significant faction of his cabinet desired 
otherwise, Brandt was unwilling to support EAG if it meant breaking with his 
53 Ibid. 
54 TNA, PREM 15/2041, Record of Telephone Conversation between Heath and Brandt, 12 
December 1973. 
55 PREM 15/2041, Proposal. 
56 Ibid.; BAK, BI02/201338, Betr.: Gipfelkonferenz am 14,/15. Dezember 1973. 
57 TNA, PREM 15/2041, Letter to Nixon. 
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European partners. After much negotiation, Bonn managed to gamer basic 
agreement on a common energy policy which called for the European 
Commission to prepare proposals for a common energy market by the end of 
February 1974 and provisions for energy conservation. 58 Under the weight of 
Schmidt's threat on the RDF funding, the United Kingdom reversed its earlier 
resistance to a common European approach to energy matters. 59 Thus, despite 
his desire to do so, Brandt did not have to contradict the earlier hardline 
position taken by his finance minister. 6o Although he initially voiced opposition 
to receiving the four Arab foreign ministers who had attended the summit 
uninvited, Brandt eventually relented and agreed that the EC foreign ministers 
should receive their four Arab counterparts. Finally, Bonn agreed to a new 
French initiative, calling for a Euro-Arab dialogue. 61 
As the Copenhagen Summit closed, the West German foreign ministry 
and Brandt were pleased with the outcome.62 Within weeks, however, the 
achievements of the summit proved almost entirely irrelevant. The efforts 
toward a common energy policy collapsed after West Germany and the United 
Kingdom failed to agree on the size and division of the RDF.63 Mockli argues 
that the course of accommodation towards the Arabs which Bonn, along with 
the other EC member states, had adopted within the EPC framework furthered 
their goals of creating a single European foreign policy. It had little effect 
though on Arab actions. 64 Instead, at their meeting on 22-23 December 1973, as 
both the Federal Republic and Britain had feared, OPEC moved to more than 
double the price of crude: a barrel of Arab light crude rose from $5.01 to 
$11.65, quadrupling the price of oil since October 1973.6s With this, the oil 
crisis became not merely a crisis in oil supplies, but also a crisis of the entire 
economic system of the West, shifting the Federal Republic's and most of its 
S8 AAPD 197313, 2063; BAK. B102/201338. Bundesrepublik und Nieder/ander driingen auf 
fsemeinsame Energiepolitik der EG. 
9 AAPD 197313, 2074. 
60 TNA, T354/69, European Regional Development Fund: Herr Schmidt. 
61 AAPD 197313, 2058-64; BAK, B102/167571, Die Beziehung der Gemeinschaft zu den 
Energieerzeugerliindem. 
62 Ibid. 
63 AAPD 197411,80-2. 
64 Mockli, 244-7. 
65 AAPD 197411, 3. 
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European partners' perspectives foremost to economic concerns and making 
them more receptive to American offers for coordination on a common Western 
response to the oil crisis. 
-Economic Chaos and a Subtle Shift to the West-
The second, December, oil price hike had a devastating effect on the 
world balance of payments structure, as huge amounts of capital moved from 
the industrialized countries and non-oil less developed countries (LDCs) to the 
oil producing states.66 In January 1974, the IMF estimated that the oil 
producing states would run balance of payments surpluses of $66 billion while 
the industrialized states would have balance of payments deficits of $45 
billion.67 Within the Western alliance, it was predicted that Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and France would be the hardest hit, with their deficits increasing to 
around $12 billion, $10 billion and $7 billion respectively. Forecasts of a $4 
billion deficit each were made for the Federal Republic and the United States.68 
Relative to the size of their economies, the LDCs were projected to have even 
worse deficits.69 
The gross disequilibrium in the balance of payments posed serious 
problems for the international economic system and the West in general in three 
important regards. First, no method existed for adjustment on such a massive 
scale: it was unclear whether the Euromarkets could handle the enormous task 
of recycling the oil surpluses and financing the oil deficits, or if banks would 
collapse in the new arrangement. Moreover, no public institution in existence, 
not even the IMF or World Bank, had the means to support such an endeavor.7o 
Second, without a proper system for recycling surpluses it was very likely that 
the OPEC countries would deposit large amounts of capital on the Euromarkets. 
66 BAK, BI02/167576, Betr.: Vorbereitung der Konferenz iiber Energiefragen am 11. Februar 
1974 in Washington (hereafter BI02/167576, Vorbereitung). 
67 TNA, T3541 152, CIXXlDocl7413, Subject: External Policies in the Current Situation; TNA, 
T354/152, Draft Brieffor the Chancellor of the Exchequer: Rome Meetings 15 January to 18 
January. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Bbk, N21K155, Working Party No.3 of the Economic Policy Committee, the Increase in Oil 
Prices; BAK, B126/48887, Weltweite wirtschafiliche und jinanziel/e Perspektiven und die 
ZUriickschleusung der Olgelder (hereafter B126/48887, Zuriickschleusung). 
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If this occurred, there was now the chance that oil-producing states would use 
the 'oil weapon' in a new way: namely, by suddenly moving their large capital 
holdings between currencies for either economic or political gain. Finally, and 
most importantly, after twenty-five years of extended growth, it was difficult to 
tell how the industrialized countries and the LDCs alike would respond to a 
massive change in their economic fortunes. No country in the West had 
experienced payments deficits similar to those which were predicted to occur. If 
oil-consuming countries refused to cooperate with one another, it could lead to 
competitive devaluations, import restrictions or other beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies. Should this occur, it would result in a drop in international trade, 
which in tum could lead to a recession and a rise in unemployment, especially 
in export-led economies such as the Federal Republic. 71 
Motivated by both the economic difficulties and a feeling of political 
disunity among the Western alliance, the United States proposed an initiative. 
not too dissimilar from the one Schmidt had suggested to Kissinger in early 
November 1973.72 On 9 January 1974, Richard Nixon, the American president, 
sent invitations to West Germany, France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Canada and Japan for their foreign ministers to attend a conference in 
Washington, DC on 11 February 1974 to discuss the oil crisis and possibilities 
for cooperation in dealing with it. As key objectives for the conference, Nixon 
named the establishment of an energy action committee whose aim would be to 
develop cooperative measures to deal with the growing energy demands as well 
as consumer-producer relations. The American president also envisioned 
holding a consumer-producer meeting within 90 days of the conclusion of the 
consumer conference or, as it came to be known, the Washington Energy 
Conference (WEC).73 Balance of payments difficulties were not to be covered 
initially in the WEC, as Washington wished to use the first discussions to "set a 
policy tone" and it was for this reason that foreign ministers, as opposed to 
71 Ibid.; TNA, T354/152, CIXXlMeeting 7411 - 1117174. a.m.; Gerald A. Pollack, "The 
Economic Consequences of the Energy Crisis," Foreign Affairs 52 no. 3 (1974): 455. 
72 Mockli points out the political elements, but it is clear from later discussions between Bonn 
and Washington and London and Washington that the WEC was not simply a tool for the 
United States to destroy European integration efforts. 
73 AAPD 197411,17; TNA, PREM 15/2178, FeO Telno 168 of 11 January 74 (hereafter PREM 
15/2178, Telno 168);AAPD 197411.138-40. 
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economics ministers, had been invited.74 Yet, eventually, Washington did 
extend invitations to certain finance ministers and offered to include either 
finance or economics ministers if the European states so desired. 75 
The Federal Republic reacted positively to the American invitation. 76 
Yet in the interest of European integration efforts, Bonn refrained from 
accepting the invitation until after discussing the matter with its European 
partners at the Council of Ministers on 15 January 1974.77 At the gathering, it 
was decided that the Community should accept the invitation on the condition 
that all members of the EC be permitted to take part as well as a representative 
from the European Commission. 78 In addition, the Nine agreed that there 
should be a joint mandate for the conference. On this point, however, there was 
no immediate agreement: while most EC members were generally prepared to 
work with America on the topics proposed, France was reluctant to agree to any 
of the discussion points put forward by the United States. 79 As a result, a 
decision on the matter was postponed. 
Yet while Bonn's official response to the WEe initiative was positive 
but wrapped in a muted European tone, its unofficial response through the West 
German finance minister was far more supportive. Where, before the second 
oil price hike, Schmidt had been gravely concerned about the economic 
repercussions of the oil crisis, after the second price surge his concerns had 
turned to alarm. He now became convinced that because of the interdependence 
of the Western economies and democracies, the only way for the West to avoid 
complete economic and political disintegration was through Western 
solidarity.80 And whereas, throughout autumn 1973, Schmidt used back 
channels to gamer support for such an approach, in January 1974, he publicly 
campaigned for it, openly attacking any policy which seemed to compromise 
74 T354/52, G-5 January. 
75 Ibid. 
76 PREM 1512178, Telno 168. 
77 AAPD 197411,17-8. 
78 TNA, PREM 15/2178, Telno 120 of 17 January 1974. 
79 PREM 15/2178, Telno 168; TNA, PREM 15/2178, FCO Telno 44 of 12 January 1974 
(hereafter PREM 15/2178, Telno 44). 
80 TNA, PREM 1512178, Record of Conversation between Heath and Schmidt. 
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this solidarity. At the 0-5 meeting on 15 January 1975 in Rome, Schmidt twice 
railed against British and French bilateralism, "insisting they were doing great 
damage to the collective interest of the oil consumers."SI At the same meeting 
Schmidt expressed support for the WEC, mentioning that he preferred finance 
ministers to attend alongside foreign ministers and noting that his determination 
to keep economic, rather than political, matters at the fore of discussions. 82 The 
following day, at the C-20 meeting on 16 January 1974, before European as 
well as oil producing states, Schmidt again assailed the use of bilateral deals, 
championed Western cooperation and supported the WEC initiative.83 
Unlike during the first weeks of the oil crisis, Brandt did not attempt to 
quieten Schmidt. Rather, throughout January 1974, the entire Brandt 
government grew increasingly committed to the successful completion of the 
WEC. Underlying this development were several factors. First, heavily 
dependent on America for military support, the Federal Republic wished to 
avoid giving Washington any reason to reduce the presence of American troops 
in West Germany.84 Their fear was not unfounded given recent comments by 
Nixon suggesting that this might be the consequence of a failure at the WEC. 85 
Yet their future defense was not their primary concern; rather, the Federal 
Republic was more worried about their economic prospects should the WEC 
fail. 
After the second price hike the entire Brandt government began to agree 
with what Schmidt had maintained for several months: namely, neither the 
Federal Republic nor the European Community could overcome the economic 
challenges without the United States.86 While the second price hike and the 
resulting balance of payments difficulties certainly contributed to this 
realization, so too did the collapse of EMU and efforts towards a common 
Community energy policy in January 1974. This left Bonn with no viable 
European options to deal with the massive economic and oil supply challenges 
81 T354/52, G-5 January. 
82 Ibid. 
83 TNA, T354/152, CIXXlMeeting 7411-1117174, a.m. 
84 AAPD 197411, 123. 
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before them, even if they would have preferred it otherwise.87 More persuasive 
still to Brandt and his cabinet was the possibility of eliminating bilateral deals. 
The United States was opposed to the use of bilateral deals and through the 
WEC framework hoped to eliminate them all together. 88 Yet Washington also 
warned that should the multilateral approach offered through the WEC fail, 
America would have to resort to the use of bilateralism, and in such an 
economic dynamic, only the United States could survive. 89 Bonn did not 
disagree with this American conclusion.9o Although West Germany doubted 
whether Washington would adopt such a policy because it would ruin the 
Western alliance and thus the United States too, but the Brandt government was 
not willing to take the risk. 91 Instead, the Federal Republic was prepared to see 
the establishment of follow-up machinery and conferences, as these would not 
only be useful in coordinating Western policies, but were also seen by the 
United States as outcomes without which the conference could not succeed. 92 
Still, despite West Germany's perspectives on the WEC, the Federal 
Republic did not tum its back on its EC partners or its European goals. Rather, 
Community solidarity was also an important consideration for Bonn with regard 
to the WEC.93 As the Council of Ministers came together on 5 February 1974 to 
discuss a common position for the conference, Bonn attempted to find a 
solution which would allow both unity among EC member states and the 
success of the WEC. The prospects for achieving their dual aims, however, 
remained uncertain given the contrasting perspectives of Britain and France. 
87 Although the European heads of state had agreed to the 1 January 1974 deadline for the start 
of the RDF, the EC economics and finance ministers failed to reach an agreement at its meeting 
on 17-18 December 1973. Given the British acquiescence to an EC energy policy, the Federal 
Republic did, as promise, increase the sum it was willing to give in support of the RDF. Yet, the 
amount hardly corresponded to that desired by London. At their meeting on 7 January 1974, the 
British responded by blocking all measures on a common European energy policy. A little over 
a week later, the EC economics and finance ministers failed to reach an agreement on the 
institutional aspects ofthe ECMF. Thus, both primary preconditions for passage into the second 
stage of EMU were in deadlock. The final blow to EMU came on 19 January 1974 when France 
decided to leave the European currency snake and float the franc. The move came as a shock to 
all, but particularly to the Federal Republic, given that only days before it had offered a loan of 
$2 billion to France to remain in the snake. AAPD 197411, 80,92-4. 
88 AAPD 197411,139-40. 
89 Ibid., 139-40. 
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91 Ibid., 139-41. 
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While the United Kingdom wished to preserve unity among the EC states, 
London only partially defined WEC success in the same tenns as the Federal 
RepUblic. Instead, Britain hoped that, alongside follow-up machinery, the West 
could agree a code of conduct for bilateral deals. 94 Although France had agreed 
to a Community presence at the WEC, Paris was neither anxious to attend the 
conference nor keen to allow the American agenda to be fulfilled. The 
Pompidou government argued that the American conference would be 
perceived by the oil producing states as an attempt by the West to establish a 
consumer cartel which would spark Arab retaliation.9s In an attempt to again 
appease the Arabs only days after the Nine's agreement to attend the WEC, 
France proposed the convocation of a world energy conference through the 
United Nations, which would include both consumers and producers, to discuss 
developments in the international energy market. 96 Aside from this 
counterproposal, Paris openly criticized American policy choices in front of 
Arab audiences, condemning the United States for what France perceived as a 
confrontational policy.97 Furthennore, France refused to accept its invitation to 
the WEC until it was satisfied the conference would pose no hann to efforts 
begun at the Copenhagen Summit towards a Euro-Arab dialogue. 98 Even the 
possibility of a West Gennan-Ied EC retreat from the French-led Euro-Arab 
dialogue, did not sway the French position.99 
Given the differences in outlook, it is surprising that the Nine ultimately 
managed to achieve a joint mandate for the WEC at the Council of Ministers 
gathering. IOO They did so after many hours of debate and heavy-handed tactics 
by France. The EC agreed that the agenda topics proposed by the United States 
would be discussed and that Europe would consider the establishment of short-
tenn working groups on specific issues. But the Community also rejected the 
creation of any pennanent follow-up machinery, new institutions or a 
94 TNA, PREM 1512178, Steering Brief for the Washington Energy Conference. 
9S PREM 15/2178, Telno 44; AAPD 197411, 124. 
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99 AAPD 197411, 93. 
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committee of senior officials to prepare for a follow-up conference. Finally, the 
mandate confirmed that the EC could review this position in the course of the 
conference and amend it as need be. 101 With a common mandate agreed, France 
accepted its invitation to the WEC - only days before the conference was to 
begin. Despite an additional American invitation to Giscard, Paris sent the 
French Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, as its only representative. 
While France was manoeuvring to get its way in the conference, so too 
was the United States. In the days before the start of the WEC, Kissinger met 
confidentially with Scheel, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, Schmidt and eventually also Jobert. The aim of his talks was to gamer as 
much support for the WEC as possible. In his meeting with Scheel, Kissinger 
reminded the West German foreign minister of the security and economic 
challenges the Federal Republic would face should the multilateral approach 
offered by the Americans through the WEC fail to materialize, and expressed 
flexibility on the matter of follow-up machinery.102 Kissinger came away from 
the meeting feeling less than optimistic, but he did have the impression that the 
Council mandate reached could be sidestepped. 103 After his talks with Home, 
Kissinger felt greater reassurance that the conference's goals would be met, 
while in his meeting with Schmidt -attending the conference as the West 
German representative (Scheel served as the EC representative) - Kissinger 
found the most willing of partners. By the meeting's end, it seemed to Kissinger 
that from the American perspective "[Schmidt] shared our general assessment 
of the energy crisis and the need for the kind of program we had outlined. He 
would do his utmost to fight for it. ... He would not participate in the attempt 
to turn Europe against America on an issue insoluble except by common 
efforts. He would affirm a program parallel to ourS."I04 As expected though, 
Kissinger had little success in shifting the French perspective during his 
meeting with Jobert; it seemed to the American secretary of state that a 
showdown would occur between France and the United States at the WEC. 
101 Ibid.; Mockli, 267-268. 
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It took little time after the start of the WEC on 11 February for 
Kissinger's summations of his bilateral talks of the previous days to prove 
accurate. Kissinger opened the conference, presenting America's two main 
proposals - the establishment of an Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) 
consisting of senior officials to oversee the work, and a follow-up consumer 
conference then a consumer-producer conference. 105 After Kissinger concluded, 
Scheel spoke on behalf of the EC. Aware of the points Kissinger raised the 
previous day and his responsibility as the Community representative to abide by 
the EC mandate, Scheel struggled to find a balance between the two opposing 
approaches, ultimately leaving the impression that the Nine were willing to 
negotiate. Following Scheel, Schmidt immediately made it clear that the 
Federal Republic supported the initiatives put forward by the United States. 
Schmidt noted that while Bonn wished to avoid confrontation with the oil 
producers, a consumer cartel should not be regarded as confrontational given 
that the consumers already faced a producer cartel. Schmidt also called for 
solidarity not only on energy matters, but also on security, trade and monetary 
relations. Finally, the West German finance minister also heavily criticized 
bilateral deals. Drawing on West German economic strength as he had done in 
the debate over the RDF and a common energy policy, Schmidt implicitly 
warned that the Federal Republic would be willing to use its economic might, 
remarking that West Germany was not the worst affected by the second oil 
price shock; rather, it could pay its oil bill and was not afraid of competition 
should bilateralism continue. 106 As Kissinger had hoped, Home also supported 
the American proposals.107 By the time Jobert spoke, he was angered by these 
attitudes; it seemed to him that the common Community mandate had not been 
observed. He even charged Schmidt with violating it. Jobert also rejected 
Schmidt's perspective on bilateral deals. 108 
When the EC went into internal discussions later that day, there was 
great tension between France and the other Eight. Yet rather than allow France 
lOS TNA, PREM 15/2179, Text: Kissinger Address to Washington Energy Conference; INA, 
PREM 15/2179, Telno 540 of 12 February (hereafter PREM 15/2179, Telno 540). 
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to manipulate the outcome as it had during the 5 February Council meeting, 
West Germany, and in particular Schmidt, took charge. Taking heed of 
Kissinger's comments of the previous day, Scheel encouraged his European 
counterparts to see that the debate was not merely about the establishment of 
the ECG, but rather the fate of the Western alliance as a whole: if Europe 
refused Washington again, he warned, it could have dire consequences for 
political relations. 109 Scheel recommended that the EC ministers contact their 
governments and discuss the options available to them. Jobert, however, 
refused to do so, maintaining that his instructions were clear.llo For Schmidt 
the choice was clear. He implored the European ministers to accept that a 
European policy was futile, for the EC could not even preserve peace and a 
balance of power in Europe much less the Middle East. 111 Schmidt declared 
that if he must choose between Europe and the United States, then he chose the 
latter and he was prepared to say this in public as well. 112 In addition, he 
accused Jobert of lacking the economic understanding necessary to debate the 
economic challenges facing Europe and caring more about France's role in the 
world.113 Bonn's pleas found a resonance with all other EC member states, save 
France, leaving the EC divided at the end of the first day. While France 
continued to adhere to a strict interpretation of the EC mandate, the Eight were 
willing to negotiate and accept many aspects of the American proposal. I 14 
When work turned to the communique the following day, despite efforts 
by the Eight, Jobert refused to alter his stance. lIS With no European version of 
the communique agreed, the EC only had the American version on which to 
negotiate with Washington. France refused to collaborate on any parts of the 
communique which dealt with follow-up machinery, including specific tasks 
and procedures. Those were of course the points of the communique which 
required the greatest amount of consultation. As a result, the communique was 
negotiated between the Eight and the United States with the latter coming out 
109 AAPD 197411,198. 
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on top. Not only did the Eight agree to the establishment of the ECG, they also 
agreed to the possibility of another consumer conference before a later 
consumer-producer conference. Crucially, this consumer-producer conference 
had no date or deadline attached to it. 116 
As the conference drew to a close, Bonn had mixed feelings about the 
result. Although there had been agreement between the Eight and the United 
States, Schmidt was unhappy that France remained outside the emerging 
Western approach to energy matters. Schmidt later concluded that "the 
structural crisis of the international economy thus began without the most 
important governments' agreeing on a diagnosis, much less on treatment." 117 
Over the next several months, Schmidt worked intensely to alter the outcome of 
the WEC. Scheel too, despite his insistence to the press that European unity was 
still on track, was disappointed: of the ambitious goals established by the Paris 
Summit of 1972, only political cooperation within the EPC had survived, but 
now even this appeared to be in jeopardy. 118 Moreover, in the light of the WEC, 
Bonn concluded that the development of a Community energy policy in the 
near future was unlikely. 119 Jobert publicly denounced the actions of the Eight, 
maintaining that France alone abided by the agreed mandate, placing much of 
the blame for the division within the EC on Schmidt.120 European integration 
efforts suffered further when the meeting of the political committee originally 
scheduled for 14-15 February 1974 to discuss the start of the Euro-Arab 
dialogue was postponed for two weeks. 121 Although Brandt and Scheel led a 
brief revitalization of the Euro-Arab dialogue at the 4 March 1974 Council 
meeting, this initiative, along with the ambitious goal of European unity by 
1980, soon faded to the background, as political change swept through the West 
and the economic repercussions of the oil crisis wreaked havoc on the West 
through the second half of 1974. 122 
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-From Stalemate to a Common Western Approach-
Much of the failure to find a common Western response to the oil crisis 
stemmed from political discord and poor working relations between the 
Western heads of government and foreign ministers. In spring 1974 though, 
political changes began to occur, starting in the United Kingdom. Having failed 
to secure RDF support and faced with stark domestic economic problems, 
trouble with the unions and growing Euro-skepticism, Heath called a snap 
election in February 1974 in the hope of regaining his position and the public's 
confidence. His gamble though proved unsuccessful when the Conservatives 
lost the election on 28 February 1974 to the Labour Party with Harold Wilson 
replacing Heath as prime minister. 123 Unlike the previous Conservative 
government, the Labour government was much less instinctively pro-European 
than the Heath government had been. Soon after taking leadership, Wilson and 
in particular the new Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, ''wasted no time in 
restoring the special relationship" between the United States and Britain which 
had been strained under Heath. 124 In addition, Callaghan also fostered a close 
working relationship with Schmidt. 125 
A second political upheaval came in France with the death of Pompidou 
on 2 April 1974. In a close vote, Giscard was elected as his successor. As 
evidenced through his work in the G-5, Giscard's interaction with his European 
as well as American counterparts during his time as minister of finance was 
cooperative and productive. Moreover, Giscard admitted he was embarrassed 
by the bickering between Jobert and Kissinger over the two previous years, and 
as president would approach matters in a pragmatic manner. 126 That said, 
because of the Gaullists in his governing coalition, Giscard faced an uphill 
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battle if he was to change French energy and Middle East policies. 127 
Nonetheless, Washington and Bonn hoped that the change of government, 
while not necessarily leading to immediate changes in policy, might permit a 
more constructive style of French diplomacy. 128 
The greatest political shift affecting West German policymaking was the 
resignation of Brandt on 6 May 1974. Brandt's departure came in response to 
the revelation that Giinter Guillaume, a personal assistant in the Chancellery 
who had access to high level discussions and documents, was an East German 
spy. It was not the Guillaume affair alone which forced Brandt to step down; 
rather, the Chancellor had been beset with a series of domestic political 
problems starting in 1972. The Brandt government already faced pressure 
because of accusations of underhand tactics surrounding the 1972 federal 
elections. Within his own cabinet, Brandt encountered a minor revolt by 
Herbert Wehner, who openly denounced him during an official state visit to 
Moscow in autumn 1973. Finally, from shortly after his re-election in 1972, 
Brandt had suffered health problems and severe depression, often making him a 
less than effective chancellor. Thus, the Guillaume affair was only the final 
blow to an already ailing leadership. 129 
On 16 May 1974, Helmut Schmidt became chancellor. Although the 
scandals surrounding Brandt's departure hampered the SPD's signature foreign 
policy initiatives-Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik-as well as the standing 
of the Social-democrats domestically, in international political-economic terms, 
Schmidt's ascendancy proved to be very advantageous for the Federal 
Republic: his understanding of political-economic matters and the social and 
political ramifications of the energy crisis made him one of the West German 
politicians most capable of dealing with the looming economic crises. 
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Moreover, unlike Brandt, Schmidt was much more pragmatic in his leadership 
and had experience in crisis management. 130 These factors, coupled with his 
Atlanticist approach, greatly shifted the dynamics of western political 
negotiations and consensus building among the allies on energy matters. 
Although a change in leadership in Washington came only in August 
1974, the increasingly positive relations in the Atlantic alliance were noticed 
and led to progress far sooner.13I Briefing the US cabinet in June 1974 
Kissinger was euphoric with regard to the changes in leadership that had taken 
place in Europe, remarking "The changes of government in Europe in the last 
year have been extraordinary. Wilson is the most cooperative; Schmidt is more 
energetic; and the French change is remarkable. We solved the problem with 
France in a half hour at the Ottawa meeting and the Foreign Minister spoke in 
English - the first time ever.,,132 Indeed it seemed only months earlier that the 
highly contentious New Atlantic Charter, would tear the Western alliance apart. 
In the end, the United States and the EC signed it with very little debate and 
with good spirit on 26 June 1974. The good relations only improved after Nixon 
resigned on 8 August 1974 and Gerald Ford became president on 9 August 
1974.133 By autumn 1974, the Federal Republic determined that relations 
between the United States and the EC were "excellent" and that "no problems" 
existed. 134 
Yet while the changes in government certainly shifted the dynamics, it 
remained to be seen whether the improved prospects for cooperation would 
alter Bonn's and the West's response to the oil crisis. Although now chancellor, 
Schmidt's views did not noticeably change from those espoused while finance 
minister: his primary concern remained economics and he gave pride of place to 
Western cooperation. That said, he did not disregard European efforts; he 
believed that European cooperation, particularly in the areas of energy policy, 
should continue, so long as this work neither obstructed nor trumped the 
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Western efforts. 135 By summer 1974, Bonn concluded, "Wir sehen die 
Notwendigkeit, in beiden Bereichen - dem international en und dem 
europaischen - voranzukommen. Allerdings sollte zwischen diesen Bereichen 
kein Junktim hergestellt werden. Es muss vermieden werden, daB die Bereiche 
sich gegenseitig blockieren.,,136 Indeed, the Schmidt administration openly 
asserted, "regionale Systeme mussen die global en untersrutzen.,,137 
As it turned out, ho.wever, Schmidt had little reason to worry about a 
European challenge. Trouble with European integration efforts started on 1 
April 1974 when Callaghan announced at the EC Council of foreign ministers 
meeting that Britain would seek "renegotiations" on its terms of entry to the 
European Community.138 Citing predominately financial concerns-above all 
Britain's disproportionate contribution to Europe's budget and objections to the 
common agricultural policy (CAP)-London threatened to leave the 
Community should discussions on their points of contention not take place. 139 
The much altered British position vis-a-vis EC membership greatly affected the 
initiatives in the EC. Although efforts toward a common energy policy began 
again in May 1974 with a new European Commission proposal, they quickly 
faltered when the United Kingdom objected to the Commission's suggestions 
and refused to discuss any revisions until autumn 1974, when the renegotiation 
talks were expected to be settled. 140 Britain's obstructionist EC position also 
slowed work on the Euro-Arab dialogue, although so too did certain Arab 
demands. 141 With EMU having broken down in January 1974 and the lack of 
progress on common energy and foreign policies, the ambitious goal of 
European unity by 1980 collapsed. Only in December 1974 did the European 
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Community revive its efforts towards closer integration through the creation of 
the European Council. This act, though, was far from the grand vision of 
European identity and union envisioned at the 1972 Paris Summit. 142 
Initially it seemed that Bonn and the West would be able to capitalize on 
the improved political relationships and lack of European competition. By June 
1974, the ECG began work on a new proposal by the United States - the 
Integrated Energy Program (IEP). The IEP called for energy supply sharing and 
controls on demand during emergency periods. It also set out a plan for oil 
pooling, alternative energy development and energy conservation over the 10ng-
tenn. 143 While the European ECG members were positive about the American 
suggestion, France's continued non-participation in this Western initiative 
worried them, especially West Gennany.l44 Through summer 1974, Schmidt 
attempted to persuade Giscard to join the Western initiative and pressed Bonn's 
ECG partners to be patient, promising that the French president did want to take 
part in the IEP. 145 Yet, despite his efforts, France did not change its stance and 
by September 1974, unwilling to wait any longer, the ECG agreed to the 
establishment of the IEP without France. 146 
Given Bonn's desire for Western solidarity, the French refusal to 
participate in the IEP would have been a disturbing set-back at the best of 
times, yet by autumn 1974 the international economy was in a downward spiral. 
Although OPEC had not raised prices since December 1973 and the embargo 
against the United States was officially lifted in March 1974 and the 
Netherlands in July 1974, the economic repercussions of the oil crisis set in 
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across the West. 147 IMF predictions on the severe disequilibrium in the global 
balance of payments structure were proving correct: nearly all Western states 
were in deficit, with, as forecast, the United Kingdom and Italy, suffering the 
most. The oil producers' surpluses had increased drastically. Through the IMF, 
the industrialized countries along with the oil producers and non-oil LDCs had 
managed to agree to the creation of the Witteveen facility, a recycling fund, 
which aided the countries suffering severe balance of payments surpluses. 148 In 
addition, the Euromarkets had reacted better than expected to the placement of 
the large oil surpluses. 149 Yet despite these positive developments, the balance 
of payments disequilibrium problems remained far from solved. 
Furthermore, while pnces were already rising before the oil cnSlS, 
during the second half of 1974 inflation rates throughout the industrialized 
states soared into the double-digits on the back of the massive oil price surge. 
Concern was growing that inflation would soon give way to recession, as global 
trade slowed and investor confidence waned. Indeed it seemed to Bonn already 
in autumn 1974 that such was the case in the United States. Helped by large 
export orders from the previous years and a strict money policy introduced after 
the collapse of Bretton Woods, the Federal Republic was able to maintain a 
balance of payments surplus and an inflation rate at 7 percent. Yet, despite its 
relatively strong economic performance, Bonn was not content to rest on its 
laurels. Rather, the Schmidt government was aware that because of their 
dependence on exports for growth and employment, West Germany could not 
maintain this strong position for very long, and needed both international trade 
and market confidence to rebound quickly. ISO For Bonn the key to both was 
Western cooperation. 
Concerned about the state of the global economic system and aware that 
France would not participate in any Western forum associated with the IEP, the 
Federal Republic turned to the G-5. Schmidt strongly believed in the 
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effectiveness "[des] informellen personlichen Kontakt[ s] der runf 
Finanzminister und Notenbankgouverneure gerade angesichts der schwierigen 
Weltwirtschaftslage.,,151 The G-S had been created primarily for the discussions 
on international monetary reform and its last meeting had been in January 1974 
- right before the collapse of the C-20 negotiations. Soon after becoming 
chancellor though, Schmidt began to push for the use of this forum in respect to 
crafting a Western response to the oil crisis. 152 Finally in September 1974, 
Schmidt's efforts seemed to have paid off, as the United States proposed, and 
the other G-5 members agreed to, a G-5 gathering on 28-29 September 1974 in 
Washington. ls3 To this G-S meeting, however, Washington invited not just the 
finance ministers, but also the foreign ministers and central bank governors of 
the five countries. 
Yet, in the expanded G-S, with different personalities, the consensus 
that Schmidt experienced as finance minister and hoped would lead to a 
common Western approach did not occur. Instead, the United States used the 
meeting as an opporturJity to unveil a new American strategy towards the 
energy matters based on reducing the price of oil. Opening the talks, William 
Simon, who had replaced George Shultz as American Secretary of the Treasury, 
began by drawing comparisons with the challenges facing the West after the 
Second World War and highlighted three problem areas: "the overall state of 
the world economy; the problem of recycling; and the high level of oil 
prices.,,154 The first two issues were of lesser concern to the Americans: 
despite evidence to the contrary, Washington "did not believe" the United 
States or the West as a whole were on the brink of a recession; rather, 
countering inflation was and would remain the major problem for and focus of 
American economic policymaking. Although confidence in the markets was 
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falling, and a major American bank and one in Germany had recently collapsed, 
Washington remained optimistic about the ability of the markets and the other 
institutions thus far established to handle the recycling issue. 155 Still, the United 
States recognized the need for new arrangements and advocated greater 
cooperation among the industrialized states on this matter. 156 
Raising the greatest alarm for the United States was the price of oil. 
Economically, Kissinger warned, "no industrialized country could live long 
with the current level of oil prices and increases in view.,,157 Washington was 
also concerned about the political repercussions of oil prices: Kissinger 
maintained that "the problem was not a question of balances in banks but of the 
acquisition of political power.,,158 The United States feared that OPEC could 
potentially misuse their political power to extort weaker industrialized states, 
such as Italy. In tum, these states could "become economic and political 
hostages of the producers.,,159 Moreover, with the producers' increased political 
power there was also a greater risk of regional instability; given the large 
amount of armaments in the area, the possibility existed for local rivalries and 
disputes. These could lead to further outbreaks of war between the Israelis and 
Arabs and greater Soviet involvement in the Middle East. Washington called on 
the other industrial states to reach a unified position, insisting that only through 
Western solidarity could the industrialized world hope to overcome the 
economic and political problems facing them. 160 
To this end, Kissinger proposed a strategy focusing on three aspects: oil 
conservation, financial solidarity, and consumer-producer co-operation. 161 The 
overall thrust of the American plan was to drastically reduce the price of oil and 
limit the transfer of economic and political power to the oil producer countries. 
Under conservation, the Americans suggested that the consuming countries cut 
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oil imports by a combined total of 3 million barrels a day. How this was to be 
achieved in each country, i.e. taxation, import levies, price decontrol, allocation 
and rationing, would be left to the respective states to determine. In this way, 
Washington maintained, the West could exert downward pressure on the price 
of oil. Conservation was to be "basic to [the West's] relations with the 
producers." 162 
For financial solidarity, Washington proposed the establishment of a 
trust fund totaling at least $15 billion per year. 163 This "solidarity fund" was to 
be used by the industrialized states to support the LDCs and to assist troubled 
Western states overcome the financial challenges of the energy crisis. Thus the 
solidarity fund could be used to help relieve large oil deficits and, in 
conjunction with other existing arrangements, for recycling. Through its 
establishment, Kissinger argued, the West could curb the producers' ability to 
use oil as a weapon, as the consumer countries would be able to "take care of 
[their] own." Lastly, Washington advocated the development of a "common 
strategy" among the consumers vis-A-vis the producers, for without it, Kissinger 
warned "the producers would be in the driver's seat in any consumer-producer 
dialogue." The American belief in this statement was so strong that Washington 
refused to enter a consumer-producer conference without first achieving a 
shared consumer approach. 164 
While Bonn and the other G-5 member states could agree with aspects 
of the American analysis, there was little consensus on Washington's proposed 
strategy.165 First, the Europeans and the Japanese did not believe that the 
centerpiece of the American strategy - the drastic reduction of oil prices - was 
feasible. Although in the immediate aftermath of the second price hike, West 
Germany had hoped to decrease oil prices to pre-hike figures, over the months 
the Federal Republic came to realize that this was impossible and instead 
argued that a reduction in oil prices would only come gradually and marginally 
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through solidarity on conservation measures and the resulting effect on market 
forces. 166 Indeed, it seemed to Bonn, Paris, London and Tokyo that overly 
aggressive action in such a direction would have the opposite of the desired 
effect. Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, expressed the four 
members' perspective well, classifying the reduction of oil prices as a matter of 
"importance" rather than one of "urgency." Of greater urgency to these states 
were other issues identified by Simon: namely, the overall economy and 
recycling. Far from the rosy American global economic outlook, the four other 
G-5 members foresaw the world economy worsening. While all maintained that 
inflation remained the chief concern, they did not underplay the effects of the 
stagnating American economy.167 As to recycling, the new West German 
finance minister, Hans Apel, aptly expressed the other G-5 members' worries, 
stating, "Recycling was most important. We could not solve this problem by 
using our own economic means. The deficit would remain.,,168 
On the growing political risks stemming from the energy crisis, there 
was little dispute. Yet the Europeans and Japanese worried that the proposed 
American program might actually exacerbate the situation. 169 Healey 
maintained that such a comprehensive Western response as proposed by 
Kissinger "smacked of confrontation.,,17o The Japanese, French and West 
Germans representatives echoed the British concern, though arguing on 
different grounds. The French foreign minister, Jean Sauvagnargues, contended 
"Too close solidarity amongst the industrialised countries could provoke a kind 
of 'class-war'. [The West] should recognise that petrodollars were the only 
wealth most of the producers possessed.,,171 Hans Dietrich Genscher, the West 
German Foreign Minister, presented the matter from a more practical 
standpoint, stating "confrontation should be avoided. Apart from anything else 
we could not carry it out."I72 
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Yet while the Federal Republic, Britain, France and Japan shared the 
same economic priorities, recognized the potential for political backlash and 
hoped to avoid confrontation, they presented no comprehensive alternative to 
the proposed American strategy. The closest they came was a British suggestion 
for a second recycling facility to be created within the IMF and outfitted with 
funds totaling $25-30 billion. 173 With it, Healey maintained, "at least part of the 
recycling problem would be under control, because a firm location for some of 
the surpluses would have been found in an international organization." 
Moreover, Healey noted it would help "to reassure, and therefore strengthen, 
the Euromarkets.,,174 For his plan, Healey found tentative support from his 
European and Japanese counterparts. America, however, disliked the British 
approach because it relied on Arab participation and thus placed the West again 
at the mercy of the oil producers. 175 As the meeting drew to a close, no 
resolutions for the issues raised could be agreed. 
In the coming weeks, the chances for agreement became even slimmer. 
A first major roadblock occurred on 24 October 1974 when in a press 
conference Giscard denounced the initiatives undertaken through the IEP as 
well as those suggested by Kissinger in the G-5 meeting. The French president 
announced that France would pursue a consumer-producer dialogue, although 
he made no concrete suggestions for its possible content,176 These statements 
came as a great disappointment to Bonn.177 Despite earlier French refusals, 
Schmidt had retained hope that they would reconsider their position. Yet, from 
Giscard's comments, it was not only clear that France had no intention of 
joining the IEP, but that it aimed to undermine the efforts taking place within 
it,178 To be sure, West Germany supported dialogue with the producer states, 
but Schmidt's government believed it should only occur "wenn der 
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Weltolmarkt [sich] einigermaBen stabilisiert [hat] .... und muB von Seiten der 
groBen VerbraucherHinder entsprechend vorbereitet sein.,,179 From Bonn's 
perspective, one of the purposes of the IEP was to fulfil the latter condition. 
This now seemed impossible given France's position on the IEP. Yet, despite 
Bonn's dismay over Giscard's comments, Schmidt refrained from publicly or 
privately criticizing the French president or his statements; instead, because of 
his personal friendship with Giscard, Schmidt placed the blame for the French 
position not on its leader, but on the Gaullist portion of his government. 180 
In Washington the French plan for a consumer-producer conference was 
perceived as a deliberate political attack on the United States, who in the G-5 
meeting had clearly opposed such a dialogue before the consumers were 
coordinated. 181 After months of adherence to Schmidt's pleas for patience with 
Giscard, the Ford administration would wait no longer. A few weeks later they 
retaliated. Despite the less than positive comments Washington had received 
about its proposed strategy at the September 1973 G-5 meeting, and requests 
from the Federal Republic not to publicly disclose the financial aspects of its 
strategy, on 14 November 1974, in a speech at the University of Chicago, 
Kissinger unveiled the American plan. 182 Days later, Simon expanded on the 
financial aspects of it in his address before the Foreign Trade Convention, 
calling explicitly for the creation of a Western solidarity fund. 183 Given the lack 
of agreement on a Western course of action on energy matters nearly a year 
after the oil crisis began, Kissinger was right to ask, "What will be our 
response?,,184 Within a few short weeks, however, Western solidarity was 
achieved and Bonn was a driving force in its development. 
Aware that he would soon be holding talks with Ford and Kissinger, 
Schmidt contacted Giscard in late November 1974 to discuss the possibilities 
for finding common ground between the American and French positions. In a 
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180 BAK, B136/17041, Vermerk fiber ein Gespriich des Bundeskanzlers mit den Herren 
Sonnenfeldt und Hartman am 27.10.1974. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Mappe 6579, Kissinger. 
183 HSA, Mappe 6579, Simon Address to Foreign Trade Convention. 
184 Mappe 6579, Kissinger. 
138 
series of telephone conversations, Schmidt and Giscard, at the former's 
suggestion, hatched a plan for a three-phase consumer-producer dialogue: first, 
a preparatory meeting in early 1975 to be attended by senior civil servants who 
would decide the discussion topics; second, a consumer caucus, during which 
consumer positions could be established and coordinated, and in which the 
French would take part; third, a consumer-producer meeting to be attended by 
the heads of government in late 1975. The two European leaders also agreed 
that Schmidt would present this plan at his upcoming talks with the United 
States. 185 
When Schmidt met with Ford and Kissinger on 4-5 December 1974, the 
West German chancellor quickly turned the discussions to energy matters and 
the Western discord surrounding them. Schmidt began by relaying that 
"[Giscard] is willing, with you, to bring about not only what looks like but 
really serves the purposes of consolidation. With his consent, I will sketch out a 
few ideas on which you and he might publicly agree.,,186 Schmidt remarked 
further that his plan was meant to bridge the American approach and "Giscard's 
carelessly launched ideas.,,187 Having presented the West German-French 
strategy, Schmidt confidently informed Ford and Kissinger, "Giscard will buy 
this.,,188 Yet, Schmidt did not only tow the agreed West German-French line, he 
also proposed a "personal idea". Schmidt suggested holding private talks 
between key consumer and producer countries, attended by 12-15 private 
citizens with access to their governments. He called it "a meeting of brains.,,189 
While Schmidt could not provide an assurance that Paris would definitely agree 
to this proposal, he appeared certain that they would consider it. 190 
18S HSA, Mappe 6586, Kurzvermerk uber das TeleJongespriich Giscard d'EstainglBK am 
28.11.74.; HSA, Mappe 6586, Kurzvermerk iiber das TeleJongespriich Giscard d'EstainglBK 
am 3. Dezember 1974; HSA, Mappe 6586, Vermerk: Betr.: Telefongespriich des BK mit 
Giscard d'Estaing am 13.12.1974. 
186 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 7, December 5, 1974-Ford, Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt (hereafter 
Box 7, December 5). 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
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Washington was not immediately convinced that the West Gennan-
French plan or Schmidt's own initiative would work. Instead, Ford questioned 
if consumer unity had reached a point whereby they could avoid going "down 
the path of ineffective results." Kissinger added that under such circumstances, 
"A producers' conference could accentuate the sense of impotence of the West 
that could offset all policies.,,191 Also a cause for concern among the American 
officials was the French argumentation on this matter in the preceding weeks, 
particularly the notion that the United States sought confrontation with oil 
producers. 192 Despite its skepticism, Washington was detennined to find a 
common Western response on the matter. As the first day of the two-day 
meeting drew to a close, the American president concluded that "the problem is 
to save France's face and make it work. Let's try to find a fonnula which will 
work and let me finalize it at [the upcoming bilateral French-American talks in] 
Martinique." 193 
By "a fonnula", however, Ford did not mean a simple reworking of 
Schmidt's proposals. Ford's "fonnula" was to include also the American 
suggestion for a solidarity fund. Since first discussing multilateral options for 
recycling at the G-5 meeting, the Federal Republic had considered the 
advantages and disadvantages of both the British plan and the American one. 
Increasingly Bonn felt that the British proposal was a better solution, because 
"schemes based on the IMF helped to avoid confrontation; the Arabs were 
already there as members, and would bear some of the burden; also, the risk of 
guarantee would be more widely spread.,,194 The American plan, however, 
raised multiple concerns in Bonn. In the $25 billion solidarity fund, West 
Gennany would be expected, after the United States, to contribute the bulk of 
the financing. Having over the last half of 1974 already extended a $2 billion 
credit to Italy, adopted a $3 billion European loan program available to EC 
member states, backed by a 44 percent West Gennan guarantee, and agreed to 
further expenditures to aid non-oil producing LDCs, the Federal Republic was 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 TNA, T3541105, Record a/Conversation between Wilson and Schmidt. Sunday 1 December 
1974. 
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feeling the strain of its international financial support. As one German official 
summed up, "Die Leistungsfahigkeit der Bundesrepublik ist nicht 
unbegrenzt.,,195 As it stood though, the risks associated with $25 billion fund 
was just too great for Bonn. 196 
Alongside the financial aspects of the American proposal, was the 
matter of national responsibility. The Federal Republic did not wish to become 
a lender of last resort for economically weaker European states who have 
"undisciplined economic policies.,,197 Instead, Bonn was clear that the onus for 
financing deficits should lie with the national governments, and funds should 
not encourage the deficit countries to pursue an inflationary policy at home. 198 
Moreover, Bonn was not fully convinced that the proposed American facility 
was actually needed. The Witteveen Fund already existed, with the IMF 
recently proposing its extension through 1975 and an increase in its funding 
from $3.5 billion to $7-10 billion. 199 Moreover, discussions were taking place 
in the OECD about the possibility of creating a guarantee mechanism in the 
region of $5-10 billion (the so-called Van-Lennep plan), and, furthermore, the 
British plan presented at the September G-5 meeting was still on the table.2oo 
Although part of the appeal of the American plan was supposed to be that the 
oil-producing countries would be severely restricted in their use of the oil 
weapon, the Schmidt government worried that it may have the opposite effect. 
If OPEC perceived their actions as too confrontational, then it may push prices 
higher. Finally, Bonn foresaw the potential for an equally political catastrophe. 
Schmidt's government worried that the United Kingdom would lose even 
further interest in European Community membership if they were provided with 
too many options for receiving financing elsewhere.201 
19~ BAK, B136/34377, Vermerkfiir die Kabinettsitzung am 6. November 1974. Betr.: TOP 7: 
Europafragen; TNA, T3541169, G5: Brie/C, Joint Community Borrowing; BAK, B136/17041, 
Aufzeichnung ilber das Gesprachs des Herrn Bundeskanzlers mit Undersecretary Bennett (US-
Treasury) und Assistant Secreatry Enders (US-State Department ) (hereafter B 136/17041, 
Enders). 
196 B13617671, US-Vorschlag. 
197 GRF, White House Central Files, CO 53-2, German Fed Rep. 12/01174. 
198 Ibid.; B136/16795, Betr.: Ruckschleusung; BAK, B136/16795, Betr.: Washington-Reise BK 
vom 4. bis 6. Dezember 1974, Translation. 
199 B 136116795, Zusammenarbeit; B 136/6795, Riickschleusung. 
200 Ibid. 
201 BI36/17041,Enders. 
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During the first meeting with Ford and Kissinger, Schmidt had relayed 
Bonn's reasoning for its hesitancy toward the American financing mechanism, 
saying "[the solidarity fund] is an invitation for Britain and Italy to continue 
with inflation. It takes away from the Arabs the risks of investment and puts it 
on us .... I can't commit my country to that amount. $4 billion is an enormous 
burden on our budget. It would explode my budget.,,202 Yet, for the United 
States, the solidarity fund had come to play an integral part in their strategy. 203 
Kissinger responded that the fund would be a means of introducing this 
discipline. Schmidt dismissed this line of argumentation though, maintaining 
that the economic risks were too great and "Italy wouldn't fulfill the 
conditions. ,,204 
As the second day of the bilateral talks began, Ford laid out America's 
counter proposal. In it, Washington was willing to agree to the West German-
French plan, so long as steps one and two were reversed, making the consumer 
caucus precede a meeting of civil servants to decide conference topics. In this 
way, it seemed to Ford, consumer solidarity would be achieved before a 
meeting with the producers took place. Second, Ford accepted Schmidt's 
private group idea with the caveat that the initial meetings be restricted to the 
consumers. Finally, he wanted at least a $2 billion commitment from the 
Federal Republic to the solidarity fund. This sum seemed extremely reasonable 
to the Americans, as Ford noted before the gathering in private discussion with 
Kissinger, "Hell, he gave Italy twO.,,20S 
Schmidt was willing to accept the American alterations to the West 
German-French plan as well as his private group initiative, but was unwilling to 
confirm whether it would also meet French requirements. Schmidt commented, 
"I will buy it. The question is whether Giscard will. I will convey it to him 
privately.,,206 The West German chancellor was less forthcoming on the 
202 Box 7, December 5. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
20S GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 7, December 6, 1974-Ford, Kissinger. 
206 Ibid. 
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solidarity fund. Schmidt recognized that if he refused, the possibility for 
Western cooperation would again be lost. Thus, he agreed to consider further 
Washington's request in the coming weeks and asked that the United States 
consider West Germany's domestic difficulties as well. Schmidt noted, "If our 
two countries shoulder the whole burden, that amount is something I can't 
stand.,,207 
Fortunately for the West, Giscard did buy the American counter proposal. Only 
ten days after Schmidt departed Washington, Ford and Giscard met in 
Martinique for bilateral talks. Here the two countries reached a four-stage 
agreement which corresponded closely to that discussed between Washington 
and Bonn. The first stage was "to complete efforts for cooperation among the 
consumers and within the Group of Ten." What constituted "cooperation" was 
left undefined, although it would soon become apparent in early 1975 that for 
Washington "cooperation" meant full "consumer solidarity" on financial 
matters, such as the solidarity fund, conservation measures and development of 
alternative energy resources - largely the same points that made up the 
American program for Western cooperation presented by Kissinger at the 
September 1974 G-5 meeting. The second stage of the Martinique agreement 
called for "technical talks with producers to see what questions would be 
discussed" in a conference. During the third stage, consumers were to reach 
concrete agreements among themselves on the topics decided in the second 
stage. Finally, a consumer-producer conference was to be held in summer 
1975.208 Given the American concern that consumer solidarity first be 
achieved, Paris and Washington decided that, as Schmidt suggested, work on 
the consumer position should be undertaken in and led by the G_5.209 Thus, a 
year after the outbreak of the oil crisis, the West finally had agreed an approach 
to the changed energy paradigm. 
207 Ibid. 
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-Conclusions-
In the immediate aftermath of the oil cnSlS, the Federal Republic 
attempted to balance its economic and political goals by pursuing multilateral 
approaches to both via the EC. Their efforts, however, were thwarted by the 
policy aims of France and Britain, which preferred to address the economic 
repercussions of the oil crisis through bilateral deals. In order to keep European 
integration efforts on track, Bonn initially refrained from pushing its dual 
approach, focusing instead on pursuing the European political course advocated 
most strongly by Paris and London. Only once it became clear that Europe's 
political gestures were having little affect on the Arab oil producers and West 
Germany's economic strength was at risk - a circumstance also made clear by 
Schmidt and the West German economics ministry - did the Brandt 
government again begin to forcefully advocate its economic agenda among its 
European partners. While Bonn's efforts did succeed in shifting the debate 
within Europe slightly in December 1973, it was not until after the second oil 
price hike in January and February 1974 that the Federal Republic achieved a 
balance between its political and economic aims: at this juncture they were able 
to encourage European political cooperation and to respond to the economic 
threat through Western cooperation. West Germany was able to maintain its 
dual path even when French opposition to the Washington Energy Conference 
threatened to undermine it. Had the Brandt government given in to French 
pressure over the WEC, as it had in November 1973, not only the outcome of 
the conference, but also all efforts toward a common response would probably 
have been fatally impaired. 
As the balance of payments difficulties became acute and the 
macroeconomic conditions began swiftly to deteriorate through summer 1974, 
Bonn, now with Helmut Schmidt as chancellor, concentrated even more on 
achieving its economic objectives. After all, Germany's economic strength 
rested greatly on the fortunes of the world economy. Yet unlike through the 
previous six months, over the second half of 1974, West Germany placed 
achieving a common Western approach ahead of first agreeing a European path. 
While this shift was due in large part to the economic problems which could not 
be tackled without the assistance of the United States, it was also a result of the 
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Atlanticist and economics-focused Schmidt entering the chancellery, as well as 
the fading of a European alternative. Had any of these aspects been different, it 
is unlikely that the Federal Republic would have made Western solidarity its 
main policy aim. As such, Bonn played an even greater role in the West's 
response to the oil crisis, for even when Washington and Paris made opposing 
proposals, West Germany remained committed to finding a response acceptable 
to all and not biased towards Europe. 
Yet the policy objectives alone would have had little bearing without a 
means of enforcing them. Rather, and similar to the methods examined in the 
first two chapters, to push its aims and influence the Western response to the oil 
crisis, the Federal Republic again relied on its economic strength and firm 
leadership. In order to shift the EC's focus back to economic matters, Bonn 
threatened to withhold its massive contributions to the Regional Fund as well as 
the EC budget. West Germany again relied on its economic might during the 
WEe in arguing against bilateralism and subsequently helping to win support 
for Western cooperation there. In addition, in order to strengthen the European 
economy and win favor among its European allies, the Federal Republic 
extended a $2 billion loan to Italy, served as the main guarantor on the EC's 
bond recycling program, and contributed greatly to Europe's additional support 
to non-oil LDCs. Finally, in order to gain Washington's approval for the 
eventual Martinique Agreement, Bonn committed billions of dollars to support 
America's proposal for a solidarity fund. 
Although chancellor when the oil crisis initially unfolded, and for 
several months thereafter, Brandt's leadership was less effective than Schmidt's 
in the pursuit of a common Western response. Attached to European integration 
efforts, Brandt initially refrained from challenging either Pompidou or Heath on 
their views toward a common European economic response to the oil crisis. 
Even when the opportunity arose for the creation of a Western response in 
December 1973, Brandt shied away from pushing it too strongly at the 
Copenhagen Summit. Once the WEC was announced, Brandt was still greatly 
concerned with achieving a single European perspective even at the risk of the 
failure of the WEC. Aside from his European bias, ill-health, party infighting 
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and the Guillaume affair were all distractions for Brandt and ultimately 
weakened his leadership abilities. 
From the outbreak of the oil crisis, despite being only finance minister, 
Schmidt grabbed the reins of leadership. Capitalizing on his economic 
understanding, Schmidt recognized that the economic repercussions of the oil 
crisis were dire and could not be solved by political talks alone. Thus, he 
pushed the economic perspective in both Bonn and Europe, even though they 
were not favored at the time. Relying on good relations with USA, Schmidt 
took the initiative to write to Kissinger in November 1973 with an idea for a 
Western conference on energy. Although Kissinger did not immediately act on 
it, given the form and content of the WEC proposal, Schmidt's suggestion 
clearly planted a seed of inspiration. And once the WEC was announced, 
Schmidt was its greatest advocate, championing it in various Western forums 
and generating support for it. At the WEC, unlike Brandt, Schmidt did not 
allow France to dominate the discussions; instead, Schmidt stood up to Jobert 
and French obstinacy, leading the EC in a drive to accept the proposals for 
Western cooperation put forward by Washington. Finally, using personal 
politics, Schmidt shaped a compromise between the French and American 
positions which served as the basis for the Martinique Agreement. Without his 
mediating skills, it is doubtful that an agreement would have been reached 
between Paris and Washington and thus a common Western response achieved. 
As a result of its efforts the Federal Republic was able to advance its 
position in the Western alliance. This advancement, however, did not come 
through the G-5, such as was seen in previous chapters; the expanded setting of 
the September 1974 G-5 meeting did little to help bring about Western 
agreement, and Bonn's voice within these discussions was lost as the United 
States dominated the proceedings. Still, despite the lackluster results of this G-5 
gathering, the Federal Republic's belief in the forum was not diminished; as 
was evident from Schmidt's "personal initiative" to the United States during 
their December 1974 bilateral talks, Schmidt still believed in the efficacy of and 
the opportunities for West Germany through the G-5 forum. Within a year's 
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time, Schmidt's belief would be justified with the success of the Rambouillet 
Summit. 
Through 1974, however, Bonn's position within the Western alliance 
improved predominately because of a combination of a waning of French and 
American economic and political power, and the willingness of Schmidt to take 
the lead. While France did not suffer from the Arab's oil embargo, the price 
hikes made it impossible for France to remain in the EC currency snake. The 
floating of the French franc not only undermined the snake and hence the 
centerpiece of EMU, but also damaged France's economic authority. Floating 
after all contradicted Paris's long-held views on fixed exchange rate regimes. 
Paris was firmly in command of the EC political response to the oil crisis, but 
once this initiative faded along with the larger push towards European Union by 
1980, France's voice within the Western alliance began to diminish. Although 
Giscard tried to continue to push the French agenda, without a strong EC 
backing, it appeared more as stubbornness rather than viable alternatives to the 
initiatives put forward by the United States. 
Less dependent on imported oil, Washington nonetheless felt the 
economic repercussions of the oil crisis through skyrocketing inflation. 
Ultimately, though, the oil crisis, and in particular the divide between the 
American and European approaches to it, further weakened the Nixon 
administration's political authority within the West, which had already been 
undermined by the controversy over the new Atlantic Charter and America's 
handling of the October War. As is evident from Kissinger's meetings with 
Western allies about the WEe, Washington recognized that this Western energy 
conference was an important test of its political leadership and the strength of 
the Western alliance. Given these circumstances, Schmidt's willingness to lead 
and push for a Western solidarity, allowed Bonn to have a greater influence and 
also take on a stronger political leadership role in the West. As Schmidt settled 
into the chancellery over the following year, he built on these experiences, 
showing ever greater leadership, transforming the Federal Republic's position 
permanently. 
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Chapter 4 
Unresolved Crises: The Failure of the Martinique Agreement 
and Deadlocked Monetary Reform 
January 1974-June 1974 
"Olpolitik kann nicht nur okonomische Politik sein. und Wiihrungspolitik kann nicht 
nur eine okonomische sein. es ist WeltpolWk. es ist AufJenpolitik . .. } 
Helmut Schmidt 
March 1975 
-Introduction-
By 1975, the West realized that the international economic system was 
in a fragile state: within a three-year period, two pillars of the economic order -
the energy paradigm and the international monetary system - had collapsed. In 
addition, attempts to reform the international monetary system through the 
Committee of Twenty (C-20) had also failed. Yet, Western lcaders were 
encouraged by the developments which had taken place in late 1974: in 
December of that year, France and the United States had concluded the 
Martinique Agreement which was to serve as a blueprint for cooperation among 
Western states and between oil consumers and producers through 1975. 
International monetary reform efforts had been re-Iaunched in October 1974 
through the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Interim Committee, with 
negotiations on aspects of reform scheduled to begin in January 1975. 
But, quite quickly, their hope turncd to dismay. First, the Martinique 
Agreement proved difficult to implement. After a promising start, the West 
struggled to complete its first stage. Focused on fulfilling the initial stage's 
terms, the industrialized states failed to adequately prepare for the second stage. 
Thus, as the latter began at the preparatory meeting between the oil consumers 
and producers in April 1975, the West remained united but was unable to 
negotiate on the heavy demands made by the oil producers and non-oil less 
developed countries (LDCs). As a result, the preparatory meeting ended in a 
stalemate and weeks later the oil producers threatened further oil price hikes. 
1 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B 136/8482, Thema: Kooperation oder Konfrontation 
- Stirbt die Wirtschaft in eine weltpolitische Krise?" Einfohrendes Referat (hereafter 
B 136/8482, Referat). 
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Under pressure, the industrialized states quickly rallied, giving into some of the 
demands of the oil producers and non-oil LDCs as well as advocating the 
revival of the preparatory meeting. Their efforts though came too late as the oil 
producers formally agreed at their June 1975 meeting to raise oil prices by 
autumn of the same year. Over the same period, monetary reform efforts 
through the Interim Committee also faltered. Arguments among the 
industrialized states over quota shares, the legalization of floating exchange 
rates and gold stymied progress towards amending the IMF Articles of 
Agreement (the Articles). The West's actions not only angered the other IMF 
members - above all the oil producers and non-oil LDCs - contributing to their 
demands and serving as a uniting force at the preparatory conference, but also 
undermined the struggling global economy. 
In the previous chapter, the Federal Republic's priorities shifted away 
from European political concerns, being replaced by economic stability and 
Western cooperation. To what extent did the latter continue to drive West 
German policy making as the West attempted to deal with the consequences of 
both crises? Did Bonn again rely on a combination of economic strength, strong 
leadership and mediation to sway its Western partners? And lastly, did the 
Federal Republic's actions help to further advance its standing within the 
Western alliance as they had in the initial stages of the two crises? 
-Solidarity, but Stalemate: The Failure of the Martinique Agreement-
The Martinique Agreement was composed of four stages. During the 
first stage, the West was to complete its efforts toward consumer solidarity, 
including common approaches to financial aspects, conservation, and the 
development of alternative resources. In the second stage, the consumers were 
to meet with the oil producers for technical talks. In this preparatory meeting, 
procedural matters such as participants and themes for a future consumer-
producer conference were to be negotiated. Third, the consumers would hold 
discussions among themselves, forming as much as possible joint positions on 
the agreed conference themes. Finally, the last stage would be the consumer-
producer conference. It was originally envisioned that the four stages would 
take no longer than 6 months, as it was hoped that the final conference would 
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take place in July 1975.2 While this was the West's plan, after many months 
attempting to implement it and indeed achieving a degree of Western solidarity, 
by April 1975, its full realization proved impossible. 
Having contributed greatly to its crafting, the Federal Republic was 
pleased with what appeared to be the blueprint for Western cooperation on 
issues related to oil. For Bonn the Martinique Agreement offered many 
economic and political benefits. Heavily dependent on the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for its energy requirements, solidarity 
on conservation and the development of alternative energy resources would 
help West Germany spread its risk and improve the West's negotiating power 
vis-A-vis the oil producers. Moreover, the consumer-producer conference was a 
non-confrontational way to negotiate with OPEC on oil prices. It was the hope 
that this negotiation would lead to a stabilization of oil prices which would help 
counter the disruption in world trade experienced since the oil crisis. Having an 
export-led domestic economy, functioning global trade and a sound 
international economy were essential not only to the Federal Republic's 
economic fortunes. In addition, the Martinique Agreement bridged the French 
and American perspectives on energy matters. This made political relations 
within the West less antagonistic than at any point in the first half of the 1970s 
and relieved West Germany of again having to choose between France and the 
United States. Thus, Bonn had much to gain from the success of the Martinique 
Agreement and much to lose from its failure. 3 
Yet from the start, the West's plan seemed doomed. Shortly after 
negotiations began on the first stage of the Martinique Agreement, the United 
States let it be known that in its view, consumer solidarity would only be 
achieved and hence the first stage completed, when Western leaders had agreed 
2 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (hereafter GRF), NSA Memcon, Box 8, December 15. 
1974 - Ford, Kissinger, French President. Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Foreign Minister 
Jean Sauvagnargues (hereafter Box 8, December 15). 
3 Ibid.; GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 7, December 5. 1974-Ford, Kissinger. Helmut Schmidt; BAI(, 
B 136/17041, Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik; Hans-Peter Schwarz et aI., eds., Akten zur 
Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1973, vol. 3, (Milnchen: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 2004), 1610; Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank (hereafter Bbk), 
N21K155, Vermerk-BetrefJ: Auswirkungen der Erdolverknappung auf die deutsche Wirtschaft. 
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a common position on financial matters, conservation and the development of 
alternative energies. America contended that anything less than full solidarity 
would leave the West open to division and ultimately failure at a consumer-
producer conference. Thus, until complete consumer solidarity was achieved, 
Washington refused to approve or attend a preparatory conference for the 
consumer-producer conference.4 While the Federal Republic also believed that 
Western solidarity was a prerequisite to the consumer-producer conference, the 
Federal Republic was more willing to make compromises to achieve this than 
many of its Western partners, including the United States. Compromise began 
with the matter on which Bonn was the key to its outcome: financial solidarity. 
Under this heading, the main issue of debate was the recycling facilities. 
By January 1975, there were two main competing visions: Witteveen II and the 
Solidarity Fund. The former initiative reflected closely the suggestion made by 
the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, at the Group of Five (G-
5) meeting in September 1974. Much like Witteveen I, the IMF oil facility 
established in 1974, Witteveen II was to aid IMF member states suffering from 
balance of payments deficits as a result of the increase in oil prices. Witteveen 
II, similar to its predecessor, would be financed through borrowing from both 
oil consuming as well as oil producing states and access to it was in proportion 
to IMF voting rights. Witt eve en II though would be much larger than Witteveen 
1. The Solidarity Fund called for a $25 billion support fund, financed by and 
available to the OECD member states. As the strongest economy in Europe, 
holding a large payments surplus, West Germany would be one of the largest 
contributors to the Witteveen II facility and after the United States, the second 
largest financier of the proposed Solidarity Fund.s 
4 Horst Moller, et al., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1975, vol. I, (Milnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006) (hereafter AAPD 197511), 215; Box 8, 
December 15; British National Archives (hereafter TNA), FCD 30/2893, Energy Questions to 
be Determined at the Community Level- COM (75)6final (hereafter FCD 30/2893, COM(75)6 
final). 
5 Bbk, N21K83, Thema: Recyclingl AI/g., 3.1.1975; N21K83, Thema: A Recycling 1WF-
6/fazilitiit 1974, 3.1.1975; Bbk, N21K83, Thema: B Recycling 1WF-6/fazilitiit 1975, 3.1.1975; 
Bbk, N2 K83, Thema: C Recycling Simon/Kissinger-Plan, 3.1.1975; Bbk, N21K83, Press 
Excerpt - Genugend Fazilitiiten vorhanden. 
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Initially, West Germany neither saw the distinction between the two 
plans nor believed that two facilities were needed. Despite having promised 
Washington at its December 1974 meetings that it would reconsider its position 
on the recycling facilities, by early 1975, the Federal Republic's views had not 
changed; rather the Schmidt government still preferred the IMF option to the 
Solidarity Fund. Witteveen II was appealing because it spread the financial 
contribution among the industrialized states and the oil producing states. This 
meant not only that West Germany had to contribute less, but also required the 
oil producers to use some of their oil surpluses to benefit deficit countries. From 
Bonn's perspective, the latter was both economically and politically justified. 
With regard to the Solidarity Fund, the Schmidt government still maintained 
that Bonn had neither the resources nor the legal rights to contribute such a 
large amount. Moreover, the Federal Republic worried that the fund would be 
utilized by governments to pay for past economic policy blunders and would 
allow deficit states to continue with policies which West Germany viewed as 
having failed and being damaging to the international balance of payments 
equilibrium, global liquidity and ultimately the overall global economy. 6 
Despite America's argument that given the oil weapon, the Solidarity Fund was 
politically necessary, at this juncture, Bonn's concerns about its own economic 
strength were still the driving force in its approach to the issue.7 
The first opportunity to discuss the two recycling options after the 
Martinique Agreement of December 1974 was at the European Community 
(EC) finance ministers' meeting on 7 January 1975. There the Federal Republic 
led the push for acceptance of Witt eve en II and voiced the greatest objections to 
the Solidarity Fund.s By meeting's end, the EC member states decided to 
support Witteveen II at the forthcoming Interim Committee meeting in 
Washington, DC on 15-16 January 1975. Understanding the role that they 
played in achieving financial solidarity though, neither Europe nor Bonn was 
prepared to refuse the American initiative outright. Rather, the EC determined 
that the "economically ambitious" Kissinger Plan needed further consideration, 
6 Ibid; AAPD 197511, 41. 
7 Ibid. 
8 TNA, T3541520, Meeting of the EEC Finance Ministers; TNA, T354/383. Principal Private 
Secretary: Developments - Recycling; TNA, T354/383, B. The Washington Monetary Meeting. 
152 
while in Bonn, Schmidt's government concluded, [dass] "der US-Vorschlag 
zum Riickschleusungsproblem stOOt bei uns in seiner Gesamtheit als auch in 
seinen Einzelelementen auf starke Bedenken - wir sind aber bereit, an einer 
Priifung mitzuarbeiten.,,9 
The European position on the recycling facilities was met with strong 
disdain in Washington. In a meeting between American President Gerald Ford, 
and American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, on 8 January 1975, the latter 
remarked, 
On the financial issue in the paper, this could be a disaster. Truman was 
dealing with a different generation with the Marshall Plan. This generation is a 
group of petty narrow politicians. The Europeans snipe at everything we try -
they object to being screwed. The Europeans have now accepted Witteveen's 
second plan. We have resisted because it puts the Arabs in the driver's seat. 
IMF voting is proportional to the contributions. The Europeans like this 
because it relieves them of responsibility. 10 
Given the opposing stances over the financing plans, it seemed hard to imagine 
that a consensus would be reached very easily. In the European press, the 
Solidarity Fund was being written off and predictions appeared of "difficult 
debates" on the recycling issue during the forthcoming economic and monetary 
meetings in Washington. l1 Kissinger, however, was confident that the United 
States had the bargaining chips to achieve America's interests. He detailed his 
tactics to Ford explai~ing, "The Europeans will agree to our facility too. We 
have to keep the Witteveen fund small enough .... If we could keep it at $5 
billion, it would be useless for the industrial countries or the basket cases. We 
must keep it at $5-6 and conditional on acceptance of our fund.,,12 Questioned 
by Ford as to their leverage, Kissinger responded, "It can't happen without us. 
Also we can reject the consumer-producer meeting." 13 
9 AAPD 197511, 38, 40. 
10 GRF. NSA Memcon, Box 8, January 8, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger (hereafter Box 8, January 
1975). 
II Bbk, N21K83, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, "Absage an den Kissinger Plan, .. 9 January 
1975. 
12 Box 8, January 1975. 
13 Ibid. 
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This was strong leverage indeed. But just as Witteveen II could not be 
established without American support, neither could the Solidarity Fund 
without West German backing, circumstances Washington recognized. To help 
win Bonn over, Ford sent Arthur Bums, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 
to Hamburg to hold talks with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on 9 
January, only days before a series of monetary and economic meetings began in 
Washington. 14 In their discussion, Schmidt repeated West Germany's concerns 
about the means of financing the Solidarity Fund, the conditions for its use and 
indeed its purpose assuming the establishment of the IMF fund. Burns assured 
Schmidt though that the Solidarity Fund was necessary alongside Witteveen II, 
as it would protect financially weak countries from being exploited by the oil 
producing states. 15 In addition, Burns stressed "the political need for a 
demonstration of solidarity.,,16 Eventually the American politically-driven 
reasoning began to register in Bonn. 17 West Germany realized: "dieser OECD· 
Fond [hat] eine rein politische Funktion, urn momentane aktuelle politische 
Pressionen oder Notigungen abzuwehren, falls sie vorkommen sollten .... [er] 
ist eine auBenpolitische Notwendigkeit, er ist kein okonomisches Heilmittel. Er 
kann zur Bereinigung okonomischer Schwierigkeiten mit beitragen. Er kann nur 
zeitweilig politische Schwierigkeiten durch Solidaritat aus der Welt 
schaffen." 18 
Having recognized the political need for it not only in terms of the oil 
producers' use of the oil weapon, but also with regard to achieving Western 
solidarity, the Schmidt government began to place political cooperation ahead 
of its previous economic concerns. That said, the Federal Republic was not 
prepared to simply accept the American proposal. Rather, as West Germany 
had done several times over the previous three years, Bonn utilized its 
economic power in order to gain Washington's support for its priority, in this 
case Witteveen II. As their meeting drew to a close, Schmidt informed Burns 
14 BAK, B126/48887, Elemente for den Bericht im Kabinett am 22. Januar iiber Washington; 
Betr.: Kanalisierung der Olgelder (hereafter B126/48887, Kanalisierung). 
IS AAPD 197511, 39-40. 
16 TN A, T354/383, FeO Telegram Number Eager 36 of 14 January (hereafter T354/383, Eager 
36). 
17B 136/8482, Referat. 
18 Ibid. 
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that Bonn would be prepared to support the Solidarity Fund in principle, so long 
as the United States agreed to certain provisions. First, there were to be "strict 
conditions" on opting out of the fund, and it was to be used only as a "last 
resort" among DECD members. 19 Second, given the constitutional difficulties 
the Schmidt government would face in providing direct contributions to the 
fund, the Federal Republic would only provide guarantees of credit.2o Finally, 
Washington had to support the creation of Witt eve en 11.21 
Considering that only a day before Ford and Kissinger had decided 
internally to accept the new IMF recycling facility, the United States should 
have had few objections to the West German requirements. 22 As it turned out, 
Burns voiced only one. Although Ford and Kissinger had decided that the size 
of Witteveen II should be limited to $5-6 billion, Burns reduced that number, 
maintaining that the United States would accept a new IMF recycling facility so 
long as its size did not exceed $3 billion. This amount was not enough for 
Bonn. 23 Although the Federal Republic concluded the meeting noting that it 
was "ready to give the US any assurance they wanted that the US/OECD 
scheme would be taken forward constructively," the Schmidt government 
remained concerned about Washington's views on Witteveen 11.24 So too did 
many of its European partners.25 
As talks on the funding facilities moved from Hamburg to Washington 
for a series of economic and monetary meetings, the conditions set out by the 
Federal Republic served as a basis for cooperation. Having fully grasped 
Schmidt's message that the IMF facility needed to be larger than $3 billion, at 
the G-5 meeting on 13 January 1975, the Ford government increased its offer to 
$5 billion. Yet, for West Germany as well as France and Britain, this sum was 
19 T354/383, Eager 36. 
20 AAPD 197511, 39-40. 
21 TNA, T354/383, Notefor the Record: Chancellor's Meeting with Herr Apel and M Fourcade 
(hereafter T354/383, Chancellor, Apel, Fourcade). 
22 Box 8, January 1975. 
23 T354/383, Eager 36. 
24B126/48887, Kanalisierung; TNA, T354/390, Meeting of the G5 Finance Ministers on 
Monday 13 January (hereafter T354/390, G-5 January). 
25 Bbk, N21K83, Press Excerpt - Arm in Arm, 20.1.75; Bbk, N21K83, Press Excerpt - EG und 
USA einigen sich in der Mitte, 15.1.75; Bbk, N2 K83 News Article - Schmidt stellt klar: Bonn 
hat kein Geldfiir den Kissinger-Plan, 13. Jan. 1975. 
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still too small. Both the West Gennan Finance Minister, Hans Apel, and his 
French counterpart, Jean-Pierre Fourcade, maintained that $7 or $8 billion was 
the minimum they could accept, while Healey infonned the American secretary 
of the treasury, William Simon, that unless the United States improved its offer 
considerably "all bets would be off.,,26 At the end of the meeting, the issue 
remained unresolved. Sensing that the deal arranged with Schmidt would fall 
through if they failed to raise their offer, Simon attempted to reach a deal with 
Healey later that same evening. Simon gave a final offer of $6 billion, to which 
London countered SDR 6 billion was the minimum.27 The only other possible 
way forward, advised Healey, was for the Americans to agree to allow for a 
provision for review of the quantum, should $6 billion prove too little 
throughout the year. Yet Simon was reluctant to agree to such tenns; in tum, 
Healey contacted Kissinger in an attempt to push the American position. The 
latter, however, would promise nothing; instead, he said only that he would 
speak with Ford. 28 
When the Group ofTen (G-lO) deputies and ministers gathered for their 
talks on 14 January 1975, the financing facilities were a main point of debate. 
While the Federal Republic had refused the American offer of a $5 billion IMF 
facility a day earlier at the G-5 meeting, Bonn had resolved that same evening 
that it was unwilling "to risk the chances of agreement with the Americans" on 
financial solidarity in order to increase the size of Witteveen 11.29 In this 
perspective, West Gennany was joined by France, but was opposed by the 
Netherlands while Britain remained undecided. 30 Yet, as the meetings 
proceeded, cooperation began to occur.31 The Americans maintained that in the 
spirit of compromise, they were prepared to support the creation of Witteveen II 
on four conditions: first, the Solidarity Fund also had to be established; two, the 
IMF fund be limited to one year; three, total borrowing be capped at $6 billion; 
26 T354/390, G-5 January. 
27 SDR stands for "Standard Drawing Rights." SDRs 6 billion = approximately $7.25 billion 
28 TNA, T354/390, Note for the Record: Chancellor's Conversations with Secretaries Simon 
and Kissinger. 
29 T354/383, Chancellor, Apel, Fourcade 
30 Ibid. 
31 TNA, T354/383, Summary of Views expressed by Ministers and Governors of the Group of 
Ten in their Meeting in Washington on 14th_16th January, 1975 (hereafter T534/383, G-JO 
January). 
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and four, the IMF had to use its own resources if more funding was needed. 32 
The American provisions initially received mixed reactions from the remaining 
G-I0 states. Britain as well as the Netherlands expressed their reservations 
about the proposed cap on borrowing.33 West Germany and France, however, 
were unwilling to jeopardize an agreement with America on financial solidarity 
over financing of Witteveen II. Thus, neither state questioned the condition on 
borrowing limits; instead, Apel expressed his government's understanding of 
and support for both funding facilities. 34 Fourcade went a step further, noting 
the "converging positions" between the United States and the Ee. He remarked 
that he "fully agreed" with Apel and supported the establishment of the 
Solidarity Fund. 3S After intense negotiations, all G-IO states agreed to the 
conditions laid out by Simon for the IMF facility. In addition, the G-IO outlined 
its intentions to establish a Solidarity Fund, renamed the "OECD Support 
Fund," "at the earliest possible date, to be available for a period of two years" 
and under the financial terms agreed between Burns and Schmidt in Hamburg36 
Yet, despite the G-lO's agreement on the financing facilities, it soon 
became clear at the Interim Committee meetings on 15-16 January 1975 that the 
matter was not settled. Instead, there many of the non-oil LDCs objected to the 
American cap on the fund's size, arguing that a much larger fund, somewhere 
in the magnitude of SDR 6-12 billion or perhaps even SDR 15 billion was 
required to pay not only for imported oil, but also their debts to the 
industrialized states.37 While Washington did not ignore the non-oil LDCs' 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 TNA, T354/383, Communique of the Ministerial Meetings of the Group ofTen in Washington 
on 14th and 16th January, 1975. Within the Federal Republic, disagreement arose between the 
Bundesbank and the Schmidt government as to the economic feasibility of the Support Fund, 
but Schmidt pushed ahead with the fund on political grounds. An agreement for the 
establishment of the Support Fund in the amount of SDR 20 billion was signed in Paris on 9 
April 1975 by all members of the DECO. Ultimately, however, the Support Fund never came 
into being, as the United States Congress refused to ratify the agreement in a vote in 1976. By 
that point, such a large recycling fund was not needed, as the capital markets were doing the 
work of recycling sufficiently and the political need no longer existed. See: Bbk, N21K155, 
Fernschreiben an den Herrn Bundesjinanzminister vom 12. Februar 1975; Bbk, N21K155, 
GECD, Ad Hoc Working Party to Prepare a Draft Agreement Establishing a Solidarity Fund; 
TNA, PREM 16/611, Telno Guidance No. 48 of25 March. 
37 Bbk, N21K81, Record of Conversation, First Session, ICMS/Meeting 1 (1975) - 1/15/75 
(a.m.) (hereafter N21K81, ICMS Meeting 1(1975). 
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complaints, the Ford government argued that the Witteveen II Fund was not the 
proper support facility in which to address the LDC's economic difficulties. 
Instead, for such a purpose, the United States proposed the establishment of a 
Trust Fund, to be financed by the profits from the sale of IMF gold. Yet, 
Washington could convince neither the non-oil LDCs nor its Western allies of 
their Trust Fund plan: the LDCs needed aid now and it would take a significant 
amount of time to establish such a facility under the best conditions, much less 
when its financing was linked to the refonn of the monetary system and the sale 
of IMF gold; and France opposed the use of the proceeds from the sale of IMF 
gold to this end. 38 
Ultimately, somewhat surprisingly, it was the French finance minister 
who was able to shape a solution which was suitable to all. Fourcade's 
resolution called for the establishment of Witteveen II with a borrowing cap of 
SDR 5 billion. Any funds leftover from Witteveen I would be added to those 
procured for Witteveen II. A constant review of the oil facility and the positions 
of the deficit states would be carried out and if necessary, the IMF would 
expand Witteveen II through its own resources. In addition, to assist those 
developing countries most strongly affected, the French, along with all its EC 
counterparts strongly backed a proposal by the IMF managing director to create 
a special account to cover the interest payments of those LDCs accessing the oil 
facility.39 Although the United States was not particularly keen on the proposed 
interest subsidy account, the American representatives did not view it as 
significant enough to block progress on the larger issue. West Gennany offered 
full support to the plan proposed by Paris. Eventually, the other members of the 
Interim Committee also agreed with the structure set out by Fourcade and it was 
agreed in the meeting's communique.4o 
At the conclusion of more than a week of economic meetings, the West 
Gennan minister of finance exclaimed, that through "konstruktive Politik" an 
38 For more on the Trust Fund and France's position on gold, please see the section on monetary 
refonn negotiations in this chapter. 
39 Bbk, N21K83, Press Communique of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the 
International Monetary System, January 16, 1975. 
40 Ibid; N21K81 , ICMS Meeting 1(1975). 
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"erstaunliche Wende zum Positiven" had occurred. Apel noted that the work 
between the Americans and Germans in Hamburg had a great impact on the 
series of conferences beginning well, and that the French had added to the 
positive work in Washington. He called the January 1975 IMF Interim meeting 
"eine der erfolgreichsten Wahrungskonferenzen.,,41 Indeed, it had been a 
successful week, as Western leaders had reached agreements on one of the main 
aspects of consumer cooperation - financial solidarity. Even Washington 
agreed that its requirement for financial solidarity had been met. 42 This success, 
however, carne at a high price to the Federal Republic: within a week, Bonn had 
signed on as chief financier of both Witteveen II and the DECD Support Fund. 
As the British noted, West Germany had had to make the biggest compromises. 
The Federal Republic's willingness to place Western solidarity ahead of its 
economic interests and its use of its economic strength had made these 
compromises possible and were essential to reaching financial solidarity. 
Unfortunately, achieving solidarity on matters of conservation and 
alternative energies was a longer process. Coordination on both these points 
was in some ways more difficult to realize than on financial solidarity: no 
single forum existed for western coordination of conservation and alternative 
energy efforts, as the G-IO had no part in the energy sector and the French 
refused participation in the International Energy Agency (IEA).43 Instead, as 
the EC enjoyed a period of rebirth after the first European Council and the 
British positive referendum vote, Paris looked to the EC and the Commission's 
efforts to build a common European energy policy as an alternative to the 
lEA.44 Although French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing informed Ford in 
Martinique that France would not "hamper" or "complicate" the United States 
efforts on conservation and alternative energy development within the lEA, it 
was inevitable that the process would be slower and tensions would arise, given 
41 Bbk, N21K83, News Article - Apel: "Eine der erfolgreichsten Wiihrungskonferenzen. " 
42 TNA, FeD 96/266, Telno 296 of22 January 1975. 
43 The member countries of the lEA were the United States, Japan, the Federal Republic, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Sweden, Austria, Canada, Turkey, 
Denmark, Spain, Ireland. Norway participated in the lEA under a special agreement. 
44 INA, FeD 30/2893, European Council Meeting (Dublin) 10-11 March 1975 - Preparations 
for the Consumer/Producer Conference (hereafter FeD 30/2893, EC Dublin); INA, FCO 
96/266, International Energy Agency: Standing Group on Consumer/Producer Relations, 14-16 
January 1975 (hereafter FeD 96/266, lEA). 
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that European lEA members would be forced to align EC actions with those 
taken in the lEA. 45 
Luckily on matters of conservation, European efforts complemented 
those undertaken in the lEA quite well. After a short debate at their 7 February 
1975 meeting, the IEA governing board welcomed a commitment by the IEA 
members to reduce their oil imports by 2 million barrels per day by the end of 
1975.46 Achieving a consensus on this point was aided by steps already taken in 
the EC. According to the Martinique Agreement, consumer cooperation on 
conservation efforts over both the short and long terms needed to be improved. 
Indeed, the EC had taken steps on a plan for long run energy saving at the 17 
December 1974 energy ministers meeting, working out a set of energy 
consumption targets for 1985 and action plans for the "rational use of 
energy.,,47 More immediate conservation methods were left, however, to 
individual EC member countries. Thus, the short-term solution of the lEA 
worked well in conjunction with the decisions already taken in the EC. 
More widely coordinated action on the development of alternative 
energy sources proved much more difficult. Particularly troubling was the 
American proposal for a floor price for oil. One British diplomat described the 
rationale behind Washington's floor price proposal in the following terms: 
"new sources would cost much more than what the US paid for energy in 1973 
and could never compete with the production costs of Middle East oil. This 
disparity poses a dilemma. If the industrial consumers succeeded in developing 
alternative sources on a large scale, the demand for OPEC oil would fall, and 
international prices might be sharply reduced. Inexpensive imported oil could 
then jeopardize the investment made in the alternative sources. Lower oil prices 
would also restimulate demand, creating a new cycle of raising imports, 
increased dependence and vulnerability.,,48 While the reasoning was sound 
enough, not all lEA members were convinced that a floor price would work, as 
4S Box 8, December 15. 
46 TNA, PREM 16/611, Telno Guidance No. 48 of25 March. 
47 FCD 30/2893, COM (75)6final. 
48 INA, FCD 961266, FeO TeinD 451 of 3 February. 
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it would be very difficult to implement and contro1.49 Within the Ford 
administration too there was disagreement about the issue with Kissinger 
arguing for the initiative and Simon remaining skeptical of its feasibility. 50 
As they had done on matters of financial solidarity, the United States 
again turned to the Federal Republic. During a visit to West Germany on 16 
February 1975, Kissinger attempted to gain Bonn's support for its floor price 
proposal. 51 While the Schmidt government understood the theoretical 
reasoning, they were suspicious that a floor price would heavily favor the oil-
rich countries over those which were oil-poor, with West Germany of course 
belonging to the latter. 52 Moreover, a floor price ran counter to Bonn's strongly 
held free-market sensibilities and the Schmidt government worried that it would 
lead to a possible indexation of oil prices to which the Federal Republic was 
strongly opposed. 53 Yet, despite their economic concerns, Schmidt maintained 
he would be willing to discuss a $5-6 floor price and at least allow for a debate 
on the issue within the IEA in order to achieve consumer solidarity. 54 For many 
months thereafter, however, Schmidt continued to doubt whether the Americans 
had properly "thought through" the pricing issue. 55 
Yet, while Bonn was willing to do its part on the floor price, the Federal 
Republic could not again play the decisive role in achieving consumer 
solidarity it had played during discussions on financial solidarity; instead, talks 
on the development of alternative energy slowed because of a lack of agreement 
of these issues within the Ee. At their meeting on 17 December 1974, Ee 
energy ministers had agreed that research and development of alternative 
energy sources should undergo further study throughout 1975. Given the 
Martinique Agreement, however, the Ee had to accelerate its studies on the 
matter and reach a decision which would allow Ee member states that were 
49 TNA, PREM 16/611, lEA - Accelerated Development of Alternative Energy Sources, and the 
Floor Price for Oil (hereafter PREM 16/611, Floor Price). 
so TNA, PREM 16/610, FCO Telno 759 of 10 February. 
51 AAPD 197511, 153. 
52 TNA, FCO 96/278, Appendix V: The Common Minimum Selling Price for Imported Oil. 
53 BI36/8482, Referat. 
54 PREM 16/611, Floor Price. 
55 Horst MoHer, et aI., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1975, vol. 2, (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006) (hereafter AAPD 197512), 522. 
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also lEA members to reach an accord on the matter within the lEA. Yet, 
through January and February 1975, the EC failed to do so. 
Although the first stage of the Martinique Agreement had clearly not 
been completed, on 1 March 1975, France sent out invitations for the 
preparatory meeting of the consumer-producer conference (the second stage of 
the Martinique Agreement) to take place on 7-8 April in Paris. Washington was 
angered by the French actions. During his talks with Giscard in February 1975, 
Kissinger had informed Giscard that the Ford administration would oppose any 
consumer-producer conference without consumer solidarity first being 
achieved. 56 Yet Paris had ignored Washington's warning. In a conversation 
with Schmidt on 4 March 1975, Giscard had explained the French decision, 
saying that Washington had originally agreed to such a move and later reversed 
its position; thus, Paris had elected to go with the original plan. Schmidt had 
accepted Giscard's explanation almost without question and given his full 
support to the French president's actions as well as the preparatory meeting 
initiative. Schmidt's reaction can partially be attributed to his close working 
relationship with Giscard, but a greater portion of the chancellor's reply was 
due to Bonn's increasing worry that the debate over alternative energy and 
indeed the entire first stage of the Martinique Agreement were blinding the 
West to the larger problems developing with the oil producers and non-oil 
developing states. In order to address those, the consumer-producer conference 
needed to get underway as soon as possible. 57 
Fuelling West German worries most was the outcome of the first 
meeting of OPEC heads of state on 4-6 March 1975 in Algiers. After more than 
a year of Algerian insistence, nearly all OPEC leaders met to coordinate the 
producers' strategy for the proposed consumer-producer dialogue. 58 The 
outcome was the Solemn Declaration which consisted of 14 sections. In it the 
oil producers laid out their "opening positions" for the forthcoming consumer-
S6 AAPD 197511, 215. 
S7 Ibid, 215. 
S8 Some of the OPEC heads of state were concerned that the meeting would appear 
confrontational to the industrialized states and consequently decided not to participate. Notably 
absent was King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. 
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producer preparatory meeting, listing initiatives and compromises they were 
willing to make. 59 These "opening positions," however, extended far beyond 
energy issues into raw materials and special concerns of the developing 
countries. The logic behind OPEC's desire to extend the subject matter and 
indeed its strategy was two-fold: first, the oil producers fundamentally viewed 
the energy crisis and recent economic difficulties very differently from the 
industrialized states and thus, sought different solutions. Second, the oil 
producers wished to build solidarity with the non-oil developing states, 
demanding discussion of topics important to the non-oil developing states and 
aligning the two factions' conference goals. 
In its declaration, the OPEC heads of state categorically denied that the 
rise in oil prices since 1973 had been a cause of the instability in the world 
economic system and stated that the oil price hikes had only marginally 
contributed to inflation problems. Instead, the oil producers attributed the 
instability to the unpredictability of terms of trade and the recent decline in the 
industrialized states' financial assets. OPEC viewed inflation as a problem of 
the West, and believed that the current high world inflation came from the 
inflationary policies followed by the industrialized states during the early 
1970s. As remedies, OPEC offered to negotiate on the stabilization of oil 
prices, but the oil producers demanded that matters of conservation and 
development of alternative energies be included in the discussion. In addition, 
OPEC advocated the indexation of oil, linking prices to manufactured goods, 
the rate of inflation or the terms of transfer of goods and technology for the 
development of OPEC member-states. Moreover, because of their worries 
about the deteriorating terms of trade and the West's financial assets, the oil 
producers sought talks on reform of the international monetary system. 
Although this was already taking place through the Interim Committee, OPEC 
heads of state feIt that they and developing states were still being excluded from 
important decisions and thus desired to use the consumer-producer conference 
to this end. 6o 
59 BAK, B 136/8482, Niederschrift aus Bergedoif. 
60 Ibid.; TNA, PREM 16/611, TeinD Guidance 47 of 19 March. 
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Over the previous several months, certain OPEC members, in particular 
Algeria, had pushed for solidarity between the oil and non-oil developing 
countries. It had been, however, a hard sell. The pairing seemed illogical, 
especially as the quadrupling of oil prices had significantly worsened the non-
oil LDCs' already existing economic problems, particularly their high inflation 
and unemployment rates. Moreover, the oil producers had massive surpluses, 
while the non-oil developing states were crippled with debt due to the increased 
costs of oil imports. Yet what both shared were deteriorating terms of trade with 
the West on their respective commodities - oil and raw materials-, a global 
recession and the feeling that the global economic order was fundamentally 
tilted heavily in favor of the industrialized states. The OPEC heads of state 
clung to these similarities in their declaration, demanding discussions on raw 
materials and a broad range of developmental problems during the consumcr-
producer conference. In addition, the OPEC heads of state adopted the 
philosophy of some of the most extreme non-oil developing states which called 
for a "new international economic order." The concept and the phrase had first 
been used at the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in April 1974 by non-oil LDCs. Throughout thcir declaration, the oil producers 
had made several references to the Sixth Special Session, helping to reinforce 
the notion that although the two factions came from different starting points, 
they suffered under the same systemic bias and ultimately shared the same 
political goal. 61 
While discussions on the consumer-producer preparatory meeting had 
occurred for the preceding couple of months in nearly every relevant Western 
and European energy forum, talks generally focused on the meeting's 
participants, rather than the actual topics which would be discussed with the oil 
producers and how the consumers would present their positions on the issues.62 
The only forum in which a common Western approach had been loosely 
debated was the G-S. As Schmidt had arranged with Ford and Giscard in 
December 1974 alongside the Martinique Agreement, a "Private Group of 
61 Ibid. 
62 FeD 30/2893, EC Dublin; FeD 96/266, lEA; TNA, FeD 96/266, Telno 41 of 6 February 
1975. 
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Five," - made up of non-government experts with access to the highest levels 
of government - had been established in late December 1974 to discuss all the 
problems which had arisen as a result of the oil price explosion, including 
monetary, trade and energy issues, with consumer-producer relations falling 
under the latter.63 Schmidt was pleased with the outcome of the first meeting of 
the Private G-5 on 2 -3 February 1975 in Kronberg, Germany, as the experts 
agreed on all the major points. Given their general agreement, Schmidt 
advocated a further meeting at which the group could work on formulating a 
common position for the industrial states for the dialogue with the oil 
producers. 64 The other G5 members agreed and a second gathering was 
scheduled to take place on 22-23 March in New York.65 When the EC heads of 
state came together on 10 March 1975 in Dublin, Schmidt attempted to shift the 
emphasis within the Europe as well towards reaching a common position. 
Schmidt pushed his counterparts to address the "substance of the oil consumers' 
position" and "what should be offered to the producers" or risk further 
economic decline. 66 The West German chancellor even offered an outline for 
how such work could advance.67 Schmidt's words seemed to awaken his 
counterparts to the reality of the situation, as the EC heads of state eventually 
agreed to the West German plan for achieving a common European position.68 
Yet Schmidt's efforts in the EC and the work of the Private G-5 would 
be irrelevant if the matter of consumer solidarity on the development of 
alternative energy resources in the lEA was not settled and thus the first stage 
of the Martinique Agreement completed. While the EC Council of Ministers 
had managed to agree general guidelines for lEA members on matters of 
alternative energy development at their meeting on 3-4 March 1975 in the hope 
that these guidelines would allow for an agreement with the lEA at its 
63 Hans-Peter Schwarz et aI., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1974, vol. 2, (Milnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005),1677; AAPD 1975/1, 215. 
64 Ibid., 215. 
6S BAK, B126/48887, Second Meeting of the Private Group of Five on March 22/23, 1975 in 
New York (hereafter B126/48887, Private G-5). 
66 rNA, PREM 16/611, Record of EEC Heads of Government Meeting at Dublin Castle on 
Tuesday 11 March 1975. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
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upcoming meeting on 7 March 1975, such was not the outcome.69 Instead, the 
lEA members developed a draft with the aim of reaching an agreement at the 
next gathering. 7o The EC Council of Ministers had agreed in principle to attend 
the preparatory meeting of the consumer-producer conference, but by mid-
March, none of the consuming countries had accepted their invitations and there 
was now a further condition posed by the Americans that the lEA be invited to 
participate as well.71 Finally on 20 March 1975, after very tough negotiations, 
the lEA agreed on a package of measures to encourage the development of 
alternative sources of energy.72 With the conditions met, the lEA member-
states formally accepted their invitations to the preparatory meeting. In 
addition, the lEA planned to attend the meeting alongside the DECO after 
receiving an invitation from Paris on 20 March 1975.73 
Thus, with just over two weeks before the start of the preparatory 
meeting, the West had completed the first stage of the Martinique Agreement. 
Little time remained, however, to develop the strategy of the industrialized 
states for the preparatory meeting. The original purpose of the preparatory 
meeting was to decide on the agenda of a consumer-producer conference, but 
this no longer seemed possible to the Federal Republic given OPEC's Solemn 
Declaration. Instead, it seemed to Bonn that the industrialized states also had to 
at least agree on a common response to the oil producers' demands. In the few 
weeks before the preparatory meeting though, Western leaders failed to reach a 
consensus on many of these issues, as each country had different priorities. 
Indeed, the most significant agreement made was that the topic of energy, 
including the stabilization of oil prices and the associated financing issues, 
should be discussed at the formal conference scheduled to begin in July 1975. 
As to raw materials and monetary issues, the West could find no common 
ground. 74 West Germany, and in particular Schmidt, was very dismayed about 
the lack of a common position. For this, the Federal Republic believed, the 
69 FCO 30/2893, EC Dublin. 
10 PREM 16/611, Floor Price. 
11 FCO 30/2893, EC Dublin. 
12 TNA, FCO 96/278, Appendix V: The Common Minimum Selling Price for Imported Oil. 
13 rNA, PREM 16/611, Telno Guidance No. 48 of25 March. 
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West could only blame itself. At an economic and monetary conference in late 
March, Schmidt remarked, 
Die andere Seite hat eine opening position, die sie, wie es scheint, mit sehr viel 
weniger Miihe zusarnmengebracht hat als wir. Mich beunruhigt dieses sehr .... 
Wir haben gesehen, dass hier unter uns in vie1en Punkten zumindest 
tendenzielle Meinungsverschiedenheiten aufgetreten sind .... Warum gibt es 
keine gemeinsamen westlichen Positionen? Meine Antwort ist: weil der 
Westen zu lange Zeit verbraucht hat, sich flir Vorfragen innerhalb des Westens 
herurnzuschlagen.75 
Considering the meager progress the industrialized states had made on a 
joint position, as the preparatory meeting began on 7 April 1975 and concluded 
on 15 April 1975, the most they could hope for was to retain a united front and 
keep the focus of the preparatory meeting strictly on procedural matters. On the 
former, Western countries were remarkably successfu1.76 On the latter point, 
little success was achieved. Over nine days the representatives of the oil 
producing states, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Venezuela, the representatives 
of the industrialized states, the United States, the EEC and Japan, and the 
representatives of the LDCs, Zaire, Brazil and India, attempted to reach an 
agreement on an agenda for the main conference, including the topics to be 
discussed, the participants, and the location. In the end though, they failed. At 
the core of the dispute were fundamentally different notions not only about the 
purpose of the conference, but also the development of the international 
economic system. As Bonn had feared the OPEC states had won through their 
declaration the non-oil LDCs to their side and the two factions stood together, 
advocating a world economic conference with a focus on energy, raw materials, 
financing and development questions, as well as a discussion of the indexation 
of raw materials, the indexation of oil and capital investments. In addition, the 
oil producers and LDCs called for a "new international economic order." The 
industrialized states though desired a conference specifically about energy and 
the questions that were related to it. 77 The differences in perspectives could not 
be bridged. Instead, the three parties decided to suspend the preparatory 
meeting. 78 
75 BAK., B 136/8482, Niederschrift aus Bergedorf. 
76 AAPD 197511,404-5. 
77 Ibid., 404. 
78 Ibid., 405. 
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West Gennany was greatly dismayed by this outcome for several 
reasons. First, being highly dependent not only on imported oil, but also 
imported raw materials for the functioning of its domestic economy, Bonn 
feared retaliation by both the oil producers and the non-oil LDCs which 
exported large amounts of raw materials, In addition, the suspension of the 
preparatory talks coupled with on-going threats to cartelize raw materials as 
well as calls for indexation of oil and commodity prices and a new international 
economic order, created greater uncertainty in the markets about oil prices and 
now also raw material prices. The resulting instability further undennined an 
already severely strained global economy. Indeed, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, macroeconomic conditions deteriorated drastically through the first 
half of 1975 with growth and trade falling across the West. Highly reliant on 
international trade for growth, the Federal Republic was keen to avoid a further 
deterioration of the international economy.79 
Hence, within days of the failed preparatory meeting the Schmidt 
government began revising its stance on international raw materials policies and 
pushing for a cooperative approach among the Ee member states on questions 
of raw materials. 8o Moreover, over the coming weeks, Bonn started to openly 
support the resumption of the preparatory conference as soon as possible and 
the inclusion ofraw materials as one of the conference themes. 8l Yet, the West 
Gennan position initially encountered resistance from the United States, who 
viewed relations with the oil producers in tenns of Machtpolitik. Washington 
wanted to refrain from appearing too anxious to revive the preparatory 
conference. Moreover, the US was less dependent on imported raw materials 
and remained hesitant about including them as a separate conference topic. 82 
79 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 12, May 29, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt; 
OEeD Economic Outlook, 17 (1975: July), 5, 18-9,32-3,37,48-9,87. 
80 AAPD 1975/1, 158,405-7,416-9. 
81 AAPD 1975/1,583. 
82 BAK, BI36/12623, Text: Secretary Kissinger's Address in Kansas City; TNA, PREM 
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(MES(E)(75)1 1); AAPD 1975/2. 903. 
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Under the threat of a new oil price hike, the West, including 
Washington, quickly did a volte face on its positions taken at the preparatory 
meeting. 83 At the IEA meeting on 27 May 1975, Kissinger suggested a plan for 
resumption of the preparatory meeting and indeed a format for the eventual 
consumer-producer conference. He proposed the establishment of three 
commissions to deal with the critical areas of energy, raw materials and the 
problems of the developing states. 84 Oddly enough, the three-commission plan 
proposed by Kissinger was very similar to the one suggested by the oil 
producers and non-oil LDCs at the close of the April preparatory meeting. At 
that time, the industrialized states, and above all the Americans, had refused the 
scheme. Only France had considered it, but eventually under pressure from its 
Western partners, placed unity among the industrialized countries ahead of its 
own desires. 85 After some negotiations with the French and minor amendments, 
Kissinger's proposal along with an agreement to revive the preparatory meeting 
was adopted by the IEA governing board at its meeting on II June 1975.86 The 
West's concessions on the subject matter and desire to restart the preparatory 
conference, however, did not suffice. Only weeks later, the oil producers went 
ahead and decided to raise prices at OPEC's September 1975 meeting. 87 
Despite Bonn's efforts, the completion of the four stages of the 
Martinique Agreement failed to materialize by summer 1975. While the West 
had largely achieved solidarity - due in great part to the Federal Republic's 
willingness to compromise and use its economic strength-, its relations with 
the oil producers and now also the non-oil LDCs had deteriorated drastically, as 
Schmidt's calls for cooperation went unheeded. As a result, Western leaders 
were now facing an increase in oil prices, potential raw material cartelization 
and the suspension of the one initiative that brought oil consumers and 
producers together. Had these been the only economic problems, perhaps the 
83 TNA, FCO 961277, Speech by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger before the Meeting at the 
Ministerial Level of the International Energy Agency. May 27. 1975. 
84 rNA, FCO 96/277, FCO Telno 268 of28 May. 
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West could have solved them more easily. Unfortunately though, at the same 
time, difficulties also recurred in monetary reform efforts. 
-Deadlock in the West: Monetary Reform Negotiations through the Interim 
Committee-
According to the Outline of Agreement approved at the final C-20 
meeting in June 1974, an "Interim Committee" was to establish short term 
palliative measures until a more propitious economic climate would allow for 
long term systemic reform. 88 The C-20's recommendations for the 
establishment of the Interim Committee were followed, with its first meeting 
taking place on 3 October 1974. This gathering focused predominately on 
procedural matters, including choosing a chairman, agreeing terms of reference, 
fixing dates for forthcoming meetings and deciding topics to be addressed. The 
Interim Committee elected to focus above all on proposals for dealing with 
further recycling arrangements within the IMF, the adjustment process, IMF 
quotas, and amendments of its articles, specifically amendments on the 
exchange rate regime and gold, among other subjects. In addition, the Interim 
Committee set a goal to complete a draft of amendments of the Articles by 
February 1975. 89 
Discussion and analysis continued throughout the autumn on the various 
topics, with the IMF Executive Committee producing suggestions for 
amendments to the Articles and further development of the oil facilities. 9o In a 
series of economic and monetary meetings between 7 and 14 January 1975, 
European leaders then met in the EC context and the G-5 and G-I0 tried to 
establish joint positions on the issues before the second meeting of the Interim 
Committee on 15-16 January. As detailed earlier in this chapter, through some 
88 The makeup of the Interim Committee was very similar to the C-20. Representatives of the 
twenty constituencies that were represented at the C-20 also made up the Interim Committee. 
The Interim Committee, however, did not have a central organizational bureau. It was named 
the Interim Committee as it was only supposed to function in the interim period until a 
Eermanent council could be established. A permanent council, however, never came into being. 
9 Bbk, N21K81, Interim Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary 
System, Meeting No.1, ICMSI Meeting 1 (1974). Press Communique. 
90 Bbk, N21K83, Fernschreiben-Betreff: Vorbereitung Sitzung Interimausschuss. 24. Dezember 
1974; TNA, T354/519, Sixth General Review of Quotas -ICMSIDocl7414; TNA, T354/519, 
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shrewd negotiating and willingness to compromise, the West was able to bridge 
their divisions on their perspectives on recycling facilities for the coming year 
and to push through a joint position at the said Interim Committee meeting. 
Unfortunately, the industrialized states were far less successful in reaching a 
common perspective on issues related specifically to the reform of the 
international monetary system. Causing disputes and stalling reform above all 
were the issues of an increase in IMF quotas and amendments to the Articles, 
specifically those referring to the exchange rate regime (Article IV) and gold 
(Article VIII).91 
Given the shift in economic weight towards oil producing countries, the 
Interim Committee needed to decide whether IMF general quotas should 
increase and if so, how this increase should be divided among IMF members. 
West Germany supported raising the general quota, but believed that the shares 
of the quota of the oil producing states should increase, while the non-oil LDCs 
should remain unchanged and the industrialized states should be reduced. 92 
Through this configuration, it seemed to Bonn that the oil producers would be 
obliged to use some of their balance of payments surpluses to support the 
deficit countries. Yet, while the Schmidt government advocated a reduction in 
the West's shares, West Germany did not believe its own shares should be 
lowered. Rather, given the Federal Republic's increased role in the international 
economy and its potential as financier of IMF liquidity, Bonn believed that its 
shares should be raised. 93 West Germany's position, as was clear from its 
stance on contributions to the recycling facilities highlighted previously, was 
not driven by an overwhelming desire to contribute more to the IMF; instead, 
because quota shares were linked to voting rights, West Germany hoped to gain 
a greater say in the IMF. 94 As it stood in 1975, the only country holding a veto 
right was the United States. While the Western allies could agree that a general 
quota increase should occur and that the shares of the industrialized countries 
91 BAK, BI26/48887, Bericht iiber die Sitzung des Interimausschusses der IWF-Gouverneure in 
Washington am 15.116. Januar 1975 (hereafter BI26/48887, Interimausschuss Januar). 
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93 BAK, BI26/48887, TO-Punkt 4: Vorbereitung des IWF-Interimsausschusses. 
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should be reduced, none were prepared to decrease their own quota shares. 95 
Thus, at the Interim Committee on 15-16 January 1975, the industrialized states 
could only manage to agree, along with the other oil producers and developing 
states, to a quota increase and to double the share of quotas of OPEC countries, 
leave the developing states' share quotas unchanged and reducing those of the 
industrialized states. 96 Yet, when compared to the disagreements on the 
exchange rate regime and gold, the West appeared to be making progress on 
quota shares. 
Despite the fact that the Fund had approved guidelines for floating and 
the vast majority of IMF member countries were doing so, it was still illegal 
under the Articles and the goal of reform remained a system based on fixed, but 
adjustable par values. As the Interim Committee debated amending the articles 
on the exchange rate regime, they had to resolve whether floating should be 
1egalized.97 Bonn was prepared to accept a legalization of floating for two main 
reasons. First, as Apel stated at the G 1 0 meeting, "a practice which was now 
used by practically all members of the Fund should be legalized. ,,98 Second, 
given the Federal Republic's great concern over the deteriorating global 
economy and the associated macroeconomic indicators, the Schmidt 
government was prepared to support an exchange rate system which would 
provide stability to the West German domestic economy as well as help revive 
the international economy. Schmidt's government concluded that in 1975, only 
a floating exchange rate system would do. They noted, "So lange der 
weltwirtscahftliche Strukturwandel und die damit einhergehende Weltrezession 
nicht uberwunden sind, wilrde eine feste Bindung der europaischen Wabrungen 
an den Dollar erneut zu Friktion fiihren.,,99 It seemed to Bonn that in such 
economic conditions "friction," such as speculative capital movements or rising 
inflation, would only undermine a fixed exchange rate system. too That said, the 
9S B126/48887, Interimausschuss Januar; BAK, B126/48887, Bericht uber die Sitzung des 
Interimsausschusses am 10.111. Juni 1975 und die Sitzung der Zehnergruppe am 10. Juni 1975 
(hereafter N2 K83, Interimausschuss, G-1O Jum). 
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98 T354/383, G-IOJanuary. 
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Federal Republic supported an eventual return to a fixed, but adjustable par 
value system when conditions allowed and advocated greater government 
management of the floating rates instead of complete market determination. 101 
Nearly all of Bonn's Western partners shared its position on the Articles 
relating to the exchange rate regime. The United States had long been a strong 
proponent of the legalization of floating rates. With the structural changes 
taking place in the international economy as a result of the oil crisis, including 
widespread floating, it seemed to Washington that to delay legalization any 
longer would only undermine the IMF and the global order further. As Simon 
stated at the January 1975 0-10 meeting, "the legalization of floating would 
introduce an element of realism in the Articles; not to do so would be to detract 
from the credibility of the system."I02 The United Kingdom, Canada and the 
Netherlands argued along the same lines. While Italy and Japan saw no need to 
legalize floating, they did not wish to have it banned: they were not frustrated 
by the prevailing arrangements and were "content to go on living in sin.,,103 
Only France opposed the legalization of floating exchange rates under any 
circumstances. 104 Dissimilar to any of its Western partners, Paris argued that 
floating was actually exacerbating the current economic crisis. Such reasoning 
corresponded to France's long-held stance on exchange rate policy: namely, a 
fixed exchange rate regime leads to international economic stability, rather than 
it only being possible after a stable economic environment exists. At the 
January 1975 0-5 and 0-10 meetings, the debate became then polarized with 
Paris clinging to its philosophy of fixed exchange rates and the United States 
staunchly promoting floating exchange rates. 105 As a result of the deadlock in 
the West, no consensus was reached on the matter at the January 1975 Interim 
Committee meeting. 
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102 T3 54/383, G-10January. 
103 Ibid.; Bbk, N21K83 , Thema: Amendment IWF Float-Sanktionierung. 3.1.1975; Bbk, 
N21K93, Informal Record of the Discussions of the Deputies of the Group of Ten Meeting in 
Washington D.C. on 10'h, 11lh, 13lh and 151h January, 1975 (hereafter N21K93, G-JO Deputies 
January). 
I04T 354/383, G-10 January; T354/390, G-5 January. 
10' Ibid. 
173 
A similar scenario played out over gold. In September 1974, the 
decision had been taken at the IMF Annual Meeting to replace gold with the 
SDR as the numeraire, i.e. the monetary system was in the future to be based 
around the SDR. 106 While all members agreed that gold should be phased out of 
the monetary system, for this to occur, three main issues had to be settled: the 
removal of gold references from the Articles; disposal of the Fund's gold; and 
the regulations for gold transactions between its members. The first point, 
removing gold from the center of the monetary system implied fundamental 
changes to the Articles, including abolishing the official price of gold, writing 
gold out as the numeraire, removing any obligation for member states to make 
quota payments in gold or for the Fund to accept gold as payment. It also 
involved abolishing all formal restrictions on Fund's members' rights to buy or 
sell gold on the market or to deal with the Fund and other members in gold. 107 
On this first matter, there was little disagreement among G 1 0 or IMF member 
states. Rather, it was the final two points which caused the greatest debate. 
The main problems regarding the disposal of the Fund's gold were two-
fold: to whom did the gold belong - the Fund or its members; and, what 
proportion, if any, should be used by the Fund for its facilities and continued 
functioning, and what proportion, if any, should be restored to the members at 
the "official" price?108 To these questions, two very different answers emerged. 
First, France maintained that the gold held by the IMF belonged to its members 
and thus, Paris wanted immediate, full restitution of members' gold holdings at 
the official price. In addition, the French wanted the Fund to have no role in 
gold policy in the future. 109 Without this, the Giscard government refused to 
pass any amendments to the Articles. 110 The United States, however, argued 
that the IMF's gold holdings belonged to the Fund, not its members. From this 
perspective, Washington proposed that the Fund should be free to sell the gold 
'06T354/383, G-10January. 
107 Ibid.; Bbk, N21K.83 , Thema: Goldgeschiifte des IWF, 3.1.1975; Bbk, N21K83 , Thema: 
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on the market with the bulk of the proceeds going towards strengthening the 
Fund's liquidity in the General Account and any other outside purposes. For the 
outside purposes, an 85 percent majority vote would be required. With the 
remainder of the proceeds, the United States advocated that they be placed in a 
Trust Fund. 111 This proposed Trust Fund was to be used on behalf of 
developing countries and financed partially through said gold sales as well as 
through voluntary contributions from the oil producing states and other 
countries with the means to do so.112 Thus, the Ford administration argued, the 
advantages of its proposal were dual: a solution to the issue of IMF gold; and 
aid to the LDCs. 113 
Of the two responses, the Federal Republic, like nearly all its European 
partners, was less convinced of the French position: West Germany doubted 
that the French demand for full restitution would get the majority vote it needed 
to be passed and if it somehow did, Bonn was concerned it would "be the end" 
of the Fund. 114 The Schmidt government, however, was also not fully 
supportive of the American perspective. The Federal Republic agreed that the 
Fund should retain the gold and, with an 85 percent majority enabling clause 
attached, should be allowed to sell its gold to the members and the market and 
that a portion of the gold should be used to strengthen the Fund's liquidity. 
Indeed, Bonn believed this should be the chief usage of it. 115 Yet, West 
Germany disagreed that the proceeds from the sales of gold should be placed in 
a Trust Fund. Instead, Bonn viewed the Trust Fund as another funding facility 
of which there were already too many. Moreover, Schmidt's government felt, it 
was unlikely to gain adequate financing. 116 In addition, the Federal Republic 
was willing to see a portion of the gold used for restitution to members at the 
official price.117 The only stipulation the Federal Republic placed on the 
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restitution issue was that if it occurred, provisions were to be made for the 
developing states. 118 
As regards the final gold matter, gold transactions between IMF 
member states, the main question was whether countries' formal freedom to 
buy gold should be restrained?1I9 While the Federal Republic wanted to reduce 
the role of gold, Bonn saw little problem with gold transactions continuing 
among IMF member states, so long as they were restrained. The vast majority 
of West Germany's EC partners were of the same opinion. As a result, the EC 
central bankers had worked out an agreement whereby EC monetary authorities 
would refrain from increasing their gold holdings through net purchases on the 
market over the next two years. 120 The United States disagreed with the EC 
position; Washington argued that allowing freedom for gold transactions 
between national monetary authorities, including not only buying gold on the 
market, but also IMF member states settling in gold, conflicted with the agreed 
goal of removing gold from the international monetary system. For America, 
the goal was a resolution which led to the complete demonetization of gold. 121 
Washington also desired that the Fund be kept informed of any transactions in 
gold among monetary authorities. 122 
At the G-5, G-I0 and Interim Committee meetings in January 1975, the 
industrialized states tried to reach an agreement on the disposal of the Fund's 
gold and regulations on gold transactions between IMF member states. For the 
most part, West Germany refrained from engaging in the gold debate too 
greatly, preferring rather to allow Paris and Washington to take the lead and 
work out their differences. 123 Indeed at the G5 and G 1 0 deputies and ministers 
meetings, representatives of the Federal Republic did not even enter into the 
118 Ibid.; B126/65732, Haltung. 
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conversation. 124 Bonn's silence, however, did not aid consensus-building. 
Instead, despite lengthy discussions, the West failed to overcome their 
discordant views. Consequently, the issues surrounding gold went unsettled at 
the January 1975 IMF Interim Committee meeting. \2S 
Although a draft of the amended Articles was to be prepared by 
February 1975, that deadline proved impossible to meet. Instead, for several 
months a stalemate ensued on the quota increase and distribution as well as on 
the amendment of the Articles. At last, a slight breakthrough occurred at the 13 
May 1975 meeting of the G-5 deputies. With the discussions on gold taking on 
the same circular character that they had for the previous four months, West 
Germany finally began to weigh in on the issue of disposal of the Fund's gold. 
Acting as mediator between the French and Americans, Otmar Emminger, the 
Vice President of the Bundesbank, proposed that the $6 billion of IMF gold be 
divided into three tranches: $1.5 billion should be sold with the profits used to 
finance the Trust Fund or an interest subsidy; $2 billion should be sold with the 
profits being returned to the IMF members; and the rest should remain in the 
IMF, with an enabling clause attached. With regard to the clause, Emminger 
advocated that it set out a requirement of an 85% vote or a similar proportion to 
determine the purposes for the remaining gold. Moreover, Emminger suggested, 
if possible, the purposes should be determined before the gold was sold. 126 
While at the time Emminger's solution was greeted with "mild amusement", 
over the coming month the Western powers would seize on his suggestion as a 
way forward on this issue. 127 
After a comprehensive debate at their meeting on 28 May 1975, the G5 
ministers determined that the Emminger compromise was "the most promising 
approach.,,128 While many technical details remained to be worked out, least of 
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all the exact size of each tranche, after months of inflexibility on this question, 
movement towards compromise had begun. Progress continued on this issue in 
the meetings of the G-5 deputies and ministers on 8 June and 9 June 
respectively. By the meeting's end on 9 June, only a day before the start of the 
June 1975 Interim Committee meeting, the G-5 ministers had agreed a ratio of 
the tranches of 2/3: 116: 116. 129 
Yet, while progress on the disposal of IMF gold was occurring, talks on 
the other aspects of monetary reform had all but frozen. Any attempts at 
reconciliation on the issues surrounding gold transactions between monetary 
authorities were blocked by the French who continued to refuse any limitation 
on gold transactions between central banks. Washington had eased its position 
on this point, more or less accepting that IMF members could settle in gold 
among one another, so long as the gold transactions were undertaken only in 
times of "severe need," but this stipulation was unacceptable to Paris. I3O No 
agreement had been reached on quota shares and distribution either. West 
Germany again tried to find a compromise solution, offering to keep its quota 
shares unchanged so long as the United Kingdom reduced its proportion. The 
British though refused to lower their quota demands. 131 The United States too 
was reluctant to reduce its proportion of shares, even though a proposal was on 
the table for increasing the percentage necessary to pass a measure in the IMF 
from 80 to 85 percent. Thus, although Washington no longer had to fear losing 
its veto right, America still rejected the notion of lowering its share ratio. 132 
Yet, of all the issues, agreement appeared most distant on the 
legalization of floating rates and the amendment of Article IV on the exchange 
rate regime. At the 28 May G-5 ministers meeting, Bonn tried to find a 
compromise solution, preparing a draft of the amended Article on exchange 
rates which allowed for the legalization of floating rates, but also interjected 
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words to indicate that there would be a return to fixed, but adjustable par 
values. Yet, these efforts proved fruitless, as France refused the draft. What 
seemed like resolve to Paris was increasingly viewed as French intransigence 
among its Western allies. Apel accused the French of being "unnecessarily 
strict" and the American undersecretary of the treasury, Jack Bennett, asked the 
Fourcade "whether he wanted to try to reach some accommodation with the US 
or whether he would prefer to hold his position until the last moment and then 
be outvoted." The French finance minister's only response was a simple "we 
will see.,,133 The divide between France and the West could not be bridged 
before the June 1975 Interim Committee meeting, as talks on this point at the 
G-5 meetings of the deputies and ministers on 8-9 June 1975 proved once again 
to be inconclusive. 134 
Given the lack of consensus among the Western leaders on nearly all the 
major points of monetary reform, the likelihood for a success at the Interim 
Committee meetings on 10-11 June 1975 was small indeed. At the conclusion 
of it, the only issue on which any progress was made was that of the use of IMF 
gold. 13s Although the developing countries had decided days earlier that all 
gold should remain in the Fund, after negotiations they revised their position 
and agreed that a small proportion could be returned to IMF member states. 136 
The Emminger compromise provided the framework for the work on this issue. 
It was left, however, until the August 1975 Interim Committee to determine the 
exact figures for the three divisions. The agreement on this aspect of gold was a 
step in the right direction vis-a-vis the developing states, but its success was not 
ensured. Instead, many Western states were opposed to passing individual 
reforms: they demanded that the quota issue, all aspects of the gold question 
and the exchange rate regime be combined in a package of reforms. 137 On the 
remaining aspects of reform though, the Interim Committee had difficulty even 
133 T354/393, G-5 May. 
134 T354/394, G-5 June; T354/394, G-5 Deputies June. 
135 Bbk, N21K84, 1CMSIMeeting 3 (1975) -, First - Fourth Sessions; Bbk, N21K84, 
1CMSIMeeting 3 (1975) - Aide Memoire by the Chairman on Gold and Exchange 
Arrangements, Annex 1. 
136 N21K83, 1nterimausschuss, G-10 Juni; Bbk, N21K83, News Article - Entwicklungsliinder 
immer noch sehr kritisch zu den Reformpliinen des internationalen Wiihrungssystems, 10.6.75. 
137 N21K83, 1nterimausschuss, G-10 Juni; B 126/48887, 1nterimausschuss Januar 1975; 
T354/383, G.1OJanuary. 
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agreeing on the language to use in the communique; thus, the communique was 
quite vague and in the case of the exchange rate regime, the Interim Committee 
had to resort to the same wording used in the January communique. 138 
The Federal Republic had attempted to break the stalemate on the three 
main reform issues through mediation and compromise, but had little success; 
instead, France and the United States, above all, refused to loosen their 
respective positions. The deadlock not only hindered progress on monetary 
reform efforts, but as highlighted in the previous section, it also contributed to 
uniting the oil producers and LDCs and affected the discord over the conference 
themes for the preparatory conference. In addition, like energy matters, the 
disagreements over the monetary system had a strong effect on the deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions, above all falling growth and trade in the West. 
Indeed, as the next chapter will show, resolving both the monetary deadlock 
and energy stalemate were essential to overcoming the 1975 global recession, 
which by mid-1975 became the focus of Western leaders. 
-Conclusions-
Much like during the previous year, a desire to maintain its economic 
strength and achieve a unified Western response continued to drive West 
German policy decisions through the first half of 1975. At first glance, it 
appears that Western solidarity was the main motivation in West German 
policymaking. As the West struggled with the implementation of the 
Martinique Agreement, the Schmidt government was willing to subjugate 
national economic concerns, such as the financing of both the Solidarity Fund 
and Witteveen II, in order to bring about financial solidarity and achieve its aim 
of Western solidarity. In addition, Bonn did not abandon the West's plan for 
cooperation, although it appeared as though it was blinding the industrialized 
states to larger problems with the oil producers. Instead, West Germany 
remained committed, aggressively pushing for the West to take steps necessary 
to form a common response to the oil producers' demands. Even after the 
preparatory meeting failed, the Federal Republic continued efforts to coordinate 
138 N21K83, Interimausschuss, G-IO Juni. 
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its raw materials policy with other EC states as well as the United States. 
Moreover, Bonn refrained from publicly advocating a resumption of the 
preparatory meeting until all Western states had agreed. 
During monetary reform talks, West Germany was much more willing 
to negotiate than it had been only two years earlier when talks were being 
carried out in the C-20. At that point, the Federal Republic's desire to ensure 
that any future monetary system did not impede its economic development, 
hindered agreement within both the EC and the West. In the Interim Committee 
efforts, however, the Schmidt government behaved quite differently. Despite its 
significance in the global economy, Bonn was willing to maintain its quota 
shares in order to reach an agreement. In addition, West Germany presented 
compromise solutions on gold as well as the exchange rate regime. 
Yet despite appearances, the maintenance of its own economic strength 
remained a core factor in West German policy decisions. Because the Federal 
Republic was so reliant on oil imports, its economic might was very dependent 
on the price of oil which after the oil crisis was controlled by the oil producers. 
Bonn was convinced that only through solidarity and a consumer-producer 
conference would the West have any chance of influencing the oil producers' 
pricing policies in a non-confrontational manner. Moreover, concluding 
monetary reform negotiations also would have been beneficial to the Federal 
Republic, as the disagreements around them were undermining investor 
confidence and hurting international trade. This, in tum, was damaging to the 
export-led West German economy. 
As Bonn attempted to achieve its policy goals, the Schmidt government 
relied on many of the same means they had employed in 1974 to gain 
cooperation and influence the West's response to the factors contributing to the 
emerging economic crisis. As had been the case in the period described in the 
first three chapters, the Federal Republic used its economic strength. West 
Germany was the linchpin to both recycling facilities and thus achieving 
financial solidarity and completing the first stage of the Martinique Agreement. 
In addition, Bonn cleverly utilized its economic means to push the United 
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States to accept Witteveen II and to negotiate special conditions for its 
contributions to the Solidarity Fund. 
Similar to its actions during the oil crisis, the Federal Republic again 
adopted a mediating role. Yet, by 1975, the Schmidt government not only 
sought to mediate between the United States and France, but also attempted to 
find compromise solutions between America and the EC and within the EC. As 
the Martinique Agreement began to unravel, Bonn called upon its European 
allies to unite on matters of raw materials, although the United States was still 
reluctant. On monetary issues, West Germany provided a compromise solution 
on the use of IMF gold, breaking the deadlock over the American and French 
approaches. In addition, through the first six months of 1975, Schmidt 
continued to be particularly important to Bonn's impact on the West. The 
chancellor lead efforts to reach a common position on the consumer-producer 
conference, proposing and organizing the Private G-5 as well as pushing the EC 
heads of state to focus on creating a joint European position on these issues and 
adopt the West German plan for doing so. 
Although West German efforts did not prevent the failure of the 
conclusion of the stages of the Martinique Agreement or provide for a smooth 
path to the conclusion of monetary reform efforts, Bonn's actions through this 
period did serve to further enhance its role in the Western alliance. By June 
1975, energy and monetary negotiations were being dealt above all by the G-5. 
In nearly all cases, the Federal Republic was the leading proponent of their use 
and within them West Germany was among the most outspoken, significantly 
choosing to present its options for compromise in the monetary field in the G-5 
rather than an EC forum or in bilateral talks. The result of Bonn's actions was 
that through the first half of 1975, the 0-5 became a key forum for Western 
countries to deal with both matters. Finally, Schmidt's strong leadership 
continued to alter the Federal Republic's role in the alliance, as was illustrated 
by Europe's response to Schmidt's calls for cooperation on a joint position for 
consumer-producer conference and Bonn's push for a common approach to raw 
materials. This institutional development and Schmidt's leadership would 
become even more important as Western leaders battled through the latter half 
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of 1975 to pull their national economies as well as the international economy 
back from the brink of another Great Depression and political upheaval. 
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-Introduction-
Chapter 5 
Steps to Overcome the Economic Crises: 
The Road to Rambouillet, Jamaica and Paris 
June 1975-November 1975 
"Economics has moved to the forefront of international diplomacy. 
The reconciliation of conflicting economic interests has become 
the test afstatesmanship inforeign affairs.,,1 
-Hans Dietrich Genscher, 
2 September 1975 
Through the first half of 1975, Western leaders had continued to focus 
on the respective efforts to overcome the two economic crises which had 
drastically altered the international economic system of the West: namely, the 
consequences of the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the oil 
crisis. Their endeavours, however, had yielded few positive results; instead, the 
oil producers had threatened to raise oil prices, non-oil less developed countries 
(LDCs) were threatening cartelization of raw materials, and monetary reform 
through the International Monetary Fund's (1M F) Interim Committee was in 
deadlock. Yet by mid-1975, these problems simultaneously became a 
motivating factor in and overshadowed by a third economic crisis - the 1975 
global recession. Already before the breakdown of Bretton Woods, inflation 
rates throughout the West began to increase, skyrocketing after the quadrupling 
of oil prices in 1974. By late 1974 and into early 1975 inflation gave way to a 
slowdown in international trade, a drop in growth rates and a rise in 
unemployment. In response to these deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, 
many industrialized states attempted to deal with them via national efforts, but 
with little success. 
With the world economy rapidly spiralling downward, Western leaders 
began to change their tactics in summer 1975. Recognizing the interrelatedness 
of the three economic crises, Western leaders took a French suggestion for a 
meeting of the Group of Five (G-5) heads of state to discuss monetary issues 
1 British National Archives (hereafter TNA), PREM 16/612, The Bulletin: Speech by Hans-
Dietrich Genscher before the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (hereafter PREM 16/612, UN). 
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and refashioned it into a G-5 summit to discuss all aspects of the West's 
economic problems. In addition, the industrialized states approached each crisis 
with a new strategy; in response to the ever graver macroeconomic difficulties, 
the members of the European Community (EC) agreed to greater stimulus 
measures and to align their efforts with one another. While the United States 
refused to join its European partners on this path, Washington did act at the 
behest of its allies, in particular the Federal Republic, to address the fiscal crisis 
in New York which threatened to disrupt European capital markets and showed 
a Willingness to consider alignment in the future. On monetary issues, the 
industrialized states managed to finally reach a consensus on key refonn 
aspects, allowing the Interim Committee to move ahead with amending the 
Fund's Articles of Agreement (the Articles). Remarkably too, the West 
succeeded in convincing the oil producing states and the non-oil less developed 
states to resume the consumer-producer dialogue and the majority of non-oil 
LDCs against cartelizing their raw materials. In addition, the industrialized 
states, in particular the United States, were able to impress upon the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that another drastic oil 
price hike was not in its interest. By November 1975, the combined Western 
efforts allowed for the advancement of three major economic conferences in 
RambouiIIet, Jamaica and Paris respectively, which would not only serve to 
overcome the crises, but also change both the international economic system of 
the West and the Western alliance. 
In the previous chapter, the maintenance of Bonn's economic strength 
as well as a desire to maintain Western solidarity drove West Gcnnan policy; 
however, despite the Schmidt government using its economic strength, 
mediating skills and strong leadership to bring about compromise, the Federal 
Republic's efforts did not suffice to propel the West's strategies for overcoming 
the crises to success. As the West began to deal with the 1975 global recession 
and the interrelatedness of all three economic crises of the early 1970s, did 
Bonn's policy goals remain the same? Would the Schmidt government again 
use the same means to influence the West's response to the crises and would 
they achieve greater success? Finally, would West Gennany be able to continue 
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the transformation of its political role in the alliance as a result of its response 
to the recession and the other economic problems? 
-An Economic Crisis Unlike Any Other-
Macroeconomic problems within the West began to develop long before 
mid-I975. Inflationary economic policies, high levels of dollar liquidity, poorly 
regulated Euromarkets and surging union wage demands combined to push 
prices both nationally and internationally higher and higher throughout the early 
1970s. This underlying inflation coupled with the massive increase in oil prices 
and oil supply cuts, resulted in a wage-price spiral and skyrocketing inflation 
rates throughout the West.2 By April 1974, inflation among the member states 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) - the 
group of countries also considered to be the industrialized states -stood at an 
average of 12.5 percent p.a .. This was a three-fold increase over the average 
annual inflation rate between 1961 and 1971 and a five percent escalation on 
the average for 1973.3 Despite the introduction of domestic anti-inflationary 
measures in all Western states, through 1974, the inflation rates in the United 
States, France, Great Britain and Italy hit highs of 12.1, 14.7, 17.1 and 23.7 
percent respectively.4 Having introduced a strict inflation-fighting program in 
spring 1973 though, the Federal Republic became "an island of stability in a sea 
of inflation," holding the lowest inflation rate in the West and being the only 
state capable of reducing inflation from 7.1 to 6.8 percent by year's end.5 
Price stability, however, was not the West's only worry. Instead, 
through 1974, inflation quickly gave way to a retraction in growth and an 
2 Horst Moller, et al., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der Bundesrepuhlik Deutschland 
1975, vol. 1 (Miinchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2006) (hereafter AAPD 197511), 809-13; 
Herbert Giersch, Karl-Heinz Paque and Bolger Schmieding, The Fading Miracle: Four 
Decades oj Market Economy in Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 156; 
Otmar Emminger, D-Mark. Dollar. Wiihrungskrisen: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen 
Bundesbankpriisidenten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986),267-8. 
3 OECD, Economic Outlook, 15 (1974, July)(hereafter OECD 15), 19. 
4 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B136/16795, Betr.: Washington-Reise; hier: 
Sprechzettel zu den wirtschaftlichen Themen. 
s BAK, B136/16764, Betr.: Konjerenz sozialdemokratischer Parteien der EG in Den Haag 
(hereafter B 136/16764, KonJerenz); Emminger, 269-70. 
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Increase in unemployment. Within a year, the annual growth rate of the 
industrialized countries fell from 8 percent in the first half of 1973 to 1.25 
percent during the first half of 1974. 6 By autumn 1974, unemployment in the 
United States was approaching 7 percent, while in the Federal Republic it was 
hovering around 3 percent. In addition, the United States was on the brink of a 
recession with growth in West Germany also dropping. 7 
With Stabilitatspolitik one of its main economic and monetary goals, 
Bonn was reluctant to shift its focus too quickly from inflation-fighting to 
stimulating growth. Yet, by September 1974 with unemployment rising and 
Schmidt's Social-Democratic Party (SPD) facing serious defeats in state 
elections, the Schmidt government introduced small stimulus measures. 8 Yet, 
these meager steps had little impact, as growth continued to wane and 
unemployment rise. By November 1974, the Federal Republic decided to 
officially make both maintaining price stability and safeguarding economic 
growth and a high rate of employment goals of West German economic policy.9 
To this end, Bonn introduced a large stimulus package in December 1974 and 
the Bundesbank lowered interest rates. 10 Yet, because of the Federal Republic's 
reliance on world trade for its growth, the Schmidt government was well aware 
that domestic measures would not suffice if the United States - the largest 
economy and alongside West Germany, trading nation - did not also begin to 
stimulate its economy. Consequently, in his meetings with Gerald Ford, the 
American President, in December 1974, West German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt pressed his American counterpart to relax America's economic and 
monetary policies and focus less on inflation and more on growth. II As Ford 
later admitted, Schmidt's efforts proved vital to the United States introducing 
60ECD IS, 19. 
7 OECD, Economic Outlook, 16 (1974: Dec.), 13. 
8 TNA, T354/169, Economic Prospects: Recent Action by Germany; Gerald R. Ford Library 
(hereafter GRF), White House Central Files, Box C053-2, The German Economy; GRF, NSA 
Memcon, Box 7, December 5, 1974-Ford, Kissinger (hereafter Box 7, December). 
9 B136/16764, KonJerenz. 
\0 OECD, Economic Outlook, 17 (1975: July) (hereafter OECD 17),95; Box 7, December 1974. 
11 Box 7, December. 
187 
its stimulus package in January 1975. 12 In addition, Bonn also succeeded in 
pushing through its dual approach in the Ee.13 
By spring 1975, France and the Netherlands had followed West 
Germany's lead, relaxing anti-inflationary programs and introducing small 
stimulus measures. 14 Because of their high inflation rates though, the United 
Kingdom and Italy could not yet relax their tight economic and monetary 
policies. 15 These various domestic actions, however, had very little effect on 
the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Only the American economy had 
shown the slightest signs of improvement, but these did not extend to other 
industrialized countries. 16 In the Federal Republic, after the January 
introduction of a stimulus plan aimed at bolstering investor activity and 
domestic demand, Bonn saw domestic demand stabilize, but consumer 
spending and investor activity remained weak. 17 Retarding national growth the 
most in West Germany was the decline in its exports. IS This was not surprising 
given that the Federal Republic was an export-led economy, but even in those 
states were trade seemed not to be such a dominating factor (at least on paper), 
growth continued to fall and unemployment rise. 19 
Economic conditions had deteriorated to such a degree that Western 
leaders feared that a political crisis could erupt as high unemployment was 
creating social and political unrest, particularly in ltaly.20 Some European 
12 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 12, May 25. 1975 - Ford. Kissinger. Schmidt (hereafter Box 12, 
May). 
13 BAK, B126/65731, Vennerk: Betr.: Treffen der Finanzminister der im europiiischen 
Wiihrungsverbund zusammengeschlossenen EG-Mitgliedstaaten. 
14 DECD 17,5; Emmanuel Mourlon-Droul, "Economist or Monetarist?: The Difficult Creation 
of and Internal French Consensus about European Monetary Integration (1974-1976)," in The 
Two Europes: Proceedings of the 3rti International RICHIE Conference, eds. Michele Affinito, 
Guia Migani and Christian Wenkel (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009),8-10. 
IS Ibid., 7,23-33. 
16 Box 12, May. 
17 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 14, July 27, 1975 - Ford. Kissinger. Schmidt- Plenary Session 
(hereafter Box 14, Plenary). 
18 Emminger, 270. 
19 DECD, Economic Outlook 18 (1 975:Dec.) (hereafter DECD 18),6, 13, 19. 
20 Box 14, Plenary; GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 12, May 30. 1975 - Ford. Kissinger. Euro. 
Commissioner (hereafter Box 12, Commissioner); GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 12, May 29, 1975 
- Ford. Kissinger, Thorn; Horst Moller, et aI., eds., Akten zur Auswiirtigen Politik der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1975. vol. 2 (Munchen: R. Dldenbourg Verlag, 2006) (hereafter 
AAPD 197512),1016. 
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leaders were even concerned about the stability of democracy in the Federal 
Republic. 21 While the Schmidt administration seemed confident about West 
German political order, it was nevertheless worried about the rising number of 
unemployed and the effect it would have on the SPD's chances of winning the 
next general election. 22 As the party of the worker, the SPD would have a 
difficult time staying in power should unemployment continue to increase and 
growth to be elusive. By June 1975, the macroeconomic problems had 
deteriorated to such a degree and the West's response become so disparate and 
weak that Schmidt lamented, 
[dass es] den Regierungen an Verstandnis flir die Problematik dieser bisher 
schwersten Krise seit den 30er Jahren fehle. Es habe allseits nur hilflose 
Reaktionen auf die gegenwiirtigen Strukturverwerfungen, die 
Anpassungsprobleme und die Rezession gegeben, keine der anderen 
Regierungen sei weit genug in die Probleme eingedrungen. Auch im Kreise der 
USA, Frankreiehs, GroBbritanniens, Japans und der Bundesrepublik sei man 
sich fiber die Beurteilung der gegenwartigen Weltwirtsehaftskrise nieht einig, 
gesehweige denn fiber die Therapie. Selbst die USA, aueh Kissinger, werteten 
die Problematik unter herkCinunliehen Gesiehtspunkten der Maehtpolitik ... 
man [erwarte] von uns, zu wissen, wie es weitergehen solle. 23 
The Federal Republic realized that this recession differed in many ways 
from previous economic downturns, including the Great Depression. One of the 
most defining characteristics of the 1975 recession was the presence of high 
inflation, creating the phenomenon of stagflation. 24 The traditional Keynesian 
prescription to a recession was to relax policies, stimulating domestic demand 
by increasing the level of money in circulation. 25 Yet, such a response was 
difficult, as high inflation, or the fear of it, was rampant in the Western world. 
In countries with high inflation rates, like Great Britain, governments had to 
focus on reducing inflation which implied restrictive policies rather than the 
expansionary ones needed to boost growth. Even in states with lower inflation 
rates, like West Germany and the United States, officials were worried about 
overstimulating the economy - that is, there was a fear that if a recovery came 
21 AAPD 197512, 1016. 
22 Ibid.; GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 14, July 27, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, FRG Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (hereafter Box 14, July); Box 14, 
Plenary. 
23 AAPD 197511,809. 
240ECD 18,46. 
25 AAPD 197511, 811-2. 
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too quickly, the flames of inflation would be sparked again.26 As a 
consequence, it appeared to the Federal Republic that some smaller European 
governments had introduced less aggressive stimulus measures than expected. 
While Bonn recognized the conundrum inflation caused in overcoming the 
1975 recession, there were no new economic guidelines to replace the now 
inadequate Keynesian approach.27 Although the United States and the Federal 
Republic had agreed to set up an international commission to deal with the 
problem of stagflation, the results of their efforts would only be available after 
several months at best. Schmidt lamented, "wir [haben es] mit einer v511ig 
neuartigen Fonn von Rezession zu tun, die noch in keinem Lehrbuch 
beschrieben [ist].,,28 
Yet Bonn also understood that stagflation was not the only phenomenon 
complicating recovery efforts; rather, a greater degree of economic 
interdependence among the industrialized states also played a role. Over the last 
decade, the Western economy had undergone a major transfonnation: trade 
among the industrialized states and the size and role of the capital markets, the 
Euromarkets in particular, had increased substantially. The fonner meant that 
an individual nation's economic fortunes rested more heavily on those of their 
trading partners. This was even more acute for those European states which 
participated in the European Currency Snake or those states with export-led 
economics such as the Federal Republic.29 The latter had various effects on the 
international economic system through the early 1970s, from undennining the 
monetary order through speculation to helping the capitalist world manage the 
effects of the oil price shocks.30 Although the introduction of floating exchange 
rates had decreased speculation for a time, in 1975 the practice was once again 
26 BAI<, B136/12623, Vermerk fiir Gespriich BundeskanzlerlPriisident Ford (hereafter 
BI36112623, Vermerk). 
27 Box 12, May. 
28 AAPD 197511. 812. 
29 BAI<, B136/17144, Deutsch-jranzosische Konsultationen Plenarsitzung: Ausfiihrungen von 
Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt und Staatspriisident Giscard d'Estaing (hereafter BI36/17144, 
A usfiihrungen) , 
30 For accounts of the effects that the growth of capital markets had on the international 
economic system, see Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Wood 
(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996), 179-180, 309-346; Barry Eichengreen, 
Globalizing Capital: a History of the International Monetary System (Princeton, NJ : Princeton 
University Press, 1996),128-145, 
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on the fIse. This time though speculators were betting on changes in 
government interest rate policies and the fluctuation of the dollar. This problem 
became especially apparent through the first half of 1975, as the United States 
kept adjusting its interest rates in an effort to affect the dollar exchange rate and 
each move led to large sums of money being transferred across borders. 31 
Given this interdependence, it seemed to Bonn that the Western states had to be 
more cautious about the effects their chosen policies had not only on their 
domestic economy, but also on those of their partners and the global economy 
in general. 
A final impediment to overcoming the economic downturn was the 
dangerous downward spiral that had developed through the interplay between 
the weakness of investor confidence and the lack of progress on international 
monetary reform as well as the instability in the oil market. With exchange rates 
fluctuating greatly and no clear indication as to if or when the world's leaders 
would return to a fixed regime, investors were reluctant to invest or buy 
abroad. 32 The uncertainty of energy prices and the threat of another oil price 
shock increased investors' worries also. 33 As investor sentiment declined so too 
did international trade, hurting the growth of the international and national 
economies alike. Thus, although stimulus measures existed to bolster activity, 
investors themselves were unwilling to take advantage of them, rendering the 
West's various reflationary programs much less effective. Ultimately, Bonn 
concluded, investor skepticism also affected employment levels, for without 
investment and growth, hiring would not return. 34 
There was no strategy, however, to deal with the lack of confidence that 
had developed over the last few months. Rather, the strategy of the Western 
leaders, as shown in the previous chapter, exacerbated the psychological aspects 
of the crisis. West Germany estimated that at least fifty percent of the crisis was 
due to a lack of confidence.3s Thus, while Bonn believed that it was important 
31 Box 14, July. 
32Ibid. 
33 AAPD 197512, 1036. 
34 Box 14, July. 
35 AAPD 197512, 1036. 
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to continue the work begun on the reform efforts in their respective forums, it 
had become clear that if the Western economy, and by extension the democratic 
order, were going to overcome the crisis, it was imperative that the 
industrialized states take steps to rebuild confidence. 
Taking into account the economic complexities of the 1975 recession, 
Bonn determined that in order to revive private investment and reduce 
unemployment - by summer 1975 West Germany's top priority - the West 
needed to harmonize their economic and monetary policies. 36 While this 
approach did not fully compensate for a lack of practiced theory, the Federal 
Republic hoped that it would encourage smaller European countries to adopt 
more and larger stimulus measures. In addition, aligned policies would decrease 
speculation and its negative effects. Most importantly, Bonn reasoned, it would 
help build investor and consumer confidence. 37 
Unfortunately though Ford and American Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger, did not immediately agree with the chancellor. Rather, when 
Schmidt first mentioned the need for greater alignment of Western policies in 
May 1975, Ford and Kissinger were less than eager. Through the first half of 
1975, the United States had partaken in several acts which ran counter to open 
trade practices. Changing policies now would mean battling Congress and Ford 
was in no place to do so given the weakened presidency after the Watergate 
scanda1.38 Moreover, considering the slight upturn in the American economy, 
Washington was satisfied with the trajectory of its policies and showed little 
interest in coordinating efforts on this front. 39 The chancellor worried, however, 
that it was too early to speak of a recovery and was unsure that the meager 
upswing in the American economy would be enough to pull the rest of the 
West, much less the world, out of its severe recession.40 Yet rather than simply 
waiting for the United States to change its position or to see if the American 
36 BAK, B 126/48887, Private Memorandum on International Concertation of Economic Action 
br. Helmut Schmidt (hereafter B 126/48887, Memorandum). 
3 Box 14, July. 
38 BAK, B136/12624, Subject: The Drift towards Protectionism in the United States; Box 12, 
Commissioner. 
39 Box 12, May. 
40 B136/12623, Vermerk; Box 12, May. 
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recovery would spread, Schmidt turned his attention to Europe, in particular 
France and his friend, the French President, Vah~ry Giscard d'Estaing. 
Utilizing his close relationship with the French president, the chancellor 
raised his concerns about the deteriorating world economy and pressed his 
counterpart in Paris on the need to coordinate efforts. By early July 1975 the 
two leaders had reached an agreement to harmonize their countries' reflationary 
policies.41 Starting at the end of August 1975, France and the Federal Republic 
aimed to introduce new stimulus programs based primarily on public 
investments with the goal of stimulating domestic demand.42 By the time the 
European Council meeting took place on 16-17 July 1975, Bonn had also 
reached similar agreements with Denmark and the Benelux states. At the 
meeting, the European heads of state and government adopted the West German 
perspective, affirming the need for harmonized policies.43 
Despite this progress, however, West Germany and other European 
leaders recognized that their efforts alone would not suffice to pull them out of 
the recession; rather, the EC concluded that their policies must also be 
coordinated with those of the United States and Japan.44 Given Washington's 
earlier reluctance to harmonize policies and its general shift towards 
domestically-orientated policies over the past years, it seemed unlikely that the 
European Community could achieve this goal. Yet, Bonn saw an opportunity 
for American participation, should it be presented to the Ford administration 
alongside its other initiative to combat the economic crisis - a G-5 heads of 
state summit on the world economy and the monetary reform efforts. 
During their June 1975 talks, Schmidt and Giscard not only discussed 
harmonizing French and German stimulus programs, but also the need for, and 
41 AAPD 197512, 966. 
42 Ibid., 966; B 136/17144, Ausfiihrungen. 
43 AAPD 197512, 965-6. It should be noted that over the coming months the degree of 
coordination between Ee states varied. For instance, France and West Germany both introduced 
extensive stimulus policies, but the coordination between them was limited. See Emmanuel 
Mourlon-Droul, "The Emergence of a European Bloc?" (PhD diss. European University 
Institute, 20 I 0). 
44 Ibid., 965-6. 
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possibility of, such a gathering. Several factors motivated Bonn to advocate a 
meeting of the G-5 leaders. First and foremost, West Germany believed that it 
would bolster investor and consumer confidence. As the chancellor later 
explained to his counterpart in the United States, "Our private entrepreneurs -
more in Europe than in the United States because you were the first into a 
depression and now, properly, the first to come out - need this sense of 
cooperation in order to give confidence.,,45 This did not mean, however, that the 
Federal Republic expected many concrete results, in fact quite the opposite; 
Bonn advised against creating great expectations, as they could surely not be 
met. Rather, Schmidt contended that the impression alone of the Western 
leaders working together, confronting "the dangers eye to eye" and 
coordinating their actions would be enough to revive confidence.46 
Yet as Bonn was aware, key to confidence building was also progress 
on reform of the international monetary system and stabilizing the oil market. 
To the Federal Republic, and especially the country's leader, however, in these 
two areas, especially the former, it seemed that discussions had faltered because 
the talks had been dominated by economic technicians lacking political 
perspective. By 1975 the future monetary order along with energy policy had 
become political matters; thus, the economic soundness of a proposed solution 
was not necessarily the key to reaching a consensus on the outstanding issues. 
Rather, diplomacy could be just as persuasive. Bonn recognized this, as 
Schmidt stated: 
Es hat kaum je Phasen von so enger Verflechtung gegeben zwischen 
weltwirtschaftlichen Problemstellungen und Losungsmoglichkeiten und 
Instrumenten mit der Bewegung der Weltpolitik insgesamt, was eben auch 
heiBt, dass man aIle die Fragen, von denen hier die Rede sein soIl, nieht den 
Fachidioten der Okonomie iiberlassen darf, weil sie die weltpolitischen 
Zusammenhange falsch sehen oder gar nieht sehen. Genauso wenig wie sie 
Wlihrungspolitik treiben durfen als okonomische Fachpolitik. Wlihrungspolitik 
ist AuBenpolitik und Weltpolitik .... Weltenergiepolitik eben so ist keine rein 
okonomische Sache, sondem eine weltpolitische Angelegenheit. ... 47 
4S Box 14, July. 
46 Ibid. 
47 BAK., B 136/8482, April KonJerenz 1975. 
194 
Despite his strong words, however, the chancellor did not desire nor suggest 
that politicians alone should make decisions on such complicated technical 
economic matters as the world monetary system; rather, Schmidt hoped that any 
political consensus reached in a meeting of the G-5 leaders would give direction 
and impetus to the talks already begun in the various forums. 48 In this way 
perhaps a greater balance between the political context and economic rationale 
could be found and significant progress achieved, particularly in the area of 
monetary reform. 
Several established organizations for Western economic cooperation 
existed, in particular the Group of Ten (G-lO), in which political discussions at 
the heads of state level could have taken place. Yet, as it had during Committee 
of Twenty (C-20) and Interim Committee talks on international monetary 
reform as well as in respect to energy matters, West Germany and especially its 
chancellor advocated the G-5. Officially, Bonn desired this forum because it 
was a "small, relatively homogenous, economically and politically influential 
circle ... 49 But it cannot be overlooked that the informal nature of G-S meetings, 
lacking the bureaucracy and strictures of other long-established organizations, 
as well as their dependency on good working relationships and personal politics 
corresponded well with the Schmidt's practical governing style. so 
Although Schmidt and Giscard discussed the prospect of a meeting of 
G-5 heads of state, they made no formal plans. Thus, when the French president 
on 9 July 1975 in an interview with Hearst Press called for an international 
monetary summit to be held in autumn 1975 and to be attended by the heads of 
state of the United States, the Federal Republic, the United Kingdom, Japan, 
France and possibly Italy, Bonn's initial reaction was one of surprise and slight 
disappointment.sl Giscard's announcement, however, seemed to catch his own 
48 Historisches Archiv der Deutschen Bundesbank (hereafter Bbk), N21K84 Giscards Initiative 
for Gipfelkonferenz iiber Wirtschafts- und Wiihrungsfragen (hereafter N2 K84, Giscard). 
49Ibid. 
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government off guard as well: the French leader made his proposals 
unbeknownst to the French ministry of finance or French treasury. 52 
The reasoning Giscard provided during the interview for such a meeting 
corresponded closely with that of Bonn. The French leader's actions seemed to 
be motivated by two factors: First, thus far, the international monetary problems 
had only been handled from the viewpoint of technicians. While Giscard felt 
the respective ministers of finance and central bankers had been successful, 
discussions had now reached a point where monetary issues were gaining 
political importance for global economic developments. Like Schmidt, Giscard 
felt that long term solutions and political decisions were needed in order to both 
resolve the disagreements on monetary reform as well as address the 
deteriorating world economy. Giscard's second motivation was his 
dissatisfaction with American policies and leadership. The French president felt 
that, similar to the past, Washington was attempting to solve its problems 
without taking into account how its policies would affect the rest of the world. s3 
At the conference, the French leader hoped to show a connection between the 
disorder in the exchange rate system and the deteriorating economy. France had 
long advocated a return to fixed exchange rates and wished to push this view at 
the level of heads of state. In addition, Giscard hoped to motivate his 
counterparts in the leading industrialized countries to coordinate their economic 
policies more closely, in particular the United States. S4 
The initial responses to Giscard's proposal were coo1.55 After years of 
debate on the exchange rate regime and continued stalemate, it seemed to 
Washington that Paris's move was an attempt to gamer support for its position 
on fixed exchange rates. S6 Since the United States was not prepared to cease 
backing a floating exchange rate regime, the Ford administration found it 
"hardly sensible" to have a meeting of the heads of state on purely monetary 
S2Ibid. 
S3 Ibid. 
S4 Ibid. 
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matters. 57 Yet, given the decline of the world economy, America did not 
immediately dismiss the prospect of a conference of G-5 heads of government; 
rather, the secretary of the treasury, William Simon, was noncommittal on the 
issue. Testifying before Congress, Simon would only say, "President Ford will 
- although we have received no proposal specifically from the French on a 
meeting like this - study it very carefully if and when it arrives."s8 Japan was 
less receptive to Giscard's suggestion, showing "no interest" in engaging in a 
top level meeting on monetary matters. 59 
The United Kingdom shared America's skepticism of the true aims of 
the French proposal, viewing it as a ploy to return to a fixed exchange rate 
regime to which they were opposed. 60 Yet rather than openly oppose the French 
president's plan, the British hoped that they could let West Germany, in 
particular its chancellor, take the lead in resisting such a conference. A first 
opportunity to discuss the idea at the heads of state level would be at the 
European Council meeting on 17-18 July 1975. The British treasury advised, 
"The prime minister should be able to count on strong support - indeed a strong 
lead - from Herr Schmidt and should not have to fear much enthusiastic support 
for President Giscard's ideas.,,61 The uncertainty about that claim grew after 
Karl Otto Pohl, the West German State Secretary in the Finance Ministry, 
warned Derek Mitchell, the British Deputy Chancellor, only days before the 
European Council gathering that Schmidt "might be reluctant when it came to 
the point to be seen to be in disagreement with his close friend, Giscard.,,62 
Realizing that Bonn may not come through as expected, the British treasury 
determined that greater lobbying of the West Germans was needed.63 In a 
preparatory meeting, Mitchell suggested to the British Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, that "he should get hold of Chancellor Schmidt at an early stage to 
make sure that he was sound and to try to stiffen him ifhe was not.,,64 
57 B126/48887, Haltung. 
58 Ibid.; BAK, B126/48887, Questions and Answers, Simon Testimony July 21. 
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This, however, would be much more difficult for the British than they 
expected: although Schmidt could definitely be counted on to take the reins of 
leadership on this matter, his perspectives on Giscard's proposal varied 
significantly from those of the United Kingdom. Having developed the idea of a 
meeting of G-5 leaders along with his counterpart in France, the West German 
leader was certainly in favor of it taking place and, to London's dismay, said as 
much at the European Council. 65 Yet while Paris placed a higher priority on 
settling the outstanding issues of monetary reform, the Federal Republic's main 
concern was reversing the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, in 
particUlar unemployment and declining world trade.66 In the coming weeks and 
months it was these problems and their political repercussions, which Schmidt 
repeatedly emphasized both to explain his support of and to win over other G-5 
leaders to what came to be viewed as Giscard's initiative, despite the 
chancellor's role in the origins of the idea. In doing so, Bonn eventually not 
only convinced its G-5 partners to participate in a heads of state summit, but 
also shifted the focus of the meeting, aligning it more closely with West 
Germany's approach to overcoming the entire economic crisis, including of 
course its goal of harmonizing economic and monetary policies. 
-Shifting the Focus and Establishing the Rarnbouillet Surnrnit-
The first opportunity West Germany had to persuade prospective 
participants was in talks with Britain on 24 July 1975 in Hamburg. After 
providing the background on the Federal Republic's economic state, including 
expressing his worries about unemployment in West Germany, Schmidt told 
Wilson that he was very concerned about future economic developments, as too 
few Western governments had adopted the expansive economic policies needed 
to overcome the crisis. For this reason, the chancellor explained, he had 
recently supported Giscard's call for a world economic conference.67 Schmidt 
also noted that he was disturbed by the downward trend of world trade and the 
devastating effect an increase in the price of oil would have on it. West 
6S AAPD 197512, 967. 
66 Hartmut Soell, Helmut Schmidt 1969 his heute: Macht und Verantwortung (Miinchen: 
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Germany's leader concluded, "Die Weltwirtschaft habe jetzt ein 'management 
from the top' notig. Er werde Prasident Ford vor Augen fUhren, daB die 
Verhinderung von Massenarbeitslosigkeit in Europa fUr ltalien die Rettung vom 
Kommunismus bedeuten konne.,,68 London had reacted quite negatively to 
Giscard's proposal when it seemed to be little more than another monetary 
conference. Yet, with the majority of the Labour Party's constituency being 
made up of the working class and unemployment nearing 1.5 million, Wilson 
could not help but agree with Schmidt's conclusions on the political dangers. 
Although they were yet unwilling to fully agree to a G-5 summit, the British 
were starting to come around to the idea. 
Still, even if Bonn won the support of London, just as with the 
harmonization of policies, a G-5 leaders meeting would be wholly ineffective 
without the United States. Washington, however, had seemed less than anxious 
to take part in either plan. Thus, West Germany had a difficult task ahead, if 
they hoped to change Washington's earlier opinions. The Federal Republic had 
its first opportunity to discuss matters with America during bilateral talks on 
27-28 July 1975. As he had done in London, Schmidt emphasized the political 
effects of the economic crisis in the hope it would spur America to action. 
Shortly into his discussions with Ford and Kissinger, Schmidt raised the topic, 
saying: 
Giscard says what I have been saying since a year ago May. I have kept quiet 
currently because I too am pessimistic. He says the greatest threat to the West 
is not the Communists or the Southern flank of NATO, but the economic 
ability of the West. Ifit were a political or military crisis, the leaders would get 
together and act. Since it is economic, we leave it to our finance ministers. If 
we leave it this way for five years, there will be a political disaster.69 
The political disaster, the chancellor warned was already taking root in Italy, 
where the Communist Party was on the verge of entering government. 70 Given 
the threat the economic crisis posed to democratic order, Schmidt explained that 
Europe looked to America. He informed Ford, "Let me speak a few frank 
68 Ibid., 1020. 
69 B ox 14, July. 
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words. The leadership here should be by the United States. Your strong 
leadership is needed, without appearing to do SO.,,71 
While Ford agreed with Schmidt's analysis of the political implications 
of the economic crisis, he lacked a solution for it himself. Rather, Ford's reply 
to Schmidt's request for leadership was "That is difficult. What would you 
recommend?,,72 As he had also explained to Wilson, Schmidt pointed to rising 
unemployment and deteriorating trade as the most worrisome economic 
developments for political stability. Both of these, Schmidt noted, were 
dependent on private investment which was weak because of the instability 
created by the disorder in the monetary system and OPEC's threat to increase 
the price of oil. The result, he concluded was that "in all of Europe, the boards 
of the big industrial companies are so skeptical they do not invest, so 
employment stays 10w.,,73 
To solve these macroeconomic problems, America again sought Bonn's 
advice, as Kissinger asked Schmidt, "What is your solution?,,74 The 
chancellor's response focused on Western political unity and policy 
coordination on the major aspects of the economic crisis. Schmidt replied: 
Die Halfte des Problems bestehe in Psychologie. Wenn die OPEC-Uinder im 
Herbst die Olpreise auch nur urn 10% heraufsetzen (oder gar urn 30% , wie der 
Schah es wolle), so werde das zum allgemeinen Pessimismus beitragen. Es sei 
wichtig, den Wirtschaftsflihrem im Westen zu zeigen, daB wir keinen Streit 
mit den Ollandem suchten. Zweitens komme es aus psychologischen Grunden 
darauf an, daB die wichtigsten IndustrieHinder der WeIt sagen konnten, die 
Probleme seien erkannt und wir wilrden ~emeinsam handeln. Dies sei 
wichtiger als das, was man wirklich tun konne. 5 
At Kissinger's request, Schmidt went on to clarify for Ford why such steps 
were necessary. First, he noted, Europe unlike the United States, was not rich in 
raw materials; thus, the EC needed stable oil prices and an assured supply. The 
policy of confrontation with OPEC which Washington had been pursuing, 
despite its claims to the contrary, since the outbreak of the oil crisis, was 
7I Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
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unacceptable to its European allies for this reason. Schmidt explained that 
Europe hoped to come to terms with the energy suppliers and refused the 
American approach, saying, "We can't join a policy of confrontation. It would 
raise unemployment as to be disastrous.,,76 On the second point on concerting 
policies, aware of the United States earlier reluctance, Schmidt noted that "if we 
can create the impression we intend to work together and coordinate policies, 
that will be enough.,,77 As a possible way of achieving the proposed Western 
unity on questions of energy and relations with oil producers as well as 
economic policies, Schmidt advocated an economic conference. 
While Ford was convinced by Schmidt's reasoning, he was much more 
hesitant about the means. Ford stated, "my immediate reaction is favorable to a 
meeting. Simon is a hardliner. My tendency is to work closely - on the 
economic side the perception of us working closely would help us with the 
producers and the Soviets.,,78 There was a divide in the Ford administration 
over the proposed G-5 meeting: so long as its focus was monetary issues, it 
found little support in Ford's cabinet, especially among treasury department 
officials. 79 If, however, the subject matter were shifted towards developments 
in the world economy in general, the summit proposal would gain more favor, 
particularly in the state department. 80 Another potential complication to the 
United States' participation was the American senate, from which any 
international agreement had to receive approval. 81 If America was to take part 
in the meeting, it would have to be planned meticulously. Although the 
American president was leaning more towards participation, he had yet to make 
a clear decision. None would come during these bilateral talks either. Instead, 
Schmidt and Ford agreed to continue discussions on the matter during a 
Quadripartite meeting while in Helsinki for the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Still, although no formal plans were set in 
motion, Bonn felt "relieved" and encouraged when Ford concluded the meeting 
by concurring that Europe and the United States needed to align its economic 
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thinking and actions.82 For such, Schmidt noted, "We are at your disposal day 
or night.,,83 
There were only a few days between Schmidt's talks with the 
Americans and the Quadripartite meeting. In this limited time Schmidt took the 
opportunity to prepare a private memorandum on international concertation of 
economic action, which he then distributed to Ford, Wilson and Giscard before 
the start of their gathering on 31 July 1975.84 In it, he laid out the steps he felt 
Western leaders needed to take to tackle the economic challenges before them. 
Although the chancellor had already highlighted the majority of his points 
separately during his discussions with various world leaders, the document 
provided Bonn's allies with a complete strategy for overcoming the global 
recession. For Schmidt, the key to economic recovery and political survival was 
Western unity and cooperation. 
Schmidt began by acknowledging that through the series of high level 
talks held over the last several weeks, there had been a "tangible improvement 
in the climate," but he warned, "what is important for us now is to agree on 
concrete steps to stabilize the world economic situation. Otherwise I believe 
there is a danger of a set-back in international public opinion.,,8s According to 
the chancellor, the "most pressing task" was reactivating private investment and 
reigniting growth. 86 To this end, he advocated harmonizing economic policies, 
including the alignment of stimulus programs as well as monetary policies, 
particularly between the United States and Europe. 87 
Schmidt recognized, however, that harmonization alone would not be 
enough to improve the economic climate; thus, he also called for "concrete 
results" on monetary reform at the upcoming Annual Assembly of the IMF.88 
For Bonn, this was especially important psychologically, as Schmidt noted, 
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"Only in this way can it be demonstrated that the present world monetary 
system is also viable in times of economic crisis."s9 Understanding that the 
differences between the French and American positions on the future exchange 
rate regime would be more difficult to bridge, the chancellor believed that it 
was both possible and necessary to reach agreement on the issues of quotas, 
gold transactions among the central banks and the use of IMF gold at the IMF 
gathering at the end of August 1975. As to the exchange rate system, he 
proposed that it be discussed during an economic summit conference. Schmidt 
advocated the Giscard initiative calling for a summit to discuss questions of the 
world economy and world monetary system. Bonn's leader even went so far as 
to suggest that Giscard's proposal be adopted at the forthcoming meeting in 
Helsinki. 
Yet, as Schmidt emphasized in his discussions with Wilson and Ford, 
economic recovery hinged on the West's ability to coordinate their respective 
approaches to energy, raw materials and relations with developing states. In the 
short-term, the West had to work together to prevent an increase in oil prices. 
Over the long run, cooperation was necessary to stabilize the oil market. To 
achieve the former, the chancellor pushed for the resumption of the preparatory 
meeting by the beginning of October, with invitations for the conference sent 
by the end of August, "before the OPEC meeting" at which the price increase 
was to be discussed. 9o As to the latter, Schmidt agreed with Kissinger's 
proposal to set up three commissions on energy, raw materials and development 
issues, but also believed a fourth dealing with financial questions should be 
included. 91 Not only in substance, but in style the West German chancellor 
sought unity, writing, "We attach great importance to a co-operative approach 
to the oil-producing and developing countries. Any aggravation of the conflict 
leads in the industrialized countries dependent on the world market to 
deepening pessimism and recession.,,92 
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Although Schmidt's memorandum was never officially adopted, action 
on the various economic challenges over the following months developed along 
very similar lines to those proposed by the chancellor. The first was the 
quadripartite meeting in Helsinki. There Schmidt, Giscard, Ford and Wilson 
discussed the French president's proposal for an economic and monetary 
summit. While the four leaders generally concluded that any conference should 
be kept to the G-5 members, they did not reach any formal agreements on 
themes or dates. 93 
Within weeks, however, Ford had reached a decision to take part in the 
summit. In his memoirs Kissinger explained the American president's decision 
as a political one, writing, "we had been insisting, [Ford] argued, on charting a 
common destiny for the industrial democracies in our diplomacy and in our 
public pronouncements, and [Ford] would not turn his back on the opportunity 
to give it additional meaning.,,94 Ford's biographer, Vanek Mieczkowski, 
however, ascertained that the economic factors had a greater bearing, claiming, 
"the meetings represented an opportunity for the United States to practice 
internationalism on economic and trade issues, particularly important since its 
foreign trade during the 1970s jumped to 7 percent of its GDP (compared to 
previous estimates of 4 percent) .... ,,95 West German analysis concluded that 
the increase of the dollar exchange rate as well as the signs of economic 
improvement in Europe achieved in August 1975 made the prospect of such a 
summit more appealing to the United States, as Washington would be less 
likely to be pushed by its 0-5 allies to alter its economic and monetary 
policies. 96 The true motivations were probably a mixture of all three. What is 
clear, however, as Ford expressed to Schmidt in a letter at the end of August, 
was that Schmidt's efforts to find a common basis for the talks - acceptable to 
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both France and the United States - had been instrumental m creating a 
compromise which the American president could accept. 97 
Upon his decision, Ford followed Schmidt's suggestion and appointed 
George Shultz, the former Treasury Secretary, as Washington's special delegate 
for conference preparations.98 Shultz was the preferred choice for Bonn because 
he and Schmidt had developed a good working relationship during their days as 
minsters of finance and because Shultz understood the Gaullist pressure that 
Giscard was under in France.99 Consultations between Shultz and the Schmidt 
government began shortly thereafter in early September 1975. By 13 September 
1975, the two parties had crafted a draft outline of the agenda for a G-5 meeting 
of the heads of state and government. Only days later, Schmidt and Shultz met 
with Giscard in Paris to discuss the draft's suggested themes and possible dates. 
Giscard seemed willing to accept the broader focus and it turned out that 
France, West Germany, the United States and Great Britain all favored a 
conference that year. Particularly Washington wanted to avoid holding a 
summit in 1976, an election year. It was agreed that special delegates from the 
G-5 member states should meet bilaterally in the coming weeks and convene all 
together on 6 October 1975 in New York to finalize an agenda and the details 
of the summit. 100 
At the New York meeting in October 1975, the special delegates had to 
determine a series of procedural questions - place, host, participants, date, 
length of conference, and character of the communique - as well as the 
conference's discussion themes. 10) Having come together bilaterally in the 
previous weeks, the delegates had a good idea of where the others stood, 
making building a consensus on most issues relatively easy. The summit would 
take place on 15-17 November 1975 in France at the Rambouillet Chateau and 
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be hosted by the French president. The topics of discussion would be world 
economic developments, trade and monetary policy, developments in energy, 
raw materials and relations with developing nations and east-west relations. 102 
The exception to the accord was the matter of participants, with the 
disagreement on this point threatening to derail the entire conference. Although 
France, the Federal Republic and Great Britain were content with the limited 
attendance, its European allies in the EC were not. 103 Above all, Italy felt it 
should be included in any summit. 104 Rome argued its exclusion would affect 
its domestic standing negatively, as it would give the impression that Italy's 
role internationally was secondary. lOS Moreover, Italy, with the support of the 
smaller European states, claimed that the G-5 meetings undennined the work 
and cohesion of the EC. To avoid this Rome proposed that a member of the 
smaller European countries take part in the G-'5 meetings on a rotating basis. 
Since Italy was to be EC president in November 1975, it made sense that Rome 
should be the representative at the G-5 summit. 106 The European G-5 members, 
however, were hesitant to include the Italians, as they hoped to keep the number 
of participants small. 107 
Although Kissinger infonned the West Gennan Foreign Minister, Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, on 23 September 1975, that he was leaning towards the 
inclusion of Italy in the conference because of the domestic political threat 
posed by Rome's exclusion from it, the American secretary of state said 
Washington would leave the decision to the European G-5 member states. lOS 
Yet, Kissinger also made it be known that if the Europeans chose to include 
Italy, then America would also expect Canada to be included. 109 Soon thereafter 
Canada made its own appeal to participate in the summit. 110 After weeks of 
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debate, France, West Germany and Great Britain agreed that Italy should be 
included, as Rome's exclusion would create problems with the smaller 
European states, which likewise felt excluded. III By early October 1975, all G-
5 states consented to Italy's participation. 112 
With this, however, the question became one of Canadian inclusion. 
While West Germany was more open to it, France was very much opposed.1I3 
In a letter to Schmidt on 4 November 1975, Giscard explained his reasoning, 
noting that should he invite Canada, then he would be forced to invite 
representatives from the EC, DECO and IMF who had also appealed to him for 
an invitation. If such were to occur, then the summit would lose its informal 
nature. 114 As host of the diplomatic event, Giscard had the final say on those 
attending the meeting, but Washington was less than pleased about the 
exclusion of Canada. It seemed to the American president that his French 
counterpart had taken advantage of diplomatic protocol just to prohibit the 
participation of America's chief trading partner. Yet, by the time the decision 
was made Ford had come too far in his preparation of the summit and the 
matter had become too politically explosive to pull out of the conference. Thus, 
despite their great annoyance at Italy's participation and Canada's exclusion, 
the United States had no choice but to attend the summit. Though Ford 
threatened to behave coldly towards Giscard, he never followed through with it 
during the conference. I IS 
By November 1975, the G-5 summit, or Rambouillet as it had come to 
be known, was set to take place. Yet, Bonn realized that its establishment alone 
would not suffice. Rather, as Schmidt pointed out in his memorandum and to 
his counterparts in Washington and London in July 1975, their efforts to 
overcome the world economic crisis were also dependent on the alignment of 
European and American economic policies, progress on international monetary 
reform as well as stabilizing the oil and raw material markets. Without 
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resolving these three issues, in particular the latter, it is highly doubtful that the 
West would have managed to recover from the recession by 1976 or 
Rambouillet would have found its lasting place in history. 
-Macroeconomic Policy Coordination-, 
During bilateral talks in July 1975, Schmidt had appealed to Ford and 
his cabinet advisors to adjust their policies in such a way that their effects on 
the international community would be less negative. 1I6 By autumn 1975, 
however, little had changed. While the G-5 conference was intended to help in 
this matter, Schmidt took steps to push action on it during his trip to America in 
early October 1975, meeting with leading American businessmen at the United 
States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce in New York, 
holding a press conference and carrying out discussions with the Ford 
administration. America's policies and even its domestic economic problems, in 
particular the United States' interest rate policy, exchange rate policy and the 
very precarious financial position of New York City, were of greatest concern 
to the Federal Republic. 
As had been its view since early 1975, Bonn believed America's high 
interest rates were slowing world growth and disrupting European capital 
markets. Although the slight signs of an upswing seen in the United States 
economy in May 1975 had grown into a full recovery by October 1975, the 
same could not be said in Europe. There, recovery had begun, but was still very 
much in its nascent stage. 1l7 West Germany worried that if American policies 
remained tight the upswing in both the United States and Europe could be 
stifled.1I8 In addition, the Federal Republic believed that American interest rate 
policy was disrupting European capital markets, as short-term funds needed by 
the West German economy were steadily fleeing Europe for the United 
116 Box 14, July; BAK, B136/12623, Vermerkfor das Gespriich BundeskanzleriPriisident Ford 
(White House. 3. Oktober 1975 12-13 Uhr) (hereafter B136/12623, Vermerk 3. Oktober). 
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States. 119 Moreover, Bonn worried about the swmgs m the exchange rate 
system. Since the end of 1972, the dollar had fallen against the D-mark by 
nearly 30 percent overall with the peak reached at the end of 1974, having a 
negative impact on West German exports. Through 1975, however, the dollar 
exchange rate vis-a-vis the D-mark had risen by nine percent, soothing Bonn's 
export concerns somewhat. 120 While the Federal Republic was certainly pleased 
about the exchange rate trend, the Schmidt administration was unconvinced that 
the drastic fluctuations that had plagued the West through the previous three 
years had indeed come to an end. 121 
As to New York's fiscal crisis, Bonn feared that a default by New York 
City could trigger a catastrophic reaction in the Euromarkets and thus on the 
credit available to European governments. The need for Euromarket credit was 
especially acute in West Germany. Over the previous months, Bonn had 
engaged in deficit spending in order to fund its enormous stimulus package 
introduced in late August 1975. By autumn 1975, the Federal Republic's public 
sector deficit had reached 7 percent of GNP, a sum so enormous in that era and 
worrying to the Schmidt government that the West German leader referred to it 
as "the largest since Jesus.,,122 In the coming year, the Federal Republic would 
have to take nearly DM 60 billion in credit to finance its budget deficit. Even if 
the economic consequences of a bankrupt New York turned out not be so dire, 
the New York crisis would still have political implications for West Germany. 
1976 was an election year, and the Schmidt government feared that if nothing 
was done about New York's fiscal problems, it would be all too easy for the 
opposition to swing the election by giving the impression that the West German 
federal government was headed for bankruptcy. 123 
119 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 15, October 13. 1975- Ford. KiSSinger. FRG Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt; BAK. B136/16800, Schmidt Criticizes 'Restrictive' U.S., 2.0ktober 1975 (hereafter 
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In his meetings both in New York and Washington Schmidt expressed 
West Germany's concerns over these three issues. 124 Before the Chamber of 
Commerce and in his press conference, just as he had done in his private 
memorandum on international economic concertation, the West German 
chancellor called for greater cooperation among political leaders to align their 
economic and monetary policies against recession and inflation. Schmidt also 
implored the American business community to take heed of the effects their 
various actions had not just on the domestic but also the global economy, as 
problems of other large industrial powers also had an effect on business in the 
United States. In addition, Schmidt reiterated his memorandum's suggestion of 
greater coordination between European and American central banks in order to 
narrow the range of exchange rate movements between the dollar area and the 
snake. As to the financial difficulties facing New York, the West German leader 
warned of the devastating effects these might have on the international financial 
system, reminding the world of the impact of the collapse in 1974 of the 
medium-sized banks Herstatt and Franklin National. Schmidt also pointed out 
the negative results it could have on American economic and political 
leadership.125 Noticeably absent, however, from the West German chancellor's 
comments was any mention of the repercussions for West Germany's budget 
financing and domestic politics. 
By the time Schmidt arrived in Washington, his sentiments had been 
well publicized and were well-known. Although Bonn's leader had refused to 
criticize outright the Ford administration's economic and monetary policies, it 
was clear that the Federal Republic was not fully in agreement with their 
direction. During his talks with Ford and Kissinger, Schmidt only briefly 
mentioned his worries about American interest rate policies and did not bring 
up exchange rate coordination at all. Instead, the West German chancellor 
seemed to save his comments for discussions with Arthur Bums, the chairman 
of the Federal Reserve, over a closing dinner. Schmidt and Bums did not see 
eye-to-eye on these matters; rather, the American Fed chief was much more 
124 B136/16800, Restrictive; BAK., B136/16800, "Schmidt sees World Impact in N.Y.C. 
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concerned about the inflation rate than the growth rate, about which Bums was 
reluctant to speak. 126 Given the nature of the talks, it seemed unlikely that 
Schmidt's sentiments would have any significant effect on America's future 
economic and monetary policy choices. 127 Yet, all hope was not lost: the 
democrat-led Congress, to whom the White House had lost a considerable 
amount of power after the Watergate scandal, was much more interested in 
increasing the money supply and conducting a policy of lower interest rates. 128 
After concluding his talks with the Ford administration, Schmidt met with some 
American Congressmen who besieged him with questions on his perspectives 
on economic policy rather than foreign policy. 129 While the extent to which the 
United States would shift its policies in the coming months remained to be seen, 
it was clear that Bonn's opinions on these matters were heard and respected. 
This was even more evident when it carne to the New York fiscal crisis. 
During his talks with Ford and Kissinger, Schmidt again raised his concerns 
about New York to which Ford replied that he neither fully agreed with 
Schmidt's conclusions nor intended to provide federal aid to the city.13o The 
West German leader's comments in New York, however, had caused quite a stir 
there and gained much attention in the media. It was not long before 
Washington also realized the threat, with Ford eventually adopting Schmidt's 
earlier advice.131 Schmidt would later express regret over his press comments, 
feeling it was undiplomatic to publically attack the domestic policies of a host 
country. Indeed, it did seem at odds with the approach he had taken with 
Rambouillet in which Schmidt clearly led the initiative behind closed doors, but 
pushed Washington to take the credit for it in public. Yet, after several months 
of American intransigence on these matters and with the Federal Republic'S 
economic health and the SPD's political livelihood at stake, it is doubtful that 
Schmidt was unsatisfied with the outcome, regardless of the means employed. 
Although Schmidt left Washington without any firm commitments from 
American officials to align their economic and monetary policies more closely 
126 B136/12623, Vermerk 3. Oktober. 
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with Europe's, it was clear from his discussions with members of the Ford 
administration as well as the American Congress that they were at least 
considering it and if pushed publicly would probably do so. This was at least a 
favorable starting point for negotiations on these matters at the Rambouillet 
Summit. That said, progress on monetary issues and oil matters had to occur 
before such talks could even take place. 
-Progress on Monetary Reform-
The June 1975 meeting of the IMF Interim Committee was a grave 
disappointment for Western leaders. Despite numerous meetings in the G-5, G-
10 and EC monetary committee attempting to reach a consensus on a package 
of reforms to the IMF Articles of Agreement, the industrialized states had 
managed only to agree on one of the four major points: the use of IMF gold. 
This left to be solved the matters of gold transactions among central banks, the 
increase and fixing of new IMF quotas and the exchange rate regime. The 
stalemate that had developed principally between the United States and France 
over these issues began to worry many Western leaders during the summer of 
1975. As noted previously, the stalled monetary reforms had been a key 
consideration in the thinking behind Rambouillet and for Giscard, the primary 
concern. Yet, the G-5 summit would not come before autumn 1975 and as 
Schmidt noted in his memorandum, it was essential for investor confidence for 
the Annual Assembly of the IMF to produce concrete results before then. 132 
West Germany's allies seemed to recognize this also. In the couple of 
months between the conclusion of the June 1975 Interim Committee meeting 
and the August 1975 gathering, a remarkable spirit of compromise took hold. 
The United States, which had been impeding progress on quotas and gold 
transactions among central banks, reversed its stance. For months, America had 
refused to lower its quota share below 20 percent, even after the suggestion that 
the blocking minority be lowered from 20 to 15 percent. 133 In August, however, 
Washington reversed its position and agreed to lower its quota share below 20 
132 B126/48887, Memorandum. 
133 TNA, T354/396, IMF Interim Committee: Review of Prospects, Review of Quotas; Also see 
previous chapter. 
212 
percent, so long as the blocking minority was lowered to 15 percent. The other 
industrialized states were willing to support such a decrease in the blocking 
minority. With America prepared to reduce their quota share and Britain and 
the Federal Republic having given up their hopes of a higher share as well, the 
IMF Interim Committee was able to progress on this issue at the August IMF 
Interim Committee meeting. There, members agreed to a decrease in the 
blocking minority to 15 percent, and eventually to a doubling of the oil 
producing countries' quota shares, a continuation of the non-oil developing 
states' quota shares previously held and a decrease of the industrialized states' 
quota shares. 134 
On gold transactions among central banks, Washington had refused the 
notion of a global limit along the lines suggested by the European Community 
and practiced there.13S America had feared that such a limit would leave the 
door open for gold to be monetized again rather than the complete 
demonetization of gold, Washington's goa1.136 In August though, the United 
States reversed this view to embrace the European suggestion. Aboard the 
presidential yacht Sequoia, the G-5 finance ministers came to an understanding 
on this aspect of gold on 30 August 1975. 137 This allowed the G-I0 to reach a 
complete agreement on the issue of gold at its August 1975 meeting. 138 The 
reversal of the American position on gold was remarkable - and not fully 
explained by Washington. The Ford administration defended its actions noting 
that it could use its economic power in two years again to renew the agreement, 
but the United States already had the same power in 1975.139 It seems more 
likely that Washington hoped to gain on the exchange rate issue, the only major 
issue yet to be settled in the package of reforms. The French, however, were 
134 Bbk, N21K84, Thema: AUg. QuotenerhOhung IWF, Datum: 5.1.1976; Bbk, N21K84, 
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still intransigent. Thus, as Schmidt surmised, the gap between the American and 
French positions could not be overcome by the August IMF Interim Committee 
meeting. While there was discussion about the possibility of splitting the 
package, i.e. passing the package of reforms without settling the exchange rate 
system issue, the Interim Committee opted against it. Instead, it hoped to reach 
a conclusion to the matter at its January 1976 meeting to be held in Jamaica. 140 
Over the following couple of months numerous meetings followed in 
the various multilateral forums as well as bilateral discussions with the 
intention of resolving the exchange rate regime issue. The two main proponents 
of the opposing positions, however, seemed to be in an ideological dispute with 
neither willing to shift its perspective in the least: the French were determined 
to return to a par value system and the Americans desired the full legalization of 
floating rates without any obligation to return to fixed exchange rates. Most 
other industrialized states were satisfied with the floating exchange rate system 
or at least viewed legalization as simply affirming reality. The Federal Republic 
in particular felt that a return to fixed exchange rates in the future was 
preferable, but in the interim floating exchange rates were necessary and should 
be legalized. 141 By November 1975, most industrialized states worried that the 
French-American impasse would ruin their previous efforts on the reform 
package. 142 Without a doubt, failure to agree on a reform package would have 
had a negative effect on investor confidence levels and the success of the -
Rambouillet summit. 
A turning point finally occurred at a private dinner hosted by Otmar 
Emminger, vice president of the Bundesbank and West Germany's 
representative at, and chairman of, Working Party 3 in the OECD. There 
Emminger informed his French and American counterparts that should they 
meet bilaterally to resolve the issue and reach an agreement, he promised to 
accept the compromise. 143 The other Working Party 3 members supported this 
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statement. With this mandate, the French representative, Jacques de Larosi<~re, 
Director of the Treasury, and the American representative, Edwin H. Yeo III, 
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs, resolved to convene as 
often and as long as necessary in order to reach an agreement. 144 
In the first weeks of November 1975, de Larosiere and Yeo III, did 
indeed meet several times. Initially, the two sides held to their long established 
positions, but eventually Paris and Washington began to give ground, albeit the 
former much more so than the latter. Finally on 15 November 1975, the two 
representatives arrived at a "Memorandum of Understanding." In it, France and 
the United States redrafted the obligations on exchange rates to read "each 
member pledges to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure 
orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange 
rates.,,145 Without saying so, the phrasing of this text allowed for floating 
exchange rates, as nowhere in the agreement is a "stable system of exchange 
rates" defined or is floating clearly excluded as such. Instead, the agreement left 
the choice of exchange rate system open to the individual country. The only 
limitation on a state's freedom of choice was that their respective choice of 
system had to foster "orderly economic growth within the context of relative 
price stability," could not produce "erratic disruptions," or "manipulate the 
system in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage over another member 
or members.,,146 There was no definition for what constituted "erratic 
disruptions." Instead, it was proposed that 0-5 central bankers should consult 
daily, 0-5 finance ministry officials weekly and G-5 finance ministers 
"periodically" about the conditions in the exchange markets and coordinate 
their actions to counteract any erratic fluctuations.,,]47 The IMF was not to be 
included in these discussions; rather, the IMF should remain outside the day-to-
day affairs of the markets and offer its advice on long-term developments only 
when requested. 148 
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In theory, the door was left open for a return to a par value system; in 
reality though, that would have been very difficult, as the French-American 
agreement stipulated that an 85 percent majority vote in the Fund was required 
for it. 149 Given America's voting power, no return to par values would be 
possible without their consent. Overall the "Memorandum of Understanding" 
came down heavily on the side of the United States. As Emminger concluded, 
"Es sah auch sehr nach einem "Sieg" der amerikansichen liber die franzosische 
Haltung zum Wechselkurssystem aus.,,150 The reasons' behind France's 
capitulation on this issue are unclear, but the outcome did finally bring an end 
to the deadlock, opening a path for productive work on the issue at Rambouillet 
and potentially an agreement on a reform package at Jamaica. Yet, this path 
would most likely have been closed had the issues surrounding energy, raw 
materials and relations with the LDCs remained unsettled. 
-Cooperation on Oil, Raw Materials and Relations with Developing States-
Greatly dependent on raw materials and OPEC oil, the Federal Republic 
began within weeks of the failed preparatory meeting to rework its policies on 
raw materials and relations with developing countries and pushed its EC 
partners to coordinate their actions on these matters. By June 1975 Bonn had 
crafted a general approach to these issues along with oil. l51 As Schmidt later 
revealed in his memorandum on international economic concertation, Bonn 
believed a dual approach to the problems in this sector was required: In the 
short-run, the West had to persuade the oil producers and the non-oil 
developing states to reconvene the preparatory conference by autumn 1975. If 
so, perhaps the oil producers would refrain from drastically increasing oil prices 
and the non-oil developing states hold off on any cartelization plans. 152 Over 
the long-run, the West had to learn to work with the oil producers and 
developing states to shape a new energy paradigm to provide for stable oil and 
raw materials markets. For West Germany, this was essential if the capitalist 
world was to recover from the economic downturn and the functioning and 
efficiency of the world economy was to improve in the future. Yet, if the 
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industrialized states wished to achieve this - and not be extorted along the way 
- it seemed to Bonn that the West had to have consumer solidarity in style and 
content as well as name. 153 
Although the industrialized states had managed to come together on the 
matter of conference discussion themes, in June 1975 the West was still very 
much divided on the proper course of action vis-a-vis the oil producers and the 
non-oil developing states. 154 With only months until the next OPEC meeting 
and a rapidly deteriorating world economy, time did not allow for lengthy 
discussions on strategy. While work continued in the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and EC, the United States, France and West Germany -as yet 
unconvinced by each other's reasoning and approaches, but recognizing the 
necessity for action- began bilateral talks with the oil producing and non-oil 
LDCs present at the conference. 155 
In late June 1975, the Schmidt government sent State Secretary in the 
Finance Ministry Jiirgen Wischnewski as an envoy to all the oil producing 
states and the non-oil developing states which had taken part in the meeting on 
a "fact-finding mission.,,156 The mission had two stated purposes: The first was 
to discuss the possibility of resuming the preparatory conference and the 
continuation of the consumer-producer dialogue. Bonn hoped to settle 
procedural questions as well as agree upon the expanded conference themes the 
industrialized states had recently adopted - energy, commodities, and 
development issues in general. The Federal Republic also sought, however, the 
inclusion of a fourth topic, monetary and financial questions, to address 
questions such as the effect of OPEC price policy on the monetary system, the 
balance of payments situation in both the industrialized and developing 
countries and the role of capital markets. 157 Although these matters had moved 
to the background because of the recession, Bonn felt that they would likely 
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return once an upswing began. Through such discussions, West Gennany hoped 
to make the oil producers more accountable for their actions. 158 
The second purpose of the meeting was to convey to the governments of 
the countries visited the Federal Republic's great concern about world 
economic developments and their respective approaches to these problcms. 159 
Bonn's leader was convinced that neither the oil producers nor the non-oil 
developing states understood the problems of the economic crisis or the 
consequences their proposed actions would have on the world economy and in 
tum their own national economies. 160 It seemed to the Schmidt government that 
although the West had become dependent on oil and raw materials over the 
previous decade, the relationship between the industrialized states and the 
developing world was not entirely asymmetrical. Rather, it was one of 
interdependence, as both the oil producers and the non-oil LDCs had export-led 
economies and thus were highly reliant on Western states for their economic 
prosperity. 161 Schmidt hoped that through dialogue - explaining West 
Gennany's interpretation of the economic crisis and the likely damaging effects 
of a drastic increase in the price of oil, a cartelization of raw materials or the 
indexation of crude and commodity prices - that both the oil producing states 
and non-oil developing states might reconsider their proposed actions. Schmidt 
and his cabinet ministers advised Wischnewski, 
158 Ibid. 
Man miisse den 611andem darstellen, was die 61preisvervierfachung schon 
bewirkt habe und was weitere Preissteigerungen fur die Weltwirtschaft 
bedeuten. Sie miiBten erkennen, welche ungeheure Auswirkungen bereits eine 
Steigerung von ,,nur" 10%, geschweige denn 25 oder 30%, haben .... Es gehe 
darum, den Erdal- und Rohstofflandem klar zu machen, welche 
Riickwirkungen eine Indexierung auf ihre eigene Wirtschaft und Entwicklung 
haben werde .... man miisse den 61landem klarmachen, daB sie bei einem 
Zusammenbruch der Weltwirtschaft selbst bedroht seien. 162 
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As the West German leader informed the state secretary days before his 
departure, the fact-finding mission represented for Bonn "die bedeutendste 
politische und auBenpolitische Aufgabe.,,163 
After eight weeks, Wischnewski completed his mISSIOn with fairly 
favorable results: all countries visited indicated that they were prepared to 
resume the preparatory meeting and cooperate with the industrialized countries 
now that the West had agreed to give equal weight to the areas of energy, raw 
materials and development issues. Nearly all were interested in the inclusion of 
a fourth subject matter to deal with monetary and financial problems, with only 
Venezuela against it. The oil producing and non-oil developing states were 
willing to continue on with the preparatory conference at the same location and 
with the same participants as those in attendance in April. They also agreed that 
this meeting should take place in late September or the beginning of October 
1975. 164 France and the United States also received the same positive replies on 
restarting the preparatory conference in their bilateral negotiations and in mid-
September 1975 Giscard sent out invitations for a preparatory conference to 
take place in Paris on 13 October 1975. 165 
On his second task, Wischnewski was relatively less successful. 
Although he conveyed West Germany's position on the economic crisis to the 
oil producing and non-oil developing states, the West German representative 
was far from convincing them to alter their respective positions on the issues; 
rather, all countries visited claimed to understand the factors contributing to the 
economic crisis and to recognize the effect that a worsening of the recession 
could have on their respective economies. Despite this, only Saudi Arabia 
questioned whether the various actions proposed by the oil producers and the 
non-oil developing states were justified and correct. 166 Even though the oil 
producers were prepared to reconvene the preparatory conference, Iran claimed, 
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"the resumption of the dialogue will have no influence, however, on any 
increase in oil prices decided upon by OPEC.,,167 
Indeed, the continuation of the preparatory conference probably did not 
have a great effect on its pricing decisions, but OPEC nonetheless decided 
against drastically raising oil prices at its meeting on 24-26 September 1975. 
Significantly influencing this outcome was the power struggle within OPEC 
between the hardliners or radical states, led by Iran, and the moderate states, 
with Saudi Arabia at the helm. This divide had been growing for several 
months. In March 1975, Saudi Arabia had refused to attend the OPEC heads of 
state summit in Algiers, arguing it was too confrontational towards the oil 
consuming countries. Yet the hardliners could not simply exclude Saudi Arabia 
from OPEC negotiations, because of the capacity of the Arab kingdom's crude 
supplies. As Wilson pointed out to Schmidt, "der Bestand des OPEC-Kartells 
hange vor aHem vom Verhalten Saudi-Arabi ens ab.,,168 
Fortunately for the West, the United States had particularly good 
relations with Saudi Arabia, relations which became even bctter when Fahd 
became both king and prime minister after the murder of King Faisal in late 
March 1975. 169 At the September 1975 OPEC meeting, the hardliners and the 
moderates went back and forth, with the formcr initially arguing for a 15 
percent increase and the latter a 5 percent increase. Reaching a compromise was 
difficult, but eventually OPEC settled on a solution put forward by Venezuela, 
Kuwait and Algeria which called for a 10 percent increase on 1 October 1975 
followed by a nine month freeze. 170 Although no definitive answer can be given 
as to the motivations of Saudi Arabia, it would be only logical to assume that 
America's influence played at least a small role in the Saudi's position, 
particularly given the approach to relations with the oil producers which 
Washington would suggest only a few weeks later at the Rambouillet Summit. 
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Yet, energy was not the only area where the industrialized states 
fortunes were improving; rather, the same was also taking place in regard to the 
West's relations with the non-oil developing states. At the Seventh Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly in early September 1975, the first meeting 
of all factions since the failed April preparatory meeting, the tone of the 
gathering was conciliatory and productive. 171 Over the previous months two 
important developments had taken place which helped bring about this easing 
of tensions. First like the oil producers, certain LDC states were moderate and 
others more radical. Through 1974 and early 1975 much of the dialogue 
between the LDCs and the industrialized states was led by the more hardline 
countries, particularly those seeking a new international economic order. By 
autumn 1975, however, the moderate faction of the non-oil developing states 
led by India had become the stronger voice in the group, thus, creating an 
environment in which talks between the two factions could proceed more 
smoothly. 172 
Also aiding the moderate LDCs' position greatly and helping to improve 
relations in general was the changed attitude of the West. 173 Shortly after the 
collapse of the first preparatory conference, Western attitudes about the 
complaints and demands made by the non-oil developing countries over the 
previous year shifted greatly. 174 In the OECD declaration of 28 May 1975, the 
industrialized states announced their determination to continue work on the 
issues of the LDCs in all appropriate forums "urn echte Fortschritte auf dem 
Wege zu einer ausgewogeneren und gerechteren Struktur der intemationalen 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu erreichen.,,17S In addition the push West Germany 
had made within the EC for a common policy on raw materials and relations 
with the developing states had begun to payoff. By the end of summer 1975, 
the Europeans had agreed a joint statement for the Seventh Special Session 
171 Branislav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, "On the Creation of a New International 
Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly," 
International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 1976): 310; GRF, Arthur Bums Papers, 
Box B62, International Economic Summit Rambouillet. November 1975 - General I. Economic 
Summit: Relations with Developing Countries (hereafter Box B62, Developing). 
172 Ibid. 
173 AAPD 1975/2, 1257. 
174See previous chapter for details on demands. 
17S AAPD 1975/2, 969. 
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which included responses to the difficulties faced by the LDCs. 176 Also at the 
UN meeting, individual European countries including the Federal Republic as 
well as the United States, Japan and other industrialized states also delivered 
addresses presenting further schemes for action on the most pressing concerns 
of the non-oil developing states, including their enonnous balance of payments 
deficits and the deterioration of their export earnings. 177 While no definitive 
agreements were achieved on the various proposals presented there, the clear 
evidence of concern and interest by the industrialized states in tackling the 
problems of the non-oil developing countries helped to create a "constructive 
environment for north-south relations.,,178 In addition, the easing of tensions 
between the two factions did seem to dampen the calls for a new international 
economic order, though it did not prevent some countries from cartelizing 
certain commodities in the latter half of 1975. 179 Still, the level of cartelization 
would no doubt have been much greater, had relations deteriorated further. 
The goodwill fostered at the Seventh Special Session carried over to the 
preparatory meeting on 13 October 1975 in Paris. Having already discussed 
their perspectives on the main conference during the bilateral meetings, the 
industrialized, oil producing and non-oil developing states had little difficulty 
agreeing on the details. Rather than attempting to resolve their issues in one 
gathering, all participants detennined that the consumer-producer dialogue, 
renamed the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), would 
have an ongoing nature, similar to the CSCE. The first meeting was scheduled 
for 16-18 December 1975 in Paris and talks were to be held at the level of 
minister with the total number of participants expanded to 27 countries. 180 Two 
co-presidents were appointed from Venezuela and Canada, but it was left to 
those states already present from the three divisions to select the additional 
participants. In addition, it was agreed that the first gathering would be used to 
establish individual commissions for the four subject matters agreed - energy, 
176 Ibid., 1259. 
177 Ibid., 1177, 1259; PREM 16/612, UN. 
178 Box B62, Developing. 
179 TNA, PREM 16/838, Note of the Third Session of the Heads of Government Conference at 
the Chateau de Rambouillet; GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 16, November 15-17.1975. Rambouillel 
Economic Summil- Third Session. 
180 Box B62, Developing. 
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raw materials, development issues and financial issues -including the 
appointment of two chainnen for each commission, one from the industrialized 
states and one from either the oil producers or non-oil developing states. 
Ministers would also use the initial CIEC meeting to create general guidelines 
for each commission. These guidelines would include such specifics as the time 
limit, linkages between the individual commissions and the degree to which 
their work should be parallel. 181 
With the first ministerial meeting of the CIEC planned, a drastic 
increase in oil prices averted and relations with the non-oil producers 
improving, by autumn 1975 the West seemed to have managed to avoid 
economic disaster, at least in the short run. Yet, Bonn felt this was only a 
temporary reprieve, as oil and commodity prices remained unstable and with it 
the long-tenn functioning and stability of global economy uncertain. 182 The 
Schmidt government believed that in order to achieve economic stability across 
the board, growing economic interdependence between the West and the 
developing states made it "an absolute necessity" for the industrialized states to 
work with the oil producers and non-oil developing states in the consumer-
producer dialogue. 183 The Federal Republic, however, also realized that the 
dialogue could be hazardous not only to its economic aims but also to Western 
political strength, should the industrialized states entcr into the conference 
unprepared or divided on the issues. Thus, in the months before the start of the 
conference, Bonn maintained, it was essential to attain consumer solidarity on 
all matters of discussion among the West and especially within the EC. 184 
Achieving these goals, however, would be a significant challenge. 
Despite months of debate in multilateral forums like the IEA, Ee and OECD as 
well as in bilateral talks and through written position papers, little progress had 
been made; instead, as the Rambouillet Summit drew near, the industrialized 
states grew increasingly divided. Towards the oil producers, America remained 
181 PREM 16/612, Fact-finding. 
182 BAK, B136/16800, Principles Adopted by the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany for the Dialogue with the Oil-producing and other Developing Countries. 
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reluctant to abandon its more confrontational approach, whereas Europe, much 
more dependent on OPEC oil, continued to desire a more conciliatory and 
cooperative stance. Although the industrialized states agreed that the oil market 
was unstable and another oil price increase would be catastrophic, they were 
divided on how to prevent this. While the Federal Republic and France believed 
the answer lay in negotiations with the oil producers through the CIEC, the 
United States maintained only through reducing energy consumption could the 
West hope to influence the price of oil. For the Ford administration, the oil-
producer dialogue was as much about maintaining the necessary consumer 
solidarity needed to support America's leadership and energy strategy, as it was 
about interacting with the oil producers. 18S A similar degree of discord existed 
on matters of raw materials and relations with the LDCs. Although several 
proposals to improve the balance of payments position, export earnings and 
overall plight of the non-oil developing states at the Seventh Special Session 
had been made by various Western states, there was no agreement on a 
preferred path. 
Unfortunately by autumn 1975, the West even lost the appearance of 
consumer solidarity when the British began to demand individual representation 
at the upcoming CIEC. 186 Given the importance Bonn attached to Western 
unity throughout the dialogue, the Federal Republic was particularly disturbed 
by London's position. On 10 October 1975, Schmidt wrote to Wilson 
expressing his concerns on this matter. The West German leader pointed out 
first that Britain's intentions could potentially upset the fine balance that the 
industrialized countries had agreed with the oil producing and non-oil 
developing countries over matters of representation, having a negative impact 
on the main conference overall. Second, Schmidt argued that British plans 
could also disrupt "the material foundations of our [European] Community 
Will.,,187 After several days the British Prime Minister replied to the West 
German chancellor's letter. He refused to alter Britain's position on the grounds 
18S GRF, Arthur Burns Papers, Box B62, International Economic Summit. Rambouillet. Nov. 
1975. Briefing Book 2, Energy. 
186 BAK, B136/11572, "KonJerenz iiber die internationale wirtschafiliche Zusammenarbeit" 
(einschliej3lich des britischen Problems). 
187 TNA, PREM 16/1062, Brief an Premierminister. den 10. Oktober 1975. 
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that a common Community policy was still far from being agreed upon and that 
was due not solely to the United Kingdom, but rather also, and more so, to 
France. In addition, Wilson maintained that as a country rich in natural 
resources there was a case for separate British participation. 188 
Given that Paris refused to join the lEA, demanded that EC members 
not agree to anything in the IEA that was not in accordance with EC energy 
policy and was blocking certain initiatives key in the long-term program being 
considered in the lEA, such as the minimum safeguard price (MSP) and 
alternative energy development, in EC energy policy negotiations, it did seem 
as though Wilson had a point about the French. Yet, Schmidt did not agree. 
Instead, he had been arguing for months that the divide between Britain and the 
Eight was greater than that between France and its EC partners. The West 
German chancellor was not swayed by the Prime Minister's letter nor did he 
agree with Wilson's reasoning for the lack of Community policy nor would the 
West German chancellor give up on a united European presence at the ClEC. 189 
On 24 October 1975, Schmidt called on the British ambassador to once 
again present his concerns. This time he showed his heightened disapproval by 
speaking in German rather than English to make his points. 190 Schmidt began 
by stressing that he had been the most fervent supporter of British membership 
in the EC; however, if the Community was to go on and be a viable entity, then 
full British participation and indeed leadership along with France and the 
Federal Republic was required. He continued, maintaining that although Europe 
had just completed the CSCE, the appearance of the divide in the European 
Community on these matters would come across as a sign of weakness to the 
Soviets and thus have a devastating effect on Europe's position in the coming 
years. Lastly, Schmidt argued, it would be greatly disadvantageous to the 
industrialized countries during the conference and the West's overall 
188 INA, PREM 16/1062, Letter from Wilson to Schmidt, 21 October 1975. 
189 BAK, B136/17104, Betr.: EG-institutionelle Ergebnisse meiner Vier-Augen-Gespriiche mit 
Premierminister Wilson und Staatspriisident Giscard d'Estaing am 24. Juli bzw. 16. Juli 1975; 
AAPD /975/2, 1020,1037. 
190 This was unusual for Schmidt, as he spoke excellent English and would regularly converse 
with foreign dignitaries in it. The change in language was definitely noticed by the British 
representative, making it less like a conversation of equals and more of a lecture. 
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relationships with the oil producing and non-oil developing states, on which he 
noted, "the future of our industries in Europe and therefore the future wellbeing 
and prosperity of our people depend." The West Gennan leader pointed out, "if 
he were an Iraqi or Algerian he would be laughing all the way home about the 
lack of unity in the Community in these matters." 191 While the British 
representative thanked Schmidt for his "magisterial survey of the world scene," 
he gave no impression that the United Kingdom would change its mind on this 
matter and indeed, before the Rambouillet Summit, London did not. 192 
As the Rambouillet Summit drew near, the Western powers seemed 
more divided than ever on matters of energy, raw materials and relations with 
the developing world. Given the role Bonn believed the Rambouillet Summit 
played in overcoming the economic crisis and the long-tenn stabilization and 
functioning of the markets and international economy, the Schmidt government 
was greatly worried. As it turned out, so too were West Gennany's allies, for it 
was on these issues, not monetary or even the economic outlook, which debate 
among the heads of state at the Rambouillet Summit would be the longest and 
heaviest. 
Yet, despite their lack of agreement going into the G-5 meeting, for 
Bonn the prospects for the success of the Rambouillet Summit were quite good. 
Within five months nearly all of the points Schmidt had called for in his 
memorandum on international economic concertation had been attained. West 
Gennany hoped that those items that remained - complete coordination of 
economic and monetary policies between the United States and Europe and 
cooperation on long-tenn energy matters - could be settled at Rambouillet. 
Moreover, through the efforts of the Western leaders, it seemed that the West 
was beginning to emerge from the economic crisis. Investor and consumer 
confidence was returning and the American economy had entered into a 
recovery while growth rates were stabilizing in most European states. The key 
to full recovery, however, remained the three economic conferences in 
Rambouillet, Paris and Jamaica. 
191 TNA, PREM 16/1062, FeO Telno 8460/24 October. 
192 Ibid. 
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-Conclusions-
By July 1975, the West faced a recession unlike any previously 
experienced. There was no economic theory to guide their macroeconomic 
policies, as Keynesian policies did not apply to stagflation. In addition, 
individual national responses to the economic problems were of little value, for 
the international economy had developed in such a manner over the previous 
decade that a state of interdependence had developed not only between the 
economies of the West, but also between those of the industrialized states on 
the one hand and the oil producing and non-oil LDCs on the other. Moreover, a 
lack of investor and consumer confidence contributed greatly to the economic 
downturn due to the failure to conclude monetary reform negotiations as well as 
to stabilize oil and raw material prices. Thus, national governments could not 
simply hope to adjust their economic and monetary policies to overcome the 
crisis; rather, they also needed to address the problems in the monetary, oil and 
raw materials sectors. 
As West Germany reacted to this crisis, the Federal Republic's policies 
were driven by a desire to maintain its economic strength as well as by a 
concern for political stability. Both factors were central in Bonn's support for 
the Rambouillet Summit. In particular, the Schmidt government pointed out the 
risks to economic and political stability in order to convince Britain and the 
United States of the necessity of the G-5 summit. West Germany sought 
alignment of European economic and monetary policies in order to bolster its 
own efforts to revive the West German economy and pushed for an American 
federal response to the New York fiscal crisis, which posed a serious threat to 
the Federal Republic's ability to finance its own government debt. Because the 
lack of consensus on international monetary reform was undermining consumer 
and investor confidence, Bonn was particularly keen to bring talks to a close, 
even if it meant the Schmidt government having to remove itself from the 
conversation. Finally, on matters of oil, the Federal Republic was also primarily 
concerned with its dependency on OPEC oil and raw material imports. Yet, as 
in previous chapters, Bonn realized that it could neither secure its economic 
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strength nor political stability without Western solidarity on all aspects of the 
crisis; thus Western cooperation was likewise central to West German policies. 
In order to achieve their economic and political aims and bring about the 
coordinated Western response desired, the Federal Republic again relied on 
strong leadership from Schmidt, an ability to mediate between its Western allies 
and build compromise and finally its economic strength, albeit indirectly. 
Through this five month period, Schmidt became central to the crafting of the 
West's response. Utilizing their good working relationship, Schmidt shaped 
with Giscard the idea for a summit. The West German chancellor then again 
relied on his positive relations as well as his economic understanding to win 
Wilson and Ford over to the summit notion, while in the process shifting the 
focus of it away from monetary issues and towards the economic crisis. As Ford 
pointed out, Schmidt was instrumental in refashioning Giscard's initiative into a 
conference he could support. In addition, Schmidt's willingness to allow both 
Paris and Washington to be perceived as the leaders of the initiative, despite the 
central role the chancellor was playing in the creation of it, was also crucial to 
the establishment of the G-5 gathering. Had Schmidt desired greater 
international recognition for his efforts, he would have risked either Giscard or 
Ford losing face domestically and thus the domestic support needed in order for 
these two countries to take part in the Rambouillet Summit. 
Aside from the Rambouillet Summit, Schmidt also contributed greatly 
on the individual aspects of the crisis. Relying on his economic knowledge and 
good relations with the Giscard, Schmidt led the drive to align economic and 
monetary policies within the EC. In addition, the chancellor succeeded in 
shifting American perspectives on the New York fiscal crisis. Although 
Schmidt did not persuade Washington to relax its policies further and align 
them more closely with Europe as was his aim, it was clear from the 
discussions and the questions posed to the chancellor by not only the Ford 
administration but also by members of Congress and the American business 
community that Schmidt's perspectives were highly respected and could still 
have an effect on American policies in the near future. Finally, Schmidt drafted 
a clear strategy to overcoming the economic crisis through international 
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cooperation. While his memorandum was never officially adopted, it did 
provide the West with a common approach for the crisis which it had been 
lacking previously and as events showed, it seems to have at least provided 
some basis for concerted action on the various aspects of the economic crisis. 
Yet Schmidt alone was not responsible for the Federal Republic's 
significant influence during this period; rather, as in previous chapters, Bonn's 
willingness to adopt a mediating role and drive compromise was also crucial. 
The initial reactions of Washington, London and Tokyo to Giscard's call for a 
G-5 summit ranged from hostility to simple disagreement. But in the months 
after the announcement, Schmidt began mediating between France and the 
other G-5 member states. On monetary matters too, a West German suggestion 
for the compromise solution of bilateral talks, allowed France and the United 
States the time and space necessary to overcome their differences on gold and 
the exchange rate mechanism. A similar outcome would have been unlikely had 
talks continued in the G-5 or G-l 0, if for no other reason than each negotiation 
would have had to occur between more members requiring more time. 
Lastly, although Bonn did not use its economic strength directly, 
providing funding to various support facilities or other countries to win their 
backing for certain policies as had been the case in earlier chapters, the power 
of the West German economy still influenced the West's response. Had West 
Germany not been the largest economy within the European Community upon 
which several member states were dependent through trade, the European 
Currency Snake or both, it is doubtful that Schmidt's pleas for larger stimulus 
packages and alignment of economic and monetary policies would have been as 
well received. Moreover, Schmidt would have been far less credible and 
effective in general without the implicit support of West German economic 
strength. 
Because of its actions during this period, the Federal Republic was able 
to further alter its position in the Western alliance. Already with the oil crisis 
and through the first half of 1975, economics was beginning to move into the 
realm of high politics. Yet the line between economics and politics became 
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even more blurred through the latter half of 1975. While part of this was due to 
the outbreak of the economic crisis, part of it was also a result of a conscious 
push by the Federal Republic and above all its leader to make economics more 
political. In his bilateral meetings, Schmidt made economic issues the main 
focus of his conversations. Furthermore, the chancellor openly admitted that an 
aim of the Rambouillet Summit was to take these issues out of the hands of 
economic technicians and provide the political push necessary to reach a 
consensus on the matters at hand, in particular monetary reform efforts. Given 
West Germany's central position in the international economy as one of the 
largest trading nations, some of Bonn's economic power was bound to translate 
into greater political standing. 
Yet economic strength would only go so far without a strong political 
advocate and a beneficial institutional setting. Throughout this period, Schmidt 
proved that he had not only the willingness to lead, but also the capability to do 
so, starting initiatives, working with his allies to find compromises, applying 
political pressure when necessary and remaining in the background when 
prudent. These skills were not only crucial to the shaping of the West's 
response to this economic crisis, but would be essential if Bonn was to continue 
to maintain a greater political role after the economic crisis had been overcome. 
Finally, with the establishment of the Rambouillet Summit, the West had a 
forum in which the heads of state and government could discuss economic 
matters. Given the size and make-up of its membership as well as the heavy 
reliance on personal relationships for its functioning, the Federal Republic now 
had a setting highly conducive to advancing its political role in the Western 
alliance. It remained to be seen if at the forthcoming Rambouillet Summit as 
well as the monetary meeting in Jamaica and the energy conference in Paris, 
West Germany would be able to solidify its new place. 
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Chapter 6 
Summitry, Overcoming and Re-shaping 
November 1975-January 1976 
Despite the optimistic noises being made in some quarters, 
I am not convinced that we have yet seen the worst of the recession. 
This is not so much a matter of economic analysis 
as it is because the recession itself has been due partly to political errors. 
-Introduction-
Politicians are capable of making further mistakes. I 
Helmut Schmidt, 
November 15, 1975 
By November 1975, signs had begun to emerge that the economic crisis 
which had taken hold of the West throughout the year and threatened political 
order was beginning to ease, as macroeconomic conditions in many Western 
states ceased their downward spiral. Yet, a full recovery was far from assured. 
Investor and consumer confidence throughout the industrialized countries 
remained weak and the slight upturn could easily be suffocated if efforts to 
reform the monetary system and stabilize oil and raw materials prices faltered. 
Western leaders realized that a sustained recovery rested firmly on the outcome 
of the three upcoming economic gatherings: the Rambouillct Summit, the first 
ministerial meeting of the Conference for International Economic Cooperation 
(CIEC) and the meeting of the Interim Committee of the International Monetary 
Fund (lMF) in Jamaica. 
Positive results first came from the Rambouillet Summit. There, the 
heads of state and government of the Group of Five (G-5) as well as Italy 
discussed the various aspects contributing to the economic downturn. While 
Western leaders failed to bridge their differences on economic and monetary 
policy coordination as well as intervention in the exchange markets, they did 
reach a consensus for cooperation on trade and international monetary reform 
as well as oil, raw materials and relations with the developing states. Also 
contributing to the success of the gathering was the clever crafting of the 
meeting's communique which helped to rebuild investor and consumer 
1 Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library (hereafter GRF), NSA Memcon, Box 16, November 15-
17,1975- Rambouillet Economic Summit, First Session (hereafter Box 16, First Session). 
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confidence. Shortly after the Rambouillet Summit, the West achieved another 
encouraging outcome at the CIEC. Relying on agreements made at the 
Rambouillet Summit as well as those concluded through their ongoing work in 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Community (EC), the 
industrialized states stood united throughout this meeting, eventually managing 
to agree steps for the further development of the conference series with the oil 
producers and non-oil LDCs. This result contributed to the stability of oil prices 
over. the forthcoming months. Lastly, at the Jamaica Interim Committee 
meeting, the West was able to push through an amendment of the IMF Articles 
of Agreement (the Articles) based heavily on a system worked out by the 
industrialized states over the previous months. With it, monetary reform efforts 
begun in 1972 through the Committee of Twenty (C-20) finally concluded and 
Western investors could begin to adjust to a new system of monetary relations. 
By spring 1976, due in large part to the efforts of its leaders, the West 
had managed to overcome the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression 
and avoid political disarray. In nearly all the economies of the West, growth 
increased, inflation receded or at least remained steady. Only unemployment 
was slow to recover to pre-crisis levels. Although exchange rates continued to 
fluctuate in the floating system, global trade picked up considerably. Even more 
important for long-run economic and political stability was the creation of new 
economic institutions and the reform of existing ones. This reshaping of the 
international economic system allowed continued economic dominance of the 
Western industrialized states, in particular the United States, despite the 
changed energy paradigm and the growing importance of the developing states 
in global trade. But it also resulted in many changes. Economically, the markets 
had a greater impact on the global economy in this transformed economic 
system. Politically, despite America remaining the hegemonic power, political 
relations within the Western alliance were permanently altered through the 
process of transformation as well as the establishment of new institutions, in 
particular the G-S. This in tum significantly enhanced the role of the Federal 
RepUblic. 
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As the economic crises drew to a close, did the Federal Republic's 
concern for its economic strength and the political order continue to drive its 
policies? The preceding chapters have shown Bonn's influence on the West's 
response to the various economic difficulties increased as the complexity of the 
problems escalated. Indeed, the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had 
been vital to the establishment of the Rambouillet Summit and his government 
had pushed hard to ensure that both the CIEC and the Jamaica meetings took 
place. As the G-5 summit unfolded, did the West German chancellor maintain 
his central role? What impact did the Federal Republic have overall on the 
outcome of the three economic conferences? Finally, since the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods monetary system in 1973, the position of West Germany within 
the Western alliance had slowly been enhanced due to its actions in response to 
the economic problems plaguing the West. As the West emerged from the 
crises and the transformation of the international economic system became 
complete, to what degree had Bonn succeeded in advancing its political position 
permanently and how? 
-The Rambouillet Summit-
When the Rambouillet Summit convened on 15 November 1975, much 
had changed since Schmidt and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing first 
discussed the necessity for a G-5 heads of state and government gathering. The 
slight upturn seen in the United States economy in summer 1975 had become a 
full-blown recovery by late autumn. Japan too had two quarters of growth 
behind it. In Europe, after the introduction of substantial, coordinated stimulus 
programs, encouraging signs had begun to appear in West Germany and France, 
though similar indications had not yet followed in the United Kingdom or Italy. 
Among the industrialized states only Great Britain still struggled with high 
inflation, while in the other industrialized states price stability had generally 
returned.2 Of all the macroeconomic indicators, only unemployment remained a 
major concern, as it was still rising. 3 In addition, on international monetary 
reform, the French and Americans had finally reached an accord on the 
exchange rate regime and the other major aspects of the package of reforms to 
2 DEeD, Economic Outlook, 18 (1975: Dec), 5-12, 46,13-15,56,79,87-9. 
3 Ibid, 37-9. 
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the IMF Articles of Agreement had been settled at the August 1975 meeting of 
the Interim Committee. Moreover, the West had managed to avoid a drastic 
increase in oil prices, pacify the LDCs in their quest for cartelization and a new 
international economic order and revive the consumer-producer dialogue. Yet 
while pleased with the encouraging economic indicators and the common 
ground the industrialized states had managed to establish over the previous 
months, West Germany was neither convinced that a full recovery was assured 
nor entirely satisfied with the level of Western cooperation. Rather, as would 
quickly become evident, the Federal Republic believed that much of the West's 
economic and political fortunes still hinged on the Rambouillet Summit. 
Given that Schmidt's grave concern about the world economy had led 
him to both promote the G-5 meeting and indeed transform it from a gathering 
on monetary matters to one on the wider economic crises, it was fitting that 
Schmidt opened the Rambouillet Summit, leading the discussion of the first 
session on the general economic outlook. Although there had been a slight 
upturn in the economies of the West recently, and some leaders were more 
optimistic, Schmidt was unconvinced that the capitalist world had seen the 
worst of the recession yet, as "the recession itself had been due partly to 
political errors and neglect: and politicians were capable of making further 
mistakes.,,4 He pointed out the threats to recovery still loomed because of high 
unemployment, unstable oil prices, raw material cartels, monetary disorder and 
protectionism. Of all these, Schmidt acknowledged that high unemployment 
was the most worrying as it could lead to social unrest and ultimately political 
disorder. S Yet, he also highlighted the dangers posed by the other aspects. On 
oil, Schmidt noted, if the price of oil increased another 10 percent, any upswing 
would be easily undermined. 6 Bonn's leader warned that a similar fate could be 
expected if raw materials cartels developed, an accord at the IMF Interim 
4 British National Archives (hereafter TNA), PREM 16/838, Note of the First Session of the 
Conference of Heads of Government of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States at the Chateau de Rambouillet on Saturday, 15 November 1975 (hereafter 
PREM 16/838, First Session); Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BAK), BI26/48887, 
Aufteichnung der Gespriiche der Staats- und Regierungschefs in Rambouillet, 15. bis 17. 
November 1975 (hereafter B 126/48887, Aufteichnung). 
s Box 16, First Session. 
6 Ibid.; BI26/48887, Aufteichnung. 
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Committee meeting in Jamaica was not reached and if trade restrictions and 
protectionism among Western states did not cease.1 As he had done since May 
1975, Schmidt called for the alignment of economic and monetary policies 
among the Western states in order to emerge from the recession. He also 
advocated further policies to stimulate private investment and consumption, 
more expansionary measures - even if that meant the creation of a deficit - and 
low interest rates. 8 In addition, Schmidt maintained that the leaders assembled 
must "send a message of confidence from Rambouillet" as this would be crucial 
to rebuilding investor and consumer confidence. 9 
West Germany's view of economic developments and the remedies it 
proposed received strong support from nearly all other G-5 member states. 
Although Japan had experienced strong growth over the previous quarters, 
Takeo Miki, the Japanese Prime Minister, believed that recovery was not 
assured until the other leading industrialized states also had strong growth. 10 
Aldo Moro, the Italian prime minister, pointed out several weaknesses in the 
Italian economy which he felt could only be overcome with help and 
encouragement from "the stronger economies in the recession - the US, Japan 
and West Germany."]) The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, confirmed 
that he "agreed with the diagnosis of Chancellor Schmidt. . . . he was not 
convinced that a rapid recovery was taking place and he was worried lest the 
recovery be choked off.,,12 Wilson though argued not only for greater alignment 
and less restrictive American policies, but also maintained that economically 
stronger European states running large budget deficits as a result of their 
expansionary policies, in particular West Germany, should be careful not to try 
to reduce their deficits before the growth had an opportunity to take hold not 
just nationally, but also internationally.13 Giscard too doubted whether a 
sustained economic recovery was underway throughout the West, noting that 
both importing and exporting countries were suffering and, as Wilson 
7 BI26/48887, Aufteichnung. 
8 Ibid.; PREM 16/838, First Session. 
9 PREM 16/838, First Session; Box 16, First Session. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Box 16, First Session. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
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highlighted, as soon as European states attempted to reduce their massive 
deficits, it would put "the brakes on growth.,,14 Thus, it seemed to Giscard that 
growth of a non-inflationary kind was highly unlikely and without strong 
growth, unemployment was likely to remain high. While Giscard believed that 
there was hope for an economic recovery in Europe and the wider West if the 
strong upturn in the United States continued, he was also convinced that if 
America's recovery slowed or stopped, another downturn would surely follow. 
Thus, like Schmidt, the French president pushed for further expansion in the 
American economy. IS 
Unsurprisingly gIven its stance throughout 1975 and the seemingly 
strong recovery occurring in the United States, Washington did not agree with 
Bonn's or the other participants' views of the world economy. Instead, 
American President Gerald Ford gave a starkly contrasting view of economic 
and political developments over the previous months. While he agreed with 
Schmidt that the Western partners had to work together, particularly to ensure 
political stability, Ford quickly pointed out that the American people and 
economy had "reacted very well to the recession." 16 He reported that there had 
been no serious political problems as a result of a rise in radicalism and gave a 
very positive view of the development of the American economy, noting that 
the health of the U.S. economy was significantly better than when they had 
spoken at the Quadripartite meeting in Helsinki in July 1975. Indeed Ford 
expected that the strong recovery taking place in the United States would 
continue and eventually pull up the European economies as well. 17 
With this optimistic perspective on the world economy, Washington's 
views on how to ensure the upswing continued to differ from those of its 
Summit counterparts. Like the Federal Republic, America argued that the 
revival of consumer and investor confidence was essential to a sustained 
recovery. IS Yet, the United States did not agree with West Germany's position 
14 Ibid. 
IS Ibid. 
16 PREM 16/838, First Session. 
17 Ibid.; Box 16, First Session. 
18 Ibid. 
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that further expansionary measures or low interest rates would provide 
economic stimulus to the global economy; rather, as Ford stated "the policies 
now in place are appropriate in our jUdgement" to generate maximum growth in 
the short term without sparking inflation over the long term and to 
accommodate strong business expansion as well as allow for a sustained 
recovery.19 Indeed, it seemed to Washington that changing its chosen course of 
action now would only disrupt efforts at rebuilding confidence. Ford argued, 
"the stability of current policy will do a great deal to enhance confidence. In 
light of our prospects, and the policy actions we have already taken, we are able 
to publicly reaffirm our confidence that although the response to stimulative 
policy measures is slower than most in the post-war period, recovery from the 
present recession is well underway.,,2o Both points applied, Ford felt, to all 
summit participants, not just the United States. Washington maintained that 
while the industrialized states waited for the policies to take hold and their 
respective economies to fully rebound, Western leaders had to avoid creating an 
image of the current world economic conditions as a crisis in democracy or the 
capitalist system. 21 In America's view, this meant the West continuing on the 
course laid out in the short run, but achieving sustained economic growth 
without inflation over the long run.22 As Ford stated, Western leaders had to 
have "consistency in national economic policies and [resist] the pressures for 
stop-go measures that inevitably have resulted in greater economic instability 
and uncertainty.,,23 
As the first session came to a close, Western leaders failed to resolve 
their contrasting perspectives on the state of the recession and how to achieve a 
sustained recovery; instead, the heads of state simply agreed that rather than 
produce a more detailed communique, they would issue "a declaration" stating 
"broad intentions and lines of action.,,24 In the Rambouillet Declaration, the 
Western leaders set both reducing unemployment and creating growth without 
inflation - the primary concerns of the Europeans and Americans respectively-
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
237 
as main objectives.25 In this way, as Western leaders emphasized in the 
document, consumer and investor confidence would be restored.26 Although 
there was neither consensus on the soundness of the upswing nor on the 
accuracy of the policies being pursued, above all in the United States, the 
Rambouillet Declaration did not reflect this; instead, it claimed that "recovery is 
underway" and the policies in place were accurate and effective.27 The only 
reference to the West German desire for more expansionary measures and 
greater policy alignment in the document was the statement that the West would 
remain "vigilant and adaptable" in its policies so as not to let the recovery 
falter. 28 Clear strategies for how any of the stated objectives were to be attained 
appeared nowhere. 
Overall, the Rambouillet Declaration carefully masked the stark 
differences in opinion that existed and gave the impression of unity. While 
Bonn would have preferred to have reached agreements on all its goals, most 
important to the Federal Republic was the appearance of consensus. For as 
Schmidt had explained to Ford in their July 1975 talks, the impression of 
Western leaders working together on the economic problems and taking 
responsibility for the world economy and hence the democratic order, even if in 
reality their respective approaches to the issues were not aligned, would suffice 
to revive confidence. 29 
As talks moved to monetary issues and trade during the second session, 
Western leaders had greater success aligning their positions, but still relied 
heavily on clever wording in the communique for the purposes of confidence 
building. On monetary matters, the Federal Republic had two primary goals: to 
reach a consensus on the package of amendments which was to be discussed at 
the upcoming IMF Interim Committee meeting in Jamaica and to devise a 
25 BAK, B126/48887, EBDI751256 - Declaration of Rambouillet (hereafter B126/48887, 
Declaration). 
26 Ibid. 
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29 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 14, July 27-28. 1975-Ford. Kissinger. FRG Chancellor Helmut 
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common approach to reduce the disorder in the exchange markets.3o Prospects 
for achieving Bonn's two main objectives on monetary issues were greatly 
improved given the agreement on the exchange rate regime and gold reached 
between France and America shortly before Rambouillet's start. In fact, the first 
aim was easily agreed, as each G-5 leader voiced a desire to pass the package of 
amendments at the Jamaica meeting and to take the steps necessary in the 
coming weeks in order to ensure that such would occur.3) West Germany's 
second goal in the monetary field, however, ran up against resistance, again 
from the United States. 
Since the introduction of floating exchange rates, Bonn and Paris both 
maintained that the wide fluctuations that 'occurred between the dollar and other 
Western currencies, in particular the D-mark, had contributed greatly to the 
uncertainty "that plagued the Western economies.,,32 Giscard argued that the 
swings, especially between the dollar and the Snake countries had been more 
effective in diminishing the competiveness of certain sectors than tariffs. 33 
Schmidt agreed with this assessment, Schmidt agreed. As he had done in his 
July 1975 meeting with Ford, Schmidt again pointed out that while large 
multinational corporations and the G-5 economies could adjust to the drastic 
exchange rate shifts, small businesses as well as smaller nation states could 
not. 34 Annoyed, the West German chancellor stated, "we need to stress greater 
continuity and calculability. What we have now is not a system, it is a 
constellation. ,,35 While it was hoped that the conclusion of the monetary reform 
efforts in Jamaica would help calm the market swings, there was no assurance 
that such would occur. To find a way to dampen the exchange rate fluctuations 
and stabilize the monetary system, Schmidt and Giscard offered similar 
approaches. Both pushed for greater cooperation between the central banks and 
30 B 126/48887, Aufteichnung; PREM 16/838, First Session .. 
31 GRF, NSA Memcon, Box 16, November 15-17, 1975- Rambouillet Economic Summit, 
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intervention in the markets in order to keep exchange rates stable.36 In essence, 
the two leaders advocated a managed float. Schmidt noted that he understood 
that the United States was not keen to intervene and indeed it would not make 
that great of a difference as they would have to do so through swaps. Yet, it 
seemed to Schmidt that if Washington at least gave the impression that they 
were "interested in dampening volatility," the stated intention would be as 
effective as carrying it out. 37 
Italy and Great Britain echoed many of the sentiments expressed by 
Schmidt and Giscard.38 Given the United States' earlier reluctance to accept the 
Federal Republic's views on this issue, however, it seemed unlikely that 
Washington would change its position now, particularly after already having 
succeeded vis-a-vis the French on the exchange rate regime issue. Indeed, 
America did not. Although Ford hoped more stability could be achieved in the 
monetary system, the American president saw such stability resulting from 
"successful management of domestic economies" and to that end, it was 
necessary to allow individual nations to chose the exchange rate system and 
times of intervention which allowed them to achieve growth, employment and 
low inflation. 39 Ford admitted that there were a number of exchange rate 
systems which could allow for this, but he also noted, "we should be aware that 
no regime that runs counter to the market realities could remain in effect for 
very long. ,,40 
Despite much discussion, Bonn and its European allies could not 
persuade the United States to agree to a managed float. Yet, as had been the 
case with the talks on the general economic outlook, the Rambouillet 
Declaration reflected none of the discord over how to correct monetary 
disorder. Instead, only a commitment was made to "counter disorderly market 
conditions, or erratic fluctuations, in exchange ratcs.,,41 More striking, however, 
was another omission. During the talks, each leader had expressed a strong 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 PREM 16/838, Second Session. 
39 Box 16, Second Session. 
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desire to bring refonn efforts through the IMF Interim Committee to a close in 
Jamaica, but in the Rambouillet Declaration this agreement was markedly less 
pronounced. Instead, the focus was placed on the rapprochement between the 
United States and France on the refonn of the international monetary system. 42 
It can only be assumed that Western leaders downplayed the consensus on 
Jamaica because they did not wish to raise expectations. Thus with the 
Rambouillet Declaration, Western leaders used many means to rebuild 
confidence, even masking agreement. 
On trade, all of the Federal Republic's practical aims were met, as on 
this issue, the heads of state achieved the greatest degree of consensus. In their 
own respective ways, each leader advocated further trade liberalization, a 
decrease in protectionism, the conclusion of the Tokyo Round of GATT by 
1977, renewal of the OECD trade pledge and the need for a Gentlemen's 
Agreement on export credits.43 Yet despite the general accord, there were 
subtle, but important differences in their resolve to implement these changes. 
As Schmidt noted, "it looks as if the Heads of Government were in agreement, 
but the tone of their detennination as expressed at the meeting has differed.,,44 
Although his statement was general, in the talks it was clear that Schmidt 
disagreed most with the British approach. Schmidt pushed for completely 
removing trade barriers, even advocating removing the protectionist measures 
in the agricultural markets in the United States and Europe.45 In contrast to 
Schmidt, Wilson took a more lenient approach, announcing he intended to 
support industries which would be "essential when recovery came," but leave 
the "non-viable" or the "lame ducks" on their own.46 Schmidt though was 
doubtful that Wilson was capable of making such a distinction.47 The positions 
of France and the United States fell between the British and West Gennan 
perspectives on this matter.48 This fine, but important distinction was hidden in 
42 Ibid. 
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the Rambouillet Declaration with the phrase "the maximum possible level of 
trade liberalization.,,49 Despite the omission, however, Bonn regarded the 
agreements reached on trade to be among the greatest accomplishments of the 
entire Rambouillet Summit. 50 Moreover, all the agreements were reported in 
the Rambouillet Declaration, as further trade liberalization would only 
encourage investor confidence. 51 
The success West Germany achieved on trade issues did not necessarily 
carry over to the issues discussed in the third session: energy, raw materials and 
relations with developing countries. Rather, on these matters, the longest and 
most controversial debate took place and while Bonn definitely had an impact 
on the agreements achieved, these did not necessarily correspond to its original 
aims. Talks focused first and most intensely on energy. For Bonn, these matters 
were particularly important, as "[energy] represented not only a test case of [the 
West's] ability to cooperate but also a major factor in the recession.,,52 It 
seemed to Schmidt that if the West could not "live up to decisions on energy, 
[it] would fail on others.,,53 Also, although the oil producers had only increased 
oil prices by ten percent in October 1975, the Federal Republic worried, if 
OPEC again increased oil prices by the same amount in a few months time, 
then any recovery the West might have realized would be ruined. 54 While West 
Germany's allies could agree with Bonn's second concern, reaching an 
agreement for a common strategy to prevent such an increase was more 
difficult. 
Ford led the discussion on energy matters and began by reiterating his 
view that the West could only shift the balance on the world oil market by 
49 B126/48887, Declaration. 
50 BAK, B126/48887, Fernschreiben: Betr.: Ergebnisse des Wirtschafts- und Wiihrungsgipfels 
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reducing its dependency on OPEC oil. 55 In order to do so, much as the 
Americans had pushed for since early 1975, Ford again called for domestic 
energy programs aimed at conservation and developing new domestic supplies 
as well as greater cooperation in the lEA. 56 The United States was unwilling to 
consider the oil producers' demands for the indexation of oil prices and looked 
instead to the introduction of a minimum safeguard price (MSP), or floor price, 
as part of a package of measures being passed in the lEA to help eventually 
lower prices. 57 The United States did not believe that the consumer-producer 
dialogue would "enable [the West] to negotiate an agreement on oil prices at a 
cost we are willing to pay.,,58 Rather it seemed to America, that the oil 
producers would never relinquish their unilateral control over prices or agree to 
reduce them. 59 That being said, Washington did see some utility in the CIEC. 
In the American energy strategy, the consumer-producer dialogue 
played a unique role. As revealed in Summit briefing books, the United States 
was interested in taking part in the ClEC for two main reasons: first, "to 
encourage on the part of the oil producers a greater awareness of their own 
stake in our economic well-being, thereby reinforcing the moderate OPEC 
countries on pricing decisions"; and second, "to keep the Europeans and 
Japanese locked on to our overall energy strategy. This requires that we assure 
them that their cooperation with us in the lEA will be reciprocated by our 
coordination with them vis-a-vis the producers, where they recognize that our 
political and economic weight gives us unique leverage. This link can be used 
to reinforce consumer cooperation.,,6o For Washington, consumer cooperation 
was critical: if Europe lost faith in America's plans, the entire approach taken 
thus far in the lEA would be rendered useless. Moreover, Washington feared 
that Europe would tum to bilateral negotiations with the oil producers on 
supplies and price, thereby robbing America of its "role as leader among the 
55 GRF. NSA Memcon, Box 16, November 15-17. 1975- Rambouillet Economic Summit. Third 
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consumers and the major bridge between the producers and consumers.,,61 The 
United States worried that this loss of leadership could have a carry-on effect to 
other areas as well. The Ford administration concluded, "the exercise of U.S. 
leadership on this central issue is essential if we are to retain our leadership 
position in the other areas of our economic, political and security relationships 
with Europe and Japan.,,62 Naturally though, the American President did not 
present Washington's position in quite those terms at the Rambouillet Summit. 
Instead, Ford mentioned the first motivation, but gave a different second one: 
namely, to create and put into action cooperative programs between the 
industrialized and oil producing states to help non-oil developing states with 
their economic and financial burdens caused by the increase of oil prices, in 
particular, their balance of payments deficits. 63 Ford added that the United 
States was "committed to a successful dialogue," but stressed that in order to 
achieve this there had to be consumer solidarity. 64 
Although Schmidt agreed with Ford that reducing dependency on OPEC 
oil was important and to this end conservation, development of domestic energy 
sources and cooperation in the lEA needed to be increased, he did not see the 
American plan as having any real effect for several years. 6S Bonn's leader gave 
a similar assessment of the American proposal for a floor price, calling it 
theoretically sound, but practically impossible. Schmidt stated, the MSP "was 
not a bargaining device versus OPEC, since when you mention it to them they 
just smile.,,66 Like Washington, Bonn was opposed to indexation, but 
exasperated by the lack of options, Schmidt maintained that the West would 
probably have to accept it because they had developed no alternative and, in 
any case, it was better than the oil producers unilaterally raising prices every six 
months. 67 Confessing he had no defined strategy, Schmidt nonetheless pushed 
his counterparts to consider two questions in the process of forming a common 
approach. The first and main one was how to convince the oil producers that 
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they could not unilaterally raIse pnces as they wished without damaging 
themselves in the process. 68 As highlighted in the previous chapter, Bonn's 
attempt to make OPEC realize its responsibilities through the mission of its 
special envoy in summer 1975 had failed. The second question was how to 
"break up the unholy alliance that had developed between the LDCs and 
OPEC.,,69 At present, Schmidt conceded, the answers to these questions, new 
proposals on how to deal with them and a vehicle for proposing them jointly 
were still lacking. He hoped though that in the process of forming a new 
strategy OPEC would not strengthen, the recession not intensify and the West 
not resort to infighting, as had occurred during the West's search for a common 
approach to energy issues in 1974 and early 1975. Schmidt was doubtful, 
however, that these three outcomes could be avoided. 70 
Schmidt's conclusions about the lack of strategy were repeatedly 
confirmed by several of those who spoke subsequently, as each voiced different 
views on how to stabilize oil prices and interact with the oil producers. 
Although Giscard agreed with Ford on matters of conservation and the 
development of alternative energy sources, he also advocated indexation, 
refused French participation in the IEA and maintained that the West was 
"lucky" to be working with the OPEC cartel because some of the members 
were moderate and had favourable relations with the United States, Saudi 
Arabia in particular.71 In his view, the industrialized states should do all they 
could "to demonstrate our goodwill" towards the oil producers.72 In addition, 
Giscard advocated greater regulation of the energy market, implying that some 
of the power of multinational companies in distributing oil supplies should be 
restrained or adopted by national governments. 73 Wilson concurred with the 
general consensus that conservation and development of alternative resources 
was necessary, but as far as how to deal with the oil producers and the 
instability of the energy market, he agreed with Schmidt, stating, "all of our 
discussions and all the multitude of international organizations failed to provide 
68 Ibid. 
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any common strategy at all. I don't mean only in the EC, but for oil consumers 
in general. I do not know what the strategy should be. I certainly don't want 
confrontation between consumers and producers.,,74 
After listening to his counterparts, Schmidt offered an important 
suggestion. Being careful to qualify his remarks as merely "speaking aloud" 
with "no plan in mind yet," he proposed that in the near future it would be 
sensible for the governments of the industrialized states to deal directly with 
those of the oil producers.75 He reasoned that the multinational corporations 
were no "serious partners in OPEC capitals.,,76 Rather, Schmidt noted, "In fact, 
they are despised," particularly in Iran where officials "wanted to deal between 
governments.,,77 He highlighted that already Saudi Arabia had close links with 
the United States as well as a very substantial amount of funds invested through 
the Euromarkets in the City of London. In addition, although Iran was overly 
ambitious in its plans, the Iranians nonetheless "understand us better than we 
may believe.,,78 Schmidt's suggestion went against the official West German 
line which maintained that oil should be left to the free market, but he seemed 
not to care. Instead Schmidt declared West Gennan policy "wrong" on this 
matter, arguing it would be preferable for industrialized governments to 
intervene rather than leave pricing decisions completely in the hands of the oil 
producing governments. 79 
Schmidt's suggestion and his argumentation throughout caught the 
attention of the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Silent 
throughout the entire summit until this point, Kissinger finally spoke up. He 
began by stating that he "was impressed by the observations and train of 
thought of Chancellor Schmidt" and while he agreed there was no complete 
strategy there were elements of one.80 Thus far, Kissinger pointed out that the 
West's strategy had been to transfonn the market conditions for oil through 
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conservation and development of alternative resources. The goal of the 
industrialized countries had been "to reach a point where OPEC loses its 
unilateral power to control oil prices.,,81 Kissinger conceded though that 
Schmidt's conclusions were probably correct: the West's strategy would not 
become effective before 1980 and in the meantime the dire circumstances 
which had been the fear and focus of many leaders might very well come to 
pass. 82 
Yet Kissinger maintained that all hope was not lost and went on to 
propose a plan of action for the coming five years. He began by pointing out 
that OPEC was not a monolith and only one country, Saudi Arabia, could afford 
to cut production. Kissinger explained his reasoning in the following terms: 
OPEC cuts production to achieve set prices. On the other hand, cuts in 
production are not unifonn. This is an opportunity for us. If the West has the 
strength to absorb the financial surpluses of OPEC, they must export oil in 
order to import goods. Iran can no longer significantly cut production to 
sustain oil prices. Iran is tempted to increase oil to keep up exports. . . . 
Algeria, Iran and Iraq cannot afford to cut production. Only one country can 
cut production - Saudi Arabia .... What this amounts to is that OPEC is 
playing with Persian Gulf chips. Iran provides the intellectual leadership, not 
the economic leadership. In addition, the countries sustaining oil prices are 
politically the most vulnerable; they cannot politically or psychologically 
sustain real confrontation with the West. We should not give them the 
assurances by avoiding confrontation .... [the West] should attempt to convey 
the idea that Saudi Arabia cannot underwrite the oil price increases for free 
without paying an economic and political price.83 
Knowing that the leaders of Europe and Japan were opposed to a more 
confrontational approach, Kissinger pointed out that when in 1974 some 
American officials threatened military action the result, after initial outbursts by 
OPEC and America's allies disassociating themselves from the United States, 
was worry on the part of oil producers. OPEC members had approached 
Washington wanting to know what they could do to avoid military 
confrontation. 84 The American secretary of state highlighted that the huge oil 
prices were being sustained by the moderate OPEC countries, i.e. "those who 
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are most psychologically dependent on the US.,,8S Kissinger argued that 
Washington could achieve a lot in this respect in they were not "immediately 
dissociated by our colleagues" and "disavowed by our friends.,,86 
Yet Washington believed cooperation with the producers of oil and raw 
materials also had its place. Kissinger maintained that through cooperation the 
West could separate the radicals from the moderates in OPEC, the LDCs from 
the OPEC states and also prevent other "pees" from arising. 87 He agreed with 
Schmidt that the industrialized states needed to break "the unholy alliance 
between the LDCs and OPEC.,,88 Washington believed this could be achieved 
by linking energy discussions with commodities. In this way, any disruptive 
actions by OPEC could be countered with a halt to the discussions on 
commodities or the threat to make oil producers pay a price in terms of military 
exports or cooperation. Kissinger summed up, "in this way we can combat our 
dependence with a coherent strategy.,,89 
Still, the American secretary of state warned that the American plan 
could be easily foiled if consumer solidarity was not achieved.90 Given 
Washington's view that consumer solidarity was essential to America 
maintaining its dominant role in the Western alliance and vis-a-vis the oil 
producers, it was not surprising that Kissinger stressed the need for consumer 
cooperation. Yet, like Ford before him, Kissinger did not explain his reasoning 
in those terms. He highlighted two areas in which consumer cooperation would 
be essential for success. First, given that some OPEC countries had already cut 
production to the lowest point possible, some oil producers would no doubt 
approach the industrialized countries for bilateral oil deals.9) On this point, 
Schmidt acknowledged that Iran had already approached Bonn in an attempt to 
get the Federal Republic to import more Iranian oil.92 If individual consuming 
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countries accepted these deals it would be to the detriment of the entire West; 
thus, it was crucial for the consumer states to maintain consumer solidarity in 
such instances. 93 Moreover, Kissinger feIt it "would be suicidal to enter a 
dialogue without cohesion among the oil importers. We should not be deceived 
into thinking that cooperation among us is confrontational vis-a-vis OPEC. We 
can in this way, hold our ground if we are confronted.,,94 He concluded by 
again agreeing with Schmidt's point that consuming countries needed to "work 
out a common strategy between now and 1980, for the next five years. ,,95 
Kissinger's analysis was met with much interest by the Western leaders, 
even by Giscard. The latter called Kissinger's analysis of market strategy 
correct and although he still feIt that the West should "be careful" on the issue 
of confrontation, Giscard was open to the United States creating "special 
tensions" so long as the other industrialized states were kept abreast of the 
results. 96 He feIt, however, that such a divided confrontational approach would 
be better so as not to place the moderates in OPEC in too a difficult position.97 
In addition, Giscard proposed that the heads of government assembled at the 
Summit should agree that in the event of an oil producer approaching one of 
them with a bilateral deal, they would consult with one another. 98 Through such 
consultations, Giscard maintained, the leaders could "see how to make their 
response accord with a common strategy.,,99 
Schmidt had no fundamental disagreement with either Giscard's 
suggestion or the "partial strategy" put forward by Kissinger. lOo Given that 
bilateral deals had been a particular concern of the Federal Republic since the 
outbreak of the oil crisis, Schmidt was particularly keen to see Giscard's 
proposed procedure towards any bilateral deals offered by the oil producing 
states taken up. Schmidt also urged that the same approach be applied whenever 
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Western states engaged in special deals on the delivery of industrial products 
with the oil producing states, particularly preferential deals. 101 As to 
Kissinger's partial strategy the West German leader felt that "the reality of 
coordination among the six countries here, or the Nine, differed from this 
partial strategy.,,102 Schmidt also seemed unsure about the Americans pursuing 
a more confrontational approach. 103 That being said, Schmidt was satisfied that 
"this partial strategy [could] work with a measure of solidarity at the bargaining 
table and cohesion here to facilitate its success.,,104 With consumer-producer 
dialogue set to begin at the ministerial level in a month's time at the eIEC, it 
was essential in Bonn's view that a minimum degree of solidarity was 
maintained at that negotiating table. lOS He noted that while he had believed the 
likelihood of achieving this aim slim, from the tone of the discussions in this 
session, he had got the sense that the chances for solidarity were better than he 
had previously thought. Nonetheless, Schmidt warned that should "danger" 
occur, it was vital the consumers "stick together" or risk a political crisis in the 
West "an order of magnitude which might be beyond the power of the West to 
solve." 106 
Having spent a great deal of the session discussing energy, the Summit 
participants had only a limited time to consider raw materials and relations with 
the LDes. For the Federal Republic these issues were nearly as important as 
energy given its dependency on raw material imports. 107 Within the short 
timeframe though, the Western leaders managed to agree on the three matters 
most important to Bonn. First, the heads of state concurred that the balance of 
payments deficits of the LDes had become enormous ($35 billion) and it was 
necessary for recovery from the world recession and for moral reasons that the 
West assist the LDes in financing their deficits. Next, the conference 
participants all believed that a scheme should be developed to stabilize the 
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LDCs' export earnmgs. Finally, Western leaders agreed that, the "unholy 
alliance" which had developed between the oil producers and the non-oil 
developing states must be broken. lOS Yet, there was no consensus on how to 
achieve these aims. 
On the matter of the LDCs' adjustment difficulties, France and Great 
Britain supported granting further budgetary aid, but the United States and 
Federal Republic were opposed. 109 For Bonn, any Western efforts on this point 
should help "educate the developing countries to understand, think, and operate 
in market economy terms.,,110 Schmidt noted, "We should make them 
understand that in the long run they can't spend more than they earn. We should 
help them to earn more rather than get more and more aid." 111 To help the 
LDCs earn more, as West Germany had done at the Seventh Special Session of 
the United Nations General Assembly in September 1975, Schmidt advocated 
the establishment of a loan scheme, analogous to the Lome agreement, for 
stabilizing export earnings from a certain number of commodities. 112 In 
addition, very surprisingly, he called for a link between Standard Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) and aid to the developing countries. l13 For years, the Federal 
Republic had been opposed to "the Link" which implied the creation of further 
SDRs in order to give a greater share to the LDCs because of the impact it 
would have on world liquidity and hence inflation. Yet with the world economy 
deteriorating and the liquidity problem less acute, Bonn was willing to consider 
such an option. 114 
Schmidt's counterparts did not respond to his point on SDRs, but there 
were mixed views about how best to stabilize export earnings. At the Seventh 
Special Session, the United States had proposed its own method through the 
\08 Box 16, Third Session. 
109 Ibid; GRF, Arthur Bums Papers, Box B62, Economic Summit: Relations with Developing 
Countries (hereafter Box B62, Developing). 
110 Box 16, Third Session. 
11 1 Ibid. 
112 TNA, PREM 16/612, Speech by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany before the Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, September 2,1975; B136/16800, Principles. 
113 See Chapter 2 for further details on "The Link" and the Federal Republic's perspectives on 
it. 
114 Box 16, Third Session. 
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establishment of a new agency - "The Development Security Facility of the 
IMF.,,115 Ford did not waver from America's own suggestion. Giscard was 
unconvinced that the Lome model should be extended, given that it had not 
been applied and no one was quite sure of its success. !!6 As to severing the 
alliance between OPEC and the LDCs, only one suggestion was made. Giscard 
commented that an option would be to limit the aid available to the non-oil 
developing states through the IMF, but no other Western leader offered another 
suggestion or remarked on the French proposal.!!7 
As the third session came to a close, it appeared as though the Federal 
Republic had achieved some of its goals. With regard to oil, West Germany had 
failed to achieve the consumer solidarity it sought with regard to the CIEC; the 
United Kingdom was still reluctant to be represented coIIectivcly by the 
European Community. Moreover, while all the heads of government voiced a 
commitment to a successful consumer-producer dialogue, not everyone foresaw 
it as a means for stabilizing oil prices. Yet upon closer analysis, Bonn actually 
did gain substantially through the negotiations. Thus, although the Federal 
Republic may have preferred agreement from Britain on representation and a 
firm belief in the usefulness of the consumer-producer dialogue, the partial 
strategy which the Western leaders agreed on and Schmidt was key in creating, 
provided, as Schmidt noted, the West with enough common ground to stand on 
for the purposes of the CIEC. On raw materials and relations with developing 
states, there was consensus, as Bonn desired, among the Western leaders on the 
need to assist the LDCs with their balance of payments difficulties as well as to 
establish an export earnings stabilization scheme. On the latter though, there 
was no firm conclusion about which of the many proposals to adopt. Schmidt's 
suggestion for the toppling of the "unholy alliance" between the oil producing 
and non-oil producing states, however, became a top priority in the West's 
approach to these matters. 
liS Box B62, Developing. 
116 Box 16, Third Session. 
117 Ibid. 
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In the previous sessions, in an effort to build confidence, the heads of 
state and government had relied on clever wording to mask any underlying 
disagreements or openly stated their consensus in the Rambouillet Declaration. 
On the questions discussed in the third session, however, this pattern was 
broken, as the goal in regard to issues of energy, raw materials and relations 
with the developing states was to improve the industrialized countries' position 
at the CIEC and influence over the oil price, since this would do much more to 
build confidence and ensure recovery both in the short-term and over the long-
run. Thus, only the general agreements were published, while the details of the 
partial strategy on oil and bilateral deals as well as the West's desire to break 
the alliance between the oil producers and non-oil developing states were left 
out. Yet, just because these points did not appear in the print, did not mean that 
the heads of state did not agree on the matters or were not committed to them. 
Rather, as Giscard noted at the time, "During the discussions there is a 
difference between what we have said and what we have agreed on. We go 
along with the conclusions. The question now is what will be said. The fact that 
we don't publish it doesn't mean we haven't agreed." II 8 
The fourth and final session was on East-West relations. The shortest of 
the meetings, the Western leaders had little difficulty reaching a consensus on 
the two main issues. Thus, the G-5 quickly agreed that trade into Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union and China should be extended and a Gentleman's 
Agreement on export credits should be concluded in the next year. IJ9 Because 
such economic cooperation and the prospect of new markets for growth would 
only encourage investor confidence, there was little discrepancy between what 
was agreed and what was printed in the Rambouillet Declaration. 
When the summit concluded, the Federal Republic declared that its 
"expectations had been completely fulfilled." Despite not having achieved all of 
its individual goals, Bonn determined that it in many of the points, the G-5 
leaders had managed to speak "eine gemeinsame Sprache zur Definition der 
118 Ibid. 
119 TNA, PREM 16/838, Note of the Fourth Session of the Conference of Heads of Government 
of France. Germany. Italy. Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States at the Chateau de 
Rambouillet on Monday, 17 November 1975. 
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Probleme" and in political and economic terms were on parallel tracks. It 
seemed to West Germany that a spirit of "common responsibility for the shared 
fate of the world economy and with it democratic order" was visible. Just as 
importantly, the Schmidt government also believed that the results of the 
Rambouillet Summit would serve to bolster confidence and thus assist 
significantly in the emerging economic recovery.120 The Federal Republic's 
allies also declared the G-5 heads of state gathering a success. While this was to 
be expected given that the Western leaders were attempting to rebuild investor 
and consumer confidence, the development of the G-5 heads of state and 
government gatherings thereafter shows that the comments of Western leaders 
were not simply empty platitudes. 
Only six months after the conclusion of the Rambouillet Summit, the 
second G-5 summit was held in Puerto Rico at the invitation of Washington. 121 
Since then the meetings have been repeated nearly every year and membership 
in the group has grown from five to seven through the remainder of the Cold 
War with the official inclusion of Italy and Canada in 1976, then to eight after 
the fall of communism. Such gatherings have come to be the main forum for 
coordination of international economic and monetary policies among the largest 
economies in the world, as the adoption of the "non-system" of monetary 
relations through the Jamaica agreement coupled with the preferences of 
Western leaders for the G-7 relegated the IMF - the organization which more or 
less held this role through the first half of the Cold War - to a funding agency 
for the LDCs. Yet at the time the G-5 leaders did not necessarily envision such 
an outcome. Indeed, at the conclusion of the Rambouillet Summit, Western 
leaders had not officially agreed on a follow-up summit. Instead, Bonn in 
particular was still focused on the 1975 economic crisis. While the Federal 
Republic believed that the G-5 gathering had served to increase investor and 
consumer confidence, in order to fully rebuild confidence and overcome the 
economic crisis, there remained two important summits to conclude: the CIEC 
and the IMF Interim Committee meeting in Jamaica in January 1976. In the 
120 BAK, B136/8482, Betr.: Betwertung der Gespriiche von Rambouillet. 
121 BAK, B136/8483, Fernschreiben: Zum Staats- und RegierungscheftrefJen von Puerto Rico 
am 27. 28. Juni 1976. 
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success of both, the discussions and agreements made at the Rambouillet 
Summit played a key role. 
-The Conference on International Economic Cooperation and the Jamaica 
Agreement-
The CIEC was to convene in mid-December 1975 and, as agreed at the 
Final Declaration of the Paris Preparatory Meeting in October, was to be of a 
more procedural nature. Yet, only weeks before the conference's start the 
conflict within the EC over separate British representation at the conference 
remained unresolved. Although the Schmidt government had hoped that the 
United States may put pressure on the United Kingdom over this matter at 
Rambouillet, aside from veiled references to it by the Federal Republic, the 
matter was not discussed. 122 In the weeks following the meeting of the heads of 
state, Bonn continued to pressure London on this issue, arguing that Britain's 
position was "a rebuff to the ideals of the Community and totally 
unacceptable.,,123 Finally Schmidt determined that the matter could only be 
settled by the leaders themselves. 124 The next opportunity for talks on this level 
was the European Council meeting in Rome on 1-2 December 1975. 
Waiting paid off for the West German chancellor, as at this gathering of 
the heads of state and government after serious negotiations a breakthrough on 
this issue occurred. Finally, the United Kingdom consented to be represented as 
part of the EC, so long as it was permitted to speak from within the Community 
delegation on its own behalf. With this, Europe and indeed the West were able 
to move forward to the CIEC with a united front. In addition, at this meeting, 
the EC reached an agreement in principle for Community decisions on the 
minimum safeguard price and emergency sharing. 125 Because of the French 
position that no resolutions on these issues could be made within the broader 
western energy forum of the lEA without the EC first agreeing a course of 
122 8AK, 8126/48887, Fernschreiben: Betr.: Gipfeltreffen der Sechs uber Wirtschafts- und 
Wahrungsfragen; Mer: Haltung der USA -im Grundsatz und zu einzelnen Themenkreisen; bak; 
8136/8482. Fernschreiben: Zum Treffen von Rambouillet am 15./17. November 1975. 
123 INA, T382126, FCO Telno 945 of 26 November - European Council: 1 -2 December. 
124 Ibid. 
125 INA, PREM 30/2899, Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs), Brussels, 9 December 1975, 
Preparation for C1EC. 
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action on them, the settlement of these issues was key to the West reaching a 
common positions for the CIEC. 126 Thus, even if at the first meeting of the 
CIEC no negotiations on positions were to take place, unlike in April 1975, the 
West was beginning to take concrete steps towards a common perspective. 
The first ministerial meeting of the CIEC took place in Paris on 16-18 
December 1975. Throughout this gathering, Western solidarity remained 
strong. Despite worries by the industrialized states that the oil producers or non-
oil LDCs would attempt to disrupt the meeting as they had the April 
preparatory meeting, the conference proceeded as planned. The four 
commissions were formed and the guidelines for their work approved. In 
addition, co-presidents were appointed for each commission: the United States 
and Saudi Arabia were appointed as co-presidents of the Commission on 
Energy, the EEC and Iran of the Commission on Financial Affairs, Algeria and 
the EEC of the Commission on Development and Japan and Peru of the 
Commission on Raw Materials. 127 The ministers continued working in their 
respective commissions for another 18 months until the final CIEC ministerial 
meeting convened on 2 June 1977. 
On the one hand, the CIEC was a failure for Bonn, as no means were 
created for the industrialized countries to negotiate with OPEC on oil and the 
non-oil LDCs on raw materials over the long-term. Yet, it did have an impact 
on oil prices throughout its tenure. In the two years between the successful 
preparatory conference in October 1975 and the conclusions of the CIEC in 
June 1977, oil prices remained stable, as Saudi Arabia and its moderate allies 
succeeded in blocking attempts by its OPEC partners to drastically increase 
prices. One of the reasons Saudi Arabia gave for its pricing stance was a desire 
to "maintain an atmosphere conducive to a positive outcome for CIEC." 128 
Yet, playing an even stronger role in the developments in the oil and 
raw materials sectors and pricing of those commodities was the "partial 
126 Ibid. 
121 Ian Skeet, OPEC: Twenty-five Years of Prices and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), 133. 
128 Ibid., 141. 
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strategy" established among the Western leaders at the Rambouillet Summit 
and the long-term efforts undertaken in the lEA and reaffirmed at the 0-5 
gathering. Over the following four years, fissures within the West's united front 
towards OPEC were minimal and the United States continued to exploit its 
security relationship with Saudi Arabia in order to influence the latter on its oil 
pricing decisions. 129 The second oil crisis was not a result of the failure of the 
West's partial strategy, but was rather primarily a consequence of the Iranian 
revolution and Iran's displeasure with American-Iranian relations over the 
previous decades. In addition, the program of conservation and the development 
of alternative resources begun in 1974 in the lEA and whose direction was 
confirmed by Western leaders at the Rambouillet Summit began to bear fruit in 
the early 1980s, as prices between 1980 and 1986 dropped by 46 percent. While 
the developments in oil prices were certainly not due entirely to the programs 
developed in the lEA, the conservation and development of alternative energy 
sources contributed greatly to the decline in price as did the concerted effort to 
break the OPEC alliance.130 Yet, these developments were some ways off and 
Western leaders still had to consider the short-term effects of the first 
ministerial meeting of the CIEC. From Bonn's perspective it was successful and 
gave an additional boost to investor and consumer confidence. All that could 
undermine the upward trend now would be the failure of the Interim Committee 
to reach an agreement on the amendment of the Fund's Articles at their 
upcoming meeting in Jamaica in January 1976. 
Once the Rambouillet Summit concluded, the "memorandum of 
understanding" reached between the United States and France and agreed 
among the G-5 heads of government was distributed to its Western allies. The 
American-French document along with all aspects of the amendments was 
discussed in a series of meetings in the G-I0 and in the EC in December 
1975. 131 Having already agreed the French-American memorandum at 
Rambouillet and having contributed so greatly throughout 1975 to reaching a 
129 Ibid., 141; Morris Albert Adelman. The Genie Out of the Bottle: World Oil Since 1970 
(Cambridge, MIT Press, 1995), 163-167 
130 Adelman, 167-178. 
131 BAK, B126/65733, Ergebnis des FinanzministertrejJens in BrUssel am 15.11.1975 zur 
Vorbereitung der Zehnergruppe und des 1nterimausschusses. 
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consensus on the other aspects of reform such as gold and quota shares, the 
Federal Republic had few qualms about the solutions to the monetary reform 
issues on the table. Instead, they encouraged the other industrialized states to 
accept the agreement. By late December 1975, the industrialized states had 
agreed a package of reforms to be presented at the Jamaica meeting. Those 
issues agreed previously at the August 1975 Interim Committee meeting on 
quota shares and gold remained unchanged. In addition, the West, with only 
minor changes to the wording, agreed to the resolution reached between the 
United States and France on the exchange rate regime. Also the industrialized 
states settled on other finer aspects related to SDRs, including the interest rate 
attached to them, as well as to the future functioning of the IMF. Given the 
accord reached among the industrialized states beforehand, the Interim 
Committee encountered very little resistance in the passing of the package of 
reforms at their meeting in Jamaica on 6-8 January 1976. Rather, within these 
three days, the Interim Committee agreed the Second Amendment of the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF. In little over a month, the Executive Board 
of the IMF had prepared a draft of the amendments and by April 1978 the 
Second Amendment had been ratified by the requisite number of IMF members 
to go into practice. 132 
With the Jamaica Agreement nearly four years of negotiations on the 
reform of the international monetary system came to a close. The Second 
Amendment of the Fund's Articles was a far cry from the overhaul of the 
system envisioned at the start of the Committee of Twenty talks. The hope 
remained though that once the markets settled and conditions allowed, the IMF 
member states would again take up the task of a more thorough reform and 
indeed at that point return to a system of fixed, but adjustable exchange rates 
with the SDR, rather than gold or the dollar, as the primary reserve asset. As 
would become evident with time though, there was no comprehensive reform, 
no return to fixed exchange rates and no replacement of the dollar with SDRs. 
Rather, the Jamaica Agreement actually set up what came to be known as the 
"non-system" of monetary relations. 
132 BI36/11567. April 1976 - Berr.: .A'nderung des Abkommens uber den Internationalen 
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The "non-system" was an apt name for the new monetary order for 
unlike the Bretton Woods system it was not only based on floating exchange 
rates but its functioning was by and large left to the markets. Although 
provisions were included in the amended article on the exchange rate regime 
calling for coordinated action among the central bank governors to ensure 
orderly markets and naming the IMF as initiator of such action, these provisions 
were hardly ever used. Instead, the American attitude towards policy 
coordination and intervention in the markets shown by the Ford administration 
at the Rambouillet Summit hardly changed with subsequent administrations. 
Moreover, through the remainder of the Cold War, despite the erratic 
fluctuations of exchange rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Fund only 
initiated talks on coordination twice: once in regard to Scandinavia and the 
other with respect to Korea.133 Indeed, progressively since 1976 until the credit 
crisis in 2008, governments had become less involved in market oversight and 
regulation of the monetary system, both on the side of exchange rate 
maintenance and control over capital movements. In this same period, the role 
of the IMF changed substantially as well. As highlighted previously, the 0-5 
and its subsequent incarnations became the main forum for policy coordination 
rather than the Fund as had been the case under the Bretton Woods system. 
Instead, since the Jamaica Agreement the IMF has grown to be a trusted source 
of economic data and forecasts through its World Economic Outlook 
publications as well as a financing center for those countries encountering 
balance of payments difficulties. 134 Finally, unlike the predictions of many 
scholars at the time, the collapse of Bretton Woods and the creation of the 
"non-system" did not spell the end of the hegemonic position of the United 
States and the dollar in the world monetary system; rather, through some clever 
restrictions on the interest rate of SDRs among other factors, the dollar retains 
its role as the primary reserve asset to this day.13S 
133 James, 270-7. 
134 Ibid, 270-7 
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Yet, in 1976, the long-term developments were unknown and the focus 
of Western leaders was on the short-term, for after all, the second amendment 
of the Articles was only to be for an interim period. At the time, West Germany 
was very satisfied with the Jamaica Agreement. For years the Fund's Articles 
had no longer corresponded to the actual activities being undertaken in the 
monetary system, creating a series of problems. Bonn concluded, "angesichts 
der weiterhin bestehenden Ungleichgewichte in der Welt, kann ein solches 
realistisches Vorgehen nur begriisst werden." It seemed to the Federal Republic, 
the amended articles returned a sense of order and rules for the functioning of 
the monetary system. The benefits of this to the Federal Republic were three-
fold: first, in the short-term it would aid in reviving consumer and investor 
confidence; next, it would help in the functioning of West German stability 
policy; and finally, it would serve as a basis for a balanced and stable expansion 
of world trade over the long-run. 136 
As Bonn had hoped, the positive outcomes from the three summits 
served to stabilize both the economic and political systems of the West. First, 
the results helped revive consumer and investor confidence and move the global 
economy into a phase of recovery. Through 1976, growth took hold not only in 
the United States, but also in Europe and in particular in West Germany. 
Contrary to their fears, this recovery came without stoking the flames of 
inflation. That said, price stability still remained sensitive and inflation rates 
were on-average still above those experienced through the 1960s. 
Unemployment also started to recede from its peaks in 1975 within most 
Western countries, yet it still remained uncharacteristically high.137 The main 
exceptions in the West's economic recovery were Italy and Britain. High 
inflation and extraordinary balance of payments deficits forced the governments 
in both countries to seek large aid packages from the EC and the IMF 
respectively.138 Also through 1976, the political instability so greatly feared by 
West Germany and its Western partners never materialized; instead, in autumn 
1976, the coalition government of the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and the 
136 13 .. B 6/11567, Anderung; B136/11567, Part IV Resolution; B136/11567, April 1976 -
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Free Democratic Party (FOP) won re-election in the Federal Republic and 
Schmidt continued his reign as chancellor. While Ford lost the 1976 election to 
Jimmy Carter, this had more to do with the political legacy of Watergate than it 
did with the economic crisis of 1975. Finally, even in the United Kingdom, 
where the economic problems were most acute and strikes most prevalent, 
Wilson and the Labour government were able to avoid calling early elections. 
Yet, the reformation of the international economic system through the 
early 1970s and the economic recovery experienced in 1976 did not spell an 
end to the West's economic problems permanently or indeed even for several 
years. Rather, although growth returned in the late 1970s and early 1980s the 
unemployment rates in many Western states remained much higher than those 
experienced through the first twenty-five years of the Cold War. In addition, 
price instability stayed significantly above average. As Western leaders were 
well aware, the application of Keynesian theories seemed to have little effect on 
these circumstances. Thus, industrialized states adopted new and varying 
approaches to deal with these structural changes taking place, including 
monetarism and the locomotive theory. In dealing with these economic 
challenges, however, Western leaders relied heavily on the new institutions for 
economic cooperation and the positive political relationships forged during the 
early 1970s, in particular the 0-5 and the Schmidt-Giscard friendship. 139 
Through both, the role of West Germany within the Western alliance was 
enhanced and ensured for the long-term. 
-Conclusions-
By spring 1976 the West had overcome the economic crisis which only 
a year previously had threatened to destroy the economic and political order. 
Nearly all Western states were in the midst ofa full recovery from the recession 
and inflation remained steady. Unemployment was still above average, but was 
receding in most countries and global trade was again increasing. In addition, a 
139 That said, the deterioration of West German-American relations during the late 1970s also 
contributed to this outcome. See also, Klaus Wiegrefe, Das Zerwiirjnis: Helmut Schmidt. Jimmy 
Carter und die Krise der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen (Berlin: PropyUien, 2005), 48-
66,99-120,206-23. 
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cooperative approach to restructuring the energy paradigm was underway in the 
CIEC between the industrialized states, the oil producers and non-oil LDCs. 
This, along with the partial strategy on energy matters developed and agreed at 
the Rambouillet Summit helped to keep oil and raw material prices stable 
enough to allow the recovery to completely take hold. Moreover, reform efforts 
on the international monetary system had finally concluded and although 
floating rates continued to be somewhat erratic, the legalization of floating and 
the overall amendment of the Fund's articles did bolster investor and consumer 
confidence. The response of Western leaders to this economic crisis not only 
helped the West overcome it, but also in the process re-shaped the international 
economic system: the G-5 first at the ministerial level and then by the late 
1970s among heads of state and government became the permanent forum for 
economic and monetary policy coordination; the central role of the 
multinational oil companies in the determination of oil prices receded to 
become dominated by a system of bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental 
negotiations with some market determination; the "non-system of monetary 
relations" was erected in which the role of the markets was increased and that 
of the IMF significantly altered. These institutional changes reinforced the 
economic and political transformations already taking place within the West as 
well as between the industrialized, oil producing and non-oil developing states. 
Essential to both the short-term effects as well as the long-term results of the 
Western response to the economic crisis was the Federal RepUblic. 
As in previous chapters, West German policy with regard to the 
economic crisis and, in particular, the RambouiIIet Summit, the CIEC and the 
Jamaica Agreement, was driven by a desire to revive the international economy, 
on which the Federal Republic was highly dependent, and to prevent the social 
and political disorder that could result from high unemployment. Indeed, 
Schmidt noted in his opening address that this last factor and its resultant effect 
on political order were of the utmost concern to Bonn and should also be for the 
West as a whole. Motivated by these economic and political concerns, West 
Germany sought cooperation among the G-5 heads of state and government on 
all themes discussed at the Rambouillet Summit and Western solidarity at the 
CIEC and in Jamaica. To a great extent, the Federal Republic achieved its aims. 
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Most essential to Bonn's achievements were the efforts of Schmidt. 
Given that the Rambouillet Summit was a meeting of the heads of state and 
government and many of the decisions made there were used as guidance for 
the other two gatherings, this outcome is only logical. Yet, Schmidt's influence 
cannot be attributed purely to chance. Rather, as in the last chapters, it was a 
combination of the West German chancellor's willingness to lead and his 
ability to compromise and reach practical solutions which were central to his 
impact during the Rambouillet Summit and ultimately to the building of 
Western solidarity. When G-5 leaders failed to reach a consensus on the 
alignment and further loosening of economic and monetary policies as well as 
greater management of the exchange rate system at the Rambouillet Summit, 
despite the Federal Republic's strong desire that Western leaders come together 
on both these points, Schmidt pushed forward calling for at least the appearance 
of agreement in the communique. In so doing, Schmidt helped to create an 
image that would rebuild consumer and investor confidence. 
On crucial issues of energy and relations with the developing states, the 
West German chancellor's observations were the driving force behind the 
partial strategy developed there. On the former, Schmidt first called attention to 
the lack of a common Western strategy for the short-term and pointed out key 
questions that Western leaders needed to answer in order to make a 
breakthrough on the issue. He then went against the Federal Republic's official 
position calling for market determination of energy prices and proposed 
government negotiations. While Schmidt's line of argumentation could not be 
said to be the main motivation behind Kissinger's comments and the plan he 
presented there for controlling the oil prices in the medium-term, for the 
proposal made by Kissinger reflected closely Washington's position as 
explained in pre-summit briefings, the West German chancellor had influenced 
the American secretary of state, as the latter twice openly admitted. Finally, the 
West German leader supported and expanded upon Giscard's proposal on 
bilateral deals. On the latter issue, it was Schmidt who led the drive to break the 
alliance that had developed between the oil producers and the non-oil LDCs, 
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which would become crucial to the West's approach to the two factions in the 
consumer-producer dialogue. 
Yet, even at a conference where Schmidt was not personally included 
such as the first ministerial meeting of the CIEC, his leadership and ability to 
compromise were also important. In this regard, Schmidt was determined to 
achieve Western solidarity and would settle for nothing less. After the West 
German chancellor failed to fully attain this at the Rambouillet Summit because 
the British still refused to be represented as part of the EC at the upcoming 
CIEC, he did not give up. Instead, in the weeks thereafter, he continued to push 
London, managing eventually through compromise to settle this issue along 
with matters relating to the building of a common Western position for the 
consumer-producer dialogue before the start of the CIEC. Had Schmidt given 
up on the ideal of Western solidarity earlier or had been inflexible with the 
United Kingdom, it is doubtful that agreement would have been achieved in the 
run-up to the ministerial meeting of the CIEC and thus it is quite likely that 
during the dialogue a split of the West would have occurred, much to its 
economic and political detriment. 
Having only agreed to the memorandum of understanding reached 
between America and France at the Rambouillet Summit, Schmidt's influence 
on the outcome of the Jamaica agreement was far less direct. Indeed, as shown 
in chapter 5 much of the Federal Republic's impact on this process came in the 
weeks immediately preceding the American-French agreement. In the time 
between the Rambouillet Summit and the Interim Committee meeting, Bonn 
served as a mediating force, moving the process along by accepting the 
memorandum of understanding and encouraging its approval among the 
industrialized states. In this way, the Federal Republic fulfilled the promise 
made by Otmar Emminger, the Vice President of the Bundesbank, as 
highlighted in the previous chapter. 
Through its efforts during the three economic gatherings West Germany 
was able to build upon the advancements made in its political position over the 
previous three years and solidify an enhanced status within the Western 
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alliance. Contributing greatly to this was the changed institutional setting. The 
reformed monetary system created conditions for the expansion of trade and the 
continued economic hegemony of the United States and dollar. From both of 
these aspects the West German economy stood to gain significantly. Because 
much of the Federal Republic's political advancement and the longevity of it 
rested on the strength of its economy, a system which assisted Bonn in 
maintaining its economic prowess indirectly aided West Germany in its 
political pursuits. 
Ensuring the Federal Republic's position even more so were the positive 
results of the Rambouillet Summit and subsequent institutionalization of the G-
5. Within the G-5, West Germany held a privileged position having the largest 
and most powerful economy of any European state in a Western organization 
biased towards European membership. As was shown in this chapter and 
previous chapters, Bonn, and in particular Schmidt, skillfully used this 
imbalance, West German economic strength and the characteristics of this 
forum, including its size, its homogeneity and its informal and personal 
character, to advance economic and political aims. Once the G-5 became the 
main organization for economic and monetary policy coordination through the 
second half of the 1970s and thereafter, the Federal Republic's seat at the center 
of the debates on the shape of the global economy and the subsequent Western 
efforts to respond to economic challenges was assured. 
The latter development may not have been so meaningful in raising and 
retaining the Federal Republic's political position, had the relationship between 
economics and high politics not changed or had Schmidt failed in his 1976 re-
election bid. Yet, such was not the case. Rather, as the Rambouillet Summit and 
the institutionalization of the G-5 clearly illustrated, by 1975 economic 
problems were no longer being handled by economic technicians and 
economics and finance ministers; instead, they had become a staple of 
diplomatic meetings at the highest levels. Even after the 1975 economic crisis 
had been overcome, economics continued to be a matter of high politics, as 
economic challenges continued throughout the remainder of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, because the G-5 forum was so amenable to Schmidt's preferred 
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governing style and he was so effective in it, as was apparent from the success 
of the Rambouillet Summit, the re-election of Schmidt to continue to lead the 
Federal Republic In this forum was also instrumental in advancing West 
Germany's role among its partners. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has two main conclusions. The first is that through carefully 
managing its economic and political goals, utilizing its economic strength, 
providing strong leadership and broke ring compromise among its Western 
allies, particularly the United States and France, the Federal Republic was able 
to greatly influence and thus playa crucial role in the West's response to the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, the 197311974 oil 
crisis and the 1975 global recession and the resultant re-shaping of the 
international economic system of the West. 
With the move to generalized floating in March 1973, the Bretton 
Woods monetary system collapsed. Yet, the West's response to it did not cease 
in 1973; rather it extended through reform efforts in the Committee of Twenty 
(C-20) and the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund (lMF), 
ending with the eventual adoption of the Jamaica Agreement in 1976. From the 
beginning West German actions were decisive in the manner in which Bretton 
Woods broke down as well as the crafting of the West's response to it. Coming 
under heavy pressure from the markets, the Smithsonian realignment began to 
crack in June 1972. At the center of this speculative storm was the D-mark. 
Faced with the option to float or erect capital controls and defend the 
Smithsonian parities, Willy Brandt, the chancellor at the time, chose the latter, 
putting Bonn's goals of closer European integration, both economic and 
political, and positive relations with France ahead of its national economic 
interests, in particular Stabilitlitspolitik. Considering America's policy of 
benign neglect and France's unwillingness to join a European group float, had 
Brandt elected to float in summer 1972, it would have had to have been a 
national one. This, in tum, most likely would have spelled the end of Bretton 
Woods, leaving the Federal Republic and Europe in a much worse position 
politically and economically. Bonn continued this approach to the unfurling 
economic crisis for the following several months, not even abandoning it under 
pressure from the Bundesbank during the February 1973 currency crisis. Only 
once the threat to West German economic strength became immense in March 
1973, did the Brandt government's objectives begin to shift. Yet, the Federal 
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Republic's policy decisions over the previous year had not only signalled to 
Bonn's European partners its trustworthiness and commitment to European 
integration efforts, but also actually resulted in furthering them. Thus, when the 
discussion of a European group float arose during the March 1973 crisis West 
Germany had a stronger political and technical platform on which to argue for 
it. 
During C-20 negotiations, Bonn was careful not to let its enthusiasm for 
European integration fog its vision of a reformed system beneficial to the West 
German economy. Instead, while contributing to European efforts to reach a 
common negotiating position for the talks, the Brandt government emphasized 
the need for a system which controlled global liquidity and hence global 
inflation and which would thus enhance the Federal Republic's domestic 
Stabilitiitspolitik. Although this inflation-focused approach to monetary reform 
made achieving a common European position during the C-20 talks more 
difficult, the Federal Republic refused to alter its course. Instead, after the move 
to floating in March 1973, the Brandt government became more attached to 
regaining domestic price stability, introducing an extensive anti-inflation 
program to this end. Under this economic policy goal, in C-20 negotiations, 
Bonn became even more inflexible on the need to control international liquidity 
and its desire to continue floating increased. When, after a year, the C-20 had 
failed to make any substantial progress, the Federal Republic, under the strong 
influence of the West German finance minister, Helmut Schmidt, began to look 
to its key Western allies, rather than the EC, to advance monetary reform. 
The Federal Republic's focus on price stability and its emergmg 
Western perspective upset West Germany's European partners, but neither was 
the source of the failure of the C-20 negotiations and both actually proved 
beneficial to the Federal Republic and the West in the long run. The positions 
of the Brandt government were not the only impediment to agreement in the C-
20: despite efforts to appear otherwise, EC states had disparate approaches to 
key aspects of reform and gulfs existed between the United States and Europe 
on the issues of adjustment and asset settlement. With the onset of the oil crisis, 
C-20 reform talks were undermined by massive balance of payments 
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disequilibria. As inflation became a chief concern throughout the West after the 
quadrupling of oil prices, West Germany's inflation rate hovered around 7 
percent, rather than in the double-digits like nearly all other Western states. 
This in tum reinforced the relative economic strength of the Federal Republic 
and thus its means of influencing the Western response to not only the 
monetary problems, but also the oil crisis and the 1975 recession. Finally, the 
shift in perspective to Western cooperation contributed greatly to the emergence 
of the G-5, the forum in which the Rambouillet Summit took place and a 
significant factor in the enhancement of Bonn's political position within the 
Western alliance. 
As Interim Committee negotiations began to stall in 1975, the Federal 
Republic understood that the ongoing deadlock was a problem for monetary 
reform efforts and exacerbating the economic downturn. As a result, Bonn 
shifted its policy aims slightly: economic stability still remained a chief 
concern, but Western cooperation also became fundamental to the Schmidt 
government's approach to monetary reform. Thus, West Germany focused less 
on inflation and more on building compromises and concluding monetary 
reform, thereby achieving significant success. Bonn was among the first to 
break the deadlock in the West over quota increases, offering to keep its quota 
shares unchanged. The Federal Republic was also the architect of the 
compromise solution on the uses of IMF gold. Finally, it was a suggestion from 
Otmar Emminger that prompted the French-American bilateral negotiations 
which led to a resolution on the exchange rate regime and gold transactions 
between governments and without which the Jamaica Agreement could never 
have been achieved. 
Alongside prudent management of its economic and political goals and 
compromise-building, West Germany also cleverly utilized its relative 
economic strength to impact the West's response to monetary difficulties. 
Rather than move to a two-tier market, close the exchange rate market for an 
extended period of time or adopt floating sooner as many of West Germany's 
European allies were forced to do in response to speCUlative pressure in 1972 
and early 1973, the Federal Republic enacted various administrative controls. 
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This economic ability gave the Brandt government the time necessary to 
achieve its domestic and European political goals, with the latter, as highlighted 
above, proving extremely important to the eventual creation of the European 
group float in March 1973. 
Finally, strong leadership also increased Bonn's influence. Brandt's 
determination to follow the European political course through the final fifteen 
months of Bretton Woods was, as highlighted above, a significant factor in the 
manner in which Bretton Woods eventually collapsed and the move to floating 
occurred. Soon after this, however, Brandt's influence on monetary difficulties 
faded, as he became more focused on domestic affairs, European political 
integration and international political developments such as the Year of Europe. 
Moreover, the role of the chancellor was structurally diminished, as the 
monetary reform efforts were handled by the ministry of finance and the 
gatherings were at ministerial level. As a result of this structural aspect, as well 
as several others factors, Helmut Schmidt came to be the Federal Republic's 
strongest advocate not just in response to monetary problems, but to all three 
crises. 
Schmidt's significant influence on the West's responses to each 
economic crisis was primarily a result of four particular aspects of his 
leadership style: namely, his readiness to exploit his greater understanding of 
economics and his belief that economics alongside its technical function had a 
political one; his willingness to lead on economic issues; his use of personal 
politics; and his ability to mediate among Western partners. Schmidt along with 
his friend, Karl Klasen, the President of the Bundesbank, led the push for 
capital controls in the discussions of the West German cabinet in response to 
the summer 1972 speculative pressures. Upon becoming dual finance and 
economics minister in July 1972, he showed his willingness to lead and his 
decidedly more political perspective on economic developments by standing up 
to American officials and informing them in no uncertain terms that the Federal 
Republic was not going to float because of the damage it would do to European 
integration efforts. Relying on personal politics, Schmidt, during the February 
1973 currency crisis, nearly orchestrated a European group float. Lastly, 
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Schmidt capitalized on his good relationships with Kissinger and Shultz, to help 
bring about a European group float in March 1973. Schmidt also left his mark 
on the C-20 negotiations. Frustrated with the large, bureaucratic structure of the 
C-20, Schmidt turned to the smaller, more homogenous Group of Five (G-5) 
forum, pushing its use among the Western powers. By autumn 1973, the few 
decisions that were made about international monetary reform among the 
Western states were reached first in the G-5, with Schmidt successfully leading 
the charge on one of the most important conclusions, namely, the suspension of 
the C-20 talks in January 1974. 
Overall, West Germany played a pivotal role in the West's response to 
the monetary problems throughout this period. The Federal Republic's 
contributions, however, have been little recognized in the existing literature. 
Gray makes the strongest attempt, but his article falls short in key areas. 1 First, 
Gray fails to acknowledge both Bonn's strong drive for a European group float 
during the February 1973 crisis and the key role the Federal Republic played in 
shifting American perspectives during the March 1973 crisis. In so doing, he 
distorts Schmidt's influence on both currency crises. In addition, Gray's study 
of monetary developments ends in 1973. Gray, however, is not the only author 
to overlook West Germany's impact. Instead, in key works on the C-20, the 
Interim Committee and the Jamaica Agreement, Bonn's role is also diminished 
in three main ways. 2 First, monetary reform negotiations, particularly those in 
the C-20, are presented as a US-Europe debate, with the West German position 
being grouped together with its EC counterparts. As this thesis shows, however, 
there were actually quite strong divisions within the EC, with Europe 
consciously deciding to present only those ideas upon which a consensus 
appeared. A significant factor in the European split was due to the Federal 
Republic's position on inflation and its acceptance of floating. Second, authors 
I William Glenn Gray, "Floating the System: Germany, the United States and the Breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, 1969-1973," Diplomatic History 31 no. 2, (2007): 295-323. 
2 Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game: Reform and Evolution in the International 
Monetary System (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982); John Williamson, The 
Failure of World Monetary Reform, 1971-1974 (New York: New York University Press, 1977); 
Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1954-1976 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1977); Tom de Vries, "Jamaica, or the non-Reform of the International Monetary System," 
Foreign Affairs 3, (1976): 577-605; Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since 
Bretton Woods, (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996). 
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generally overlook the role of the G-5 in the talks, thus missing Bonn's 
important contributions in this forum. Finally, to a large extent, the literature 
ignores the mediating role that West Germany played in the Interim Committee 
which allowed for compromise on key aspects of refonn and the eventual 
acceptance of the Jamaica Agreement. 
Although the oil crisis took place in autumn 1973, much like the 
collapse of Bretton Woods, its repercussions were strongly felt through 1975, as 
Western leaders struggled to agree a common approach to the changed energy 
and raw materials paradigms. Not until the Rambouillet Summit in November 
1975 and the Conference for International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in 
December of the same year, did the West finally agree a joint response. In this 
process, the Federal Republic was again highly influential, relying on similar 
means to those employed to deal with monetary problems. After initially 
struggling both internally and externally with its European dual-track approach 
to the oil crisis through late 1973, Bonn shifted its policy aims in January 1974, 
continuing its political course within Europe, but also ensuring its economic 
survival through the creation of broader Western efforts at the Washington 
Energy Conference (WEC). Had West Germany not altered its policies, it is 
very likely that the WEC would have been a failure and the burgeoning 
Western response crushed. With European integration efforts beginning to 
falter, mounting balance of payments deficits and skyrocketing inflation in the 
West and the Atlanticist Schmidt at the helm as chancellor since May 1974, 
West German policy became decidedly more focused on economic aspects and 
transatlantic in perspective between spring 1974 and early 1976. Western 
solidarity became a cornerstone of Bonn's approach to matters of energy, raw 
materials and relations with developing states. The Federal Republic's 
commitment to this policy was crucial in achieving agreement on these issues at 
the Rambouillet Summit as well as presenting a united front at the CIEC. 
In response to the oil cnSlS, the Federal Republic agam used its 
economic strength to sway its partners' positions. At the WEC, the implication 
that because of its economic might the Federal Republic alone of all European 
states could withstand an oil pricing paradigm based on bilateral deals 
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contributed to the Brandt government's argument for Western cooperation and 
hence the eventual agreement of nearly all EC member states to it. Bonn also 
made literal use of its economic abilities, serving as the chief underwriter of the 
EC loan scheme for the financing of oil deficits and extending a $2 billion loan 
to Italy. In the Western fora, West German economic strength was a 
determinant factor in the establishment of the key recycling facilities 
Witteveen II and the OECD Solidarity Fund. Not only was the Federal Republic 
a major financial backer of both of them, but also by refusing to contribute to 
the American-led OECD Solidarity Fund unless Washington also supported 
Witteveen II, Bonn skillfully utilized its economic might to overcome 
American intransigence and bring about a consensus on a fundamental aspcct of 
the Martinique Agreement. 
Together with savvy policy management and economic strength, 
Schmidt's leadership also greatly influenced Bonn's impact on the Western 
response to the oil crisis. Grasping the economic repercussions of the oil crisis 
and recognizing that cooperation with the United States was necessary to 
overcome it, Schmidt reached out to Kissinger with an idea for a Western 
energy conference. While Kissinger did not immediately take up Schmidt's 
suggestion, Schmidt's idea influenced Washington's later proposal for the 
WEC, as is evident through its strikingly similar purpose and form. Unwavering 
in his economic assessment and with a growing willingness to lead, Schmidt 
pushed his views of the oil crisis in the Brandt government and among Bonn's 
European allies though late 1973 and early 1974. His efforts culminated at the 
WEC where arguing primarily on economic grounds, he stood up to the French 
foreign minister, Michel Jobert, and presented a strong alternative to Jobert's 
political approach. Schmidt actions were decisive in the outcome of the 
gathering and thus turning the Federal Republic and the EC towards a Western 
approach, rather than solely a European political one. 
Once chancellor and with a common Western approach beginning to 
take form, Schmidt used a combination of personal politics and mediation skills 
to bring about full Western solidarity by December 1975. Working closely first 
with Giscard and then Ford and Kissinger, Schmidt managed to create a plan 
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which bridged the French and American approaches to energy matters and 
served as the basis for the Martinique Agreement agreed between France and 
America in December 1974. When a Western strategy again seemed to be 
failing in late 1975, Schmidt made a strong appeal to his counterparts at the 
Rambouillet Summit to work together, posing questions and driving a 
discussion which eventually led to the creation of a partial strategy for energy 
matters and relations with the non-oil developing states. Finally, Schmidt 
managed to broker a compromise with the United Kingdom on representation at 
the CIEC, thereby allowing for Western solidarity at the conference. This, in 
tum, offered greater chance of success of the consumer-producer dialogue 
overall and contributed to the steadiness of oil prices in the coming years. 
Despite the clearly great influence that the Federal Republic had on the 
West's response to the oil crisis, in broader historical works on the Western 
alliance and even some works on West German foreign policy, Bonn's efforts 
are largely overlooked. Instead, because their studies focus on the immediate 
aftermath of the oil crisis and predominately the political debates, Bonn appears 
to be caught between America and France. 3 In writings specifically on the oil 
crisis the Federal Republic is given greater credit. Venn accurately points out 
how national objectives of the four Western powers undermined the broader 
Western approach.4 While Mockli admits Bonn's key role, because of his focus 
on European political cooperation, he frequently depicts Bonn's moves toward 
Western cooperation and in particular Schmidt's role in events in less than 
positive terms, particularly at the Washington Energy Conference.s Yet 
analyzed from a more widely Western and economic point of view, West 
Germany's actions, and especially those of Schmidt, are shown in this thesis to 
be decisive in the West remaining unified and achieving a common response. 
3 William C. Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar: the Strained Alliance 
(London: Macmillan, 1992); Derek W. Urwin, Western Europe since 1945: a Political History, 
4th ed. (London: Longman, 1989). 
4 Fiona Venn, "International Co-operation versus National Self-Interest: the United States and 
Europe during the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis," in The United States and the European Alliance since 
1945, eds. Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (Oxford: Berg, 1999),71-100. 
S Daniel Mockli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and 
the Dream of Political Unity (London: I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd, 2009). 
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Moreover, Mockli ceases his analysis in spring 1974, failing to cover the entire 
timeframe of the Western response to the oil crisis. 
As macroeconomic conditions deteriorated and the 1975 recession set 
in, the Federal Republic, and in particular Schmidt, were central in creating a 
common Western response to overcome it. The same commitment to Western 
cooperation which featured in Bonn's policy aims in response to monetary 
difficulties and the oil crisis was also a key component in its approach to the 
1975 recession. This objective drove West German officials to advocate joint 
action, even when the traditional leader of the West, the United States, was 
initially opposed and led in part to the alignment of economic and monetary 
policies and the Rambouillet Summit. Having an even greater part in these 
latter developments, however, was strong leadership from Schmidt. 
As growth began to falter and unemployment began to rise in late 1974, 
Schmidt recognized that while continuing to fight inflation was important, so 
too was countering the slowing global economy. Using his economic authority 
and the perceived West German economic strength, Schmidt succeeded in 
convincing Ford to enact further stimulus measures. Once the 1975 recession 
had reached its full impact in summer 1975, Schmidt realized that it was a 
downturn unlike any before it and overcoming it required progress on the other 
two crises and political direction. After Washington made clear to Bonn in May 
1975 that America was uninterested in pursuing a multilateral response to the 
economic downturn, Schmidt took the lead. Working closely with Giscard, he 
first arranged for economic and monetary policy coordination among European 
states. Although Schmidt failed to convince the United States of the same, 
Schmidt did persuade the Ford administration that federal support was 
necessary to avoid New York City going bankrupt. 
Schmidt again collaborated with Giscard to come up with the idea for 
the Rambouillet Summit. After Giscard presented the G-5 heads of state and 
government meeting as primarily a conference to resolve differences in the 
monetary sector, rather than publicly rebuke the French president, Schmidt 
worked behind the scenes transforming the gathering into one focusing on the 
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problems of the international economic system. In the process, Schmidt 
managed to convince the United States, Britain and Japan - all skeptical of 
Giscard's original proposal - to attend the Rambouillet Summit. As Ford later 
noted, it was due to Schmidt's efforts that Washington was willing and able to 
participate in the 0-5 gathering. This was due not only to the expanded content 
of meeting, but also the manner in which Schmidt handled the talks around the 
summit. By orchestrating action, yet staying out of the spotlight, Schmidt 
avoided raising suspicions among Bonn's allies about its intentions and 
trustworthiness, as had been the case with Ostpolitik and the 1969 and 1971 
floating of the D-Mark. Moreover, it allowed the United States and France to 
save face domestically - crucial to both as each were restricted by domestic 
pressures - and in the case of the Rambouillet Summit, it bound both countries 
to the success of the conference. Had Schmidt not pushed for Washington to 
take at least the appearance of leadership on the first world economic summit, it 
is conceivable that America would have backed out of the conference when 
Giscard refused to invite Canada. 
Finally, Schmidt was also central to the success of the Rambouillet 
Summit. Although he would have preferred full agreement on all points 
discussed at the Rambouillet Summit, Schmidt understood the appearance of 
such was enough to revive confidence. Thus, he strongly pushed for a 
communique that presented this image, regardless of the actual results. In few 
months time, Schmidt's notion on confidence proved accurate, as confidence 
was recovering together with the Western economics. Moreover, Schmidt's 
efforts to bring the G-5 heads of state and government gathering into being and 
focused on questions of the international economy was essential to the G-5 
becoming the main forum for Western cooperation on economic issues. 
Recent works, such as those by Soell and von Karczewski, contribute 
significantly to the scholarship on West Germany's role in the creation of a 
Western response to the 1975 recession. 6 The detail in their books on the 
6 Johannes von Karczewski, "Weltwirtschaft ist unser Schicksal:" lIelmut Schmidt und die 
SchafJung der Weltwirtschaft (Bonn: Dietz, 2008); Hartmut Soell, Helmut Schmidt J 969 his 
heute: Macht und Verantwortung (Miinchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008). 
276 
development of the Rambouillet Summit and the proceedings corresponds 
closely to that put forward in this thesis. In addition, they reach similar 
conclusions about the key role Schmidt played in both. Yet, by primarily 
focusing on Rambouillet their analyses barely explore the interconnectedness of 
the three crises and this shapes - and to a degree limits - their interpretations of 
Bonn's impact on the West's response to the 1975 recession. While the 
Rambouillet Summit was essential to overcoming the 1975 recession, it was 
only one component in the West's response and of Schmidt's activities. As this 
thesis has shown, the Rambouillet Summit would most likely not have even 
taken place, had progress in response to monetary and energy problems not also 
occurred. 
The second conclusion of this thesis is that through its actions in 
response to these three crises, the Federal Republic was able to permanently 
elevate its political standing in the Western alliance. This came about because 
of three main factors: American, French and British economic and political 
weakness; the transformation of the institutional setting; and the shift of 
economics to the foreground of political debates and diplomatic relations. 
By the early 1970s, American economic strength was declining. 
Significant balance of payments and trade deficits and slowing growth coupled 
with perceived increasing strength of the EC led the Nixon administration to 
adopt expansionary measures, introduce its unilateral acts of 15 August 1971 
and pursue a policy of 'benign neglect.' As intended, these actions provided the 
United States with greater room to manoeuvre in domestic economic and 
political terms. Yet, these economic policy decisions, coupled with 
Washington's refusal to support the terms of the Smithsonian Agreement, its 
inflexibility in the C-20 negotiations, its initial response to the oil embargo and 
price hikes, its confrontational tone towards the oil producers, and its 
unwillingness to introduce further stimulus measures in 1975, severely 
weakened Europe's trust in the accuracy of its economic policies and ultimately 
American leadership on economic issues. During this period, American 
diplomatic efforts, such as the "Year of Europe" and arms reduction talks with 
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Moscow and its handling of the October War undennined European-American 
relations. A change of leadership in the four leading Western countries in 1974 
repaired some of the damage to the transatlantic relationship, but Washington 
still faced difficulties regaining its fonner political status because of the 
Watergate scandal and the subsequent weakness of the American presidency. 
Although the United States never complctcly lost its status as the 
Western economic and political hegemon, its relative economic and political 
weakness meant that Washington could not simply exert its economic or 
political might in order to guide the Western response to the crises. Nor given 
the interdependence of the Western economics and the Cold War context could 
the United States simply pursue its own course of action, particularly on energy. 
Rather, cooperation with its Western alliance partners, above all those in 
Europe, was necessary to overcome the economic challenges and maintain the 
political alliance. By 1975, as briefing books for the Rambouillet Summit show, 
even Washington was aware of the delicate position of its traditional leadership 
role and the need to work with Europe, especially on energy matters. 
To ensure such European coopcration though, Washington could not 
look to France as it had done in the run up to the Smithsonian Agreement or to 
its traditionally closest ally, Britain, as the relative economic and political might 
of both declined during this period. In rathcr quick succession through 1973 and 
early 1974, France lost its leadcrship role within Europe. With the collapse of 
Bretton Woods and the move to the European group float, the cornerstone of 
French arguments on monctary refonn, namely that fixed rates were essential 
for an ordcrly international economy, was undcnnined. This combined with the 
failure of EMU to advance to the second phase in early 1974 and France's exit 
from the European snake in January 1974 severely weakened Paris's authority 
in Europe on economic and monetary matters, as both the theoretical and 
institutional frameworks of their positions appeared unsound. France's doublc-
digit inflation in 1974 and its macroeconomic difficulties in 1975 did not help 
this situation. Paris lost political influence within the EC when the French-led 
European political position on energy failed to prevent a second oil price hike 
and lost even more political capital due to Jobert's antics at the WEC and 
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through the fizzling of the European political approach through summer 1974. 
Moreover, until 1975, the French-American relationship was highly 
acrimonious, only becoming more cordial with a change in leadership in both 
countries and the assistance of Schmidt. Suffering severe balance of payments 
problems as well as high inflation and unemployment rates after the 
quadrupling of oil prices, Britain's economic woes surpassed those of any 
Western state. Politically, London was also weakened, as first its 'special 
relationship' with America was strained due to Britain's focus on EC entry and 
integration processes, and later its relations with Europe were soured by its 
threats to leave the Community. 
In West Germany, plagued by neither similarly serious economic nor 
political difficulties, both the United States and Europe had a potential ally. By 
carefully balancing its economic and political policy aims, Bonn appeared a 
firm contributor to European integration efforts without permanently souring its 
relations with the United States. This also contributed to West Germany's 
ability to mediate between America and Europe. But unlike in the 1950s and 
1960s when Bonn frequently mediated between Washington and Paris, but 
hardly advanced its political role within the alliance, by the 1970s, this changed 
due to its economic position, leadership and specific aims. 
During this period, the Federal Republic's economic strength increased 
relative to its Western counterparts. Despite also suffering a downturn in 1975, 
after the increase in oil prices, West Germany actually managed to reduce its 
inflation rate and maintain balance of payments and trade surpluses. As 
highlighted previously this economic strength was used to great effect to sway 
the West's response to the economic crises. Moreover, West Germany had an 
able and willing leader in Schmidt. His economic knowledge mixed with the 
strong performance of the West German economy gave Schmidt authority on 
economic matters which in tum made his perspectives on the economic crises 
more respected by the other Western leaders. Such was evident in Schmidt's 
meetings with American officials in December 1974, May 1975, July 1975 and 
October 1975 in which Ford, Kissinger and members of the American Congress 
solicited Schmidt's advice on how to respond to the economic crises. Using 
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personal politics, Schmidt built good relationships with his Western 
counterparts, coming to be seen as an honest broker. Indeed, Schmidt's 
mediating skills proved crucial in the establishment of the Rambouillet Summit 
and the culmination of the Martinique Agreement. Schmidt was also willing to 
take the lead, as he did with regard to the Martinique Agreement, the 
Rambouillet Summit initiative, the coordination of economic and monetary 
policies in Europe in 1975 and the New York budget crisis. Important in each 
of these, however, was Schmidt's ability to balance his leadership drive with 
the right degree of public awareness of his personal efforts. 
Lastly, West Germany's influence grew because its specific approaches 
to the crises were often middle-of-the-road between American and French 
positions, but still beneficial to the Federal Republic. On monetary issues, while 
Bonn's thinking was more akin to the United States on "the link" and gold and 
more similar to that of France on issues of adjustment and asset settlement, 
West Gennany sat squarely in the middle on the exchange rate regime: satisfied 
with floating in the interim, but ultimately preferring the stability of a fixed 
exchange rate system. On energy issues, alongside America, the Federal 
Republic advocated consumer solidarity, but, like France, also sought a non-
confrontational dialogue with the oil producers as a means of influencing the 
price of oil. Finally, at the Rambouillet Summit Bonn hoped to settle 
outstanding monetary issues as did Paris, but also like Washington wanted to 
use the G-5 gathering to discuss the international economy and rebuild 
confidence. Thus, quite frequently, the compromise solution between French 
and American perspectives was the West Gennan position. Through this period 
then West Germany became the key link between the United States and Europe, 
enhancing its role within the Western alliance without significantly 
compromising its goals in the process. 
Another significant reason for the shift in the Federal Republic's 
political position within the alliance was the overhaul of the Western economic 
institutional structure during this period. Through it not only did the West have 
the means to deal with the changed economic dynamics of the capitalist world 
over the coming decades, including the growth of the capital markets, OPEC 
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control of oil supplies and prices and greater economic interdependence, but the 
Federal Republic also had the means to ensure its economic and political 
advancements. With the move to group floating in March 1973, the Federal 
Republic was granted greater freedom to maintain its Stabilitiitspolitik and freed 
from the onslaught of speculative flows due to dollar crises. In addition, 
because West Germany had entered into a group float with its closest trading 
partners in Europe, Bonn still enjoyed a substantial degree of trade stability. 
With the Jamaica Agreement and the creation of the "non-system" of monetary 
relations, this established framework changed little, as the floating order was 
legalized. While the Schmidt government's perspective on floating began to 
wane in the late 1970s, as Washington increasingly pressured Bonn to act as an 
economic "locomotive," within a few years, when the EC establishcd the 
European Monetary System (EMS), the overall economic benefits affordcd the 
Federal Republic from the reform of the monetary institutions were substantial. 
West Germany had both greater flexibility to achieve its Stabilitiitspolitik and 
relatively steady trade. Under this system, the Federal Republic had the 
framework to maintain or even enhance its economic strength, a key componcnt 
of its political might in the West. 
Of all the structural changes, having the greatest impact on the Federal 
Republic's political position in the Western alliance was the creation and 
institutionalization of the G-5 as the main forum for coordination of 
international economic policies at the highest levels. Given its exclusive 
membership - made up of the economically and politically most powerful 
Western states - where European states outnumbered non-European ones - and 
the fading of the IMF's role in the management of international economic 
relations, Bonn not only had a permanent seat in one of the most influential 
international economic organizations, but a relatively enhanced one thanks to 
its economic strength and the larger European contingent. In the informal G-5 
discussions, where progress was based greatly on personal relationships, 
Schmidt's leadership style ensured by-and-Iarge that the Federal Republic was 
able to seize on the opportunities afforded it. Only when Jimmy Carter became 
president did Bonn's approach falter, as the personalities of Schmidt and Carter 
clashed. 
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Yet, the lasting impact of Bonn's burgeoning leadership during the 
crises and the advantages offered to the Federal Republic from the institutional 
changes would have been short-lived had economics not moved to the fore of 
international political debates. Three factors were catalysts in this process: first, 
the severity of the macroeconomic difficulties forced Western leaders to take a 
greater interest in economic issues, rather than leave them to economic 
ministers and technicians. Second, the interdependence of national economies 
by the mid-1970s meant that Western states could not hope to overcome 
economic difficulties without the cooperation of its trading and political 
partners. Third, once the oil producers took control of oil prices, energy became 
a matter of economic security and international diplomacy. Schmidt recognized 
the growing interconnectedness of economics and international politics and 
encouraged his Western counterparts to be proactive. Solidifying the shift of 
economics into a matter of high politics and international relations were the 
continuing economic problems, including the macroeconomic difficulties of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the second oil crisis and the increased trade with the 
Eastern bloc. Finally, after the Jamaica Agreement, the markets came to play an 
ever greater role in the international economy: while some Western countries 
were content to take a more laissez-faire attitude to this development, others 
were not. Thus, the processes of globalization also became part of the 
discussions of Western leaders. 
The conclusions put forth in this thesis add to the existing literature on 
both the individual aspects contributing to the shift in the West German 
political position within the alliance and to the broader understanding of the 
history of West Germany and the Western alliance. To the analyses on the 
changing role of American hegemonic economic and political power during this 
period, this thesis shows that the United States was aware of the precarious 
nature of its position and sought in particular the assistance of the Federal 
Republic to maintain it.7 The Federal Republic replied to this call not just with 
7 Examples are David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982); Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money: the Role of Hegemony and 
International Monetary Order (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1991); Robert O. Keohane and 
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economic, but also political support, mediating between Washington and Paris. 
Among the many works on European integration, the benefits Bonn accrued 
from the failure of Ee efforts in 1973/1974 are rarely noted: yet, through them, 
an opportunity for greater leadership within the West opened for West 
Germany, as France's traditional role was undcrmined. 8 This thesis goes 
beyond the existing scholarship on the structural changes in the early 1970s too. 
So far the economic benefits afforded the Federal Republic through the 
introduction of floating exchange rates have been noted, but the connection to 
political advancement have not. 9 In emerging scholarship on the G-5, a 
connection between international diplomacy and the G-5 is recognized, but with 
a different focus and hence conclusions than offered here. lo This thesis 
advances James's claim about the important role the politicalization of 
economics played in the outcome of the reordering of the monetary system and 
the 1975 recession, showing specifically its centrality to the Western response 
to these crises as well as the oil crisis. II Finally, my argument supports recent 
works which stress Schmidt's influence on the economic crises. 12 Indeed, 
Schmidt's leadership style was peculiarly well-suited to the economic 
challenges of the period. It is hard to imagine that a similar outcome would 
have occurred had Brandt - idealistic and more interested in security affairs and 
East-West relations - remained chancellor. 
Yet, Schmidt cannot be given all the credit. Rather, as this thesis has 
shown, the interplay between Schmidt's savvy political leadership, economic 
strength and the sheer opportunity for change created by the emergence of 
economics to the fore and the relative economic and political weakness of 
America, France and Great Britain led to an enhanced role for the Federal 
Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Daniel Sargent, 
"From Internationalism to Globalism: The United States and the Transformation of 
International Politics in the 1970s," (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2009). 
8 Examples are Tsoukalis, Loukas. The Politics and Economics of European Monetary 
Integration. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1977; Kaelberer, Matthias. Money and 
Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2001; Mockli. 
9 See Otmar Emminger, D-Mark, Dollar, Wiihrungskrisen: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen 
Bundesbankpriisidenten (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1986). 
10 ' Examples are Soe\1 and von Karczewski. 
11 James, 264-66. 
12 Above all Soell's arguments. 
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Republic in the Western alliance. Contrary to the story put forward in broader 
works on West German history, this process of political transformation was not 
restricted to monetary issues and began long before the economic difficulties of 
the late 1970s or the development of EMS.13 Indeed, it was intrinsic to it, 
setting the precedent for a coordinated Western response to economic problems 
and of strong West German leadership in them and establishing the economic 
conditions and political relationships which were essential to the creation of 
EMS. Building on the study undcrtaken by William Gray in relation to the 
collapse of Bretton Woods, this thesis also shows the dcgree to which 
throughout these crises West Germany was tom between its European and 
global commitments. 14 Lastly this thesis begins to tell the international political 
economic dimension of the history of the Western alliance, a history which by-
and-large has been overshadowed in the history of the Western alliance by 
political and defense-orientated studies and is only now beginning to emerge. IS 
In it, the actions of the Federal Republic are prominent and Bonn's place within 
the Western alliance has only continued to increase after 1976. 
\3 Wolfram lIanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Helga Haftendom, Coming of Age: West German 
Foreign Policy since 1945 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006). 
14 William G. Gray, "Towards a 'Community of Stability'? The Deutsche Mark between 
European and Atlantic Priorities, 1968-1973," in The Strained Alliance, 145-168. 
IS See ibid.; Hubert Zimmermann, "Unraveling the Ties That Really Bind: The Dissolution of 
the Transatlantic Monetary Order and European Monetary Cooperation, 1965-1973," in The 
Strained Alliance, 125-144; Gray, "Floating the System." 
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